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**Defense Reorganization: A view from the House  
Archie D. Barrett**

**Guest Presentations, Spring 1987**

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## Defense Reorganization: A View from the House

Archie D. Barrett

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**Oettinger:** Today we'll be hearing about the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. Last week we heard from Jim Locher about the Senate side. Today we'll hear about the House of Representatives. It is a great pleasure to have with us again Arch Barrett, who talked to us at a time when the law was "a gleam in the eye." It is now half a year old and with the beginnings of some possibilities for review. You have seen Arch Barrett's biography. You know what the subject is, so I don't need to say anything further other than that he has his presentation in some segments, and I think would prefer not to be interrupted in each segment. At the end of each he'll entertain questions on that and then move on to the next one. Sir, it's all yours.

**Barrett:** Thank you very much for having me here again. I want to make some opening remarks before we proceed. I want to tell you a little bit about the House Armed Services Committee. Some of the things I say later on will be more understandable if you know a little bit about the committee.

We have 52 members of the House on the committee. That's a lot of congressmen. Thirty-one Democrats and 21 Republicans. The committee has a professional staff of 44. We do not have a minor-

ity staff on the House Armed Services Committee; it is, I believe, the only major committee in the Congress that does not have majority and minority staffs. That stems from, perhaps, bygone days when we considered foreign policy and defense policy something that could be approached in a bipartisan manner.

The committee oversees defense policy in general. It authorizes the defense budget. It oversees the execution of the budget. It has all sorts of interests beyond resource allocation. It deals with research and development, procurement, military personnel, arms control issues — it shares that, of course, with other committees — strategic weapons and conventional weapons, alliances and foreign military aid, and on and on.

I compare the Armed Services Committee and probably the other legislative committees, to "Bagehot's buckle."\* He used that analogy when he was writing about how legislatures are connected to the executive in a parliamentary system through the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. In our system that analogy really holds for a committee like the

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\*Walter Bagehot, *The English Constitution*, 1867.

Armed Services Committee that links the Department of Defense with the entire House of Representatives. It tends to be, and I think rightly, the committee that presents the case for a strong defense to the House. That's changing over time. In the past the committee has been accused of rubber stamping the Pentagon budget, always pushing for a stronger defense. Rightly or wrongly, that's been the allegation. What's changing now, very rapidly, is the rubber stamp. Under Chairman Les Aspin the committee has developed a questioning attitude. But the committee remains very much in the mold of a body that brings the proponency of a strong national defense to the Congress.

Now the last thing I wanted to mention in the introduction is the authority of the Congress. A lot of times — in this bill that I'm going to talk about, and as a whole — Congress is criticized for micro-management. That has some validity. But it always troubles me when I'm speaking to a military audience when this issue is brought up, particularly if the speaker hasn't thought out his position. There's absolutely no question that the committee and the Congress have the authority and the right to get into anything they want to in the Department of Defense, to the degree of specificity that they want to.

The Constitution has one sentence about the President and the military. It says he's the Commander in Chief, and that's all. There are some historians who would point out that that was included so that there would be no question that the President has control of the militia of the several states, not as a grand idea about generalship in war. Nevertheless, I'm not disputing that "Commander in Chief" is a much broader concept today than it was then. The point is that the Constitution, with respect to Congress and the military, goes on, and on, and on — sentence after sentence — about what the Congress' power is: "The Congress shall have the power to declare war, and make rules concerning captures on land and water, raise and support armies, provide

and maintain a navy, and make rules for the government, and regulations of the land and naval forces. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions. To provide for organizing armies, and disciplining the militia." Plus, of course, Congress authorizes and appropriates the resources of the Defense Department.

The distinction that must be made is that when you discuss congressional micromanagement or congressional meddling, you need, particularly if you are in the military, to understand that you're talking about a normative subject — what is prudent — and not a legal subject. I think people frequently misunderstand that. I often caution audiences to make the distinction between what they think Congress ought to do and what Congress legally can do.

These remarks apply very much to what we're going to talk about today because the Congress certainly has dealt with the Department of Defense organization in great detail in the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Bill. These (figure 1) are the general subjects I'll talk about. I've been asked to provide a sort of a "how goes it, where are we now," before concluding my remarks. I want to save plenty of time for that. Because Jim Locher has been here, a lot of this will be familiar to you.

First of all, a critique of the Department of Defense organization must, I think, start with at least understanding two ideas that came out of World War II. One obviously was that we're going to integrate our armed forces in some fashion so that they will fight as a team in the future. The other was the opposite of that. We could call it "disintegration," I suppose. The services had always been separate and independent and wanted to maintain that independence. From these independent services had to come some sort of an integrated overall Department of Defense.

- **Critique of Defense Department Organization**
- **Events Leading to 1986 Reorganization Act**
- **Principal Provisions of the Reorganization Act**

**Figure 1. Seminar Agenda**

The “disintegration” (continuing of the status quo) theme was carried most prominently by the Navy Department, both the Marines and the Navy. The Navy was afraid that in any integration scheme it would lose its air arm to the emerging Air Force. The Marines were afraid that they would be absorbed by the Army. I think these concerns were legitimate. In any case, there was a real push to retain the identity of the services.


On the other hand, the “integrationists” felt that we just couldn’t fight a war in the future the way we fought in World War II. The best example of this position is the Eisenhower quotation in his letter to Congress in 1958 proposing changes — the fourth round of defense organization changes, by the way — in which he said:

Separate ground, sea, and air warfares are gone forever. If again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements with all services as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified. Combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service.

Marshall said much the same thing.

Question. How do you organize three “disintegrated” military departments and four services, and yet have an integrated — joint, unified — fighting force? Well, I could answer, hailing from Congress, one way you do it is to say you’re going to do it, and then legislate it. And they did! In the National Security Act of 1947, in the declaration of policy, Congress says, “In enacting this legislation it is the intent of Congress,” — and here are the two conflicting points, all in one paragraph — “to provide a Department of Defense, including three military departments, to provide that each military department shall be separately organized under its own secretary.” There’s the disintegration theme. And down further it says, “To provide for the unified, strategic direction of the combatant forces, for their operation under unified command, and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.” So the two conflicting themes are embedded, from 1947 on, in the National Security Act. (I should say from the 1947 Act, as amended. It was worded a little bit differently in 1947. What I just read to you were the words that survived after the 1958 revision.)

The organizational concept that evolved in the law with the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, and subsequent changes sponsored by Truman, Eisenhower, DOD officials, and various congressmen, is best depicted here (figure 2).



**Figure 2. Legislative Organization Model, DOD, 1958–1986**

The Secretary of Defense is given overall authority, direction, and control. When Congress put those words in the law in 1958, the report said that Congress received continuing complaints from the Secretary of Defense that he doesn't have enough power. So Congress gave him authority, direction, and control. The report indicated that Congress would have added a lot of other things if it could figure out anything to say to make the Secretary stronger. Congress meant for the Secretary of Defense to run the Department.

Military departments are the input side. They organize, train, and prepare forces for war.

The output side is the war-fighting side, the joint commands — unified and specified — the organizations that Eisenhower was talking about. The input will be separate. The output will be integrated. Combinations of forces from four services will be prepared to fight and they will fight wars if necessary. The commands I'm talking about are the European command, the Pacific command. Commands like that are unified. The specified commands are those such as the Strategic Air Command (SAC), the North American Aerospace Defense Command, and the Military Airlift Command (MAC).

Each of the unified commands has components that were established as a result of the National Security Act law, but not required by it. In Europe we have the U.S. Air Forces, Europe; the U.S. Army, Europe; and the U.S. Navy, Europe. They come under the unified commander, and they're supposed to fight as one force under that unified commander. But, in fact, on a day-to-day basis they're Air Force commands, Army commands, and Navy commands. In effect, they're little armies, air forces, and navies. They have their own support, they fly their own training missions in the Air Force and run their own exercises in the Army.

Notice that there's a line (figure 2) from the services over to these commands. It doesn't link with the unified commander. The line is meant to go down to the component commands, and that means that the services are responsible for administration and support of those commands.

Above the unified commands we have unified overall direction for planning; that's the Joint Chiefs of Staff, responsible for military advice and coordinating military planning.

Let me just digress for a minute and indicate that this is probably not the model you would draw if you were asked to draw a military command structure under civilian control. You would put the

President and/or the Secretary of Defense on top, and you'd probably have under that a Chief of Staff for the Armed Forces, and the staff that supports him. Under that you would probably have Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines; then under that the subunits. You would, I believe, draw some sort of a hierarchical structure like that. The structure's not bad at all. It provides for civilian control right at the top and combines maintaining and employment functions. Contrast the rationalized hierarchical structure with the National Security Act model. There are two chains of command there. The model divides authority in that manner between the maintaining and employment functions. The point is that the legislative model is a little bit different than what you would depict if you were just drawing from a tabula rasa. It's important to keep that in mind when you see the way things really work.

I'll give you an example of how the actual model worked out in the Lebanon crisis when the Marine Headquarters was attacked by terrorists. Immediately after the bombing, General Kelley\* went to Lebanon. But note that General Kelley is on the military department side of the DOD organization. He's not on the employment side at all. I don't know whether he got there before anybody who was on the employment side. But he got there very fast. And the papers, as you will recall, played up General Kelley's visit. General Kelley was visibly shaken by the whole thing. A few days later he came back to the United States, and he had the most up-to-date information of any senior leader in the United States.

The House Armed Services Committee asked him to come before the committee, and he did. It was televised over the entire United States. He gave testimony and answered questions about this disaster. Thus the Congress and the public associate General Kelley, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, with the tragedy that happened in Beirut. I'm not saying you shouldn't associate him with it, but I'm saying it leads to some confusion if you think about the chains of authority and responsibility.

What's wrong with the legislative model? The idea is that the services recruit, train, and equip, and the theater commanders employ. It reconciles disintegration with integration, at least in theory. What's wrong is that the slide depicts the legislative approach, *de jure*, but not how it actually works. The services have never been content with merely maintaining forces, preparing them for combat, and

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\*General P. X. Kelley, Former Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps.

then turning them over to integrated, unified commands. They've attempted — successfully — to dominate the employment side of the organization.

That brings us back to General Kelley. I think, in fact, he was much more than this (the role depicted in the "maintaining" service side of the organization). He was much more in contact with those Marines in Beirut. He felt their tragedy much more strongly than if he had just prepared them for long-term employment by a unified commander. He went to Beirut on the spot, because he was much closer to being their commandant than perhaps a reading of the law would indicate. However, when he was questioned on this issue by the Armed Services Committee, he rightly pointed out that he was not a part of the chain of command; he was not a part of the chain of authority. He was not trying to skirt his responsibilities — don't get me wrong — he pointed out his position correctly. He understood.

I think, though, that if you read that testimony, you will find a lot of the congressmen didn't understand it. They associated him with the chain of command. I can see their point of view, too. Kelley had gone and come back, and was sitting before the committee, and he was on TV before the American public. So the de facto organization leads to a lot of confusion.

The organizational arrangements lend themselves, in other words, to allowing the services to dominate more than, I think, an objective reading of the law would support. Let's just take a look at the unified and specified commanders. They come from the services. They go back to the services. Their promotions hinge on the services. It was very difficult, for example, to get the unified commanders to testify on the reorganization legislation, because the services were very much opposed to the legislation. Despite the fact that the legislation would benefit these commanders, most wanted no part of going on record with regard to these controversial issues.

Yet we found their command prerogatives were very, very limited. If you think about what a unified commander, or a military commander, must deal with, and what authority he should have, and if I asked you to put them down on a piece of paper, I think you would be surprised when you compared your piece of paper with the reality of the unified commanders' authority. The commanders had very limited authority over the selection or the firing of their subordinates. They had no court martial authority over their subordinates. They had very little authority to reorganize their subordinate commands, the component commands I mentioned ear-

lier. They had very limited authority over the chain of command, and rearranging the chain of command below them. By law they were prohibited from exercising authority over the support chain that came from the services. They were severely limited in the area of administration. They were limited in the area of training. They had no budgetary resources, and, as you know, budget equals clout in the Pentagon. And, even in time of war, if you read their governing directives carefully, you wonder whether they would really have had complete authority over how to employ forces under them in order to win. They were very, very weak. Yet these are the commanders the United States would depend upon for its survival if there were a war.

Component commanders, under the unified commanders, on the other hand, had vast authority. They had all of the things that the unified commander didn't have. When I said the CINCs were limited, I meant they were limited because the component commanders had these things. General Jones, when he came before the Investigations Subcommittee, said that when he was a component commander in Europe, the head of U.S. Air Forces, Europe, he got everything from the Air Force — his airplanes, his people, their promotions, their pay. Everything came through the U.S. Air Force channel. On a day-to-day basis he did all of his training based upon Air Force directives. He said that his attention was not so much to the CINC above him as to the Air Force — 90 percent of the time. The services dominated the unified commands.

Go up to the next circle up there on the figure, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff. Of course the Joint Chiefs of Staff are shown on that side, on the joint side, supposedly to provide overall national defense perspective. But where did they come from? They're the chiefs of the services. So they have dual hats. In this organization they were asked to be the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. They were asked to provide military advice on issues that would at many times, in many cases, be contrary to their services' interests. They found themselves unable to do it. As a matter of fact, if you think about it, it may be beyond the capacity of any individual to do that.

For example, if the Chief of Naval Operations this year has worked for 18 months on a Navy budget and he and the entire Navy behind him decide that service needs two carriers in the budget for next year, it's a little bit unrealistic to expect him to come over to the Joint Chiefs of Staff arena one

afternoon and agree to the following proposition put to him by the other Chiefs: "Look, we're not going to get \$312 billion. We're only going to get \$287 billion. So we're all going to have to cut back. How about giving up a carrier?" Well, it just doesn't happen that way. They've not been able to do those sorts of trade-offs. As a result, they're unable to provide military advice on many of the very fundamental military issues:

- Roles and missions of the services haven't been looked at since 1948, the Key West Agreement, despite all of the changes since that time.
- Joint doctrine is not really joint at all. It is developed by the services. It covers certain military missions which fall in the cracks between the services.

Often there are orphan missions — like close air support, an Air Force mission supporting the Army, or sealift, a Navy mission to transport the Army to war. Our Army might not show up for a war because we don't have enough sealift for its weapons and equipment. The same thing can be said about airlift; it's supposed to transport Army support forces during a war. These missions are just not close to the heart of the services. But they're very close to the heart of the unified commanders. They're the kinds of missions that they would support, and support very strongly. The JCS hasn't been able to deal with them. Special operations is a current case in point. Congress took the bull by the horns last year as a result of insufficient progress in the Department of Defense.

Perhaps most important of all is resource allocation. The JCS was uniformly perceived as not being a factor in resource allocation decisions, which perhaps in peacetime are the most fundamental of all military issues.

The Joint Staff which is depicted under the Joint Chiefs of Staff is criticized because it's a cypher for the services; it's sort of a secretariat for the services. The staff people come from the services, and go back to the services. The procedures that have been laid down by the Joint Chiefs of Staff cause any staff paper to go to four or five levels before it gets to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If any service at any level objects to the Joint Staff paper, it goes to the next level. In effect each service has veto power in developing the content of any advice rendered.

Military advice is a major shortcoming of the JCS. I have some quotations on slides to indicate that this is an opinion held by many, many people. Maybe it would be best if I read them. This is by Kissinger who says:

The inevitable and natural concern of the service chiefs — with their competitive and often mutually exclusive mandates — is the future of their services which depends upon their share of the budget. Their incentive is more to enhance the weapons they have under their exclusive control than to plan overall defense policy.

Zbigniew Brzezinski: a similar type of quotation. I present both of these slides because one of these quoted served a Republican President; the other, a Democratic President.

My own experience in the White House, working closely with President Carter, was that our military establishment has become, over time, increasingly unresponsive either to the pressing threats to our national security or to effective presidential direction.

Former Secretary of Defense Brown:

Recommendations from the JCS during four years were almost without exception either not useful or the reverse of being helpful. That is, worse than nothing.

Former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger:

The proffered advice is generally irrelevant, normally unread, and most always disregarded. The ultimate result is that decisions regarding the level of expenditures and the design of forces are made by civilians outside the military structure.

The Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report, which was published, I think, in early 1985, was endorsed by six former Secretaries of Defense.\* One of the quotations (figure 3) indicates that the quality of military advice needs to be improved.

General Lymon Limnitzer, a former JCS Chairman, who was a critic and an opponent of reform, nevertheless included in his testimony this statement:

I have always felt that many of the previous shortcomings in the JCS resulted from issues remaining undecided for far longer periods than they should by engaging in endless and useless arguments in order to get unanimous agreement.

Those are not all quotations from the Investigations Subcommittee testimony. Some are from the testimony; some are from other documents. But they indicate the tenor of the thinking about the

\**Toward a More Effective Defense: The Final Report of the CSIS Defense Organization Project.* Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1985.



JCS. Most of those people were above the JCS in the sense that they were people who received the advice of the JCS. We say that the JCS is the principal military adviser to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. I've just shown you what some people at the highest levels think about the advice they received. Their quotations are a strong indictment.

Other criticisms of the system involve military planning, the chain of command, and military operations. In some cases every service wants a piece of the action whether the prospective operation justifies it or not. I think the attempted Iranian hostage rescue probably shows that, although the Holloway Commission exonerated the military on that score. I don't think much of that Commission's report. Ask yourself, "Would the rescue effort have been carried out as it was if there hadn't been a JCS, with each service equally represented, planning the operation?" I think the answer is no. Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger sums up his criticism as follows:

The existing situation does impede planning, for each service quite naturally wishes a piece of the action in any crisis — and the existing structure assures that all somehow will be fitted in, even if a service provides less than optimal forces for dealing with a particular crisis.

The Investigations Subcommittee found that the chain of command to the Marines in Lebanon extended from the President to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Mons, Belgium, where the European CINC is located, but actually his headquarters was in Stuttgart, Germany, so, in effect, it went to both of those places. Then it went to the Navy commander in Europe, who was located in Naples, but his headquarters was in London, so it went to both of those places. Finally, from there, it went to the ships at sea, the Sixth Fleet. From the Sixth Fleet it went to the amphibious task force commander, and from him, finally, to Colonel Geraghty on the ground. The subcommittee found that it was almost like playing telephone. By the time communications got to Geraghty some things had gotten garbled. Going up the chain from Geraghty, it was the same way.

The chain of command was not changed, even after the bombing (until just before the Marines left Lebanon). There are a lot of reasons for that. If you read the hearings which the subcommittee published on the Lebanon investigation, you will find that the European commander did not want to interfere with the chain of command. He did not want to interfere with Colonel Geraghty's operation. I think the explanation is found in General Cushman's book in which he discussed the wall of separation between

**BY IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF MILITARY ADVICE, STRONGER  
JOINT MILITARY INSTITUTIONS SHOULD REINFORCE, NOT USURP, THE ABILITY  
OF CIVILIAN LEADERS TO MANAGE THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.**

**HAROLD BROWN**  
Secretary of Defense (1977 - 1981)

**ROBERT S. McNAMARA**  
Secretary of Defense (1961 - 1968)

**CLARK M. CLIFFORD**  
Secretary of Defense (1968 - 1969)

**ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON**  
Secretary of Defense (1973)

**MELVIN R. LAIRD**  
Secretary of Defense (1969 - 1973)

**JAMES R. SCHLESINGER**  
Secretary of Defense (1973 - 1975)

**Figure 3. A Call for Change**



the components and the unified commander, and a natural antipathy to interfering.\* If you read those Lebanon hearings you'll find that General Rogers, the European commander, explains Cushman's point very well. He mentions his 30 years in the military — the fact that he was a battalion commander something like 20 or 25 years ago — and states that he just didn't want to move into the area of unit command. As a result, our chain of command remained serpentine. You should note that in that chain of command there were officers of every service. For example, General Rogers' deputy at the European Command was an Air Force four-star general. Below him was the Navy component commander. There was a Marine, of course, on the ground. Rogers, CINCEUR, was Army. To cut someone out of that chain of command might be considered breaching the wall of separation of the components.

In Vietnam the United States never created a unified command. The Army did propose it. The United States put 500,000 troops on the ground in Vietnam. But, of course, the JCS was against it because that would have meant cutting out a part of the unified Pacific Command (headed by an admiral) and creating another unified commander. Instead, the United States had two chains of command, to Vietnam: one through the Pacific Commander (CINCPAC), and another direct from Washington. That was because the war really couldn't be run by going through CINCPAC.

**Student:** You don't consider MACV (Military Airlift Command, Vietnam) a unified command? I know it wasn't named a unified command, but it was a joint command.

**Barrett:** No, I don't, because the Pacific commander continued to insist throughout that war that the orders went through him. The direct link to MACV, although it was established, was an informal one.

**Student:** Well, could it be considered a sub-unified command, such as Armed Forces-Korea?

**Barrett:** It could have been. But the question is should it? Should we have had two chains of command? With 500,000 troops, and with all the action right there, not in Hawaii?

**McLaughlin:** More to the point, though, was that MACV also did not have control over those SAC

B-52 missions. He didn't have control of the Navy operations off Yankee Station, he didn't control ...

**Barrett:** Exactly right, and that was my next point. The United States had four chains of air command. Two from the Pacific commander: one to the Navy in the Gulf of Tonkin; and one to the Air Force in Thailand. Some Air Force forces were assigned, in country, to the Vietnam command. Then we had B-52s that were commanded through SAC headquarters.

**Student:** Five. You forgot the Marines.

**Barrett:** Okay.

**Oettinger:** In Korea, contemporaneously — we're not at war there — you have a very similar situation, alleviated only by virtue of the extremely complicated, obscure, but effective process of multi-hatting. The worst effects of that are mitigated because although they're all in this damn chain, by and large they've managed to arrange it that most of these multiple chains pass through one head.

**Student:** The last time I counted them, CINCPAC — Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea — whatever you want to call it, had seven hats.

**Oettinger:** It looks ridiculous except if you see it in the context of Archie's remarks. It's a way of alleviating what otherwise would be a totally impossible situation.

**Barrett:** The last example, Grenada. It was obviously a successful operation. But there have been any number of criticisms. Communications. I don't want to get into whether the communications gear was right or not. The point is that there had not been sufficient joint training and joint exercises so that the Air Force and the Army could work together. In another case, Army helicopters wanted to land on Navy carriers; they had wounded aboard. The press has criticized the Navy for not letting them land. The Navy did exactly the right thing. It's a very dangerous operation, particularly at night. The Army pilot could have not only killed the people in the helicopter, but also done a lot of damage to the ship. The point is that Army helicopter pilots were not qualified to land on Navy ships. There had not been joint exercises and joint training so that that could take place. Another example, naval gunfire was never able to come to the support of the Army; certainly not in the first stages. The problem is a lack of joint training and preparation so that our forces can fight a war as an integrated team of land, sea, and air forces. All of these things point that out.

\*LTG John H. Cushman, USA (Ret.), *Command and Control of Theater Forces: The Korea Command and Other Cases*. Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1986.

The bottom line, then, from this long critique is that the real organization, the de facto organization of the Department of Defense, is something like what I have depicted in figure 4. The services dominate not just the input side, but also the output side. They dominate the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the component commands; they have significant influence over the unified commands. As a result, decisions that are made in the Department of Defense have been made on the basis of conflicts between the services and the civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The subcommittee found other criticisms of DOD organization. For years there have been criticisms of the military department headquarters. There's a Secretary in each headquarters, with around 250 to 300

people serving him in the Army and the Air Force; 800 in the Navy. On the military headquarters staffs, there are 10 times that number in the Army and the Air Force, roughly 3,000; in the Navy, 2,500. Each one of those staffs will have something like a research and development office. There is a research and development office, for example, in the uniformed Navy headquarters, and a research and development office in the Navy secretariat. In the Office of the Secretary of Defense there is also a research and development office. Many sages have said, "You don't need three management headquarters staffs with the same function. You can get along with two. One should be cut out." There have been a lot of recommendations for consolidating these offices.




Figure 4. Department of Defense Organization as Portrayed by Critics

The subcommittee was also concerned when it looked at the defense agencies. The defense agencies are in a way analogous to the services in that they're maintaining, or input, organizations. The subcommittee was concerned that the agencies were not sufficiently responsive to the output organizations which many of them would have to serve in wartime. For example, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense Communications Agency, the Defense Mapping Agency, and the Defense Logistics Agency would be responsible for direct wartime support. Are they ready enough? Do they participate in joint exercises? Are they sufficiently responsive to the unified and specified commands? Those are the sorts of questions that have been asked. The subcommittee did not think they have been sufficiently responsive to the employment side.

With respect to personnel policies, the subcommittee found that the joint side suffered. I mentioned that the Joint Staff is more a cypher or secretariat for the services. The officers who work there go back to their services. There were many indications that they weren't well trained in joint matters before they went to the joint side. They had very little, if any, experience in staff work, much less Joint Staff work, before they went to the joint side. The experience level on the joint side stayed low because they never came back. If a joint officer took a position that was contrary to his service, he was very likely to be penalized in his career in terms of promotions, and his career assignments would be as bad as his promotion prospects.

**Student:** Did you find actual evidence of that? On what are those assertions based?

**Barrett:** Yes, we did. In the hearings from last year that have just come out in the last couple of months you'll find Admiral Train and Admiral Hansen speaking to those issues. Admiral Train said very frankly that he had intimidated joint officers. He called them to his office when he was on the Navy staff and intimidated them so they would change their position, or so they certainly knew what the "Navy position" was.

**Student:** A perpetrator of this, actually.

**Barrett:** Admiral Train, by the way, is a strong supporter of change and came before us as a supporter, but he did acknowledge that. Admiral Hansen had been on the other end of that sort of treatment and he talked about it also. And I suspect that if you look at Admiral Train's testimony, he's trying to say it's a fairly common thing.

That's as far as I want to go right now. If you want to stop for a little while and ask some questions this is a good breaking point. This is the end of the critique of the old organization.

Next, I'm going to talk about how Congress changed the law.

**Oettinger:** To the extent that there were differences in the critique between the House and the Senate, could you characterize those or was the assessment pretty much the same? Were there fundamental differences in perception? That shades into another question, were there folks on the military side who, like Admiral Train, wouldn't own up to there being difficulties? What would be their main argument in terms of, "It ain't broke so don't fix it?" Could you address those two aspects of your diagnosis?

**Barrett:** With respect to the first part, let's keep that in mind as I go through the story on how the legislation came about. There weren't major differences in the end between the House and the Senate, but what happened actually is that one paced the other at different times in an interesting way. The Act is much stronger, I think, than either House would have passed in the absence of interest from the other side of the Hill.

**Oettinger:** What about the Defense Department opposition? If it composited the most eloquent statement that says, "This is nonsense, we're doing fine," what would be the justification for not revising the law?

**Barrett:** I suppose, John Lehman's\* statement that interservice rivalry is something that we have in Washington but you don't find it out in the field. Also, Admiral Tom Moorer's\*\* statement that there may be some problems but it's certainly within the realm of the possible for the civilians and the military in the Pentagon to take care of those problems. To a large degree that's a valid observation and statement; that the power was in the Pentagon to take care of many, many of the problems. (Acknowledging that there are some problems, however, he would never acknowledge the degree of problems that I've tried to lay out.) But it's well within the powers of civilians in the Executive Branch to take care of many of those problems.

Other justifications for not revising the law: the claims that joint officers are protected; there's no intimidation. That the military departments do need those multiple levels of management; that apparent

\*Former Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman.

\*\*Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN (Ret.).

functional duplication — for example, R&D officers at each level — is more apparent than real, because they do different things; one level oversees, the other one carries out.

**Student:** What was the straw that broke the camel's back, if you will? Many of these things that you describe have been going on for quite a while. It's been written about for an awfully long time by people outside, in academia, as well as by other folks who work close to the subject. Was it something like General Jones writing, in 1982, an article about some of the problems he'd been facing?

**Barrett:** That's the next part I want to go to. I'm going to try to answer that question in part. But I can't give a definitive answer. I'm just going to discuss the very things that you point out and give several partial answers.

The paradoxical question is, Why did Congress reorganize in the 1980s when all of a sudden, after the doldrums of the 1970s, a lot of public support for the military finally emerged? At the same time as public support grows, why does Congress come along with the most far-reaching reorganization since 1958?

**Student:** Did the 1970s investigations of the intelligence community play a part in all this? Was the impetus already there? After Congress investigated and reorganized the intelligence community maybe it felt it could deal with a large issue area. Did that transfer at all to this DOD area?

**Barrett:** It's a good point. It's not a part of my explanation. I hadn't thought of that. You mean that Congress felt that it could handle this large a task? I don't know; maybe. It wasn't a part of the thinking of members that I dealt with.

**Oettinger:** I wanted to return to John Lehman's statement about interservice rivalry existing in Washington, but not in the field. It seems to me that you can look at Iran, or *Mayaguez*, or Grenada, a whole series of incidents, and say, "It ain't so in practice." Maybe after four years of war in the Pacific everybody gets it together, but when you had a crisis, the fact is that things got screwed up. Mostly they got screwed up because of interservice lack of coordination. That must have impinged on some folks.

My second observation is more personal. Over the last couple of decades you have an increasing amount of spending, particularly in the last decade, on various tools of interservice command and control having to do with strategic, and theater, and so on, where palpably the preparation, which is the

mission of the service, didn't work. The technical stuff might have worked, but when push came to shove they weren't in place to do anything with it. That certainly was increasingly felt among people who were worrying about the effective use of the technology. Doctrine, archaic service-centered doctrine, precluded the effective use of a lot of expensive technology.

What I'd be interested in is whether that's a narrow parochial perception, or whether, in fact, along with other factors, these were things that had surfaced in the consciousness of Goldwater, or Nichols, or any of the other staff or principals involved in the hearings?

**Barrett:** Yes. As you just pointed out, all of these critiques have been around since World War II. What's not around is a solution.

What's around is a critique. The critique I've tried to give you today uses up-to-date examples. But the critique is a general critique. You'll find it in my book.\* My book is slavishly based upon previous studies. I just bring them forth in there in a sort of formalized, regularized manner, all the critiques that have been made. They're all there.

**Student:** I was thinking of your book when I mentioned that. You started with a model of how the defense establishment actually works, and how (theoretically) it is constructed. My question is, did you look at any other alternative models, real-world models, such as the British general staff system, or how the Germans do things, or how the Chinese do things? Did you look at anybody else to see if, one, is this phenomenon strictly American, or two, are there better ways of doing things somewhere else, before you design legislation?

**Barrett:** No, we didn't do a great deal of comparative analysis at all. The subcommittee tried to take that model that I've already shown you, the *de jure* model that has existed since at least 1958, and flesh it out, make it work.

There are many other ways to go about it. I hear all the time, "Why didn't you create a general staff? Why didn't you do this or do that?" Congress stayed within the model, more or less, I think.

**Student:** Why?

**Barrett:** I think the answer to that is that the subcommittee went about as far as it could go. There's not going to be much support to do more. If you read my book you'll see that although it's a scathing critique (based upon previous scathing critiques), I

\*Archie D. Barrett, *Reappraising Defense Organization*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1983.

only offer one or two legislative recommendations. Most of these problems can be taken care of within the Pentagon. I said at the beginning of the book, in effect, that what I'm going to try to do here is lay out things that are politically acceptable, that stay within the bounds of the politically feasible. I'm not going to start with a tabula rasa and sketch an ideal organization. I'd like to have an impact.

I'm not denigrating the other way — thinking about the ideal. I have also said, and I would say now, that certainly we need people to think about what the ideal would be. But that was not my interest. My interest was to take what I thought were the political boundaries and set out reforms based upon all of these studies that could be undertaken with some prospect of near-term success. In other words, to go from the critique to the solution that was available within the political bounds.

Now what happened? I started out that way (modest reform measures) in 1982 when I was assigned to the reorganization issue by the Armed Services Committee. But as time went on, as I'll explain, the political boundaries expanded, and expanded, and expanded. And all of a sudden there is a situation that does not restrict reorganization to just one or two legislative changes. In the end a very revolutionary law comes out. Momentum built up, and that brings us back to the question, "Why did it happen in the 1980s?"

**Student:** That was one reason for my question. When you say political boundaries, of course one of those boundaries has always been a prejudice against a German general staff type system. I wonder whether in fact that's still a valid prejudice or still a valid boundary. I don't think that can be determined because there are some advocates, some very strong advocates, retired general officers, who advocate a general staff system, a truly integrated command staff system. I wonder if the Congress just didn't shy away from that, thinking, "That's not politically feasible," when, in fact, it may very well be politically feasible.

**Barrett:** I don't know. You had to live with this thing from 1982 on to feel the boundaries. Until 1985 the boundaries were probably there; they weren't expanding very much at all. Then things happened and they did expand. Maybe at the end with the expanded reform mood you could have gone back and rewritten bills and gotten even more. I don't know. But I certainly lived within very strict boundaries for a long time. To answer in more specific terms, any mention of a general staff up until

1985 would have played into the hands of the opponents and probably defeated the reorganizers very quickly.

I happen to be one, by the way, who thinks a general staff would be a bad idea. So my own boundaries probably militated against it.

Even with the things the subcommittee was doing, like establishing the joint officer personnel system and those sorts of things, great care was taken to characterize them as not being a general staff. The subcommittee was criticized by opponents who said, "Do that and you've got a general staff." You'll find back in 1982 the opponents saying that one move in the direction of changing the JCS, in a very mild bill — making the Chairman an adviser in his own right — and you've got a general staff.

I'll have to leave the question on political boundaries for you to answer. To do so, you will have to do a tremendous amount of reading; all the inputs, all the critiques over those years. It would be an interesting thing to do. Although the boundaries moved, they didn't move easily. And if you were in the system, as I was, you would at each point think you were pushing them about as far as they could be pushed. It may have been a misperception. Obviously, I may have misperceived in 1981 and 1982 when I wrote my book just what the boundaries were. I either misperceived or they moved. I believe they moved.

**Oettinger:** The general staff idea is an Army type of idea. It makes a great deal of sense there. It is an awful idea historically, and probably contemporaneously, from a Navy point of view. I would argue that the political shibboleths aside, because some of that is ideological junk, there is a good, solid professional argument that says that a general staff doesn't make sense as an over-arching structure. It goes too far in the direction of things that make sense over a certain period of time for one service, but it doesn't necessarily make sense for the others. Therefore, tweaking, rather than revolution, is probably not a bad thing to do.

**Student:** I am aware of a very articulate Air Force general officer who, when he spoke to us at Air Command and Staff College, advocated a general staff type approach, at least for the Air Force and Army. He wasn't that concerned with the Navy. But I think some good arguments could be made for a system like that for those two services with the air and ground components.

**Barrett:** I noticed there's one slide here that I don't want to overlook (figure 5). It's from Jim

## Senate Armed Services Committee Staff Report — 1985

- Officers knowingly champion service over broader security needs and believe themselves to be acting correctly.
- The problem is more deep-seated than can be corrected by mere organizational realignments. The core of this problem is the basic attitudes and orientation of the professional officer corps.

**Figure 5. Defense Organization — The Need for Change**

Locher's study.\* I think he says, as well as anybody can, what the problem is in the personnel area. He found that officers knowingly champion service over broader security needs, and believe themselves to be acting correctly. Think about that for a minute. They knowingly champion service over broad security needs and believe themselves to be acting correctly! Then he goes on to say that is what has to be turned around if we're ever going to improve the performance of this system. That quotation was based, he said, on interviews with officers.

**Student:** When you say they believe themselves to be acting correctly, do you mean correctly for the common good, or correctly for their service?

**Barrett:** Their concept of their country's interest, I guess.

**Oettinger:** Again, it's not necessarily bad, because it's the argument about the balance between specialization and generalists. It would seem to me that that's a perfectly defensible and reasonable argument if it is made in a context where there is some over-arching integration. This goes back to something that's been a thread throughout the seminar. Where the hell do these things come together? We had a couple of other sessions on the matter, "Okay, we get this piece of intelligence, we get that

piece, but where does it come together?" We had that in the discussions with the guys from the National Security Council staff. If you assume that it is the mission of the Director of Central Intelligence to pull it all together from a national point of view, then there isn't any need for NSC staff, there isn't any need for White House staff, etc., etc., because that's what these guys are supposed to do. If, on the other hand, they believe (and perhaps correctly) that they are an input, then the question is, where the hell does it get put together? I think the difficulty here is that the services had all this incentive to think correctly on service matters but no place was there an effective apparatus for jointness. One can't fault them for it. It's not necessarily a criticism of the services. It's a criticism of the structure that says there ain't no place where there is an effective way to pull it together.

**Student:** The conflict comes about when as a service you have a mission, in the Air Force case, the control of the air. You have a doctrine that says, "This is how we go about doing this." Now, if that conflicts with the doctrine that the Navy has, or the Marine Corps has, the Air Force officer, if he understands his doctrine, if he understands the reasons for it, and if he believes those things, of course, he's going to argue, and so is the Navy guy for the same reason. And it's an honest belief. Both believe that their mission is important.

**McLaughlin:** And the dishonesty is that it is never argued in public.

\*U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*. 99th Congress, 1st session, Oct. 16, 1985. Washington, DC: GPO, 1985.

**Oettinger:** What is very important to distinguish here is the role of the Joint Chiefs. One cannot fault the services or the officers for taking the attitude that essentially they're specialists. All of those criticisms of the JCS presume it's the one place where nominally the heads should have been knocked and things argued out, but the issues are compromised, obfuscated, and never put together. That's where the problem arises. One cannot fault the services for doing their thing. The problem lies with the JCS where the stuff can come together; not accepting this committee fashion of obfuscating endlessly in order to get unanimity.

**Barrett:** I want to turn to the question of how it happened in the 1980s. I always say that I don't know, but I'm trying to give you some clues. We've been over this ground a little. This slide (figure 6) shows that there were studies from Rockefeller in the early 1950s to the 1970s and 1980s laying out the problems. The Blue Ribbon Commission reported in 1969. Symington in the early 1960s wrote a scathing transition critique for Kennedy before he became President. A defense Manpower Commission reported in the mid-1970s. A massive GAO (General Accounting Office) report came out in the 1970s. All of those contained the same sort of critique. Then under Harold Brown there was a defense organization study which was actually five studies and, in effect, a repeat of the previous critiques.

The other studies listed in the figure are of the same nature. They came along in the mid-1980s; they reinforced the reorganization movement and, in fact, gave a big push to it. The Georgetown Center did a study in which all sorts of defense experts participated. That earlier quotation by the six former Secretaries of Defense came from the CSIS study,\* all six endorsing the major outlines of the study. The CSIS study included legislators like Representatives Les Aspin and Sam Stratton, and Senators Nunn and Cohen, as well as former Secretary Laird, and General Andrew Goodpaster, and on, and on. It recommended very, very far-reaching changes.

The Heritage Foundation, with strong links to the administration, came out at about the same time with a report that was entirely consistent with the CSIS report. Later on, the Packard Commission, the President's own Blue Ribbon Commission, made recommendations that were consistent with the previous two and with the bills being considered in the Congress. Finally, there was a very far-reaching

Senate staff report which I'm sure Jim Locher talked to you about.

**Oettinger:** And Cushman's stuff?

**Barrett:** That's right. I think General Cushman's book influenced the staff and in turn the representatives and the senators.\* As soon as I would receive the Cushman drafts, I would send them over to Jim Locher, because I knew he was doing a study at the time. General Cushman allowed me to do that. I also placed him in contact with Locher. One time when we were negotiating last summer in the conference, I talked to General Cushman about an issue, and I think that Jim Locher called him separately, when we were in disagreement. Cushman's book did have a lot of influence, intellectual influence, on the staffers.

Another answer to the "why it happened." You mentioned Jones. I think you're right. The proximate cause of what happened in the 1980s is that a sitting member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman, came over and said that there are problems, fundamental flaws, and I'm going to work to correct those problems (figure 7). He was followed within two or three weeks by General Meyer, Chief of Staff of the Army, and another member of the JCS. Meyer said the same thing as far as what's wrong. But he then said that Jones was not going far enough in his recommendations for change.

It was amazing. Two out of the five sitting members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in early 1982 made these statements. Unprecedented. I was there the morning that Jones made his statement. He did it in a closed session of the House Armed Services Committee. The committee had been in session a long time. Secretary Weinberger was presenting that year's budget. Jones was accompanying him. The ranking minority member, Representative Dickinson, called attention to General Jones who had sat silently beside the Secretary. Dickinson said that he wanted to welcome Jones. He noted that General Jones would be retiring in five months, that he had had a great career, and that the committee had enjoyed working with General Jones. Representative Dickinson then invited Jones to say something. I expected General Jones to tell him that it had been good to work with the committee, that his had been a good career, etc. Instead, Jones launched into his discussion of JCS problems and what he was going to do about it in the future.

**Student:** Was that a prepared statement he made?

\*LTG John H. Cushman, USA, (Ret.), *Command and Control of the Theater Forces: Adequacy*. Washington, DC: AFCEA International Press, 1985.

\*See page 178.



### **Studies Critical of DOD Organization (Four Decades)**

- Rockefeller to Brown
- Defense Organization Study, 1977-1980
- CSIS Defense Organization Project
- Heritage Foundation Mandate for Leadership II
- Packard Commission
- Senate Staff Report, 1985

**Figure 6. Events Leading to 1986 DOD Reorganization Legislation**

### **Active Support of Generals David Jones and Shy Meyer**

#### **Congressional Initiative:**

#### **House**

- Representative White
- Representative Nichols
- Representatives Aspin, Skelton, Kasich, Hopkins

#### **Senate**

- Senator Tower
- Senators Goldwater and Nunn

**Figure 7. Events Leading to 1986 DOD Reorganization Legislation  
(Continued)**

**Barrett:** No. I don't really know whether he intended to do it or not. Maybe it was on his mind. But he did it.

**Student:** Maybe he was writing his article.\*

**Barrett:** I think he had already talked to Secretary Weinberger about changes. I don't know whether Weinberger knew he was going to bring it up at that time. He sat there quietly for hours. It came as a surprise to the committee.

When that happened in 1982, I was a member of the Investigations Subcommittee staff. It happens that that subcommittee has jurisdiction over organization. That's how I happened to become associated with this effort.

The subcommittee chairman was Representative Richard White of Texas. His role in reorganization illustrates one of the most interesting things about how American government works. Mr. White knew the Constitution. He understood what I explained at the beginning about the authority and responsibilities of the Congress. He knew that he, for the Congress, had the responsibility of looking into JCS organization when Jones made such a far-reaching statement about existing problems, even though he hadn't had much to do with organizational matters before that. He had not encountered many issues in this area, so he wasn't familiar with Department of Defense organizational matters. But within two months the subcommittee started hearings. If you read those hearings you'll find that Mr. White at first asked only a few questions. I, as a staffer who had some experience in this area, asked quite a few questions. But as Mr. White quickly began to understand the issues, he asked the questions more and more; and finally, it was all Mr. White.

There are two pertinent observations to make about White's legislative role: First, he was responsible for a part of Congress' constitutional jurisdiction and he understood that, which I've already mentioned; and second, he became convinced that there was a serious problem within his area of cognizance. When that happens in Congress you've got something. After a few hearings, when he became convinced that the JCS organization was flawed, White would not turn the issue loose. By the middle of the series of hearings he was having me draw up possible legislative provisions to take care of problems that he saw. And he was trying the proposals out on the witnesses, surprising them. By the end of the hearings he had prepared a bill. By the end of

that year he had gotten that bill through the House of Representatives, the first time in 25 years. It didn't go anywhere because 1982 was the last session of the 97th Congress. The bill received one hearing in the Senate. Mr. White did not run for reelection. But he single-handedly began the legislative movement that led to DOD reorganization.

The next year the subcommittee had a new Chairman, Bill Nichols of Alabama. It was Mr. Nichols who settled in for the long haul and delivered the reorganization act. It is named for him. Nichols had somewhat the same approach as White. He told the subcommittee that he felt that reorganization is unfinished business, that Richard White took a thousand pages of testimony and made a tremendous effort, that the bill passed the House last year, and that the subcommittee must continue to get to the bottom of the issue. Subsequently, the subcommittee held brief hearings. It reported another bill. That bill was passed in the House in 1983. Once again, it dealt only with the JCS.

Senator Tower, in the middle of 1983, initiated a study that eventually became the Locher staff report. It was anticipated that that study would be completed and that the 98th Congress would act on the JCS bill. That didn't happen.

The next year, 1984, was the second year of the 98th Congress. As May rolled around it didn't seem that the Senate was moving on reorganization. Mr. Nichols resorted to a parliamentary technique to move the legislation. Even though his bill had already passed the House, he attached it as a rider to the authorization bill that year. That meant the Senate would have to confront it in a House-Senate conference, because the Congress passes a defense authorization bill each year. Nichols' move forced Senator Tower's hand. It turned out that he was opposed to JCS legislation, or certainly to legislating that year in that Congress. He strongly opposed the Nichols bill for the four months that the conference went on. Every time it came up on the agenda, because Senator Tower was the conference chairman, the Senator delayed consideration. Obviously, his tactic was to put it off to the last hours of the conference, and then have the conference drop it.

Representative Nichols sat there in the conference just as determined that the House would get something as was Tower on the other side. In the end the House got something, but not a whole lot. At about 1:30 in the morning as the last session of the conference wound down, when Tower finally turned to the issue, it was obvious that Nichols was not going to give in. As a result, the House pushed through

\*General David C. Jones, USAF, "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change," *Armed Forces Journal International*, March 1982, pp. 62-72.

the first changes of real import to DOD organizational legislation since 1958. Even so, only a few changes were accepted by the conference, not the entire House bill.

That was in 1984. A lot of other things happened at the end of that year and in early 1985 to change the whole ball game. Jim Locher has probably told you about it. Representative Les Aspin was elected chairman of the House Armed Services Committee in early 1985. Aspin had not been a strong supporter of the JCS legislation because he thought it should go further than it did. By this time he had been a member of the CSIS study and he was even more convinced that we needed more far-reaching legislation. It was also during this period that CSIS brought out its report, as did the Heritage Foundation. These reports dealt with the overall defense organization, not just the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Senator Goldwater became Chairman of the Armed Services Committee. (Senator Tower had not run for reelection.) Senator Nunn formed a close and strong alliance with Senator Goldwater concerning the reorganization issue. They announced that they were supportive of reorganization legislation. Nunn emphasized that it would not be limited to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Senate would look at the overall structure of the Department of Defense. That was early 1985.

Chairman Aspin joined with Representative Nichols and Representative Ike Skelton in the 1986 House reorganization effort. Skelton has long been a supporter of reorganization. He would in fact favor support of something like the general staff; much more far-reaching reorganization than what eventually was enacted. Aspin, working with Skelton and Nichols, forged an agreement that this time around, and in that Congress, there would be much more far-reaching JCS legislation. The Nichols subcommittee then put a great deal of effort into more far-reaching reform, more hearings and all. By November of that year, for the third time, the House passed a Joint Chiefs of Staff reorganization bill. This time it was a very, very strong one.

At about that time the Senate staff (Locher) report was published. It deals with Department-wide defense organization. The Locher report recommended very far-reaching changes for the CINCs — strengthening them; it recommended integrating the military headquarters; it revealed many problems in the joint officer personnel system; it presented a comprehensive analysis of the Department of Defense. The House staff had not focused on the Department as a

whole. The House had concentrated on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The story gets a little complicated now. Mr. Aspin became convinced that the Senate was really serious about comprehensive reorganization. They're not only going to pass the House Joint Chiefs of Staff legislation, he decided, they're going to come back to the House with a very comprehensive bill covering the entire Department of Defense. At that point in late 1986, if you had read the Locher report, you would understand Aspin's conclusion that it was going to be far-reaching legislation in every respect. So Mr. Aspin rekindled the Nichols-Skelton alliance once again. The Investigations Subcommittee went to work on a comprehensive DOD reorganization. The subcommittee held more hearings. Eventually, the House passed a very, very far-reaching Department of Defense reorganization bill.

In the meantime, the Senate, because of the complexion of the Senate Armed Services Committee, did not pass a bill that was as far-reaching. Though there was strong sentiment for reorganization, there was also opposition. The most far-reaching parts of the Senate bill were the Joint Chiefs of Staff section and some aspects of sections strengthening the CINCs.

So in the end what happened is that the House passed a much more far-reaching bill than the Senate in many respects. Each chamber drove the other. The Senate report helped both Houses a great deal. Then there were the other reports. The House finally decided that we need all the far-reaching proposals it adopted.

When the House-Senate conference met in August and September of 1986, it consisted of groups of like-minded people. But the question was how far to go in each of the areas addressed by the two bills: JCS, Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, military department headquarters, CINCs, defense agencies, joint officer personnel, and staff reductions. It took a great deal of time to iron all those things out. But the legislators knew from the beginning that they were going to be successful, the two bills preordained that they were going to be successful. They were going to have far-reaching legislation.

**Oettinger:** I'm amazed by the combination of accident and premeditation in all this. It's marvelous to get it on the record. These are the things I hadn't had the vaguest idea about. In a sense, our thread in

this, General Cushman, began out of a conviction based on some technical observations of Cushman's personal experience in Korea: his seething while getting some of this stuff on the record; it being too hot a potato to handle elsewhere; somebody introducing him to us; our being at that moment capable of supporting it. Except for the accidents you've recounted it could have been just another critique in a chain; 25 years' worth of totally forgotten things that molder on the shelf. You get the thing in draft form, you know what happens to drafts. It happens to get into somebody's hands; someone who is working on the topic at the moment. You have Archie's account a few moments ago of the usefulness of it in terms of the staff input. If the thing had been off by six months one way or the other, it would have been another piece of academic stuffing on the shelf. There was a great deal of premeditated care in setting the thing up, but it might have gotten exactly nowhere except that it happened to weave as one thread into this fabric of combined planning and accident that Archie has described.

**Barrett:** You can see that I've puzzled about the answer to your question for a long time, else I wouldn't have these slides to talk about it. I want to say one more thing on the record about this chain of coincidences. On the record, I believe that the Steadman report, which was one of those five Harold Brown reports, influenced General Jones a great deal. It came out while Jones was Acting Chairman. The incumbent Chairman, George Brown, was ill and was about to retire. I remember observing panel discussions on the Steadman report


with Jones sitting at the table and participating. It wasn't until three and a half years later that he felt that he could move on reorganization. He decided that Steadman was, in the main, correct. I think you'll find that Jones' recommendations have roots back to Steadman. But Steadman's recommendations in turn have roots reaching way back in history.

**McLaughlin:** I had the advantage of seeing the next slide (figure 8) which I think may say there's more than sheer coincidence at work in this process.

**Barrett:** I always say it would be disingenuous if I didn't give credit for the passage of reorganization legislation to several incidents — Iran, Lebanon, Grenada, and "spare parts," including toilet seats and coffee pots. Reorganization piggybacked on a lot of other things that were happening. There's no doubt about it.

**Student:** You ought to diagram this, Tony.

**Oettinger:** Well, I hope that when you see this record, you won't sanitize it too much. I think that an awful lot of very interesting discourse will help. As in scientific discovery, as in a lot of political things, also, you find this interesting combination of the accident and the prepared mind or organization that is capable of taking advantage of it. Clearly it requires both: Iran, the spare parts, and the coffee pots were part of it, but on the other hand, if some of these people weren't ready to perceive a pattern, it wouldn't have made any difference. It's a nice record of how things happen in reality as opposed to the pipe dreams of the political theorists.



**Figure 8. Events Leading to 1986 DOD Reorganization Legislation (Concluded)**

**McLaughlin:** There are a lot of factors we haven't mentioned yet. The number of people in the Congress who have had active military service has declined dramatically. Fewer members were indoctrinated by a service. Going along with that, and maybe it's a post-Vietnam syndrome, is the declining regard for the opinion of the military officers. The number of generals who got up and said you're creating a Prussian general staff met a lot of skepticism, especially with some of your younger members in Congress who are not terribly impressed by these opinions. That, along with your procurement scandals, raises questions about the competence of the services who are recruiting, training, equipping, and are therefore responsible for the procurement scandals in a sense. And, really to give Congress its due, just the sense of watching that increasing military budget. We can talk about returning to a certain level of big bucks, and the understanding that: Gee, more carrier groups to execute a maritime strategy or SDI, or what do we do with modernizing the Triad? An awful lot of this was being brokered out in the old committee style, in "the tank." I think there were a number of congressmen who really

started to worry whether or not we were being given coherent strategic advice.

**Student:** Added to that there are a few other things. Accounts that came out in the late 1970s, early 1980s, about the Cuban missile crisis and the poor quality of advice given Kennedy by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Son Tay raid. The Westmoreland-CBS scandal. A lot of the post-Vietnam analysis and questioning. Harry Summers' book, *On Strategy*. Lots of other indicators that despite all the money put into the military it just wasn't doing its job very well for some reason.

**Oettinger:** I'd like to make sure that you leave yourself some time for concluding. We were talking a bit over lunch about this being one round in a long fight. What about what I'd like to call the usual perversions? Congress has fired a shot. If history's any guide, the very folks we're talking about are at this very moment, in all good conscience, and again with the good of the services, the country, and all that in mind, playing games again. Would you like to evaluate where we are after six months since passage?

**Barrett:** Okay. Let's look at what Congress did (figure 9). What it did was work with the legislative




Figure 9. Defense Reorganization: The 1986 Act

model that existed before reorganization. Conceptually, Congress attempted to move DOD. We moved from the de facto model on the left to the original 1958 legislative model depicted on the right. In other words, Congress didn't adopt a general staff. Congress tried to improve the workings of the joint advice system by making the Chairman the principal military adviser. It gave the CINCs all those command authorities I mentioned — a somewhat limited but still a very strong measure. That straightens out the CINC's relationship with his subordinates, it is hoped. Congress even allowed the CINC to limit communications outside of his command. The legislation gave the Joint Staff to the Chairman. If you read some of the things in the reports, Congress wants the Chairman to revise all the procedures of the Joint Staff, to make the Joint Staff an entity in its own right — an entity that speaks with its own voice and not as some sort of secretariat for the services.

The legislation required a major reassessment and reevaluation of the structure of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and a major reassessment of the defense agencies. Congress required significant consolidation of the service headquarters, the military staffs, and the service secretariats. It also linked the defense agencies much more closely to the output side of the Department of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In brief that's what Congress did.

If you are familiar with those details then I'll go over some current issues about the implementation.

First of all, last month [March 1987] Representatives Dingell and Aspin joined together in a letter to the Secretary of Defense that accused the Air Force of not implementing the military department title in good faith, of undermining civilian control in the way that the Air Force reorganization will take place. Particularly cited were two areas. In the first, the acquisition reorganization, the letter said that the new Assistant Secretary for Acquisition, who is the successor to the Assistant Secretary for Research and Development and Logistics, would have less than a handful of civilians to work for him while at the same time he would have a general officer under him who would have 400 people working for him. So Dingell and Aspin alleged, of course, that the man in control would be a three-star officer rather than a civilian.

They also alleged that the reorganization of the comptroller would have the same effect of undermining civilian control. Before reorganization the Air Force had an Assistant Secretary for Financial

Management in the secretariat, and a comptroller on the Air Staff. In the consolidation the comptroller has been brought into the secretariat, in accordance with the reorganization act. But the Air Force decided to do away with the civilian, the Assistant Secretary for Financial Management. That's not required in the law. But it wasn't prohibited, either. So what you'd have for directing financial matters in the Air Force is a comptroller who came from the Air Staff and who is a three-star general. Working for that three-star general would be many of the civilians in the secretariat. Among those civilians is Mr. Ernest Fitzgerald who has been, as you know, a whistle blower of note for years and years. The letter mentions Mr. Fitzgerald and says that the Air Force has effectively silenced him by putting him under a general officer. Those are the two main issues to surface so far.

**Student:** How would he be silenced, because he works for a general officer? What difference would that make?

**Barrett:** Well, Mr. Fitzgerald would maintain, I believe, that he's under authority of the military now, and not nearly as free as he used to be when he was directly under a civilian official.

**Student:** But it's not so much the fact that he's working for a military officer, as that his position has been moved so that he's no longer dealing with issues that he's familiar with.

**Barrett:** No. I think his point would be that he's still dealing with those issues, but his boss is a military man.

**Student:** Do military men think differently? Do we reason differently?

**Barrett:** Maybe. Maybe not. The Air Force reorganization causes that question to be asked. The way secretariats were organized before made the question moot. There was a civilian secretary and several civilian assistant secretaries. Their role was oversight of the military staff which was located, in an organizational sense, below them, in the Air Staff headed by the Chief of Staff. What the reorganization has done is bring part of the Air Staff up, the comptroller, and put the high level civil servants under the military.

**Oettinger:** Let me try an analogy and see if it helps clear up the point for you. I perform a normal function. Let's say I'm an auditor. I'm doing exactly the same job, but today I report to a committee of the board of directors; the finance committee of the board of directors. Tomorrow morning I report

to the treasurer who reports to the chief executive officer. I submit that though nominally my job description, etc., has remained exactly the same, my ability to discharge my responsibility can be very different. Nominally nothing has changed.

**McLaughlin:** It's your boss, in effect, whom you're auditing.

**Oettinger:** I may have the same guts and integrity, but when I walk around and try to get access to records and so forth, I'd be treated very differently by the folks, depending upon to whom I report.

**Student:** There's really an additional layer then that you're put under. It could have been other civilians as opposed to the military person there.

**Oettinger:** I think what's making this misleading is that it has nothing to do with the civilian, per se, except for the fact that the military, in this instance, happens to be the equivalent of the CEO.

**McLaughlin:** It illustrates something else, though. You pull the thread and this whole thing starts falling apart. Why are there three-star Air Force generals in financial management functions? Is that what you train those people for? That's why you have a civilian secretariat in the first place, in theory. If you look at Air Force Systems Command, why do you have thousands of Air Force engineers? Blue suit engineers doing project management: electrical engineers, mechanical engineers, whatever. That wasn't intended under the old law. You may argue there are lots of reasons for doing that, but initially you had uniformed military assigned to development to give input on requirements, not to manage it. That gets into the Bob Komer argument about how you should have a separate procurement agency. Get it the hell out of the services completely.

**Barrett:** I don't know if I articulated it carefully enough. These issues are going to be looked at in a subcommittee meeting next Tuesday. And I didn't mean to take sides at all. I talked to the Air Force people yesterday. They have contrary opinions and arguments on each of these issues. But these are the issues as they were laid out in the letter.

Most of the issues, though, have to do with the personnel section of the legislation. I don't know of a single proposal for change to the law except in Title 4 which deals with the personnel matter. I met in a congressman's office yesterday with General Herres, the new Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By the way, he mentioned that he was the living embodiment of this legislation, because the

vice chairman was another product of the bill. He indicated several things that the Department would like to change.

First of all, joint tour length. The requirement is that the tour length be three and a half years for officers below the flag officer rank, and three years for flag officer rank. The Pentagon is going to recommend that the tour lengths be three years in joint assignments for officers below flag, and two years for flag officers. I probably don't have enough time to comment on each of these.

**Oettinger:** You've got five minutes.

**Barrett:** They also recommend that instead of the three and a half years being in one assignment, an officer should be allowed to bank his time as a joint officer.

**Student:** I'm curious, is there a problem with that particular point?

**Barrett:** The problem with this from my point of view, and I haven't heard it argued strongly from their point of view, is that the tour length was established to meet one of four or five objectives established by the Investigations Subcommittee for the joint officer legislation. One of the objectives was to get good officers. Another was to get trained officers. Congress wanted to get an increased experience level on the joint side. There are all sorts of statistics showing how people breeze in and breeze out, tours as short as six months, in order to check off joint duty in their career.

This Pentagon proposal is sort of treating joint duty as a career broadening experience for the officers. It may downgrade getting the job done. To me, it's like the criticism of Vietnam personnel policies that officers were cycled through a year at a time to broaden their careers. The other consideration is winning the war. The joint jobs need to get done. I think the judgment for Congress is going to be, "Well, do we want to go back to what it is right now?" Tour lengths are roughly three years for colonels and below, and two years for generals right now. The Pentagon proposal amounts to no change from the status quo, or very little change. So, in my view, what they're suggesting to Congress is, "Let's just give up on this part of the legislation." Now that's from my point of view without having heard their side. But that's all I can give you as a comment.

The Pentagon also recommends crediting some in-service time as joint time; for example, the operations deputies on each of the service staffs. The argument is that these officers spend all their time on joint matters even though they're assigned to the



Air Force ~~to Army, Navy and the Marine~~ Corps. The Pentagon also recommends that assignments such as Air Force-Air Division Officers, where officers serve with the Army, should be joint assignments.

There's a similar case that I'm not familiar with which the Army officers are assigned to Korea and those multiple-hat headquarters you mentioned.

**Oettinger:** On a case-by-case basis, some of that sounds legitimate, some of it sounds like hog wash.

**Barrett:** You're exactly right.

The definition of a joint assignment. My notes here are not sufficiently detailed for me to remember what I wanted to say. I'm not sure what the Department of Defense is going to suggest as a change.

It's just tell you that the law requires a position-by-position analysis to designate joint assignment is. But the way they're going about it is agency by agency, in effect. They're saying that all officers assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense; all officers assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**Oettinger:** Even those assigned to grind the ax for the service.

**Barrett:** Right, if the proposal for in-service joint assignments is adopted.

For the defense agencies, I think that eventually there will be a quota of something like 30 percent, 40 percent, or 50 percent. Once again, I have to hear their side of it. But to me that's not exactly following the law because I think there may be some positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense that really don't qualify as joint positions.

Under the emerging system, if you're assigned to OSD you automatically get your joint billet, your joint duty credit time. It's not the right way to go in my view.

The Department will also propose that it should not have to follow the man who has served in a joint assignment for the rest of his career. I mentioned that there are provisions in the law to protect joint officers throughout the rest of their careers.

The Pentagon proposes to track the joint officer for the first assignment after the joint assignment, not for his entire career.

Special operations are a part of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. But separate legislation

creating a special operations unified command was passed last year. In order to create that unified command, which the Pentagon opposed, the Department is going to disestablish the Readiness Command. In fact, that has been done. The Department has established the Special Operations Command. The former commander of the Readiness Command is now the commander of the Special Operations Command.

The command is in the same military base in the same building. That's not so troubling enough. But the Department has also announced that an existing Army command, Forces Command, will be redesignated as specified by the Department. That specified command designation moves the Army command over from the left side of the organization figure to the right side. So people who are assigned there, of course, will get joint duty credit.

**Student:** I hadn't heard of that one. That's a brand new one.

**Oettinger:** You wish you'd thought of that.

**Barrett:** Joint education: You know that the new requirement is that you have to have joint education before you get a joint assignment in order eventually to become a joint specialist. It's going to be recommended that the present service schools now become joint schools. So that takes care of that. If you go to the Air War College or the Naval War College, you get credit for a joint assignment, or you would if this proposal were accepted. I'm sure the schools are going to change their curricula. Also, the proposal may just apply to the intermediate schools. But the concept is that former service schools would now be considered joint schools in order to meet the requirements of the law.

The Department will also propose that officers be allowed to reverse the joint education and then joint assignment sequence; that is, an officer could have a joint assignment before he has joint education. There may be good reasons for that. But let me explain the reason Congress specified the sequence. The idea is that an officer should be trained for a job before he goes to the job, he doesn't become trained after it.

**Oettinger:** Thank you so much. It was splendid.

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