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and Control**

**C³I Issues from the United Nations Perspective
William R. Clontz**

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C3I Issues from a United Nations Perspective

William R. Clontz

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Oettinger: We're delighted to have with us today Colonel Bill Clontz, who is the military advisor of the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, and he'll deal with the command and control and intelligence issues as he sees them from his current assignment at the United Nations. We'd like a little bit of introduction from you as to how you came to be punished, if that's the word ...?

Clontz: ... to be in such an awkward position.

Oettinger: To be in that position, and he has agreed to be interruptible with questions from the moment he goes. So let's be our usual polite selves.

Clontz: Some things haven't changed over here, I see.

Oettinger: He is also an alumnus of the National Security Program here at the Kennedy School, so it's a homecoming for him. It's a pleasure to have you here, Bill.

Clontz: It's a chance to go to Legal Seafood for dinner. So I signed up in a heartbeat here.

I am an Army officer, originally an infantry officer. I got religion and converted to Army aviation some years ago. I've had a little special forces time. I'm a foreign area officer, West European focus, primarily. On the political-military side, I've had a couple of assignments in France, and one up in the Pentagon. For my year or two on the National Security Program, I worked conventional arms control—or the lack thereof.

I just came out of a brigade command of the 82nd Airborne Division last June and was in the middle of a nice quiet fellowship at the Brookings Institution when I got the call to go up to the U.N. and talk to Ambassador Albright. I did a very quick turnaround, about a ten-day process from start to finish, and wound up working up at the U.S. Mission. The U.S. Mission has a small military staff component. About half a dozen of us represent the various services, DIA, and some administrative and logistical functions.

We actually see ourselves as drivers of a stagecoach. We have a long leash that connects down to the Pentagon, the Joint Staff, and they're good enough to humor us and let us think we really do pull the those reins. They're pretty good about be-

ing responsive to us, as are the State Department and DOD and some of the other agencies around the Beltway.

That's basically who I am. My experience at the U.N. is quite limited. I have never taken part in a peacekeeping operation. I had spent no time at the U.N., even as a tourist. I'm at the end of my first trimester, so I may still be a tourist. I haven't really decided yet how that goes. I've been up there since about the middle of February, and as I told the group at lunch, sometimes I feel like saying "February of which year?" It's been a busy two or three months. I guess that's pretty well the norm for the U.N. these days. There's a lot of sound and light and fury, but I'm not sure how much heat we're generating some days. There's a great deal going on out there.

As was said, please feel free to interrupt or question or make comments. I know there's a varied experience here. One of you has got much more time in the U.N. than I do. We have some CIA representation here, I take it? If I touch on anything that anybody's got some functional experience in, or a contrary experience or reinforcement, please feel free to speak up. If I learned anything at the U.N., arguing is okay. So what I will give you is my experience from that limited perspective that I've got, somewhat from the U.S. perspective, but I'll really try to work this as a member of an organization that works with the U.N. as part of a national element, and try not to make too American-centered a presentation here.

My understanding was that your area of interest up here is intelligence, command, and control. What I thought might be useful today, rather than give a canned presentation, is sort of to walk through the buffet of those two broad areas, some of the experiences we've had, and what seemed to be long tent poles that are keeping things going and short tent poles that are causing operations to collapse in on themselves a bit since I've been up there.

I'd like to start with the intelligence piece if I could, and make that a lead-in because it does tie directly to the command and control. There's an interesting story, in terms of intelligence. Literally my first day

on the job, I was sitting in a meeting over in the U.N. building, and it was mixed company—that is, part U.S. and part U.N. bureaucrats and diplomats, people from the U.N. permanent group. I, in polite company, said the word "intelligence," at which point several people got out their clubs and beat me into submission and said "No, no, no. We don't do intelligence in the U.N." I have since found that's not necessarily the view anymore. Traditionally, habitually, that was true. Intelligence within the U.N. permanent community itself, and among some of the member states, was equated in a very negative sense with spying on each other. Therefore, since we're good member states, we are the world, we don't spy on each other, and we're here to do common business, so we don't do intelligence.

The events of the last year, or year and a half—the dramatic increase in peacekeeping operations and the level of violence and risk associated with them—have very markedly driven a great number of people in the U.N., and the U.N. culture itself, to start realizing intelligence is not a dirty word. In fact it's an essential tool if you are going to start looking at what we've been referring to as Chapter Six-and-a-half or Chapter Seven peacekeeping operations, where you have great unquantifiable dangers out there, and to put people out there without benefit of good intelligence is wasteful at a minimum and probably criminal in the extreme.

Oettinger: Just for clarity of the record, Chapter Six or Chapter Seven is which one?

Clontz: Sorry. Ambassador Walker (at this time, Deputy U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N.) keeps telling me I'm incorrect to refer to Chapter Six, but in the vernacular, when we refer to Chapter Six, we're talking about classic peacekeeping operations wherein the two or more parties have agreed to stop fighting, have asked you to come in as an intermediary, interpose yourself between them, and help them build confidence measures and go about their business as two peaceful partners in the same part of the globe.

Chapter Seven are the peace enforcement operations, where you have to fight your way in, fight your way there, and fight your way back out. There is some more substantial level of violence and some level of disagreement by one or more parties in terms of your presence and what your mandate is for being there.

So there have started to be what I perceive as some cultural changes, and I'll talk to how that's manifested itself from the viewpoint of being inside the U.N. As we talked about at lunch, some of that is generational. For those people who have not been invested for many years in the traditional U.N. culture but have come aboard recently, in the time they have been there, the pace has been very fast and a number of missions are going on. That particular group tends to see this as a functional issue. It's not a question of what we do traditionally, it's what we need to do to accomplish the mission. Those who have been in the U.N. for a very long time have a little more difficulty looking at this as just a way to do business.

Oettinger: Before you go too far from the intelligence change, even among older, permanent members, the Soviets and the U.S. knew bloody well they've been spying on each other for 40 years. The French keep getting their hands caught in the cookie jar, the Brits have their on and off Burgess and McLean episodes and their moles, God knows what the Chinese are doing, so

Clontz: Whom am I referring to?

Oettinger: Yes. Whom are you referring to? Is the hypocrisy a matter of professional survival, or bureaucratic mores, or what? When things like that survive, they must have some functional use. So what purposes does it serve?

Clontz: Actually there's some of both, I suppose: a little survival in sync with bureaucratic impetus there. I was really referring to the professional staff at the United Nations, those in the Secretariat, not the member delegations, but those people who've been in the peacekeeping business

since before there was a Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Surely they know everybody's looking at everybody. It was a matter of cultural ethos ...

Oettinger: ... but did they believe it or did they just say it?

Clontz: It's hard to tell. Ask me again in the next three months.

Oettinger: It would be an interesting question on how far self-delusion can go or veneers or whatever. It's a mystery.

Clontz: Apparently a fairly great distance. What do you think?

Student: I'm not sure how much delusion is delusion in these circumstances. I think things have changed since the end of the Cold War.

Student: I would say that the complex among the old guys is common with every bureaucracy. You have a set of rules: "That's what we have always done; that's what we've never done," and that makes your life easier. It's also that they may be worried about losing power to a new agency or to a new department using more intelligence and knowledge than the old staff guys who don't have much influence. What they produce is not up to date; it's elaborated over years; and so the Secretary General or the Security Council would believe the new guys, the intelligence guys, more. It may be more psychological.

Clontz: That probably has something to do with it. I suppose there may be some of that. You mention the idea of bureaucratic survival. I suppose that may be an issue as well for those who consider the implications of a good intelligence program in support of the U.N. operations. Almost by definition, at least initially, they're going to be relying on national intelligence means from one country or another, and that implies some loss of control and direction as well. That's true for all resources. Any time you have to go to one donor or one country for a major capability, that would cause me some concern from a U.N. perspective. If I

depended on you for something and it was the only outlet I had, it would worry me, quite frankly, because you could terminate that support any time you chose to.

Student: I wonder if whether it might be worth making the distinction here between political intelligence and tactical intelligence.

Clontz: Yes. That's a good point.

Student: I would judge there is a great aversion on the part of the U.N. Secretariat, and probably the member states, too, to anything involving political intelligence. I can see some fairly horrendous bear traps coming out of that. But I think, as you stated, it's a generational thing. People are beginning to realize that tactical intelligence is important to combat, to military operations. You've got to have it, and any half-way reasonable military operation on the ground should have provision for doing that.

Clontz: It's a good point, I agree.

Oettinger: Bureaucratic nonsense would sort of be an easy thing to deal with. If you recall, several speakers talked about the difficulties that the intelligence people in the U.S. have in adjusting to the relationships with law enforcement people, where I believe one would think it's sort of the same problem. You've got to find out who the bad guys are, et cetera, and when we weigh this in terms of jailing him versus killing him, you have a very different set of imperatives. It may be that the U.N. has to figure out what approach to intelligence is appropriate for its peculiar missions, and it may or may not turn out to be the same as that of any national body. I don't know, but it's a brand new area that I don't think anybody has thought about very much.

Clontz: There are some real procedural wickets to run through in terms of how you handle it, given the membership and the structure of the United Nations. We'll talk about it in a moment. There's no classification system. "U.N. Protected" is the only system they have, and that's about the same

as for "official use only." I'm afraid it doesn't have much weight. So, in that environment, how do you produce and obtain intelligence from various national sources and how do you use it? It's a little difficult when you have a consensus operation.

Oettinger: I'll bet, though, that the U.N. Secretariat has some pretty good ways of keeping its payroll and employment things about as carefully under wraps as any other organization. No?

Student: In terms of an overall structure of an organization and the functioning and what anywhere else would be called a career path, I think the U.N. is something completely different.

Clontz: It's fairly porous. Yes. I agree.

We mentioned the generational split. The second factor, I think, that's driving the more functional look of intelligence is a large amount of borrowed military manpower that's now part of the U.N. structure. There are substantial numbers of military officers from many countries who are part of the peacekeeping operational structure up there who are on loan for six months or longer periods. A great number of those folks just quite naturally reach for intelligence as the first thing when you start talking about a potential operation somewhere. They expect to see it and they complain a lot when they don't have it. So there's a functional community that, in its other life when it's not working for the U.N., deals with intelligence all the time and expects to see it. That's driving it a bit as well.

There's an interesting sort of a dance going on currently. If you address the issue of intelligence produced by a national source, say the United States, made available to the U.N., the first two questions that come up are: "Who on the national side decides what goes across the street, and who inside the U.N. decides where that intelligence is disseminated?" We're in the midst of going through that process on a couple of projects with the United Nations now. I'll walk you through just the baseline mechanics for how we do routine intelligence sharing with the United Nations,

and, frankly, I don't know how well other countries do this or how much they do. I know the bulk of what we would consider intelligence comes to them through the U.S, though they certainly have lots of other information sources.

The procedure we set up for just daily, routine, what I would call low-level military-oriented intelligence is that there is a U.N. support desk now that has been established inside the Pentagon that does all-source agency collection, some raw data, but mostly analysis. It's largely manned by DIA, but it actually represents an interagency task force, if you will. Every day that particular desk, based on the cues we give them on the things that we think the U.N. would be most interested in, selects out the intelligence that's available and goes through a review process that says: these are things we can release without undue concerns about sources and means. As you all understand, the issue is normally not the information itself, but what it tells you about sources and means.

So they do a filtering process that's electronically downlinked. Some of you are probably familiar with JDISS (Joint Defense Intelligence Support System), an electronic system for moving information. We have a direct link with the Pentagon. We have a similar system set up in the United Nations Situation Center. We're the last filter: one more quality control check, to make sure someone hasn't done something really untoward here, and also, by the way, to make sure we're giving some useful information. Occasionally we'll go for days without any information in a given area, and one of our functions is to get back to the U.S. intelligence community and say, "You know, the U.N. really is interested in this area. We've not seen anything for two or three or four days. Can you take another look and see what you've got out there?" We scan that information daily, hit the button, and it goes directly over to the United Nations Situation Center, where they do their dissemination.

I'll talk a little bit about the U.N. dissemination in a minute, but that's how the process works in the most mundane sense, from the U.S. side, for daily intelligence. There are two other particular cases. One is

where the U.N. has asked for a great deal of information on a given country for a given project, or just because they think they're getting ready to do a large-scale operation and they need some background. The third category is emergency requests.

Let's go back to the second one. We had a request that I guess had been going four or five months when I got there, where the United Nations had come formally to the U.S. mission saying, "We need information and intelligence on Country X." That had gone into the system and not much had happened on it. We started looking at it in the February/March timeframe and we found out, quite frankly, the reason was that what the U.N. had said was, "We need information on Country X," and the response came back, "Okay, when do you need it?" "Real soon." "Okay, got it; we're working on it. What do you need to know?" "Everything. We need to know everything you've got on this country." Those of you in the intelligence community know that's not a real functional request. You wouldn't do that, and you really can't do that. That's just too large.

So we went through a process of about two months of saying, "Let's refine this thing a bit. Tell me, if you will, what's driving this? What is it you need to do? What are your concerns? Tell me what information you've got, and I'll be happy to give you a quality control check on that from our perspective and tell you if this is accurate or not accurate." So they went through that process and we had our initial session; again, an interagency review of what we thought we could best provide them. We sat down with the U.N. users and gave them about a day-long run-through on the country. It was a very useful process. Out of that I've received two similar requests in the last month that were much more focused. "I need it for this reason. Here's the reason I'm interested in it. Here's what I've got. Here's where I've got some gaps."

Student: How can you convince the U.S. intelligence community to respond to you as a customer? How have you been able to place a priority or raise your visibility in the noise of all the requirements that

are flying around? And how are you finding the clearance process of "Can we give this to the U.N.?" or the coordination from the U.N. support desk at the Pentagon? It's almost impossible from agency to agency in the U.S. government, so I'd really be interested in how you do this.

Clontz: It's a cumbersome business.

Student: Does that turn it into "not daily" because the information is held up?

Clontz: No. Actually we get it daily. Having U.S. support desks has come a long way. Your agency has a U.N. support team as well. I just spent a day last week talking to them. So there's somebody in all the different communities now who is dedicated to U.N. support, and who is kind of interested in making this happen within the security provisos we've got. So that's helped a lot. The second piece is, if we're really convinced in support that we can't get there from here, we go to the NSC, and they can generally make that sort of stuff happen.

I would tell you again, only based on a little less than three months, that we've had very little of what I would call "natural organic resistance." Of course, everybody is very concerned. Our assumption is that when you take something of an intelligence nature over to the U.N., it immediately goes to 184 countries. I just assume it's going to go to lots of folks that normally you wouldn't want it to go to. So, if that is such a threat to your sources and means, then don't do it. But if you can come short of that, we try to do that, and the agencies have really been quite good. The people have been more responsive. This one particular, all-encompassing country brief really caused a great problem. That was just not going in and we weren't willing to push that either. That's a non-starter. It's got to be a little more reasonable than that.

What has come out of this process, by the way, on the U.N. side, is that as we refined the process a light came on, and one of the key individuals is the gentleman who runs the Situation Center over there. He came back to us and said, "What do you need me to do in terms of procedure so that

you're more comfortable giving me this information?" That strikes me as a sea change. The reality is, I don't think he's quite high enough in the pecking order to do what I would need him to do to achieve that. But that's fairly important. Somebody inside the system, this same individual, is starting to sit down with the bureaucrats inside the system and talk about, "If we don't want a classification system, call it something else, but if we're going to start using more sensitive information from lots of national sources, we need some way to control it. Other countries are not going to share with the U.N. if they don't have some confidence about the distribution set-up. Let's start that internal dialogue." That's going to be a very long process, quite frankly. You'll never get something like a national classification system with any confidence. You just won't have it.

Oettinger: But you've begun informally right here, because even though you say that whatever goes to the U.N. goes to 184 countries, within this setting you've felt compelled to say, "Country X." So there is, even within the United Nations confines, the development of some ...

Clontz: Some mechanism. Yes. That's a good point.

Student: You must have given him excellent training before he got here.

Clontz: Some old habits just die hard.

Oettinger: I didn't want to embarrass you and make you feel you have to choose now, but literally, you have no compunction to reveal that. I just find it fascinating to see a little organizational dynamic work its miracles on you.

Clontz: Such as it is. Yes.

Student: I'm quite interested, Bill, in which bits of the Secretariat are getting this stuff. Again, the U.N. is an organization that those fortunate enough not to have come in contact with it before will find hard to understand, but it's one of the few places in the world where information really is

power, and that, in my experience, to some extent has acted as a disincentive to distribute widely. Doesn't that study mean that what you give won't immediately get into the wrong hands, but it's unlikely to get into everyone's hands? I'd be quite interested to see whether the stuff that's going across now is going to the Situation Center, and therefore, to peacekeeping operations and that sort of military structure, or is it finding its way now into the more political bits of the Secretariat, the peacemaking branch and the preventive diplomacy people?

Clontz: Actually what we have are the two ends of the bell curve. I think we've not hit the middle very well. I really can't quantify it, quite frankly, but most of the relevant information that we send over to the Situation Center does in fact go to the field missions. Now, I only know that incidentally from U.S. liaison efforts out there, and that's one of the things we ask them to do occasionally. "We're sending this sort of stuff to you through U.S. channels. Is it also coming with instructions? Make sure this gets out there. Are they also getting this through U.N. channels?" More times than not it is.

That's the left side of the bell curve, in that controls on the ground within missions tend to be almost nonexistent. Some amazing things popped up in some amazing places in Mogadishu. Holy smokes! It got to a point where the people you wanted to have it seemed to be the only people in the whole country that didn't have it.

The other side of the bell curve is up at the U.N. Headquarters. I don't see, quite frankly, the level of distribution I'd like to see among policy makers. I think there's some real value in getting that sort of stuff disseminated, packaged so it's readable by the executive. He doesn't have a lot of time to do this, but he gets used to getting an intelligence update, in some form, every day. That's a very spotty effort. It's not routinely done the way you and I would assume. You come into work every morning, and you expect to see a good intelligence update on everything that you touched the night before. We tend not to do that. The Situation Center does produce, daily and

then some, an intelligence or a reporting summary based on information that we've given them, that other countries give them, and their reports from the field. That is given to DPKO, and I'm not sure to whom else in the Secretary General's office. Additionally, they produce a much smaller executive summary. It takes the four or five pages and wraps into two pages.

Student: Who's doing this?

Clontz: It's done by the Situation Center.

Student: So they have an equivalent of some kind of truth shop?

Clontz: That's kind of my next point. Equivalent is really the operative word here. It's a collection, cut-and-paste center. They basically collect data from the various sources, do editorial writing, and put it out. There's no effort, at this point, to do any real analysis or census or tracking over time to see what intelligence trends are. So basically they collect, put it in a preliminary package, and put it out.

Student: Can you comment on that issue that you just raised as it relates to command and control? Is the U.S. sending intelligence information through your office to the Situation Room to be shared with a peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation out in the field, and does it ultimately get to them?

Clontz: Yes. Actually we send it to the Situation Center to share with whomever the U.N. thinks they ought to share it with. We don't tell them, "Give this to the following eight guys in your organization," though we certainly hope it goes to them.

Student: But if you have a really good piece of tactical information that would be helpful to the guys on the ground, and you have U.S. troops under U.N. command, and it's coming through a different channel out there, where does that put you in terms of U.N. Headquarters deciding not to send it to the field commander, but U.S. elements get it?

Clontz: Our experience so far is that that's a problem for the U.N. We don't have any problems about making sure. If we've got timely information we think needs to go out, we're very straightforward about that. We have comm links to U.S. elements in there. We send that to them with instructions to share it with their field commander. Generally, the field commander will call back to U.N. Headquarters and beat up on them and say, "Hey, you guys have got this stuff. I know you've got it. How come I don't have it?" If the U.N. Headquarters feels embarrassed, or doesn't like that, they can referee it themselves. We're not willing to sit on information because they haven't gotten around to distributing it. If we have the means to do that we'll put it out.

By the same token we can do that among allies. There may be a larger British contingent, and the U.S. won't have any qualms about asking them to disseminate it. They do the same with us.

Student: That raises a very interesting question that we were talking about at lunch—national links versus U.N. comm links. I can imagine some pretty ruffled feathers being ruffled even further when that happens. One of the other things you also tend to pick up when you are treading around the corridors, let's face it, is a kind of—I don't know what's the correct word—tendency to undervalue intelligence simply because it comes from the U.S. in this fashion. Have you noticed any of that?

Clontz: You do hit a bit of that. Not so much undervalue; I find it is distrust. If we were painting a different picture on what's developing on the ground somewhere than the U.N. has from its own reporting, there's a natural mistrust that says, "We think you're trying to slant information here for a particular objective." I'll walk through a good case shortly here. We had a lot of that in Somalia lately. In fact, in the last two weeks, we were getting very different pictures from the U.S. side and the U.N. side. It was kind of refreshing. We all just sat down with the folks who do this on the U.S. side and the U.N. side (and we are all seeing the same reports here; we do share that sort of information) and said, "Let's

walk through how we all came to the conclusions we did."

What we found was that it's a fairly mechanistic process. For the last couple of weeks in Mogadishu, for example, it's been a very up-and-down situation. All you have to do is read a newspaper. There's a very quiet day, and then all of a sudden there are a bunch of technical vehicles running around the airport threatening anything. There are very dramatic differences. As it turns out, the U.S. information that we normally receive at the U.S. mission dealing with Somalia goes through all the usual U.S. filters, and we get information about 18 to 24 hours after the U.N. gets the same information. So we'll say on a given day, "Boy, it's looking a little rough around the edges here." We'd cross-check across the U.N.: "No, it looks pretty good to us." We did this for about three or four days running and said, "Okay, let's play doctor. I'll show you mine, you show me yours." It turned out it's the same stuff, but it's 18 hours out of sequence, and because it's very up and down, it looked really different.

Now the other part of that is, you've got to look at the environment in which you're operating. To me the learning point from that particular exercise was not that we're out of sync in time, but the difference between a minor incident and a very serious threat to someone at the airport is not very large in terms of quantity. Four or five extra technical vehicles and 50 or 60 extra tribesmen with automatic weapons could be a serious threat to you. So the margin of what constitutes a threat versus what constitutes just normal business in Mogadishu can be very, very different.

There is, quite frankly, some institutional bias. Most of the people in the United Nations who are involved in a peacekeeping operation want that operation to succeed, and they will tend to put a better spin on events. Most of our intelligence community, by definition, by training, by good solid reason, tends to be conservative, and a little pessimistic sometimes. So there's just a bit of a natural tendency to be a little different. So if you get those and you put them out of sync, in terms of time, you get

a very different picture on the same information.

Oettinger: I find this fascinating, because if you go back over what we've discussed in the last ten minutes, it has very little to do, to my mind, with what is specifically United Nations. It has a lot to do with the development and use of intelligence and the relationship between producers of various stripes and consumers of various stripes. I won't bore you with it, but I urge you to do the exercise in your minds of comparing what was just said with what was said by people from different services. Remember the guy who said the Navy had to have their own production guy there because they didn't want to see it through Air Force eyes and a particular customer. In fact, everything Bill has said in the whole presentation, perhaps exacerbated by virtue of the fact that the U.N. has problems of the kind that will occur in other organizations, and is in a different stage of development in terms of cohesion and so on, is an endemic problem. It's kind of nice to have it on record in terms of an organization that's finding itself, as opposed to some of the things we've heard in this semester where it's folks who have been working it for a decade and have made some progress, or in some instances have made no progress. Some of these questions are intractable, not because it has to do with the United Nations, but because they're very difficult intelligence production and consumption questions.

Clontz: I think the problems are worse because it's United Nations inherent, but there's nothing original. I could strike the United Nations and say State Department in my experience and have the same sort of dialogue. With coalition warfare and folks who were involved in Desert Storm/Desert Shield, you saw some of the same sorts of things. There's nothing unique here. It's just a good deal more difficult to get the handle on it at the U.N.

Student: Taking for granted the two camps between farming out to one country to provide the command and control system for some operation and this other concept

of having this combined staff of all different nations, how is an intelligence section ever going to function? What is it going to look like inside? Are you going to have 20 different communications systems coming from 20 different nations? What kind of power battles are going to be fought?

Clontz: Let me give you the good news and the bad news. The bad news is you're seeing a bit of that. The Situation Center is a quantum improvement on how the U.N. used to do business. It didn't exist a year ago, but it is staffed by 24 individuals from 19 countries. That was a conscious political decision made so everybody got an interest. That's just inherently unbelievably inefficient, but it gave lots of different countries a stake in the Situation Center.

In terms of how this thing will work mechanically for intelligence and command and control, when Secretary Perry was up at the U.N. last month, we'd been working a proposal at a sort of low level for about two or three months, and it came on line by the time he came over, so he formally made an offer to the U.N. Some of you are probably familiar with DISA, the Defense Information Services Agency. One of the things they do is build command posts and C2 structures. They don't do turnkey operations, to my understanding, but they can design one based on your needs with exquisite detail right down to "Here are the numbers and types of computers you need, based on where you're going to set it up. Here are some extension cords you'll need. Here's the electrical load your room can or cannot handle. Here's the air circulation pattern." It's an exquisitely detailed exercise. The Situation Center is getting ready to move. They're in the UNITAR (U.N. Institute for Training and Research) building now and they're going to move to the U.N. Secretariat building. DISA is going to come down in the May/June timeframe and offer to design one of these things for them, but it is designed in a generic sense, so that it doesn't say, "You need to buy the following five Hewlett-Packard or IBM computers." What it will say is, "You need this much computing and processing power and you need this many electrical systems." They will consciously design it so if the

U.N. wants to it can buy one-third of the computers in the U.S., one-third from India, one-third from wherever. It doesn't make any difference, but you will have the technical specs so that whatever you buy will all net together in the physical sense.

That's the easy piece. The harder piece, which they are really just getting started on, are the SOPs, standard operating procedures, on how you do that. Who generates a report when? Who has to call somebody when something goes down? A lot of that's been done in the last year or so. I'll tell you a couple of amusing stories on that shortly. But, if you get good interoperable equipment and you get some SOPs, I think it'll dampen down a lot of this.

But to cut to the end of your question, I don't think you'll ever get an all-source analysis intelligence center like we're used to. I'm not sure you need that for the U.N., quite frankly. I just don't know if you can get there from here, or what it would take to make that a truly functional operational capability. It's just way too soon. We're going down the yellow brick road and seeing how that's going to go.

Oettinger: But I regard this as a very optimistic statement from the U.N. point of view, because, as you say, what we're used to in the U.S. military has taken 30 years to get there from here. So to me it's music to my ears to hear you say that we've gotten used to doing something.

Clontz: But remember, I've only been here three months. So I'm not cynical yet.

Student: But as an alternative, if each of the countries that was providing information provided it in the same format, wrote to a U.N. style or something like that, it might eliminate some of the problem. Can you see that evolving?

Clontz: Yes. I can. That's the second piece. There are a number of contractors from several countries, the U.S. included, who offered to do some work with the U.N. in terms of things like a relational database shell. You can think of any number of applications where you could put information into that database. It becomes

part of your historical intelligence analysis, part of your budgeting, part of your theories. They're trying to move to that so that your having trained from a particular country is not important, and your being particularly good in a given language is not important. They're trying to make as many of these things menu driven as they can. Behind that simple menu is an electronic program that will do the crosswalk, so that you get that sort of information. That's a good example: "If you're going to give me some intelligence or give me some information, here's the format I'd like you to have."

Right now we don't even have that inside the U.N. for internal reports. If something bad happens in Mogadishu or Kigali or someplace, the conversation about how good that report is tends to depend on who's on both ends of the telephone. It's one of these situations, "Call back, I need this. Call back, I need that." We're just getting there.

There's a quick story I was going to mention on the Situation Center, to show you what a culture change this is. I am told that at Christmas of 1992, one of the missions, I think it was in Somalia, had a real problem, and some sort of crisis came up. They really needed some guidance from New York. Had you left then? Were you there in 1992?

Student: No, I was gone.

Clontz: It was over a holiday weekend, Christmas weekend, I think. The mission overseas called Headquarters in New York and no one was home. They couldn't find anybody for the better part of a day. Now, that's criminal. You can't do that. To their credit, the powers that be at the U.N. said, "That's criminal. We can't do that," and very quickly, they cobbled together the Situation Center, which is now growing into something fairly impressive. It's getting to be a pretty impressive outfit. Now, it is 24 hours a day, seven days a week. You can call that number from anywhere on the planet and get a reasonably intelligent guy who, maybe not immediately, but pretty quickly, can put his hands on somebody in each of the departments. It's not to the point where he's got an electronic link. He

doesn't really have a good roster of duty officers in each section, but it's rapidly moving that way. More importantly, the guys in the field can call and get that, more so than people in New York trying to get to the field site. It's starting. I would hope that eventually it would be something like the Situation Room in the White House—a really integrated, deep, cross-reference affair that tracks lots of information and puts it out to lots of people, but doesn't try to run operations. That's probably the right model.

Student: My question has something to do with that. It seems from your talk there is still a lot of confusion and frustration with the dissemination of intelligence, and I imagine that bodes the same amount of frustration and confusion for the commander of the peacekeeping operation. Does he at this time have the recourse to utilizing national sources?

Clontz: Sure.

Student: Is that something that is done as part of U.N. doctrine, or is it just kind of a "This is the best I can do, I'm going to do what I have to, call my buddies back at my war department or whatever and get that information?"

Clontz: It's done frequently. It's done by necessity. It's not a formal U.N. doctrine, but it's sort of like the unofficial black market. It's just the way you need to do business and everybody who does that has the capability of doing that and it works. To a large degree, that depends on who that commander is and what country he comes from. You may well have a commander from a country that doesn't have those resources either, but he may be able to call on friends who can help him do that.

Student: For instance, how much contact has General Rose* had with the U.N. as opposed to back home in the U.K.?

* General Sir Michael Rose, Commander of the U.N. Protection Force in Bosnia.

Clontz: We were saying at lunch that General Rose is a particularly astute guy. He has really gotten the most out of the U.N. system and his national system, and, I think it's fair to say, the Navy system as well. He's been very aboveboard about it, but he has used every means he's got. That's a good example: if you happen to get a commander from a country that has large and important capabilities, he brings with him a lot of goodies because his country wants him to succeed. So there's something to be said for that. Very often though, that's not the case.

Student: Is the converse equally true?

Clontz: Yes, it is, and we're talking about the command and control piece here. That's another issue. It's frequently very tough. Very often you really don't know what kind of commander you've got until he steps off the plane in the operational area. That's pretty exciting for a military guy to contemplate. There are places in the world where you get to be a three-star general because you're related to somebody or you're the next guy in line, or whatever. No system's perfect, but there is a bell curve out there, too, about how people get to be high-ranking military officers. You'd like to know that the person who is available to run that operation can really do that. Sometimes you can, sometimes you can't. We'll come to that shortly. The U.N.'s trying to tackle that one as well. But again, that's a function of, "Okay, if you don't like that guy, who else is offering somebody?" Sometimes nobody. Sometimes that's the only guy in line. It's a question of him or nobody. It's not good.

I mentioned a little about the JDISS. The last category the U.S. has worked with a bit lately is the formal emergency request. This is one that really gets to the issue. We got a request two weeks ago, I guess, when things started going really badly in Rwanda. A number of reports were coming in. You have to envision what this looked like to the U.N. They had a small group of peacekeepers up on the Rwanda/Uganda border, who were really isolated, and they had a lot of folks in Kigali; nobody down south, nobody in the north between the

capital and that area. They started getting a lot of second-hand reports from third-country nationals, from other member states, from the international media, that indicated that they had two scenarios. One said, "This thing is really going badly for the country, but there's no immediate threat to the peacekeepers and we've got a few days to see how this thing goes. Maybe the peacekeepers can help contribute to settling this thing down. Let's let this thing run its course for a few days." They had some other information that said, "Your guys have been targeted as well. There is one solid bloodbath at the Ugandan border coming down. It's not just the government forces. It's the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) that's doing all the killing, and they're not going to stop when they come to your guys. You're not only not going to be able to make any difference, but your guys are also going to be sacrificed." If that was true, they had about 24 hours to decide if they were going to try to pull everybody out at the same time they were evacuating all the foreign nationals, or if they were going to stick it out.

So they came to us and a number of other countries as well. I'm sure they went to the Belgians, they went to the French, I don't know who else, and they said, "We've got two reports and we've got to make a decision. We don't have the information to do it. We need some help. What have you got?" I was impressed. It took about six hours for the U.S. community to work its way through and say, "We've got some information for you." Our senior intelligence individual at the mission did it as a verbal brief to the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping and said, "Don't take this very far, but you can make your decision based on this." Boom. That's what he's got.

Student: Was it definitive enough to make the decision? Because that in itself would have been remarkable.

Clontz: The scenarios were so different. Almost any national technical means could have told you that, "Yes, that's happened or not happened." We were able to tell him with fairly high relative confidence, "We

don't think you've got that big a problem. This is not a good situation. We don't think a worst-case scenario is developing. We don't see the evidence of that." They got that from whomever else they went to, too. They made the decision to sit for a few days and it worked out okay. But I was amazed. I thought, "Boy, we're never going to get this this quickly." We got it at the end of the same day, and I was impressed.

Student: Did you let the collectors know?

Clontz: Yes, you bet. One reason I went back last week, as a matter of fact, was to thank the guys who did that. They did good.

If I could talk just a minute on multiple sourcing for intelligence, both over at the U.N. and for the U.S. mission, obviously the United Nations does not want to be dependent on any one country for intelligence if it can help it. First, that's just not smart business, and second, I'm an operator and I love getting intelligence, but I don't trust anything that comes from one source. I like to get lots of sources, too. So everybody shops around for intelligence. I thought it might be interesting just to go down the list sort of in order of how everybody seems to work the intelligence piece on both sides of the U.N. Plaza there.

For us, in almost all cases, we go to our traditional sources—DIA, CIA, the U.S. government agencies that work intelligence. That's sort of our baseline core. For the U.N., depending on the area of operations they're considering, they will use that information as a baseline from which they start, too. But there are many places where we just don't have much to contribute. We just don't have the assets or the information, and other places do. But to the extent we can, the people in the peacekeeping operations, as opposed to the Secretariat guys, who are a little more suspicious, will take that core of information you give them and they'll say, "Okay, here is truth as I know it today. Let's go see who else has got the same truth here."

For us, if we start with U.S. sources, our first stop is usually the Situation Center either to see what they have on hand, or ask them to query the field specifically. They

are very good about taking PRs (procurement requests). We tell them, "I'm hearing some things from my side. I'm happy to share what I've got. I need to confirm it," or we just tell them, "I'm getting some queries from Washington. I need to know the following things." If they don't have it, they're usually pretty good about calling the field and asking them for the information. As we talked about at lunch, sometimes a field will give you that, sometimes it won't. Most of the field commanders are good about keeping their independence from Washington or from New York. Every once in a while, they'll just say, "Yes, we'll get back to you on that," and they never do, just to make sure New York understands they can't micromanage an operation in the field. That's pretty healthy and that's all right.

The next most-useful source we found are the field desks, or the desk officers inside the U.N. in the various departments—peacekeeping guys, logistics guys. Lately the bright light has come on. We figured out that the humanitarian assistance people, who within U.N. organizations have nothing to do with peacekeeping, would be useful. It's a whole separate operation and until recently we didn't talk to each other. It's very often your first and best indication there's a potential peacekeeping operation coming up. They'll start seeing refugees long before the peacekeeping guys ever get that word. So they're an extremely useful source to talk to about what's going on.

We have a fascinating relationship with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). As a U.S. military guy, I had worked with NGOs before—Médecins sans Frontières, the Red Cross, all those folks. I suppose in some ways the relationship we had in Somalia is a pretty good paradigm of how I think that goes. It's a real love-hate, I need you-I don't need you relationship between them. For military people on the ground, NGOs can be a wonderful source of information. Again, they frequently know what's going on long before you do, but they can be a real burden to protect. NGOs, in my limited experience, have a habit of putting themselves in places where they don't need to be from a security point of view, and they need somebody in the mili-

tary to come get them out. From the NGO point of view, they are certainly grateful to have whatever help and assistance and protection you could give them, but their stock in trade is their credibility as a neutral force that is there to help. Every time they do business with any kind of structured force, they put that at risk. So there's a real tension, and you've just got to work that a day at a time, individual time.

The worst-case scenario, from our perspective, is when you get an NGO that is naive and thinks a good way to ingratiate itself with a local power is to give him some information that you have given the NGO and that could endanger an operation. In my own experience, most NGOs are pretty hardened, smart folks. They were in country long before we got there, they'll be there when we leave, and they're fairly smart guys. There can be a sharing of information, but it is not an easy relationship for either the peacekeeper or for the NGO.

Student: How about the NGOs that have agendas?

Clontz: That's almost a redundant term.

Student: Like Human Rights Watch. There are a lot of organizations out there that just go in, try to get information, and make their case.

Clontz: I think most of the U.N. operations have been fairly successful in dealing with the NGOs, and the few U.S. ones seem to be doing that. You go in with the assumption that there is probably a secondary and tertiary agenda on everybody's part; they assume the same, and you don't know what that is. It's not like I really support you or love you, but you've got something I need, and I probably owe you something in terms of protection. I'll see what we can do business on here and we'll figure out the rest of it later.

Oettinger: This is, again, sort of an almost universal interorganizational or interpersonal paradigm. You do business with whomever you can. You assume that they're not necessarily your friends, and I think Bill put it very well: God save us

from amateurs. They are the most dangerous. The agendas don't do nearly the damage that amateurs do.

Clontz: I've reached a point where sincere people just scare the hell out of me. I like an old crusty cynic. I can sort of do business with that guy there. Sincere people are just dangerous in this environment.

Student: I do think it's worth mentioning that a lot of NGOs, apart from the ones who perhaps might be engaged directly in humanitarian relief, but all the human rights people, have an interest not only in giving you information, but also in giving you correct information, because it doesn't do them any good if they make a fuss about something that subsequently proves to be false.

Clontz: Yes. The NGOs really walk a tightrope more than we do. They really need the local population's cooperation and they really need the peacekeepers. They really do have a delicate balance to walk.

Oettinger: This is, by the way, one of the reasons why the newspapers and the general public and so on distort the role of lobbyists. Just to be parochial for a moment, take the Washington scene. Everything you describe is absolutely true of good professional lobbyists. Their word is their bond and they don't survive by screwing around with their friends, even though they all know that they may be on different sides of the same argument. Again, there are the dangers from outsiders coming in who don't know what the hell they're doing and mess up what otherwise is a fairly carefully honed professional operation.

Clontz: It sure is.

Student: There is one category you haven't mentioned yet: the press.

Clontz: That's coming up next, divided into two categories here, if I might: the U.S. media and the international media. Those of us in the U.S. are accustomed to dealing with the U.S. media and CNN. In

U.N. Headquarters, U.S. missions, just like any U.S. government or military organization, there is a TV tuned in to CNN with the sound turned off and you're looking for pictures, because that frequently is the first report you get. What's slightly different on the U.N. side is that we've got better access than most U.S. operations due to the larger international media community. There's a fair-sized contingent of international media that is accredited to the U.N., and they will come to you for information a lot. But I admit it, they are a terrific source of information as well. That's very much a two-way street. As we were saying at lunch, I really miss the downlink for BBC and Sky News. I get that only intermittently in New York. When I was working in Paris, boy, those were very useful sources to me. So the media is very much a source of information.

Now the problem in a lot of situations on the ground is that the media are no more accurate than anybody else. They just have an imperative to get the information out, so frequently they don't check. They're also very subject to being misled. It's been a terrific problem in the war in Bosnia. Either side will feed stories to them and there's a deadline coming. I'm the first guy to get it. It hits the airwaves and it becomes a fact. The U.N. is subject to the same pressure as we are domestically—terrible stories in the media, and questions about what we are going to do about it. You just heard the report on your car radio coming out and there is a guy with a microphone in your face on U.N. Plaza. "What are you going to do about this?" It's the same problem the President said he's had there. Six hours later, he found out it's a planted story; nothing to it. Such-and-such an atrocity, or such-and-such an offensive, never happened. But you have to deal with that all the time.

Generally, we on the U.S. side, and also I think it's fair to say most of the U.N. folks in the peacekeeping business, use that as a first indicator. It's a hand-raiser. It may be something or may not be, but more times than not, perhaps not in quantity or quality, but in some degree, there is something there, so you can't afford not to chase

it down. It's frequently your first indication.

Student: Do you think there's a difference between something like CNN, which is visual, and the print media? When you see the television pictures, it looks like the whole place is going to hell in a handbasket. Most of the information that you're getting from on-the-ground U.N. troops is probably going to be in print, in cable-ese or something like that. Is there a difference there in terms of the immediacy?

Clontz: There is a difference there, and there's a bit of what I call the "tea leaves phenomenon" too, inside any bureaucracy—in the U.S. mission, in the State Department (I think they're particularly prone to do it), and to some degree, the U.N. They'll get the morning press clippings and they'll agonize over the phraseology. Ninety-nine percent of the planet couldn't care less. They went right to the sports page. This is not going to have an impact on policy, but there will be much wailing and gnashing of teeth over some sentence. I'm convinced in the scheme of life it amounts to naught. So inside our little community of high priests, we'll all get exercised about it.

But you're exactly right in terms of making something happen: the visual media certainly does. And the media's not above packaging to have the impact. So you may have a story that there's been a massacre in such-and-such a village. Nobody knows that, but this is TV and I need pictures. So get me a clip of another massacre and we'll use that as background: this is a village being massacred. That's a distinction that really gets lost when it goes across the airwaves.

Oettinger: But I think, though, a lot of media studies over the last decade or so show that even for the visual stuff, what you've described about the print stuff is pretty much the norm for most people. That is, it is one of the most distrusted of the media among ordinary folks. A lot of the research showed that. Everybody is exposed to lying ads and fake thises and thats, so that I think the impact on the pro-

fessional community is greater than the impact on real folks. What keeps troubling me about the analyses and gnashing of teeth in *Foreign Affairs* or elsewhere about CNN, et cetera, is that it's more of an in-group phenomenon than it really is something that matters to real people.

Clontz: Somalia may be the big exception. It's going to be a trite phrase now: the media got us into Somalia and the media took us out of Somalia. But I think that's the exception rather than the rule. If you look at all the coverage that is going on in Bosnia, there have just been horrific things graphically depicted. When you look at the polls in the U.S., there's no sentiment to put men on the ground and all that in spite of two years of continuous coverage. So yes, it varies.

Student: In Latin America we had a list of reporters and press, so that if they were the source, you'd take it on faith; with others, you just blew them off; and with still others, you'd just wait and you'd have to get confirmation about anything.

Clontz: Yes. There are some that are just more reliable, and there are some where we'll go to the trouble and check. There are some who have an agenda. Quite frankly, with some guys, it's just a style of writing. Some people just do sensationalist writing. Sometimes you'll read a quotation and you think, "I don't believe he really said that," and you go back, and he didn't say that, but somebody put a little spin on it there. But I do think we probably stew in the media juices more than we need to.

Student: But do you use them?

Clontz: In what sense? To get information, or ... ?

Student: No, to get your message out.

Clontz: Oh, sure, yes, you bet.

Student: How?

Clontz: Usually very up front, and quite frankly, we don't have any problem with

that. You don't understand. Our number two ambassador is Rick Heneford, who was a journalist for some years. He won a Peabody or something, I guess, for his coverage of Russia some years ago. He's pretty good, but he doesn't have any problem about calling a journalist. He's got a pretty good entrée with these guys, not because he cuts them any more slack, but he's just of the faith. He's got no problem with saying, "You know, from our perspective, the coverage has not been really clean on this," or "You guys haven't looked at this lately. Anybody interested in an exclusive interview with an ambassador? We'd like to tell you what's going on and what we think our side of it is. You can use or not use what you want to. We'd like to have a hearing on it." He gets a pretty good response on it. It generally gets pretty good coverage.

Now again, it's probably easier for us because Albright's in the Cabinet, so she tends to get better media response than a lot of ambassadors might, and she's a good interview. She's good on TV, too. She's doing *Larry King Live* Friday night. Watch it! How many ambassadors will sign up to do *Larry King Live*?

Oettinger: Once the President sets the tone, it becomes safe for ambassadors.

Clontz: That's right. That's it.

Student: Have you noticed the U.N. itself making any more use of public information and public affairs in carrying forward its field operations?

Clontz: No. The U.S. has four or five areas that we're continually pounding from a national perspective, where we tell the U.N., "We really think you're woefully inadequate here and you're hurting yourself." Use of public media and public affairs is one of them. There is a public affairs department, but it's pretty amateurish. We don't think they do a very good job of telling our story. We don't think they do a very good job of using the public media means that are available to them in a theater of operations to tell people inside a given country what's going on. It would seem to

me that spending a little bit of money for a radio transmission capability, for a TV capability, for newspaper production, would be money well spent. I suppose it's tinged with propaganda issues. Maybe that's part of it. But they do not do that very well and I think they hurt in this country because of it. The U.N. is working very hard doing some very nice things. But, boy, you'd never know it!

Student: Does the U.S. encourage a United Nations PR effort? Because in the past, at least, it did everything possible to discourage it, at least in the days when, according to the U.S. perception, the United Nations majority did not agree with the United States. So for many, many years we did everything possible, we wouldn't give any money if at all possible, et cetera, et cetera.

Clontz: That was then. This is now.

Student: And that has dramatically changed?

Clontz: That has done a 180. It's true ahead. I can tell you that's a specific area that we've raised several times at the U.N. and told them that they need to put some muscle and some capability in that area, very much so.

Student: We have a U.N. Secretariat Fellow at the CFIA (Center for International Affairs at Harvard) who has written a research paper on just this point. If you're interested, I'll see whether she would be willing to share it.

Clontz: I'd love to see it. Yes, thank you, I would.

I was going to mention the last two sources that we all go to—we, the U.N., ourselves. Other member states are not to be forgotten. There are a lot of countries with some very important capabilities in a lot of places that nobody covers well. So again, how willing anybody is to share what they really have is open, but it seems to us a wasted opportunity if you don't canvass the field very widely every day for areas that you have an interest in. It appears

to me (again, it's a subjective evaluation) that it's not something that the U.N., in terms of the Situation Center DPKO, does quite as aggressively as it might. It would just seem very useful to put somebody to work on the phones or making the rounds every day, asking a couple of pointed questions and saying, "No kidding, I really need some information. What can you help me with?" There are a number of countries that will give you something if you ask for it, but if you don't ask, they're not going to volunteer it. So ask! It doesn't hurt. I probably hit about 30 or 40 percent of the time when I do that—go around to the various missions—but it's 30 or 40 percent more than I had before, so I like to do that.

Then lastly, there is, as everyone here is aware, a wealth of really useful open source information out there. It's extraordinarily useful for the sort of thing the U.N. needs today. That gets in some ways back to the business of the hardware, and the software, and the modem, and the downlinks, and those sorts of capabilities. There is probably more information out there than the U.N. could ever use, but they've got to get their hands on it and they've got to come up with some means to organize that data. There is just a ton of stuff.

We have made the point on occasion, when they've come to us for information in a given area. If we can, we're more than happy to provide it. We've asked the U.S. government agencies to do that. We said, "We know you get some of this stuff from open sources. Bring the bibliography, show them the open sources that they can go to directly without having to go through you." In some cases that means that someone just didn't want to do the research work. They'd rather you do it. But very frequently you get people who are challenged to find out about something, and it's not really their functional area, so they don't know. So let's share the information out there.

Oettinger: On the open source thing, there's a curious note, and it may be well worth the attention of the U.N. and national governments and others. There are now on the horizon technological means from several outfits with low earth orbiting satel-

lites, and they have half a dozen competitors who would like nothing better in the next five to ten years than to provide global coverage from a hand-held computer. At that point, the notion of having the businessman, or the humanitarian, or the NGO, or whoever happens to be wherever whatever is happening, become an on-the-spot reporter opens up. In terms of this question of who is where and knows what and so on, it seems to me that over the next decade there may be some very significant changes, at least in the popular possibilities. That's again another reason for keeping on stressing what are sort of bureaucratic essentials and essential tensions, because the details of all of this will keep changing. You need to know the fundamentals in order to be able to take advantage. I think the means are going to improve that radically.

Clontz: The capabilities have outstripped the demands for some time in this environment. Yes, I think you're right.

I was going to talk just a bit about the analytical and timing disconnects, but the example I cited earlier about Somalia just highlights it. You've all seen that in various interagency processes, but it is more accentuated in the U.N. The information comes from several different sources, so even if you're saying the same thing, it's really worth getting very specific about time and source and crosswalking those two. If you've got a disconnect, very frequently that's where the difference is.

I was going to lead a bit into command and control. Are there any other specific issues anyone wants to talk about on intelligence?

Student: I have one question about intelligence and availability to everybody. Is there any kind of publication from the U.N. about proliferation, something like *Jane's Weapon Systems*, on weapon systems of a certain type produced last year, delivered to such-and-such countries, confirmed by the producing country or by producers themselves, to tie that down?

Clontz: We're nowhere near the capability of something like a *Jane's*, quite frankly.

There are a number of efforts going on in the U.N., some of which are driven by a General Assembly resolution and some by Security Council resolutions. There are frequent reports, specifically in the area of weapons nonproliferation.

Student: Wouldn't it be useful to produce every year something that says, "We know that this number of weapons systems was produced and they were delivered, or are under construction, or under contract ..."

Student: Doesn't the International Atomic Energy Agency do that, though?

Student: I don't know. I have never seen it.

Clontz: For nuclear weapons they do, yes. You're talking about, say, if you got munitions and chemical weapons and that sort of stuff.

Student: That would be useful, too.

Student: There is something in the U.N. called the Center for Disarmament, and I'm sure if you were to write to them they would deluge you with paper. I wonder quite how much of it is useful paper. That's another question entirely.

Student: With overproduction you can do that.

Clontz: There's an actual mechanical process in the U.N., too, just in terms of the volume of paper. You'd be amazed how late some documents come out. I'm still getting original issue of items from the last General Assembly. They finished up months ago. Some of that's just failure to adopt modern technology and use desktop publishing. I'm convinced there's a guy named Gutenberg in a basement somewhere chiseling out the letters. Things come out slowly and they come out prodigiously. The numbers of copies are just stunning. We had something the other day. Myanmar, which used to be Burma, has lifted their economic sanctions against South Africa. That's a two-page document.

I've got six copies in my six-people office. Imagine how many went out from the U.N., period. That's kind of staggering. That's some of the waste, fraud, and abuse stuff. That's the old business of, "If we're going to put this out, everybody should get it, so give everybody a copy so nobody's offended." That's the opposite of "keep the good information," but that kind of stuff just churns out forever. The publishing arm tends to run way behind, so really substantive, detailed stuff like that just never gets cranked out.

Student: Bill, you said you go to the Pentagon or the DIA or the intelligence agencies for intelligence. Do you ever go directly to a unified command?

Clontz: Sure, you bet, absolutely. I've got a pretty good setup, with phone numbers for all the JTFs, all the CINCs, and that's a two-way deal. I try to give them a heads-up, too. If I get a whiff something's coming up, and it's in their area of operations, we're quick to pass that to them, along with the caveat that, on a scale of confidence, here's what we've got. That works very well.

Interestingly enough, from the U.S./U.N. side, Ambassador Albright really works the CINCs. She calls them all. In the three months I've been there, two of them have been through. A couple more are coming in the next couple of months. So she's figured out that's a pretty good comm link for everybody.

Student: How many times has she met with Joulwan?

Clontz: Once that I know of. She and Shalikashvili talk on a regular basis. CINCSOUTH has been up. General Hoar (CINCCENT) is coming up Tuesday. She gets around. She and Boorda* talk so much that it drives the Pentagon crazy. They can't figure out what the hell they're talking about. They just know they're talking to each other. So now he's the CNO, they're really worried about what's going on over

* Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda, Chief of Naval Operations, 1994-

there. Yes, that's an excellent point. Unified commands are a really useful resource.

I probably should mention that NATO has a permanent liaison desk inside the United Nations in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. They have chosen to man that in a very interesting way. That officer has no institutional capability. He is literally a high-powered courier, and they rotate him every two weeks so that he is truly current on what's going on in NATO, and when the U.N. guy asks him, "What's NATO doing here?" or "What's the NATO view on this?" he can speak with some authority. And because he rotates every two weeks, they now have a stable of operators back in NATO who are pretty familiar with the U.N. piece. They've done two or three rotations. We talk to those guys fairly regularly, too.

That's an interesting relationship. He's a NATO guy, not a U.S. guy. Sometimes he's a U.S. officer, sometimes he's not, but when he's there, he is there as a NATO officer. So occasionally when I've got something, even though that's a guy I've known ten years, I can't give that to him as a NATO guy, or he's got something, but he's got instructions. He'll share it with the U.N., but not with any missions, that includes me. We all do a bit of that. But that's a really useful conduit also. We find very frequently that works out well.

Student: One of the sources you haven't mentioned, which we've talked about some in this class, are commercial organizations, big multinational corporations. To what extent do you use them and to what extent do they use you?

Clontz: It depends on how much money the U.N. owes them.

Student: I see.

Clontz: No, that is a good point. Quite frankly, unless the U.N. has a contract with them, where they actually do work with them, they really don't have a means to tap into them very much. We, as the U.S./U.N., don't do very much of that either, though obviously the sources that produce intelligence for us do some of that.

Yes, that's an excellent point. Right now, I suppose, in Somalia, probably one of the best intelligence sources you've got is Brown and Root, which is doing all the contract servicing work for the UNOSOM (United Nations Operations, Somalia) mission. They're out there doing everything from portable latrines to aircraft engine maintenance. They're all over the place. They're probably a great source. We just don't have the mechanism to tap into that directly.

Student: Does the fact that some of those organizations are truly multinationals now give you some pause when you ask them for information?

Clontz: No, it doesn't me, because again, if I've got any time at all, I take everything somebody gives me with a grain of salt. I'm always looking for somebody else, so that's just one more source to add to the hopper.

Command and control, if I might. There are two schools of thought. One school says, "There's entirely too much command and control going on in the U.N. They're trying to direct stuff from the top. Boutros Ghali thinks he's the king of the world. They're trying to run field operations." The other school says, "This thing is out of control. There's no command and control, nobody's in charge." I'm pleased to inform you, both groups are absolutely right. It sort of depends on which operation you're looking at, and I'll try to make some sense out of that in a minute.

What's driven this whole business, quite frankly, is the rapid growth in peacekeeping operations. When you did one peacekeeping operation every decade for 40 years, this wasn't particularly important. Depending on how you count these things, the U.N. has signed on for more PKOs in the last four years than they did in their first 43 years. They used to have four or five going. There are about 18 going now. The peacekeeping budget used to be about \$250 to \$280 million, in that range. It's running about \$4 billion a year now. There are at any one time about 70,000 troops in the field under U.N. direction, in just about every time zone on the planet. That is really

rapid growth. So how do you command and control that? Also, a lot more of these operations have gotten much more violent. Suddenly command and control becomes a very important issue.

Oettinger: As you were talking, I was trying to figure out how many there were. I can recollect maybe about five, which is only a fraction of the ones you mentioned. Can you remember all of them? I think we'd all be interested.

Clontz: I brought the list. Now, a lot of them are very small. We've still got the category I call vampire operations. You can't kill them. They just keep coming up. We're still doing peacekeeping in Palestine from the 1940s. Cyprus is still going. There's one going in the western Sahara. UNPROFOR (U.N. Protection Forces) is going. Somalia is going. There's a standby mission for Haiti. That's been standby since I've been there.

Oettinger: Cambodia?

Clontz: No, Cambodia's officially done.

Student: Kashmir?

Clontz: Yes, Kashmir's another one that's been going just forever.

Student: What about the one in South America? Is that over now, too? El Salvador?

Clontz: There is still an effort in El Salvador. That's essentially a done mission, but it's still on the books. Golly, I've forgotten what all the rest of them are now. There are three or four other small ones in Africa. Most of them are fairly small, but it all adds up to control and command and control issues.

From the U.S. perspective, I also roll in things like the multinational force observers in the Sinai. It's not a U.N. operation, but it ties up three battalions at any one time, one's there, one's coming out getting retrained for warfighting, one's en route, and all the overhead that goes with that. I'll leave you the list if you want. It's

an interesting breakdown. It's more than most people think about.

The command and control piece doesn't break down this cleanly, but I've looked at it from three perspectives: the culture of command and control, again inside the U.N.; procedural issues; and equipment and hardware issues. On the culture issue, there's the question of who is in charge. You have a number of candidates: the Secretary General, Security Council, the Secretary General's special representative in the theater of operations, the field commander, or the major donors. Depending on the issue at hand, any one or any combination of those can truly be in charge. The Secretary General can be in charge in the sense that he makes very broad decisions if, as has been the case frequently in the past, the Security Council gives him that kind of latitude and doesn't want to direct it, or it's one that everybody else sort of washes their hands of and he is left to make some decisions. It doesn't take a lot of imagination to imagine a really terrible situation where everybody says, "Option A is even worse than Option B. Secretary General, which one do you want to do?" It's not a really good choice. He is frequently put in that position.

The Security Council, when it chooses to, is probably, for my money, the most powerful organization in the U.N. They can do things or cease to do things with probably more impunity than any other body in the U.N. The Security Council is a very changing animal, depending on who's sitting on the Council this year, this month, this week. It can be extremely active or it can be extremely docile. Who the president is this month can make something of a difference, though I think that's probably less important than I would have thought before I came up there.

So it really is a moving piece in terms of who is actually in charge. It is not a clean line. I meant to get back earlier to something mentioned during lunch. In the best-case scenario, you design the absolute best command and control structure that is possible for the United Nations. It will never be as clean and as functional as anybody's national command and control. It will not get there, because this is an inher-

ently political process and it is inherently consensus-based to some degree. You're just never going to be able to ram through a sustained command and control structure the way you would do it as a national power. You can get a lot further along the line than we are now, but you are not going to get to Nirvana, I'm just convinced. I'm not sure you want to.

Oettinger: I don't think that the model that you hold up is necessarily right, because the command structures as they exist in peacetime in a national setting are hardly ever the right ones. The history is that the ones you concoct at the start of something are almost always wrong and you end up replacing the initial generals and the initial command structures.

Clontz: The plan never survives the first shot.

Oettinger: So it isn't all that far different, it seems to me.

Clontz: It's somewhere on the continuum, that's true.

Student: Sometimes you even change during the war, like in the Second World War. All the big participants changed some kind of command structures due to different types of operations and different environments, and in essence learned during the war.

Clontz: The only point I was trying to make is that otherwise it is a natural tendency for us to look at command and control as we used to in national settings and say, "That's the way you do command and control." That template doesn't quite match up, and you could move in that direction for all the right efficiency reasons, but you will not get to that objective, and in fact, when you look at the political factors involved, you really don't want to go quite that far. I don't know of anybody who's worked closely with the U.N. who really wants to have a U.N. military command and control structure that's as efficient as the best national structure. That would make a lot of people very nervous. You

don't really want to have that kind of capability. When you come down to it, nobody wants to do that. I shouldn't say nobody, but a lot of folks don't.

Student: Over time though, will your vampire organizations develop pretty good command and control, or are they always in a state of flux?

Clontz: No, they're doing pretty good command and control, but they're classic operations. They're not particularly threatened. They're inherently pretty clean and simple operations. They've gotten pretty routine. Everybody's gotten comfortable with each other. It seems to work out pretty well.

Of those, I think Cyprus is probably the one that's had the most flux and the most difficulty. Cyprus has gotten uneven from time to time, and it's been a really changeable environment. Cyprus is one of those, if my memory is correct, that is largely being paid for by the Cypriots now. Their contribution to that is increasing a bit.

Student: Here's hoping!

I think you're absolutely right, that you can't get up to a national command and control level, nor do you particularly want to. I think a potentially more serious problem is the mandate, because that is a deeply political thing.

Clontz: Yes, that's right. In fact, I was going to talk about that a bit at the very end. It's an excellent point, it really is. It's the mother stone of how these things start and end. It has traditionally been seen only as a political document, and it is primarily and largely a political document. I'm getting ahead of myself a bit, but yes, you really hit on probably the key document for this thing.

Let me finish up just a bit on some other cultural issues. "Culture" is probably not the right word, but things within the political area that you need to look at.

Other agendas. There is no such thing as a clean decision in the U.N., or anywhere else I suppose, but particularly in the U.N. Everything you look at in terms of how you structure a peacekeeping opera-

tion, how the mandate is written, or what that command and control piece does, has some impact on other issues that are about to come before the Council, or could be precedent setting.

A good example: about the time peace started breaking out all over Sarajevo, General Rose made the point, "I'm short about 2,500 to 3,000 troops that I need to do the Sarajevo peace correctly and sustain it. I'm short about 10,000 troops to attempt to do the same sort of thing in terms of the other safe areas, not a full-blown Sarajevo, just to hold these things together and continue doing the convoys, and do some sort of protection around safe areas." We didn't have enough troops; we were short of donors. The Turks came on line and said, "We can give you 2,000 or 3,000 troops tomorrow. They're good, dedicated, serious troops; they're disciplined; we're a member of NATO; we'll be ready to go tomorrow; we'll haggle about the prices later. We're ready to play. We want to get in this thing for lots of reasons." Straight military command and control were one consideration; to get a baseline force you can draw on when the field commander decides to bring them in. But this was clearly not a military command and control decision. Lots of people got real excited about this in terms strictly of the Turks and the Balkans, but there was a tertiary issue. The Secretary General, quite correctly in my humble opinion (and I don't often agree with the Secretary General, for whatever that's worth), said, "We have a precedent here that says you don't bring neighboring states into a peacekeeping operation. If you do it for all the good reasons we talk about, the next conversation you have is a Russian who would like to help his friends in Georgia with their neighboring problem. And you set a precedent that says, 'I know you used to be bad guys, but you are good guys now and we're going to bring you in here.'" That's not a specious argument. That's an issue you've got to worry about here.

So there are a number of things you would do. I happen to think the Turks are great troops. I think they're going to be a valuable addition. I've commanded some and they've been pretty much on good be-

havior in the Balkans for most of the last 600 years. So we ought to be able to work that out.

But it is not a specious issue. There are lots of political and, in the more remote sense, military issues, that touch on the stuff very directly. Nothing is clean. I assume that every time I look at an issue there are at least three more layers I haven't thought of yet. That's why the Security Council takes so long to do something. The Security Council meeting only takes about two hours, by and large. There are eight hours of preliminaries and bilaterals, where everybody is trying to figure out what the hell everybody else has got on the table that you haven't thought of yet, before you vote for something and commit yourself to something you didn't mean to do.

Student: How many hours are you working around for the informal consultations?

Clontz: We had the all-time champion last week. The Security Council had put off decisions repeatedly on a couple of resolutions on Rwanda and on Bosnia, in large part because the Secretary General had not given them the information they demanded. It got to a point last week where they sent a note to the Secretary General saying, "We've asked you three times for this information. We can't make a decision without it. We're going to convene tomorrow at three. We're not going home until this thing is done." We all left at 2:30 the following morning. It was a long night. But, son of a gun, they did not go home until they had the information they thought they needed, debated it out, and made their votes. You can earn a second college degree waiting on some of these things to start. It is a maddening process. It really is.

It's a very interesting process, too. The command and control inside the Security Council is very interesting, very subtle. The Security Council does most of its work through what's called the informals. Very few of those issues, except for an actual resolution, come to a vote. It's a consensus building exercise and the president's got to talk to everybody off-line, talk to them in a group, sense the temperature of the room,

and at the end he says, "What I understand the group would like to do is the following." I haven't seen him miss many points yet. They pretty well get it, but it's a real art. I don't think I've missed my calling. It goes past me most of the time. It's a very interesting process.

The other agendas, or a piece of them, are conditional donors. Some of us talked about this one at lunch. Italy, you will remember, in UNOSOM basically said, "Here are our troops; here is our equipment; but every decision above the level of crossing the street has to go back to Rome for approval." That's a conditional donation. For UNPROFOR, this time around, we offered up a counter battery radar set of equipment (to detect where artillery is firing from), but no troops. The Jordanians said, "We'll take that mission." It was a good match. They had the same radars, so they go together. But they really didn't want to bring along logistical tails, so they said, "We want this battery to be in Sarajevo where they can be supported by the other Jordanian troops." We already had British and French radars. We kind of needed some out in Tuzla. They said, "You can have them, but only if they go to Sarajevo." UNPROFOR said, "Well, yes, three radars are better than two. We'll work this out on the ground." So they took them in there. The U.S. has said, "When you get a peace treaty, we'll put some troops on the ground, but only under NATO command. We're not going to work for a U.N. command structure."

It's a standard package. Every single donation, whether it's for five military observers or 30,000 troops, has a set of caveats with it. So for the military commander on the ground, that now becomes part of his coordinating structure. It is an amazing matrix. Sometimes you figure this guy is going to do bodily injury to himself just drawing the diagram for how this thing works. So if you wonder, sometimes, why the U.N. can't scratch its nose with its elbow, that's why. All of us who give things put so many strings on them that the guy looks like a ball of twine instead of a commander out there. We do that sometimes because we don't trust the U.N. to do it and sometimes for our own political pres-

ures. The feeling at the U.N. has generally been, "Something's better than nothing and we'll try and work it out." And that's what they are doing.

Student: What role do you play as the military advisor to the mission in determining those strings? Do you communicate them or do you play more in assessing what political effect they'll have?

Clontz: Here's the way our piece goes. For something like Bosnia, there's not much role to be played. The rules got laid out about a year ago, and those rules aren't going to change. It's going to be NATO and it's going to be with a peace treaty.

For the lesser pieces, for all the rest of them, what Ambassador Albright asked from us is, "Don't tell me it's a good idea or a bad idea; don't tell me yes or no." She'll come to us and say, "The U.S. is facing the following issue. We're considering, on a political level, doing option X." My job is to say, "Okay. If you're going to do option X, my best estimate from a military perspective is that these are the resources it'll cost you to do that. Here's my best guess for your chances of success. If you succeed, here are the branches and sequels I think, in a military sense, would probably flow from that. If you fail, here's what's likely to flow from that on the ground. Now you can go make your decision. I'll tell you what I think it'll cost, how it's likely to go in either direction, and my best guess for how it's going to go." In some cases I can do that based on my experiences, more times than not. That's when I get to pick up the reins, and I can go back in the Joint Staff or the intelligence community, and we can work it informally.

If it goes back, say, to the White House level, she'll normally carry that back as a Cabinet member. The J-5 usually has a flag officer who sits down with the principals or the deputies meeting as a military advisor. I'll just call him back and give him the same thing I got her. So he's got that input.

Yes, we do get asked. Sometimes the military advice wins out, sometimes it doesn't. We're big boys and girls. We understand that sometimes you do something that doesn't make military sense because it

does make political sense. That's not necessarily a bad thing. What's a bad thing is to do something stupid in a military sense because you didn't do the math and you didn't understand what you were doing.

We haven't had too many problems with that in Ambassador Albright. I said she does her homework pretty well. She's one of the better bosses I've worked for. She's pretty quick on the uptake.

The command and control culture. I talked earlier about the Situation Center story. That's a good example. Command and control was a nine-to-five, Monday-through-Friday exercise until about a year ago. There is a conscious understanding now that operations really do go on continuously and you've got to have some means to keep that going. So, that's a good piece of it.

We talked a little bit about field independence: commanders in the field keeping a little bit of distance from New York, and reminding them the sun doesn't really rise and set in New York: "We're doing stuff here and we'll tell you what we need." I do see that a fair amount. That's good in the sense the field commanders get what they really need. It's bad in a sense that when member states go to the Secretariat and say, "What the hell is going on?" and the Secretariat can't tell you, it does not engender confidence inside the U.N. You are less likely to donate next time around if you're still waiting for an answer on the last mission you put something up for. So there's a bit of a split there.

Personnel selection and retention. How do you build what we would call a military staff, or what they call the peacekeeping staff up at the U.N.? There have traditionally been two criteria inside DPKO that I understand. One, is it a warm body that's available; and two, does it over-represent any particular country or any particular region? We're looking for that balance. Those two are the driving factors, and, as I said earlier, most of them are on-line for six months at a throw. If you put those three factors into an environment that does not have standard operating procedures or even standard filing procedures, you have chaos. You do not have 43 years of experience, you have six months of experience 86

times. That has been the case in some areas. That's not to say it's all been total chaos. There are a lot of very good, talented people who have been doing this stuff for a long time. But a lot of the foot soldiers on the staff have been operating on that basis.

There is now, ongoing, a conscious effort inside the U.N. to try to identify the skills you need to do a particular job more precisely. If you do that far enough out you can keep your geographical balance. There are smart people in all areas in all parts of the world. We've just got to work the timelines out a little further. We're trying to do that with the dozen or so U.S. officers we've got over there. We've now rewritten about a third of the job descriptions since we've been up there to make them a little more precise, so I really give them the right person doing the right thing. We've converted all ours from six months to one to two years, so if you do something, you'll be there to reap the benefit or pay the price and fix it and pass it on to the next guy. That's the trend for our DPKO. Most countries are willing to give some people up for a little longer to get that kind of stability.

The last piece of the cultural issue is language. Somebody asked, before we broke for lunch, "What about all the overhead in the U.N.?" There is a lot of overhead in some departments. I don't think DPKO is one of them. But it struck me when I first got out there, and I was reading all the gee-whiz figures on the U.N., that almost half of the people employed full-time by the U.N. are essentially clerk typists. At first blush you think, That's ridiculous! All those people just to crank out paperwork? Even for the U.N., geez, where are the operators and planners?" The reason is because the U.N. has two official languages, English and French. You have people from 184 countries, and some of them are not particularly fluent in French or English because they had no need to be. You need a lot of secretarial support to translate that stuff into documents that everybody can work with. That's one of those things technology can really solve for us. They have a wonderful translation program, so that before long I guess we'll all

be able to speak into a computer in English and it'll type out in French. I guess that's there to some degree. I don't know.

But the language issue and all those things that go around a language, the cultural differences that we all run into, are a big deal. Everybody here has got a funny story about something you misunderstood in a funny language. Well, multiply that by 184 countries inside an operation trying to do business and you are going to get some inefficiency and you are going to get some disconnects in the command and control piece.

I've gotten really good at doing the old "What I understand you to say is ..." routine. I end most of my conversations that way, and I'm finding about a 50 percent hit rate. Half the time I really didn't quite get what that guy meant to say. That's the price of doing business in a multilingual environment, I guess.

In terms of procedures, in my little humble command posts that I've run as a military officer, I've always had a sign up, really prominently, that says, "Who else needs to know?" I don't believe that information is power. I think it's stale fruit that's getting ready to go bad and I've got to get that stuff out. I like to do that. As an operator, I've always thought that was a comfortable way to be. That's not necessarily the culture in the U.N., in part for the reasons we talked about—that information is power, and in part because there just hasn't been a structure that automatically pushes information out. A lot of people aren't used to doing that.

That ties us to this business of the situation report and the executive summary. We had an interesting exercise last month. We had the J-2 come down and just touch base with the Situation Center and with the Secretary General's military advisor and talk about information flow and so forth. We thought it would be interesting. It had been about six weeks since anybody from the U.S. intelligence community had come through the U.N. structure at that level. So, what we did was reproduce everything we had sent to the Situation Center over the last six weeks, a huge stack of paper, two-sided, and have the good admiral carry that stuff over. There was a lot of stuff. A lot of

the people in the tall building said, "Where'd all that come from? We haven't seen that." "It's in your system. It's just not getting out." I don't think a lot of that's keep-away. A lot of that's just because there's not an analysis, census, breakout system set up yet to get their information out. So there's more information than they know they have. They just can't get it out. That's not unique to them either. Who here has not run an operation where you just couldn't handle all the information coming in? It's a bit of a problem for them.

We talked about the "information as turf" business, and the idea of consensus. Because there is an imperative to get political consensus for an operation, that tends to translate down inside the bureaucracy that does the command and control base back in New York in the sense of, "If anything changes of substance, you sort of need to stop the train and make sure everybody's on board and then go forward," instead of, "You've got responsibility. Make this thing happen, and make sure everybody knows about it. If they've got a problem, we'll work it out later." So there tends to be a stop-and-start nature to the planning process, and to some degree, to the command and control process back at the New York level because we want to make sure everybody is on board before we go forward. Again, you are not going to get rid of all that, but it's just you pay a price in terms of time.

If I could, let me just talk a minute about the hardware piece. I know we've got a couple people here who are a lot smarter in the hardware business than I am. If you go through the Situation Center, which is kind of the heart of command and control for the U.N. back in New York, there is a real hodgepodge of equipment. That's how we got in the business of asking the DISA folks to come down. The Center had bought things along the way as money became available, and based on people's particular expertise, and some of the equipment clearly doesn't net together. The Situation Center is not that big, but it could certainly profit from a LAN that sends that stuff all the way around. If they could profit from a LAN, think what a wide-area network can do inside the Secre-

tariat itself. My feeling is that it's kind of arcane to sit at a computer, produce a situation report, go to the Xerox machine, make 43 copies, walk across the street, and pass it around. How come everybody didn't just call that up on their monitor in the morning?

Part of that's in not doing the system, and part of it is that you have a generation of administrators on the other side who don't know how to turn that computer on yet. They think their secretaries are supposed to do that. So that's two culture changes you've got to work out here. They haven't gotten there yet, but we're hoping the DISA team will lay out some options for them. If they're interested in doing it, it'll make it a lot easier for them.

We really don't have any satellite downlinks for communication, for data, and for imagery. There are various options for the communication piece, but it would be extraordinarily useful, it seems to me, for a U.N. field commander in a crisis situation to be able to doodle something on a map and, diddley, send that off and have it come back on the U.N. side. By and large, we don't have that capability. So you're talking about verbal descriptions for things being pouched or cabled, in terms of text, and all those problems with transliteration or numbers. You just open lots of possibilities for errors.

Maps are one of those fundamental things for command and control. The U.N. map center is just a little bit bigger than this room. They have some capability to produce maps. In fact, they put out quite good maps for what they do, but they don't have the ability to produce them in large quantities, they don't have the ability to stockpile them, and they don't have the ability to generate original research to update maps.

The U.N. gets no easy missions. We only ask them to go to places nobody else wants to go to, and that tends to be places where nobody's made a good map for 30 or 40 years. So it's a bit of guesswork, and they have to go out and ask for help. We do an incredible amount of business with the Defense Mapping Agency for them, and I'm sure other countries do as well, just trying to get them a lot of maps. But just think, if they had a standing contract for something like a bit of LANDSAT time

where they could generate that sort of data, call it down, and produce a map with some accuracy very quickly. It would make life a lot easier. In a lot of places, being off a few hundred meters on a map can be pretty serious business if it happens to be around a border. You can start a war and not mean to. It's a very rudimentary capability.

That's one where they know they've got a shortfall, but nobody's really come out with a good set of proposals on how to fix that one. As long as they can contract out to major countries that have mapping capability, I think they'll probably continue to do that. It's not the best solution, but in terms of hierarchy of problems it's probably the right call.

I talked about LANs and wide-area networks. There are two parts there, acquisition and installation on one side, acceptance on the other. You've just got to get people used to using that stuff. That's no different for us here. We've all been in offices where people didn't want to use the computer, so they were getting ten percent of their value. They're no different.

We mentioned, briefly, relational databases. A number of people, some individual contractors, some countries, are working with the U.N. to try to see what can be done by software that is now done by manual labor, either to increase efficiency or to reduce errors or to do the crosswalk piece. There are some very interesting offers on the table over in the field operations division that say that you could enter a small query that says, "I need to do a peacekeeping operation in country Hamma Hamma, and the level of threat, on a scale of one to three, is about a three," and two or three other parameters. That program then would come back and say, "Based on standard data, here's what your force looks like," right down to how many batteries you would need, how many rifles you need, how many MREs (meals ready to eat) you would need." It would include current cost data, because you could update the database consistently as to how much that would cost.

Using that same program you could do the adjustments and say, "Okay, that's my TIPFDLE (troop induction plan; force de-

ployment logistics exercise),* U.S. military guys. That's the troop list and the order I'm going to ship them in." That same thing now becomes a dynamic shell. You get a call back that says, "I broke one of those trucks." You hand that in, "Short one truck." That one keypunch takes that truck out, goes over to the logistics guys, requisitions another truck, goes over to the budget guy, and tells him, "I'm getting ready to spend \$60,000." UPS does that every day. The U.S. military doesn't do as much as we'd like to, but we think for the U.N., given all the coordination problems they've got, boy, what a benefit that would be. They could profit from that more than a national structure could.

That stuff exists. Software for that has been out for a long time. They've just got to find the money to do it. It looks like that's about an \$800,000 or \$1 million contract to do that in a really integrated way throughout the whole U.N. structure, so they may be doing a car wash shortly to try to get that going.

I think I beat to death the business about SOPs and reports. You've just got to do that sort of stuff.

Scheduling. There are some very arcane systems for scheduling. When I first came to the Situation Center, I asked the duty officer, "What kind of watch do you work here?" He's on 18 hours and then he's off for five days.

Student: That must have been tough!

Clontz: That's pretty exciting. I'd hate to rely on that guy if I came in there on hour 17 for something useful. He'd be a basket case by then.

Oettinger: That's what you get in most hospitals with the interns and the residents.

Clontz: That's right. I've often thought of that when I walk into an emergency room: "Please, let me get a fresh one!" But it's not smart for these guys. That's just not going to cut it.

* The schedules under which troops and materiel are placed in a theater of operations.

Oettinger: It's not smart with interns, either, or for the patients.

Clontz: That's right. But why do you do that? "It's always been that way." The Situation Center is only a year old and we've already got, "It's always been that way." So you've got to get some rationality in there and get that piece going.

That's about it on that particular piece. I can talk a little bit about U.S. command and control issues, but I think you guys have probably beaten political issues for the U.S. to death.

Oettinger: We've been around it in different ways, but if you've got some ways of relating it to the U.N., then we haven't.

Clontz: Only in the sense that it is the hot button issue for the U.S. political side. I have spent more time responding to congressional inquiries on command and control in the U.N. than probably any other issue. It relates to the U.N., for us specifically, in two ways. One is a number of the reforms we talked about here today just in terms of more efficient management. When that gets in front of somebody in the Congress who is looking at a budget for paying our U.N. dues, he sees that as U.N. command of U.S. troops. It's hard to explain to that guy that it hasn't got a damn thing to do with command. It's just talking about using the resources you've got in smarter ways. "Trust me. There's no command involved here. This is just operational business." You can't get there from here. So, the fact that the Congress is extraordinarily leery, even more so than the rest of us are, about command and control impinges on our ability to help the U.N. to do some reforms that it needs to.

The other one that impinges on it, quite frankly, is the conditional donor business. We sometimes are that conditional donor. We said up front, "We're never going to give up full-fledged command of U.S. troops to a U.N. commander. It's not going to happen. We will give operational command of specific units in a mission scenario in a theater where it makes sense." That's workable, but I'll tell you, there are

a number of guys in Congress that don't want to sign up for that one at all.

What we're trying to do now is two things. One is to get some political consensus from the U.S. so we can go forward on the command and control issue. Two is to use this as an illustration when we sit down with the U.N. We had mentioned the mandate. From the military perspective, probably the most important part of the mandate is that when you send out a mission, you've got to be exquisitely accurate about the command and control relationships. We didn't do that in a couple of places. That's part of mission creep. It's not that the mission got bigger, it's just that you didn't define the damn thing to begin with, and just grew into it, and the command and control got to be a piece of that. So we've all got some definition of work to do.

Everybody in the U.N. is acutely aware of that. They also know it is the hot button issue for the U.S. So we're not getting a lot of pressure on it, even though a lot of countries think it ought to be a very unified command issue, but it doesn't always work that way.

The last thing I'll mention on the command and control piece is that part of the problem has been the quality of the U.N. commanders. Again, that's a "Hey, you!" exercise, and that has something to do with U.S. confidence in the U.N. commander. The U.N. has been working a standby forces project for the last year. The U.S. has just announced in the last three weeks that we're going to sign on board that operation in the following fashion. The U.S. is not going to precommit any forces and we're not going to earmark any forces. What we are going to do is look at the last 18 peacekeeping missions and say, "It's fairly obvious what you guys really need from the U.S. What are the value-added things we can contribute? You can count on us if a mission goes that we vote for, and if we decide to participate, these are the kind of capabilities we'll be most ready to produce."

Some countries are in a better position to say, "I'll give you these specific kinds of units." They'll take the units and the capabilities and start to build what looks like some troop list. The reason we've offered

this, in addition to planners, is that we're hoping they'll take that over to the planning section and start building some contingency plans and some mock units. From there, they'll go over to the U.N. training organization and say, "Hey, why don't you tell all your customers here's what the units and the mission are going to look like, so they can train." And from there, maybe they'll go to their donor countries and say, "Here are the kinds of missions I think I'm looking at and here are the forces. Whom have you got who could command something like that?" Then, let's come up with a standing list of standby commanders and let those guys start exercising with the international structure and national forces, so you can sort of look that guy in the eye and see how he goes.

The general running Somalia right now is a talented and decent guy, as far as I know. I've talked to him a couple of times. This is his first field command. He had never commanded troops in the field before. If this continues to wind down to March of next year, it's not a problem. If this becomes a shooting war, he is going to have a very exciting learning curve. That ought to make everybody nervous, including him, and it does. So it just seems to me that you could build the rest of these pieces enough that you could sort of identify an order of merit list for commanders and let those guys start working in various forums.

Student: That's very perishable.

Clontz: Sure it is. You have to update it almost constantly, and there is no guarantee that the guy you worked with is the guy who's going to show up. But at least you have some basis to start from, rather than saying, "Who's got a three-star general I can have for a year?"

Oettinger: You know, it's funny. I was going to say that this is a problem that is likely to be easier for the U.N. than for the national forces, because for the peacekeeping, or whatever, operations, the smaller numbers here are more frequent than the larger forces. One of the reasons for this uniform pattern of the commanders in

charge at the start of a war being replaced very quickly is that, by and large (and this is true of the U.S., too, forgive me), it tends to promote people who are good at administering things in peacetime, and they are not necessarily the same folks who are great in a wartime period. Short of being at war all the time, which is not exactly desirable, it's not clear how you address this. That's a very fundamental problem in dealing with organizations whose main role is to keep themselves from doing what they're trained to do, because nobody wants them to do it if anything else works first. I'm not sure, but that may be an easier problem or at least it might be approached in way where, if you could build up that roster and in fact use these guys in some way, you'd have a better trained or better run force. I don't know, but it's a hard problem.

Student: It's just a thought, but from the U.S. military perspective, it seems like we're burning faster. It used be that we were looking at 20- or 26-year careers. We're looking at 15-year careers now. We're looking at downgrading a whole bunch of flag officers so there are fewer left to do something, and Goldwater-Nichols wants to put another layer on that, so there's more that they have to do if they want to advance. I see a lot of trends going in the opposite direction.

Clontz: Sure. That's right. It gets tighter.

Student: We had a dinner with the ex-president of Cyprus, whose contention is, "Let's just hire a bunch of mercenaries." Is that an option?

Clontz: Yes, that's an old issue that goes around the U.N.: the idea of a standing army and/or a volunteer army. There are a lot of people who really do like it. It doesn't carry much weight among most of the members, to include the U.S. side, for two reasons. One gets back to the old business: not everybody wants to have an independent standing U.N. military capability. People like having the strings. But the other part is operational. If you look at the U.N. budget process over the last couple of

years, you probably, at best, could not afford to do something that requires more than a division minus a couple of brigades. That's about all they could logically recruit, stand up, train, and put out there. That is probably just enough for somebody to decide that we need to get out here, and put them on the ground, and there's no backup. There's a real risk that somebody—and it could be the Security Council in a moment of passion—could decide to put a force on the ground that's just big enough to get in trouble but too big to get back out if nobody's going to reinforce them. So we sort of like the idea of, "Let's all sign up for this or let's not sign up for it. Do it one at a time."

Student: On a different issue, it seems like the United States has two philosophical tenets. One is: one bomb, one target, 100 percent effectiveness, and the other is zero casualties. Do you see those same two trends going in the U.N.?

Clontz: No, not really. You mean the whole idea of collateral damage? It's not as big an issue on that side. But you've got to understand, quite frankly, that the U.N. community is probably not more callous, but more callused than we are about civilian casualties because they're in operations that do this every day. One of them, in the space of about a week, went into six digits: over 100,000 people. Most of the people the U.N. deals with as casualties die badly, and die in large numbers. It's not quite as tough an issue for them. Quite frankly, their biggest handicap in that regard, and you see this a lot in Bosnia, is that anything you do from a military perspective that changes the status of the military observers—all those guys you put down there as lightly armed guys with the blue helmets—puts them at risk. That really ties our hands. There are a lot of things that would make a heck of a lot of sense, in both a military sense and a much broader sense, in Bosnia, but there was a great deal of hesitation in figuring that all those MOs could just be off the face of the earth tomorrow. Nobody wanted to do that.

That is not an easy call. Those guys are really hanging it out. They are working in

incredible circumstances, and they are truly at risk on a day-to-day basis. They don't have a clue if it's going to be a good day or a bad day when they get up, and the bad days could be significantly bad. Some of those guys were essentially under house arrest under pretty good conditions. Some of them were in pretty damn tough conditions. We lost track of some of those guys for a couple of days. We really don't pay them enough to do that. So it's a problem. That's why you've heard a lot of people, including some of the Bosnians, saying, "Just get the MOs out. It's not worth the price. It's too big a realm for you."

Student: This is not actually a command and control question; it's more a U.N. peacekeeping question. Is there any idea of assigning U.N. flight corridors over other sovereign states, in addition to no-fly zones or exclusive U.N. flying zones over Bosnia, for example? I heard that the problem in Bosnia is that the Serbs set their shelling times. They know they have exactly three hours and 30 minutes, because the Croats require a four-hour flight plan.

Clontz: That's right, they require the clearance.

Student: So, they know they have exactly 30 minutes to get into the woods. Wouldn't this violate the sovereignty of independent or not actually involved states?

Clontz: Yes. There is some talk about that. It hasn't happened for two reasons. One is the sovereignty issue. The U.N. really doesn't want to get into the business of trying to violate someone else's sovereignty. Two, quite frankly, is the resources. It seems to me, if you look at the map, all of Bosnia is not a very big place. But the guys who do the logistics a lot more than I do tell me that to expand the no-fly area substantially or to make another one really is a huge increase in resources. We haven't done that.

The sovereignty thing is a pain in the neck. We just increased the U.S. contingent in Macedonia by 200 folks. It's basically a reinforced company. We had a train with seven cars worth of equipment going

there. It had to go through five countries. You would not believe what it took to do that.

Student: Paperwork?

Clontz: If you want to know anything about the Bulgarian parliament, I'm your guy. I know more than you ever want to know about that. You would have thought we were invading Bulgaria! It was amazing. There was a two-page list of requirements to let this train go through. It was unbelievable.

Oettinger: They figured maybe Lenin was in it.

Clontz: That must be it.

Student: Did you find out about this before the train went, or en route? Did command and control and information ...?

Clontz: I've got to tell you, it was really funny. We found out in advance, but just in advance, and it wasn't really the Bulgarians' problem. It was EUCOM, the U.S. Command in Europe, saying, "Hey, you know, we're the imperial army and we're all here together. We're doing this. Let's start rolling." They're not used to dealing with former East Bloc countries who are not quite as cooperative as those guys we've all been working with for a while. We've done that ourselves a couple of times in the last three months. We put our timeline in a certain way, and you can't get there from here. You've got to do some coordination.

The bottom line is, yes, it's irritating, but hey, it's his country. If he wants you to paint the train orange and put red noses on your bikes, that's what you're going to do. Just do it and get the damn train through there.

Student: It must have been the Bulgarians who once pointed out, "You guys will be gone in three months, or six months, or a year. We've been living here for several thousand years and we're going to have to live with these neighbors for another thou-

sand years." That makes a hell of a difference in how you look at things.

Clontz: And precedent is precedent. Letting somebody with military equipment roll through with your permission sets a lot of precedents.

Oettinger: Sir, we are very, very grateful to you for taking the time and the thought to come and join us. We want to express our gratitude with a very small, literally, token of our appreciation.

Clontz: Thank you!



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