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**Seminar on Intelligence, Command,  
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**C<sup>3</sup>I Issues from the United Nations  
Perspective – Revisited  
William R. Clontz**

**Guest Presentations, Fall 1997**

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## C<sup>3</sup>I Issues from a United Nations Perspective—Revisited

William R. Clontz

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**Oettinger:** In keeping with the normal custom, I won't give a detailed introduction of our speaker today, since you have had a chance to read his biography. But I would like to point out to you that he is an alumnus twice over: once from having been in the National Security Fellows Program, and then the second time from having spoken to this seminar a couple of years back.<sup>1</sup> I remind you also that in inviting him I gave him a fairly open-ended charter. When he spoke to us last, he had been at the U.N. as Madeleine Albright's intelligence advisor for about three months. He subsequently spent another couple of years there, and I asked him essentially to update us both on that U.N. experience and on his experiences in the private sector since then. You should know, Bill, that the group has been told of your seminar presentation. Some of them at least will have read it; I can't vouch for everybody on that. They've

also had a look at this book of Pickert's,<sup>2</sup> with which you may not be familiar. So they bring some background to the kinds of topics you might be talking about.

**Clontz:** Thank you, Tony. What I thought might be useful today would be to proceed along the following axis. I will give you just a couple of words about some parts of my background that are not covered in the biography, but that might be relevant for what we're doing here today. I'll talk a little about C<sup>3</sup>I in a broader context in the U.N. perspective—some of the issues that frame C<sup>3</sup>I issues in that community—and then go to the specific components of C<sup>3</sup>I in the U.N. environment. Maybe at the end, if there is interest and if we have time, I'll talk a little bit about what I call benchmarks: some measurements of what has happened over the last couple of years and issues of concern to C<sup>3</sup>I, and some

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<sup>1</sup> See William R. Clontz, "C<sup>3</sup>I Issues from a United Nations Perspective," in seminar proceedings, 1994.

<sup>2</sup> Perry L. Pickert, *Intelligence for Multilateral Decision and Action*. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 1997.

that haven't come to pass as yet that might make a little better environment there.

As Tony mentioned, when I came here last time, I really came with two perspectives—or maybe 1.5 would be better. I had spent most of my adult life on active duty in the Army, mostly in the rapid deployment area. I spent most of my time in airborne special forces units, air assault, and that sort of thing. I had been up at the U.N. for a grand total of three months, as Tony said, but even at that point I was beginning to get some sense that I had latched onto something very different in the C<sup>3</sup>I environment up there. 1994, you might remember, was an incredible time for C<sup>3</sup>I issues in the U.N. and for peacekeeping in general, which really was driving the C<sup>3</sup>I debate at large in the organization there.

I come here now with a 2.5 perspective instead of a 1.5, having been in the private sector for about a year. I am surprised to find—and I'll be quick to tell you this—that a number of the C<sup>3</sup>I issues that we dealt with on the government and the international side, the same sorts of dragons we tried to slay, prevail in the corporate sector as well. I face a lot of the same issues, with different players and different imperatives, but the general structure is about the same. I'll try to talk a bit about all three of those because they seem very useful for C<sup>3</sup>I.

A couple of caveats if I could, at the outset. I have been out of the U.S./U.N. for just about a year now. I have certainly stayed in touch with them. We talk on a regular basis. I have a continuing personal and professional interest in what's going on up there, and I go up about three times a year to stay plugged in. But I don't do the business every day. So, if someone here has a more current experience in some particular area, or you have information that you think is different from what I'm going to say here based on my experience, you certainly won't hurt my feelings if you say, "I did this another way," or, "I saw this other piece here."

At lunch, one of you mentioned he was one of those guys who actually read the transcript from the last time I was here (he must have had a really slow day). He commented that there seemed to be a lot of interruptions and a lot of back and forth. I hope that's the same here today. If you'd like to jump in and

make a comment or ask a question, please feel free to do so. It is not my intent to talk all that long here.

I said at the outset that I thought it might be useful to look at C<sup>3</sup>I in a broader U.N. context before we started looking at the specific components. During the two years that I was up there, I divided my time about evenly working C<sup>3</sup>I issues among three constituencies. One was the U.N. bureaucracy itself—what we in the military would have called "permanent party": people who are career U.N. bureaucrats. I don't mean that in a pejorative sense, but there were people who worked for the U.N. as their careers. The second were member states who had greater or lesser degrees of involvement with C<sup>3</sup>I issues depending on what was driving them on that day at that particular time. The third was our own U.S. community, and that was further subdivided. Obviously, the interagency process that you all know about, at least in theory (and many of you know in practice), was a big part of how we invested our time in working these issues.

There was also a significant amount of time dealing with the Congress—sometimes the members of Congress themselves, more often with staff guys—and a significant amount of time with the public at large. I found that the public at large really did not know a lot about the U.N., and frequently had incredible expectations of what it could and could not do. C<sup>3</sup>I was a subset of that. C<sup>3</sup>I, I found, was a very useful construct when I talked to people about what a large organization can and cannot do, because those are the tools you have to do business with, and if you can walk people through to see how the C<sup>3</sup>I construct operates, then they begin to understand the organizational and the operational imperatives up there as well.

The first question that we usually dealt with when we were talking with a new group about C<sup>3</sup>I in the U.N. was, "Why are we asking the question in the first place? Is C<sup>3</sup>I a relevant issue in a U.N. environment?" Obviously it was, but asking how C<sup>3</sup>I works in the U.N. and how it should work was a dramatically different question than if you were asking that same question in a national context.

We'll walk through some examples here. In a domestic or in a national context, if

you're dealing with a C<sup>3</sup>I issue in the context of the particular mission (for example, a peacekeeping mission, or disaster relief, or something), the implicit understanding always was, "I want the best quality C<sup>3</sup>I that I can get. That will drive the quality of the operation I'm doing; that will do the institution building." That wasn't always the case in the United Nations, because there were so many conflicting agendas. There were many times when a lot of people were not particularly interested in having an extraordinarily capable organization. Sometimes that related to the issue at hand: they didn't think that needed to be done. Sometimes it was a turf issue: people just didn't want that much capability outside of national control or out of some committee's control here. It was an enlightening exercise for me to realize fairly early on that getting the best C<sup>3</sup>I I could was, in fact, not always the end game here. It was not always what people were looking for. So it's a very different question.

That leads to a whole list of questions that I've summed up under the rubric of what was the same and what was different. Again, please understand that my perspective is that of a member of a national delegation at the New York headquarters. I would like to think what I'm going to talk about here would track through a lot of people who worked in the U.N. community, but you would certainly get a different flavor from someone who worked inside the Secretariat, or from someone who worked in one of the operating agencies like WHO (World Health Organization) or one of the aid organizations. We all have our own experience here.

When I looked at the organizational dynamics of a place like the United Nations, I found there were a number of things that looked very familiar to me, having worked these kinds of issues in the Pentagon and other large organizations, and some that were quite different. I'll talk about what was the same and what was different in just a moment.

The other thing I would recommend that you put in your head in terms of thinking about how C<sup>3</sup>I is treated at the U.N. is that the difference between 1994 and 1997 is really quite dramatic. When I was there in 1994, the U.N. was consumed by peacekeeping. I think the time I was here we had

about 80,000 to 85,000 troops in the field for about 19 or 20 ongoing missions, and we were spending about \$4 billion a year doing that. The United States was on its way to being between the number one and number three troop contributor, which was a very significant change. In the past, the permanent five members of the Security Council generally didn't put troops in the field for U.N. missions. It was really exceptional when they did. Peacekeeping got to be so large in the early 1990s that withholding troops wasn't an option anymore. Moreover, peacekeeping had become so all-consuming that it really sucked the life out of most of the other agendas in the U.N.—including a lot of reform issues.

At the top of the list for me was what I would consider C<sup>3</sup>I. How does the organization move information; how do people get controlled; how do the pieces fit together? Boutros-Ghali, who took a lot of abuse from our side of the ocean on a lot of issues, had a wonderful analogy when he introduced his agenda for peace and talked about trying to reform the U.N. processes. At that period, he said it was like trying to repair a car engine while it was doing 90 miles an hour going down the highway, and that's about right. If you look at the numbers of missions, and the complexity of missions, they went from Chapter VI, which are permissive, invitational type missions, to Chapter VII, peace enforcement. The size, the type, the number, and the range of functions required in the missions grew exponentially every six months for about three years. It was just striking.

A traditional U.N. peacekeeping mission heretofore had been (it's a very gross generalization) about a battalion of light infantry troops in a permissive environment. The peacekeepers had been invited by all parties to act as a buffer, a separation force, and, if that went well, to bring a political component that would give you some mediation services as well. Those contingents were generally fairly self contained and self sustaining. We went from that to operations like Bosnia and Somalia, where it wasn't unusual to have 20,000 troops in the field. Many of them came with nothing but their uniforms and rifles. They did not have a logistic infrastructure, did not have a communications ar-

chitecture, and frequently were led by people who had never run an organization so large and so diverse. It was an extraordinary thing to ask an organization to do. And, not surprisingly, they didn't do many of them very well. It was just beyond their capacity. But a big part of that was the C<sup>3</sup>I piece. If the organization could have foreseen what the 1990s were going to be like and built a structure to deal with that, we probably would have done better. But, of course, none of us are clairvoyant; none of us saw that coming up there.

That has dramatically changed. I think they're down to about 15 or 16 missions now, most of them quite small. There are about 18,000 as opposed to 80,000 troops in the field, and the two biggest missions comprise the vast majority of those 18,000. They are UNAVEM III (U.N. Angola Verification Mission), which is steadily winding down. It's been winding down for a long time; we keep putting a halt on it. It will go away, I feel confident, next year. Then there's the mission in Eastern Slavonia, up in Northern Croatia, which will go away after the first of the year. When those two are gone, I think the next biggest one is the old Lebanon mission.<sup>3</sup> So these get down to much smaller missions.

What they're spending for peacekeeping now varies by the tabulation, but I took a look at the U.N. Web site yesterday. They've got some numbers that show about \$2.25 billion. That's probably some rounding up and cross accounting. I think the more accurate figure is probably in the range of about \$1 billion. So it is a much smaller issue in terms of how they manage peacekeeping forces; therefore, things like C<sup>3</sup>I are not quite the hot topic they used to be in the U.N. community. That is a mixed blessing, I think.

**Oettinger:** Is this a reduction or a change in world conditions, or the "once burned, twice shy" phenomenon, or what?

**Clontz:** A bit of both, but more of the latter. I don't know of many people who can look at Bosnia or Somalia and say, "Those were good successful missions for which the or-

ganization is equipped." It's just not an organization built to do robust peace enforcement. So, yes, there is great reluctance to do that sort of thing.

We were talking at lunch about a much-maligned document called "PDD-25" (Presidential Decision Directive 25). Some of you might be familiar with it. It is known as the Clinton Administration document that guides us in peacekeeping operations. It is actually a document that began fairly early in the Bush Administration, and carried over to the Clinton Administration, which spent the first year finishing it up. I saw the original drafts, and I saw the end product, and there wasn't that much of a shift between them, quite frankly.

One of the things that PDD-25 does is say there are a number of questions you ought to ask before you sign up for a peacekeeping mission. Some of these are a bit difficult to ask in the real world, but the overriding philosophy is not that you have to answer them all, or that any one is more important than the other, but that you are negligent if you don't make an effort to ask those questions. They are: What might you reasonably hope to attain by putting a force in this particular area? How long might one reasonably think, in very general terms, they would be there? Does this contain a high probability to shift from a Chapter VI to a Chapter VII environment?

Again, I emphasize that they're not a checklist. In fact, one of the later drafts called these criteria, and the word "criteria" was taken out because it was never intended to be a checklist. There were discussions of particular missions. As I recall, you'd go through this list of considerations, and you may come out with, "Nope, it doesn't make the test, except for one." But the one for that particular topic may have been so important that the decision was made to do it.

The whole point of PDD-25, and the reason I mention it, is that it translated into the U.N. culture more than a lot of people even inside the U.N. might admit, because it was necessary to do some front-end analysis, understanding you're not clairvoyant, but you need to ask the questions and have some feel for what you're signing up for. As the U.N. has done more of that, it's a little less inclined to take on some of the more open-ended

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<sup>3</sup> U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

peacekeeping missions. So it is a bit of the "once burned, twice shy" type of exercise.

But, as I was saying, because peacekeeping has gotten so much smaller, I do not perceive quite the same intensity of interest within the international community in C<sup>3</sup>I issues as they apply to the U.N. That is something of a mixed blessing.

**Student:** Are you saying that this PDD-25 has basically guided U.S. policy for peacekeeping in terms of the U.N. since the early Bush Administration?

**Clontz:** No. The early Bush Administration started drafting the policy that says, "When we do one of these, here are the guidelines that say what's important. Here are the questions we ought to ask." It was an internal process they never finished. They worked on it for about two-and-a-half years, and then passed it off to the Clinton team. The Clinton team spent about a year on it, and then they published it at the end of the first year. So, since about the end of the first Clinton Administration, it's been a formative part of the debate for how we do these things.

**Student:** Was it finalized after Somalia?

**Student:** It was after, wasn't it?

**Clontz:** Yes. It was after Somalia, that's right.

**Student:** It didn't seem like Somalia met the criteria. If we would have used it, they might not have gone.

**Clontz:** Again, there were a lot of objections inside the U.N. to many of the tenets of PDD-25. A lot of people thought it was intended to be a fail-safe checklist, so that if you went down this, there was no way the United States would ever participate in peacekeeping again. I can tell you in all sincerity and absolute clarity that wasn't the intent, and it hasn't been used that way. I suppose probably the earliest and most difficult test was that about the time the ink was dry on this, Bosnia became the issue at the U.N., and clearly PDD-25 didn't make a lot of difference there for the U.N. organization.

I just want to close out the point about the relative advantages and disadvantages of C<sup>3</sup>I not being such a hot topic. Because not so many people are focusing on it right now, I don't think a lot of C<sup>3</sup>I issues are getting the resource attention that I'd like to see them get in terms of U.N. institution building, but they're also not getting second-guessed quite as much. There are a lot of nice, small initiatives going on, some inside the Secretariat, some by member states who care about how they do this business here, and some of them, I think, are going to bear some very nice fruit. We'll walk through those toward the end.

Probably the other good thing about its not being such a glaring issue in terms of peacekeeping is that it's enabling a number of people to step back a bit and realize that although C<sup>3</sup>I has been associated with peacekeeping in the U.N., peacekeeping is just one of the components that use it. The same C<sup>3</sup>I problems we had in peacekeeping certainly applied in humanitarian disasters. If you look at the large-scale operation in Goma, Zaire, boy, there was a C<sup>3</sup>I case study if ever I saw one, both good and bad, from our national perspective and that of the international community in the U.N. So, there's nothing that says C<sup>3</sup>I is only a military or only a peacekeeping issue, and, hopefully, a number of people can step back now that peacekeeping is not so all consuming and take the debate in that direction and look at it in a different context.

I mentioned that a lot of the things were the same in trying to build a C<sup>3</sup>I construct in the U.N. If I've mentioned anything here that doesn't ring a bell with your experience and organizations, you ought to let me know. I suspect they're all familiar.

The first one is turf. Who controls the issue, and who controls the flow of information is a big deal in a place like the United Nations. I think a lot of the problems that we would have in the national setting are actually aggravated a bit in a multinational organization such as the U.N. But the issue of who controls things, and who has access to information, is extraordinarily difficult. It is arguably the least information sharing organization I've ever worked in. It was really very frustrating. There is a great deal of informal information sharing going on, but building



open procedures to get information around doesn't happen a great deal.

There were problems of procedural issues. People tend not to dust them off and tend not to exercise them except in times of crisis. When a crisis comes, it turns out the procedures you had 10 years ago don't really meet the current demands. Again, not a unique thing for the U.N., but something that makes it tough.

Timeliness. I found almost no structure in any of the levels of bureaucracy that put a time value on the flow of information and directives inside the organization. There was no penalty for getting information out to people late, just as there was no penalty for not sharing things.

That was critical in 1994; it's not such a big deal now. When you have large operations in very dangerous places going on, a culture that isn't geared to getting information out could be an extremely dangerous thing. It created, interestingly enough, some real backlash. The traditional tension that one sees between a field organization and a headquarters organization really got exacerbated by poor information flow. The people in the field said, "Lives are in danger here. We need better information flow." Of course, the guys in headquarters said (as they always do say), "You guys don't understand the big picture." That sort of dialogue goes on in other places, and it went on there as well.

There was a problem I found in the U.S. communities that I find in the corporate sector now as well, and it was true in the U.N.: what I call customer definition—information, command and control, and all those things related to them—of service needs. You have customers and you have suppliers, in the most basic sense, and there's often a great deal of confusion or misinterpretation, from my perspective, about what information was for and who needed it and when they needed it.

If you put it all in commercial terms like customers and suppliers, it's an interesting way to look at it. You realize you have lots of dead ends. If you go to someone and you say, "Now you have information. Whom did you get it from, how long did it take you to get it, and what will you do with it and why?" it's a conversation a lot of people in the organization have not had before. It leads

them to do some interesting things when they think about it literally in that way: "My in-box is not the end of the process. I am part of the distribution process, probably, even if I don't realize it."

My old headquarters always used to have a big sign that said "WENK" hanging everywhere: "Who Else Needs to Know?" That was not something that did much in the U.N. culture, but if you could get a guy to think about it before he put it in his hold-box, "Do I need to give this to anybody else?" it's a very useful exercise. Again, the bell curve applied. Some got much better at that than others; some were not culturally or personally or institutionally inclined to do that sort of thing.

Of course, the lasting issue, the one common to all of us, is resources. I think C<sup>3</sup>I is now more of a procedural than a cultural issue, but in the early 1990s it was largely a resource issue. The simple ability to get in touch with everybody they had around the world in a useful, functional, prompt, reliable way, or to have dialogues and discussions and move the information back and forth in a reasonably secure mode, didn't exist in a lot of places. They spent a lot of money and scrambled very hard to get there, but the resource issue taxed them greatly in the beginning. As many of you understand, if you've worked in the electronic or hardware end of information management, a wrong decision can be extraordinarily expensive. So, again, here is the car going 90 miles an hour down the road, and if you try to buy a radio to put in while it's going, that's a very difficult thing to do. I'll talk a bit about some of the resources we tried to put at their disposal to make it a little easier, but that was a tough part of it.

Now, those were all things that I think all of us have seen in organizations we've worked in. They were also true in the U.N.—in some cases, even more true. There were some things that I found different, at least in quality, if not wholly different. One of these was the political mix. In every organization I know of, people come to issues with secondary and tertiary agendas. I don't know what the mathematical term is for tertiary to the tenth power, but that was the environment we worked with in the U.N., and that influenced the C<sup>3</sup>I issues greatly. How

well an issue could be grappled with, whether it would even be addressed or not, depended on how many players were at the table at that time and what their agendas were. Very frequently (and this is not unusual in political circles; we see the same thing in Congress), you will find an obstacle in the road that you cannot get around that has absolutely nothing to do with this particular C<sup>3</sup>I issue. It's something else in another committee, another legislative body, another branch of the U.N., where you have made life hard for this entity. Until you budge off that, they're not going to allow the money to be spent for radios or satellite downlink time or whatever the issue happens to be.

**Oettinger:** I might just interject, for the class and for the record, that if you want to see more detail of that historically throughout the seminar, NATO procurement and C<sup>3</sup>I is a good example, because the avowed purpose was to provide the best possible equipment in case the Soviets came over the Fulda Gap. But the real agenda, by and large, was procurement and the national industry component of that, and so if you looked at the issue in military terms, it looked completely lunatic. If you looked at it in national economic terms, it made perfectly good sense, and you'll see those threads woven through 10 years of these seminars.<sup>4</sup> It has diminished in importance now that the Russians aren't about to come through the Fulda Gap.

**Clontz:** That's quite right. I do not believe there was a month that went by when I didn't get at least one congressional inquiry along the lines of, "How much is the U.N. spending this year for procurement, and how much of that is going to U.S. firms?" My British and French counterparts got the same queries from their governments. Things that have nothing to do with C<sup>3</sup>I directly tend to drive how you spend your resources and how you're going to do things.

The most striking difference, which became apparent to me very quickly, was that

the division between what I would term political intelligence and operational intelligence effectively didn't exist. It was extraordinarily difficult to separate those two. It has a bit to do with the nature of the U.N. as an organization. Because it is a world body, its governing members, its sources of resources, its sources of intelligence, and its potential (I hesitate to use the word) targets for intelligence were the same body. There was nobody outside the loop. So, for example, suppose that in the peacekeeping department they established a planning cell that started doing contingency planning and looking ahead for potential trouble spots. Suppose they tried to build a database of what an environment might be like in a country that was on the verge of becoming a failed state, and tried to structure what a force might look like that would be appropriate for that mission, so you could save some of the startup time. Well, that's a member state you're talking about! That's hard to do.

Probably the most brilliant example in my memory is that when Rwanda was unraveling as one of the worst cases of genocide certainly in our lifetime, Rwanda sat on the Security Council. This made debates a little tough! Fortunately, Rwanda wasn't a permanent member and couldn't veto; and toward the end, the Rwandan delegate just quit showing up. But it is an example of the difficulty the U.N. had. There is no one outside the tent.

Therefore, to try to do the predictive analysis and the preparatory work, and lay out the intelligence groundwork, as any prudent planner would do, was extremely tough because you were talking about a member state, and frequently a member state that may be a little paranoid about your doing it. That member state thought maybe you were trying to push the country over the edge.

As I said, in many cases where the issue of political versus operational intelligence came up, it essentially meant that you couldn't get that separation. It was just extraordinarily difficult to do. The only way you could do it was to compartmentalize the intelligence effort so that very few people even knew what was going on. It was not very sharable information. Frankly, most of that was done outside the U.N. formal structure.

<sup>4</sup> Barry M. Horowitz, "The Emergence of Data Systems: Cost and Technical Change in Military Systems," in seminar proceedings, 1993.



I'm going to skip around a bit, but I'll probably go ahead and go to this. One of the key players for the use of C<sup>3</sup>I in the U.N. peacekeeping environment is the military advisor to the secretary general. He's a two-star general, and the assignment is rotated around among various countries. The current military advisor, General Frank van Kappen of The Netherlands, grew up in NATO. In fact, at the end of his first day I went over to see him. I said, "So what do you think, sir?" He said, "This isn't NATO, is it?" He immediately understood the differences in the organization, but his number one concern by the end of his first week (and I can tell you that it remains his number one concern today) was the lack of an intelligence culture, and the difficulty in getting good, reliable intelligence.

What he has done, and I tell you this in all candor, is build up a much larger informal network of intelligence sources than his predecessors did. What that means is that, on a given day, he may ask me to come over as the U.S. guy and he'll say one of two things. Option A is: "Everything I see tells me we have trouble coming six months to a year down the road in country X. I can't do an intelligence estimate in this organization. Could you provide me some general or specific information about this particular problem?"

Depending on the sensitivity of it, I would tell you that generally our answer was "yes." We were interested. We thought, as a government, that it was in our interest for the U.N. to have good intelligence. Their making decisions anywhere on the basis of bad intelligence was not in anybody's interest. So generally, if we had the capability, we could provide that to him, depending on how sensitive it was and how extensive it was. It could be in the form of directed briefings to a small group. We had a couple where a very senior official from Washington came up on a plane, sat down with the under secretary general and the military advisor, gave them a verbal brief, and went back to Washington. But they built up a system where if they really needed some fairly focused intelligence, they would come to a member state that might have that capability and say, "I cannot do this as a part of my internal organizational process. Would you be willing to

support us on this?" and countries could say yes or no. Option B would be a specific request for a very specific, usually singular, piece of information or analysis.

One of the trends I found very encouraging for the two years I was there was that they got very good at "shopping for intelligence." Those of you who have been in the intelligence business are familiar with that phrase; it means: "Don't go with one answer. Ask several sources the same question and see what you get." We really encouraged them to do that for their own uses and for ours. We frankly did not want to be the only source of reliable intelligence for the United Nations. That's not in their interest, and that wasn't in our interest. In the most basic sense, if the operation went wrong, we'd like for it not to be because we gave them the only intelligence they had and it wasn't good. So we encouraged them vigorously to go out to as many sources as they were comfortable with, and ask questions, just as a matter of process. We told them, as a supplier of intelligence, that we didn't care whom else they asked, and they certainly didn't have to tell us what the differences were. The current military advisor grew up in that environment and knows how to do that, and has been training a lot of people in the organization to do it.

**Student:** Sir, that sounds as though it might be an adequate approach for a longer-term problem, but when you were in the crisis management business and things were heading south fast, then what did the military advisor do?

**Clontz:** Here is an interesting piece. The little walk-through I just did about "I need some of the following information," became part of the crisis system also. I'll walk you through the U.S. system we set up for a bit here. We got to a point where I could do same-day turnarounds on pretty extensive requirements for them. I am reasonably confident the French do that as well, and by now, the Russians do it too, which is nice. That's three countries that don't always have overlapping coverage. There were times, I will tell you quite frankly, when the U.N. would come to us and we'd tell them, "We don't have a clue. We just don't have any assets on

that. I just can't do that." It is not a substitute for a good institutional rigorous system, but we got pretty good.

To be honest, that surprised me. My experience with our own intelligence bureaucracy, particularly if we were dealing with people outside the U.S. community, is that it's very slow, but we had a number of cases that were literally life-or-death issues for peacekeepers on the ground. Where they perceived there was a threat, but not how big it was, we gave them same-day turnaround.

**Student:** Was there a mechanism to give information when it wasn't requested?

**Clontz:** Yes. I probably ought to go ahead. I got a bit out of my sequence here.

We had three mechanisms for sharing information with the U.N. The first vehicle is routine. We had a daily feed that went to them every day, generally twice a day. It went in through the Situation Center. I don't know if any of you have seen either the current or the old Situation Center, but it's an interesting little illustration of how things have changed in the United Nations. When I was here last time, the Situation Center was four rooms in a 1950s building that I'm sure hadn't been painted since Kennedy was President. It had no air conditioning. It had a bunch of fans on the computers trying to keep them from overheating, and, I kid you not, it had a bootleg phone line going out to First Avenue to get a phone line from which they ran their modems. That was the U.N. Situation Center.

There was a famous story the year before I got there. Something happened around the Christmas holidays in Somalia, and the deputy force commander called back on a Sunday night, and after about 10 tries got a night watchman, who said, "Hey, it's Christmas, man, everybody's gone." He couldn't get anybody for hours. That was a relic of the old "We're only doing Chapter VI; this is not a very dangerous place."

To their credit, before the real ramp-up in peacekeeping came, that one incident rang a lot of bells in the U.N. They started putting some serious resources toward building a situation management center—not an operational command post. Interestingly enough,

the model they chose was the White House Situation Room: a smaller-scale version of that, a place where you don't run day-to-day operations, but you can put your finger on a lot of things. They did the bureaucratic infighting and got a pretty good hunk of one floor in the main building of the U.N., and now they have a very credible Situation Center.

Coming toward the end here, there are a number of things that center could be doing that it's regrettably not doing. But one of the things it does do very well now is that anybody on any mission anywhere on the planet in the U.N. can call that place and get them on about the second ring, and that place can put them in touch with anybody in the leadership just like that. It also works in reverse. I've called Bosnia at two o'clock in the morning. I've called Somalia at four in the morning. The system works very well. They've got that piece down. They didn't have that before. That's real important.

One of the subsets of the Situation Center is what they call the information service: INR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research) for State Department guys. It's a small intelligence unit. It does not do any original collection, and it does only the most rudimentary analysis. But it is a place with some computers and some people who are dedicated to the business of gathering information, mostly open source, but some at low-level classification, from various member states, and putting it in the hands of the right U.N. leadership. That became the primary vehicle we used for the daily or routine sharing.

When the intel center started, it had only two people in it, an American and a Russian, which for me as an old Cold Warrior was a real shock. I thought someone was kidding me. "Let me get this right: the intel center is run by an American and a Russian?!" I think it is now up to about six or seven people, almost exclusively manned by countries that have some intelligence capabilities of their own and were looking for a way to put that at the disposal of the U.N. What better way to do it than have one of your own trusted folks inside that building, inside that office, who can hand-deliver things to the leadership there?

The mechanism we set up for the routine sharing—and I think it worked rather well for

the U.N.'s needs for routine stuff—is that we put a JDISS (Joint Defense Intelligence Support System) terminal in there. Some of you are familiar with JDISS; it's a downlink system. It's old stuff; they have better stuff now. But the electronic link was as follows. It originated from the Pentagon. We had an interagency committee that met every day. We had given the U.N. a long list of parameters, IPRs (integrated processing requirements) if you will, that we updated on a regular basis, partly from our analysis and largely from what the U.N. told us they were interested in currently. The list said that if they needed to know anything about the following 59,000 areas, this committee—representatives of the various intelligence agencies in Washington—would gather up 24 hours' worth of that data, sit down first thing in the morning, go through it, and decide what could be sent up, realizing it was going to the other side of First Avenue, which means it's going to be unclassified very quickly. It's going to be "Official Use Only" at best. It essentially went through a declassification exercise. They did that scrubbing, and sent it electronically up to a JDISS in my office. At that time I had a naval officer working there. She had been a career intelligence officer. She screened it one more time to make sure that nothing had slipped through that just overtly rang alarm bells and made her say, "Boy, we shouldn't be sending this across the street." If it looked okay, she would hit the retransmit button. It went to my Air Force major who sat in the center and then distributed it to the U.N.

That's how the daily routine flow went. There was a good stated dialogue. The U.N. could change parameters at any time: "I need more of this. I don't need so much of that. Thanks very much." It was just like any other intelligence customer.

**Oettinger:** Just a quick clarification: the U.S. mission to the U.N. was on one side of First Avenue, and the U.N. proper, the Secretariat, was on the other side.

**Clontz:** That's quite right. A stunning number of Americans thought I worked inside the U.N. The missions are just like embassies. We were the "embassy" across the street

from these guys. But I could literally look over and see my JDISS across the street picking the stuff up.

That's how the routine flow went. It was not the fastest system in the world, because it had to go through those two extra screenings, but again, this was routine general information. It was fast enough for what the U.N. needed, and gave our intelligence community confidence that they could deal with the flow. Equally important, it gave us the ability to talk to those congressmen who were concerned about security leaks: "Here's the mechanism, and you can see the kind of things we sent across."

**Student:** You submitted raw material or only summaries?

**Clontz:** A little of both. Mostly they were summaries and paraphrases, but there was some raw material as well once in a while—nothing extraordinarily sensitive.

The interesting thing about that system was that we were just getting started about the time I got there, and it took a few months to run the kinks out, but both parties were satisfied. It was working pretty well for a routine system. About a year and a half into my tour of duty up there, the Russians came to see me, and said, "We understand that you have a protocol for sharing information with the U.N. We're going to put a guy in the intel center; would you walk through how you guys are doing it?" That was another *Through the Looking Glass* thing for me! I just thought that was terrific.

**Oettinger:** As a precursor of that same issue—whether you provide raw or sanitized material to anybody—there's a thread through the years of the seminar of the green door syndrome, of guarding the intelligence so that the operators couldn't use it, which was within the U.S. only a scandalous situation. If you want to get the flavor of that, you can look at several of the presentations by Admiral Inman in the history of the seminar, indicating his judgment.<sup>5</sup> You'll see the pro-

<sup>5</sup> Bobby R. Inman, "Managing Intelligence for Effective Use," in seminar proceedings, 1980; "Issues in Intelligence," in seminar proceedings, 1981;

gression of his judgment on how, in principle, it should be easy to sanitize or make stuff available so that it can be used, while at the same time safeguarding sources and methods. Over the last 20 years, there's been a radical change in thinking about how to approach the problem of maintaining sources and methods while at the same time making the information usable within your own forces, as well as by allies and by occasional allies who might be enemies the next day or were enemies yesterday.

**Clontz:** That's right, it's eminently doable. When we started the process, I think large numbers of the intel community thought we were never going to get here; that there's nothing we can send to that environment. But that wasn't true, because you could send a fair amount.

Again, what the U.N. was looking for in this flow was trend analysis sort of stuff. They were looking to build a database. They were looking to build background. They were looking to get confirmation of what they heard from other sources. That's an eminently doable piece. So that's the first of the three pieces, the routine.

The second category was what I call "large-scale specified requests." A peacekeeping mission decision has been made or it's about to be made. They know they're going somewhere. They don't have a lot of information, or they feel like there are gaps in their information or they need confirmation. They will say, "Can we get an omnibus briefing on country X, or the history of this conflict, or regional issues related to this?" Those usually weren't particularly time sensitive. There was a somewhat larger audience, and the briefing had a good deal more depth.

Those, interestingly enough, were the most difficult of the three to structure because you were right on the line between more depth, but more sensitivity as well. We did about three of those in the time I was up there, and that was about like putting a summit together. Who's going to attend the briefing? What are they going to do with the

information from our perspective? How much can I leave with you? How much can be verbal? That sort of stuff. You had to err on the side of caution, because these tended to be larger groups. But again, once we went through the first agonizing process of doing one, it wasn't as hard as we thought it was going to be. You could get there from here with a minimal risk about protection of the security issues, and got arguably a much better U.N. operation for having done it.

Now, interestingly enough, when we started the process, the U.N. would say, "We need to know everything about X." Intelligence guys know that's not a very useful question. You don't have enough time for me to tell you everything you want to know about X. Let's talk about what it is you need to know and why you think that's important, and more importantly, what do you think you know? Do you have things that you would like me to confirm or deny for you based on my sources?

Again, over two years they got really good at that. The requests were increasingly more focused. It was much more useful, and our intelligence community was much happier dealing with that. Nobody wants to get a request that says, "I need to know everything about Angola and I have about 30 guys at the U.N. who need it next week." People jump out of windows in the intel business when you ask them that kind of thing. When you say, "I've got 14 guys in the U.N. Here are their nationalities; here is who is on the U.N. staff; here is who is on line; here is the reason they have asked me; and here are the 10 specific things they've asked. If you have any background you would like to add to that, they'd like to have it." That we can deal with. We did a lot of those, and those are very useful.

The third category consisted of the crisis or emergency responses. All cases that I know of were done verbally, and they were done at no lower a level than the military advisor. It was always the military advisor or the under secretary general of peacekeeping, or somebody in the secretary general's office. They'd send a courier over or call and say, "Could you come over right now?" and if the U.N. had something hot going on, of course you'd go over there. They'd say, "I have this problem. I've got a small number of

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"Technological Innovation and the Cost of Change," in seminar proceedings, 1986.

peacekeepers in this area. I heard from a source I find reasonably trustworthy that there are 100,000 refugees we didn't know about who are less than six-hours' march from there." Or, "There's a very large armed group we didn't know about. They're coming down and the word is they're going to take out the peacekeepers. Can you tell us if that looks true or not? Do I need to do everything possible to move my guys, or have I got some time to play with this?" That was the request. It was just that: "Come over. Here are the parameters. Here is what I have. Here is what I need to know."

We could go back over to the mission, make the necessary calls on the secure phone and again, in every one that I knew of like that, we got back to them the same day. The one exception I know about was where they had a bit more time and Washington was really sensitive about it. They didn't want us to transmit that. They sent up a guy to do it. But for the other two or three, we got the information, walked over, and gave them what they needed. I assume they did this with two or three other missions as well. I certainly hope they did.

**Student:** That was my question. But, in briefings such as this—verbal, high-level—was there ever more than one mission in the room at the time?

**Clontz:** No.

**Student:** They would only do sort of bilateral briefings?

**Clontz:** Sure. Because you were only dealing with two or three people who had this sort of information, you could trust them to respect the confidence. It wasn't going to go anywhere else. But they would generally tell us if they were asking other folks. We would always tell them, "I hope you're asking somebody else. If it were me, I'd ask X, Y, and Z." We always encouraged them to do that.

Sometimes they would tell us, "We've asked two other countries." Sometimes they would tell us about two other countries: who they were, and what they were doing. We were generally their best source of intelli-

gence, so they were pretty good about sharing with us what they had gotten from them. But it was in the "nice-to-have" category. We didn't feel that we needed to know. We were happy to give them what we could.

So those were the three general mechanisms for handling an intelligence program.

**Student:** We had a similar problem when I was assigned with U.S. TRANSCOM before I came here. When we were planning for both Bosnia and Zaire, all the countries involved considered information about their transportation requirements to be classified. U.S. TRANSCOM had to act as an intermediary and honest broker between them.

**Clontz:** During that time, it was not unusual for a U.N. staff guy to pick up a phone and it would be General Fogleman's<sup>6</sup> office on the line asking about some transport issue.

**Student:** General Kross picked right up on that when he became CINCTRANSCOM.<sup>7</sup>

**Clontz:** That's good. You did well. TRANSCOM was probably the most functional CINC we had working with the U.N. They sponsored some U.N. guys who came to U.S. transport training. They put a liaison guy up there during crisis periods. They really did some good nuts and bolts work.

**Student:** That was kind of an interesting thing. At first we didn't understand why they would consider that information such important intel. But for some of the participating countries, contributing military assets meant that they were taking them away from another commitment that they had made to another country, which was maybe a member, and they were technically violating some other sort of agreement or treaty, because they were robbing Peter to pay Paul.

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<sup>6</sup> General Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF (ret.), was Air Force chief of staff from October 1994-August 1997.

<sup>7</sup> Lt Gen Walter Kross, USAF, former director of the Joint Staff, was commander-in-chief of U.S. Transportation Command at the time of this seminar.



**Clontz:** Some of the big ones: India and Pakistan did not like to talk about this, because of issues between India and Pakistan.

**Oettinger:** I don't know if this is naive or profound, or somewhere in between, but ...

**Clontz:** It's a fine line, I think.

**Oettinger:** You were talking earlier about everybody being inside and this being a problem, but it would seem to me that under other circumstances that can be an advantage. The example that comes to mind is the Cold War, U.S./Soviet. In a sense, everybody is sort of inside, and the open skies and mutual knowledge probably were instruments of deterrence, in that I can see what you're doing, you can see what I'm doing, and what the risk is. It would seem to me that using that explicitly in the U.N., as "We know what you're doing," and thereby inducing a stoppage, or perhaps a diversion, is an instrument of diplomacy and politics as much as a problem.

**Clontz:** Again, this was only a problem when you were talking about targeting a particular member state ... for intelligence purposes. It came down to two issues. One, the U.N. was extremely sensitive about the issue of national sovereignty. As you all know, there were a number of peacekeeping issues in the last couple of years that sort of trod heavily on the issue of sovereignty. The U.N. has gone a couple of places in the last few years that it would never have gone before because the host nation didn't invite them. Haiti comes to mind. Boy, I would tell you that rang a lot of alarm bells in a lot of member states whose governments weren't exactly freely elected! They were really concerned about the precedent that Haiti set. So, from the perspective of national sovereignty, when you start collecting intelligence on a member state because we might feel the need to do an operation, that worried a lot of people.

A subset of that is that in the U.N. (this is one man's opinion), one of the enduring cultural divides that we just never got past, that came up with astonishing frequency, was the North-South divide. There was a very

strong feeling in the General Assembly that the Security Council sort of ran roughshod over the organization and that the P-5 (five permanent members) and the northern tier states ran the Security Council. Therefore, when the Security Council or the Secretariat (in planning for a potential mission, it would be decided on by the Secretariat) started gathering intelligence on the member state, people's hives sort of broke out. That's the only two contexts, and that's a fairly narrow range of occasions that we're talking about, but those are real factors.

**Oettinger:** I would urge members of the class to look at Phil Heymann's discussion of internal security issues<sup>8</sup> in last year's seminar proceedings—when we have them, which won't be too long from now. It seems to me there's a similarity here, in that police actions, after all, are internal to a state, and so there are a lot of different issues from military issues. It may be that police and internal security precedents, with their concomitant balance between civil rights and state security, are more of an interesting precedent than some of the more military things. Phil Heymann's presentation at the last session I think will help shed some light on that for those of you who might be interested in pursuing this further.

**Clontz:** If I could, let me run down a very short list. Any time we started looking at a particular issue—a new peacekeeping issue, an organizational structure issue in the C<sup>3</sup>I realm—I had sort of a checklist of major players I expected to take some role in how this issue was going to go. If you have occasion, academically or professionally, at some point to deal with the U.N. on one of these sorts of issues, I daresay the same list will still be valid. Now, who is number 1 and who is number 10 on this list will change a lot depending on two things: the issue and the personalities. Again, because the U.N. is such a fluid and diverse organization, personalities, both organizational and national personalities as well as individuals, have a

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<sup>8</sup> Philip B. Heymann, "Relationships Between Law Enforcement and Intelligence in the Post-Cold War Era," in seminar proceedings, 1997.



big ratchet effect on the deck, shifting who is most informed.

First, obviously, is the secretary general. The secretary general has a great deal to say about how the U.N. operates—apparently not as much as Boutros Boutros-Ghali felt he had to say, but perhaps more than Perez de Cuellar did. There's a range there. That's one of those positions where clearly personality and the ability to work with the other member states makes a big difference. But, for example, if the secretary general is not a particular fan of institutional organizational reform, C<sup>3</sup>I or otherwise, you're not going to get the bureaucracy to spend any effort trying to make that happen. He's going to set the agenda for the Secretariat. So he is always going to be a player in how these issues get weighed out.

Right below him there's going to be a whole range of under secretaries general. For the military guys, I always used to explain to people that if you think of the secretary general as a corps commander, the under secretaries general are division commanders. They've got fiefdoms. They've got the ability to do self-sustaining operations. They have line-item authority on their budgets. They're fairly important guys.

The lineup of who's important is not always patently obvious. For peacekeeping, you would naturally think the under secretary general for peacekeeping is the main guy, and he certainly is, in terms of how a mission is structured for command and control, what kind of intelligence they go for, and what kind of resources they put toward building the mission. But he is patently not the only one. The U.N., like any other organization, has finite resources, and for every dollar or drachma that goes into peacekeeping, it's not going into humanitarian assistance. There is that usual bureaucratic backbiting going on. The under secretary general for humanitarian affairs is fighting the resource issue, and that's going to affect how you structure the operational piece here.

An even more important guy, the most unassuming title in the U.N., is the under secretary general for administration. I mean, how boring can that be? I'll tell you how boring it is. That guy controls all the hiring, all the firing, and all the budgets inside the Secretariat. That's a pretty boring guy!

You may come up with an institutional reform that says you need 15 percent more people next year. If his hiring policy doesn't allow that, or his budget says you don't get it, you don't get it! It's not going to happen. So, it's an extraordinarily cross-functional thing. DAM, as it's called, Department of Administration and Management (an unfortunate or fortunate acronym, I suppose) really is a pervasive organization. It runs through everything and affects every effort to do organizational flow inside the U.N., not just those kinds of things.

I talked about the Situation Center earlier. If you're looking for a microcosm of the U.N. and how C<sup>3</sup>I works, the Situation Center is a good place to do it. It's a smaller version in many ways of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) itself, and in many ways it's a smaller version of the whole Secretariat, but not as much as we had hoped. I'll tell you, the U.S. hope was that DPKO would sponsor the Situation Center, but that it would truly be a Secretariat entity in which the humanitarian and all the other guys would be just as comfortable doing business, and out of which they would run crisis operations. That generally hasn't happened. It's stayed pretty much a creature of DPKO, not because DPKO kept it that way, but because the other guys felt it was DPKO's arena and they didn't want to come and put the resources in to do it. We had hoped that they would all put people in with functional expertise and liaison capabilities. We saw the Situation Center as having great potential for an integrated function inside the Secretariat.

**Oettinger:** It's sort of curious, because these ecumenical sentiments took a couple of decades to permeate the U.S. internally, so it's not clear why it would happen overnight at the U.N.

**Clontz:** I say we *hoped* to do that; the "we" is those of us who felt the Situation Center was a good idea. Not everybody in the government did, of course.

The Security Council. If you're looking at C<sup>3</sup>I dynamics inside the U.N., one of the most interesting things you can do is look at who is on the Security Council this year.

One-third of that membership rotates every year, and the presidency rotates every month. It can make a huge difference in how much of a role the Security Council plays monkeying around at the operational level, for example. If it is presided over by a country that really cares about an issue, or has members who really care about an issue, boy, they're an important part of the mix of how things are resourced and structured. If it's not a big issue with somebody, you can't get there from here. It's just not going to be a problem.

Using the Haiti example again, I remember Nigeria was on the Council—one of those governments I told you about that was a little nervous about the idea of people going in and tossing out undemocratically selected governments. There were long, hard debates into the night about whether or not they were going to support the resolution to do the mission in Haiti or not. It had nothing to do with Haiti. It reflected their concern for their own president. You'll see lots of that. The group dynamics in the Security Council are fascinating, and they absolutely affect how the U.N. does its business.

Below that are people who don't have a title, but I call them "secretary briefers." When the Security Council had an issue that they were wrestling with, and they wanted the Secretariat as the executive branch, if you will, to come down and brief them on what the U.N. was doing, what they thought the risk was, or what was happening in a mission, the secretary general himself would almost never do it (a little bit of executive privilege and distance here). So he would send a couple of briefers down, usually somebody out of his personal cabinet who had ambassadorial rank, or the military advisor.

There's an interesting dynamic there. Who that person is, and how he's perceived in the Council, will weigh a lot on how they use that information. A trusted briefer, who is well known in the community and has some personal standing on his own, will give the Council information, and they will tend to take it at face value. If he's seen as the lap dog of the secretary general, whoever that is, then they're going to take it with a grain of salt, and go look elsewhere for confirmatory information.

The military advisor I've already talked about. He's an extremely important guy, not because he runs operations, but because he is the senior military guy in the headquarters. He is about the only person who can say, "I understand what we're trying to do, but let me explain to you what the operational impact is." He's the one guy at the U.N. who can say, "Let me talk to you about cost and sequence of events and branches in that sequence so we understand functionally what we're about to sign up for politically."

The other thing is that he is the only link the field commanders have. We'll talk in just a minute really briefly about how U.N. field missions are organized, but there is a political and a military component for all of these peacekeeping missions. One of the jobs that has grown up informally over the years for that military advisor is to be the direct link back to the headquarters. If a field commander feels like he's just not getting things done, he's having trouble with the bureaucracy, he and the political counterpart are not getting along, he can always pick up a phone and call that two-star general back at headquarters, and cry in his beer and see if he can get a little help. It was a very important function. Most of them spent a great deal of time talking to those guys. He would get the information back, and he would support what they were trying to do in the field.

The Committee of 34. (They may have retitled that now, since it's up to about 100.) This is probably a good illustration of how we sometimes do business. The Committee of 34 is a group formed some years ago of countries who were most interested in peacekeeping, both functionally and in terms of institutional structuring inside the U.N. It's an informal group, an adjunct, an offshoot, of the General Assembly. They met twice a year to deal with peacekeeping issues, and they really had two functions. One was to be a link between the General Assembly and the Secretariat to help the Secretariat get some bureaucratic oomph for the issues they were trying to work and try to help them work their priorities. The other was to flow the other way—to go back to their own national delegations, and say, "We have been working very closely with the Secretariat as part of the Committee of 34. When this issue

comes up in the General Assembly, you have the information you need to do that."

Somebody got the bright idea about a year ago that the membership ought to be open to anybody who ever did anything on peacekeeping, and it immediately went to 100 countries, so I suspect they're not doing a great deal these days. The group dynamics haven't worked out yet. But institutionally, it could be an important area because occasionally the General Assembly gets very agitated at something in the peacekeeping area. Generally, they don't have the right to mess with that—that's a Security Council issue—but for things like resources and personnel, they can. The Committee of 34 is usually the first indicator that something is bubbling there. We had one of those incidents this year about staffing. I'll come to it shortly.

Lastly, if there are countries involved in a particular structuring issue, you ought to see where the North-South division comes in. I've mentioned that earlier. It was the single most depressing thing I found in the U.N. We just could not seem to get past that. There was a great deal of distrust on both sides of that divide in a lot of issues. It wouldn't be hard to get somebody from the northern tier to say, "I think a lot of my colleagues from the southern tier countries just see this as a jobs program, and they're not really concerned with reform and so forth." It wouldn't be hard to get someone from the southern tier to say, "This is another example of northern tier guys trying to say, 'We know how to run all the railroads, you ought to do it our way,' and it looks like those northern tier guys are writing all the mission orders for the southern tier guys to go fight." We had a lot of that going in both directions, and it is the one area where I saw very little progress in the two years I was up there. It was just a really tough nut to crack, and I would tell you that from my perspective, it permeated lots of issues and shaped a lot of arguments.

Second behind that probably was the U.S. debt. The first year I was there, we would go to meetings and the context frequently would be, "What's the U.S. position on this given issue?" Everybody wanted to know what the U.S. position was, and they would sort of pick their spots from there. Certainly, that was not always the case, but it was more important than somebody else.

People would generally give some space to try to figure out where we were going, and they would take their cues either for us or against us from there. By the second year, that wasn't the case. We were spending half of any meeting talking about the U.S. debt. It became a huge consumer of time and resources for everybody. I fervently hope that we quit being a deadbeat and pay our debts.

But issues like that will come up. The reason I bring it up is that it became such an overriding issue that it bumped everything else in the way of reform out for the better part of the year, whereas previously we had the political heft and the moral weight in many cases to drive through some institutional reform that gave us better command and control, or gave us a more transparent U.N. By the time the debt crisis got so bad and the U.N. was so broke, we didn't have that currency anymore. Nobody else had picked it up; nobody else had that kind of heft or size. In effect, we lost about a year's worth of reform.

**Student:** What answer did you use for us not paying the debt off? How did you handle that issue?

**Clontz:** It depended on whom I talked to, quite frankly. The stock answer was, "This government acknowledges it has a debt, and we'd like to pay it. However, we have a democracy and there's a legislative process here. The legislature has acknowledged the debt but says, 'We're not going to pay it if it goes into a black hole.' You may not like that, but the reality is that until we get some reforms on the books, I don't think we're going to be able to deliver the money. That may not be right, but there it is." Now, if it was a country we were really mad at, we'd say, "It's none of your damn business." We'd throw out some terrible thing they had done. It was an uncomfortable debate. It was not a good place to be in.

People think of the U.N. as an institution that consumes a lot of resources, and, to some degree, it certainly does. But they don't realize that for peacekeeping, which was the big money thing, the U.N. is nothing but a transfer agent. Some of that money goes to contractors, but the vast majority of it goes to

countries that provide the troops. So, when we didn't pay our debt for a couple of years there, and they were doing the \$4 billion peacekeeping each year, we were stiffing Bangladesh and Pakistan, and Britain, France, and Germany were picking up the slack for us. The U.N. literally is a clearing-house. They get the money, divide it up, and pass it over.

**Oettinger:** A couple of articles in the *Pickert book*<sup>9</sup> detail that for those of you who want to pursue that further.

**Clontz:** I'll tell you how bad that got, and this was a good example of how institutions adapt in times of crisis as well. It was striking to me. I reported for work on a Friday, and by nine o'clock my phone rang. This was the first phone call I got in my job. I figured out which button it was, and picked it up. It was Lieutenant General Merle Freitag, who was the Army comptroller general at the time. He said, "You don't know me," and I said, "No, but my secretary tells me you're a three-star general. What the hell can I do for you?" He explained to me that there was a little oddity in U.S. law that I had not been aware of, which says that if an entity like the U.S. Army expends resources in support of something like the U.N., that money has to be paid back by the close of the following fiscal year in order to go back to that organization. If not, it goes into the general treasury. Merle Freitag was about 17 days away from losing \$31 million worth of Somalia support, and he was not amused. The Army wasn't amused. So, I spent my first two weeks beating up the Secretariat to cough up \$31 million so I could get the U.S. Army to support what they would be doing the following year.

Our debt was not so large at the time, and it was possible. They did that, but it was on a Thursday, if I remember rightly, that I got a call at about five o'clock. They said, "If you can come over about seven, we'll have a check for you." "I can certainly do that. Thank you very much." The clock ran out on either Friday or Monday.

So, I went over and there was a secretary with a typewriter with a Citibank check in it, typing more zeros than I had ever seen in my life: \$31 million. I was already worried about getting mugged crossing the street. They handed me the check, and the assistant comptroller (I kid you not; I'm not making this up) said, "Please ensure that no one cashes this before Tuesday." I had just been kited a \$31 million check! I thought this was comptroller/accounting humor. He was deadly serious. They were moving some bonds and debt around to cover this thing.

But the way the organization has had to live for the last few years is that they owe money to the following groups: to the member states that supply primarily peacekeepers; to the contractors who do logistics and transportation and that sort of stuff; to the landlords who own the buildings they lease around the world; and to the local government entities that do electricity and water and that sort of thing. They stiff group one until someone says, "I'm pulling my troops out next month if I don't get paid." So they pay them, and they don't pay the contractor until the contractor says, "Last ration unless I get paid," at which point they stiff landlords until they are threatened with being thrown out of leased buildings, then the utilities, and then the cycle starts all over again.

The question I was often asked was, "If they've got a \$4 billion to \$6 billion debt, there must be a lot of slack in the system. How do they keep going?" That's how they kept going. They had to rotate the debt around.

Now, if you're spending all your time and energy trying to do that, how much are you doing for institutional reform? Not a heck of a lot. You're just worried about eating next Thursday. It actually got worse over the two years. It clearly has gone over the hump now, but it was an all-consuming exercise when I was there. I digress.

Let me just run through the next topic really quickly, if I could. I said I'd talk a little bit about the functional areas of C<sup>3</sup>I inside the U.N., so I'll give you just a couple of bullets to think about.

Intelligence is generally a good-news story. I told the story when I first got here that at one of my first meetings over at the U.N., I said the "I" word. I said

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<sup>9</sup> See note 2.

"intelligence," and some of the old guys got out the brickbats and beat me up and said, "We don't do intelligence here. We all trust each other. This is an open community of nations, humma, humma." Somalia and Rwanda pretty well put an end to those sorts of dialogues.

There is still a great deal of sensitivity about intelligence, for all the reasons that I talked about, but the U.N. is now a place much, much more aware of the value and the need for intelligence and its predictive value. There are a lot of people who understand that predictive intelligence itself is something of a myth, but that you can do predictive work based on good intelligence. They understand that subtlety. They're getting it from lots of places.

Interestingly enough, the humanitarian community has led that charge as much as the peacekeeping guys have. When a couple of hundred thousand refugees show up that you weren't looking for, you come to appreciate the value of intelligence, and I got as many requests for routine intelligence from the humanitarian side as I did from the military side. I thought it would be wonderful if those two guys would get together and give me some unified requests, but that's for another day here.

There are still some concerns about it, but the hard reality is that places like Somalia really taught them. You just can't go into an unsettled world and not have some clue about what may be around the next corner. It's an irresponsible thing to do with troops and with peacekeepers and with the NGOs (nongovernmental organizations), which are a separate story because NGOs certainly don't work for the U.N. They'll be quick to tell you that. But they're a part of the general community out there.

The Situation Center. I mentioned it has gone light years in terms of being an integrated center, although it has stopped at about the 60 percent mark of what it could be. Our vision was that they would do maybe the next level of analysis for intelligence, and that they would work a much more precise and broader distribution network, not only of intelligence, but also of information—particularly routine briefings in the field to get the whole organization worked into what's going on out there.

There are just some institutional, personal, bureaucratic problems in the organization. People got nervous. If you share information, somebody's liable to use it against you. So they don't do anywhere near as much of that as they should. At one point, they were producing a bimonthly summary of peacekeeping activities, with some very good summary data. For countries such as the United States or France or India, one of the bigger countries, it's nice; it's okay. For small countries that have peacekeepers, it was incredibly important. That was the only resource they had, other than the occasional reports they got from their guys back there. It was extremely important to them. It was a real heartbreak for a lot of smaller countries when they lost that resource, and to the best of my knowledge, that faucet still has not been turned back on.

We already talked about the role of the military advisor and shopping for intelligence. That's worked out.

Probably the last piece I'll mention on the intelligence that's still being worked in the organization is that the United Nations is never going to be a security-driven intelligence-based organization. That's just not going to happen, and you wouldn't want it to happen. Having said that, in an uncertain world, and given the kind of operations they do, they're going to need some intelligence over there. So there has to be a balance between open and closed that says, "I have a set of security protocols to handle information. I have a program to train people. I have some SOPs (standard operating procedures) that survived the turnover of people to handle this stuff." We're not there yet. They are certainly making some good efforts in a lot of countries, and working with them.

We had an unfortunate incident on the last Somalia pullout. Some of you may have heard about this. After the last U.N. peacekeeper left, the American ambassador, who was our lead political guy for Somalia at the time (now our ambassador to the Congo, I believe) and the Marine commander, who had done the covering force, went through the compound. They were literally walking through as the last couple of last guys joining the Marine contingent coming out, and they came across what had been the intel center in the U.N. operations center, and found a



bunch of documents that shouldn't have been left there. Now, this is a two-sided story. This included some U.S. documents that they shouldn't have had in the first place. So we had to go back and say, "That's interesting. How did those get delivered to them?" We obviously had some problems in our own house. That caused some repercussions. There was some fairly sensitive information from a number of sources that come to the U.N., and it had been left in the rush to go out—disks, maps, papers, and that sort of thing had just been left in the intel center.

There was a good offshoot out of that. I don't know how well the agreement is holding up at this point, but out of that we got an agreement. We made a number of security manager training courses available to U.N. staffers, and I think a couple of other countries did as well. The Secretariat reluctantly (they didn't want to give up the control) agreed that if there was an operation in which they expected to ask for intelligence from a given country, they would inform that country in advance from where they planned on picking the intelligence officer for that operation, with some assurance that he was an intelligence professional, that he understood how to safeguard materials, and that he had a charge to do that. By the time I left, they had developed both a field SOP and a headquarters SOP, and while I'm certainly not an intelligence pro, it looked like a very good one. If they're following that, at the end I think it's a good story. Given that you have such turnover of personnel, and you've always got borrowed manpower in peacekeeping missions, it's always going to be a danger.

**Oettinger:** Of course it's an issue with any mission that has intelligence resources. The U.S./Iran embassy was another case in point, where the Iranians took a lot of (even shredded) documents, and they pieced them back together again. The only safeguard against that is not to have the stuff there.

**Clontz:** That's right, and to destroy it more often earlier, because I remember there was a huge backlog there that hadn't been destroyed, and that made it easier for them.

That sort of caps the intelligence theme. Just a couple of words on the command piece.

Traditionally, for U.N. peacekeeping missions, when they break out the key positions in a mission, and they go to get a commander, the mechanism at work is the following. If the Russians were putting in 25 percent of the force, the Belgians 15 percent, and the U.S. 5 percent, and so on, in rough terms, that would be sort of the breakout of the key staff positions. It is just a proportional ratio sort of thing. You would have an intelligence officer from Russia, a personnel guy from Nigeria, an operations guy from Belgium, and a logistics guy from Australia. Depending on how important a contributor you were, or how strongly you felt about an issue, you'd get one of the real key slots, such as the deputy commander or the operations slot. Usually, the largest contributor, or whoever had somebody available that nobody objected to, would be the force commander.

You can obviously see the problems in this. At one point, the commander of the U.N. forces in Somalia, arguably the most violent and most difficult mission they ever had, had never commanded a single trooper in combat in his life; had never had a field command. This was his first one. That's a pretty tough training ground to break in. I wouldn't want to do that one! And, of course, the staff had not worked together before. They frequently and literally met each other on the ground the first time. You just can't do that in complicated operations.

There's been a great deal of arguing inside the organization about how they do that, but I think in large part for a mission that looks like it could be dangerous, that mold has been broken. In Haiti, you had largely a U.S.-based leader and key staff. In Eastern Slavonia, you had a Belgian commander and key staff. In other words, when he brought a leadership package with him, it said, "Functionally, this team knows how to do business together. They've got an SOP that works. They know how to make all the comms work. Let's seed them with everybody else. Everybody's got to play, but if everybody else drops out, these people can functionally do business." So, the Belgians hit the ground in Eastern Slavonia really very impressively, from the first day. That had



been essentially a corps staff brought down to size for this thing. In my opinion, from an operational perspective, both of those missions went really well largely because of that.

There was a lot of grumbling. You have to take care of everybody's concerns. If you're putting a thousand troops into something, you've got a right to have the deputy commander or the deputy G-3. You need to get into the command loop here, and you need to be consulted, but not to the point where what counts is the ratio and not the ability of the organization to work. So I think that's a lesson that's probably been learned, although it's going to have to be followed up.

There's still a command problem with what I call the "Call Mom" syndrome. The standard rule is that if you do a peacekeeping mission, it is bounded by the mandate, and if you want to do something outside that, contingents have to call back home to get authorization. That's entirely appropriate. I would tell you that some contingents took that much further, and wouldn't do anything without checking with their capital first, which really undercut the operation and the commanders running that operation. It got to be impossible both from a security standpoint and from an operational standpoint. That's a tough one they have to work out.

We talked at lunch here about a lot of command and control problems that are inherent in U.N. operations because it's a pick-up game. You bring a team together for the first time. There has been a long-standing argument: Should you have a standing force? The U.S. position has generally been "no," for lots of reasons I won't waste time going into here.

A number of countries over the last year (led, I guess, largely by the Canadians, the Dutch, and the Norwegians more than anybody else) have come up with a really very clever alternative. I think it's got great potential. The U.N. has something called the "stand-by forces initiative." It's sort of a ready reserve list. It exists more on paper than reality. So here is the range of possibilities you had: a pick-up team for every game; a stand-by force, which is a paper organization; or a standing army. These three countries and some other countries came together and said, "What if we created something else—a coalition of the ready and willing?"

What they were putting together is, I guess, ... larger than a brigade now; it's brigade size plus with command and control, some internal logistics capabilities, and a full range of operational troops. They've largely identified the forces, and in the next year or so, they're going to go through a series of training exercises.

They don't belong to the U.N., so they don't have to go through all the bureaucratic stuff. They're just saying, "U.N., when the time comes, if you need one of these, call us, and we'll put this force at your disposal." But in the meantime, it's being trained and organized and equipped and paid for separately, so it doesn't get involved in all the fights among the member states.

**Oettinger:** Who is paying for it?

**Clontz:** The participating countries.

**Oettinger:** So, it's kind of a venture capitalist group?

**Clontz:** Absolutely, and it's very interesting. When they started doing this, they came to all the permanent five members and said, "We want you to know we're doing this. We think this will solve a lot of problems. We don't want you to fight us, but we don't want you to take part. Once one of the big guys gets in, it becomes a political issue for everybody. Just stay out of the way, and we'll tell you what's going on." We thought that was a good idea. We won't know until next year, when they start trying to exercise the C<sup>2</sup>, but it's got some great potential here.

It's probably not worth going into all the various missions. There's a range of command and control possibilities. I would just ask you to focus on the last couple that we were doing. Again, Haiti and Eastern Slavonia, I think, were examples of how you could probably do that. Those were always going to be easier than Bosnia or Somalia were ever going to be, so don't overdraw the lessons. But they really did try to take the lessons learned to keep things much cleaner and much more organized.

There's one short vignette I need to tell you about Eastern Slavonia. I have often touted Eastern Slavonia as an example of

how things can be done by the book and work out well. There was one terrific example of an exercise that they did that was not by the book, and worked out really well.

In Eastern Slavonia, the main source of income was some oil fields, as I recall, in the eastern end of the country. When the U.N. mission moved into Eastern Slavonia, the oil fields were controlled by some local Serbian militias. About two weeks after the U.N. got in, they sent a note to the political director saying, "You'll be pleased to know we've been safeguarding these oil fields for you. If you'd kindly send us \$1 million, we'll continue to do so; otherwise, forget about these oil fields."

The Eastern Slavonian mission, remember, was one of the ones I talked about that had a good, coherent staff to begin with. So, they were ready to do planning and that sort of stuff. They also made this (even though it was a Chapter VI mission) a very robust package. They had a squadron of armed Hind helicopters with Ukrainian troops. They had crack reconnaissance units from Argentina. They had a very robust, mechanized infantry battalion from Jordan. This was a no-kidding force. They could do business with anybody in the neighborhood. So they got the note. The next day, the guys who owned the oil field woke up to a big noise at sunrise, and they looked out and three battalions of mech and armor had lined up, and the six Hinds were sitting there. A little Jeep came up and said, "You've got an hour to get out of the oil fields!" And they all left! Not a shot was fired.

Now, what was interesting about that is that the political director for that mission, Jacques Klein, an American, and the force commander, who was a Belgian three-star, sat down and looked at one another and said, "We think we know how to handle this. We think these guys are bluffing. We know we've got the capability to handle it. We probably ought to nip this in the bud. If we ask New York, we'll be debating forever. Let's just say we're sorry we forgot to ask." And they just did it! They never asked anybody. They just went out and did the damn thing. If they had asked, we'd still be debating it, I suppose.

**Oettinger:** But if there had been a mishap, they would be in deep trouble. So, again, it's a personality matter.

**Clontz:** That's exactly right. Particularly the personality mix. When Haiti happened, the political guy and the military guy were just like that. For Haiti, it was reversed. In that case, the military guy was an American. The diplomat was an Algerian—an extraordinary, very smart guy. A lot of people in the U.N. were concerned that Haiti was just going to look like an American operation with the U.N. covering. They didn't want too many Americans in there. When this guy came in, his first question was, "How many Americans can I get?" because he wanted us to stay fixed in the operation. He thought it would be important for the security forces we could bring to it. So, that relationship between the political and military guys can really do some interesting things for a mission.

I think we've already talked about the control issues. If I could, let me just talk about communications for about five minutes.

When I talk about communications as opposed to command and control, I'm really talking mostly about physical assets, because that was an important issue for the U.N. When they expanded to so many operations, they didn't have the physical ability to communicate with each other in a very reliable way in a lot of places. They had a lot of donated equipment that didn't net together. They had a lot of potential grants. France would say, "I'll give you \$1 million for comm gear, but you've got to buy French equipment." All countries do that, us included, but when you've already got a bad mix of comm gear, sometimes that's a gift you can do without when you're trying to net all this kind of stuff.

You might be interested to know that we did a financial and functional analysis on the peacekeeping missions in the second year. We found out that for the start-up phase of a mission, one of the largest costs was communications—not logistics, but communications. We thought, "That's odd, why would that be?" For the first 45 to 60 days of a standard U.N. mission, the number one communication device was the hotel switchboard—

until they could get the comms going, which would frequently run 45 to 60 days because you couldn't get the authorization documents out of the Secretariat to spend the money to go out and buy satellite time. So, for want of a nail, the horse was lost.

That has largely been addressed. They now have bought bandwidth on satellites. They've got some very nice, portable, suitcase-sized kinds of units going around. So, that has gotten a lot better. Communications was just killing them for a while there. We, and several other countries, have given them some equipment and a lot of expertise. Some of you know DISA, the Defense Information Services Agency, which builds command and control for our CINCs. They brought a team up and spent about four months with them, and gave them a real soup-to-nuts review on some ideas and some places they might want to look to save money and get some efficiency. Those that they could afford to do, they adopted all right off the bat. So, communications have gotten much better.

Let me close it out, if I could. I thought it might be useful to do some benchmarks here: things that have gotten a lot better, that you ought to be encouraged about from a C<sup>3</sup>I perspective, and some that have not improved.

If you're looking at the U.N. from either a professional or an academic point of view, for C<sup>3</sup>I and for many other issues you need to understand that you're looking at two sets of parameters: one is operational, and one is institution building. The U.N. is 45 or 50 years old now, but it's still a new organization in terms of the challenges it has to deal with. They're still building the house out there. That's somewhat different from taking care of your operational perspectives today. If you can take care of the operational requirements in a way that builds permanence, that's great, but sometimes you can't do that. So, understand that if a crisis requires you to spend time, money, and attention on today's problem, that investment may be gone when the problem's over if it wasn't something you could do in the sense of the long-term solutions that may be there.

Personnel and staff selection has gotten markedly better in the last two years. I think it took a setback just last month. Traditionally, for military on-line personnel, the U.N. took whoever showed up. Sometimes they

had to take them because country X said, "We need you to take this guy." I would occasionally run into a three- or four-star general where a major had been sitting yesterday. One of the guys was *persona non grata* and needs to get out of his country for a while, so he's a desk officer in the U.N.

The current military advisor, General van Kappen, largely got rid of them to the extent that it's possible in a political organization. The organization now looks at people's professional qualifications. You have to speak one of the working languages, either English or French, and frankly, English is the one that they prefer you to have. It is the *lingua franca*, at least for peacekeeping, and largely for humanitarian units as well. You have to have some degree of professional competence, and some degree of computer literacy. If you can't bring those things to the table, then it's a bit tough to make a contribution to an outfit that doesn't have enough people anyway. You become a liability, instead of an asset.

There are a number of countries that are involved in peacekeeping by providing soldiers who don't have the staff skills at the level the U.N. needs. That can get to be a North-South issue. Again, some of the same countries I talked about, Canada and The Netherlands, have led the way. They have done a lot of bilateral deals with several countries and said, "The problem is that you've got a small army, or navy, or air force, and the U.N.'s a much larger organization. Your people don't have a chance to exercise those skills. It's in our interest that you be part of the training staff that runs the U.N. Here's the deal. We'll sponsor one of your guys. He'll go to a staff college in a larger country, and we'll pay his bills to go be part of the U.N. staff for a couple of years." At the end of the day, we get a better U.N. I think they've gotten some takers on that, and that it's a very useful way to attack this issue.

Professional development in C<sup>3</sup>I, in general, has gotten a bit better. There is a training unit inside DPKO now. There is no separate training unit, but there are training entities in the other Secretariat organizations. The one in DPKO now has resident courses, correspondence courses, and will send mobile training teams out to different contingents before they

deploy. One of the things they say is, "Let's look at your comms. How are you going to net with the U.N. structure?" The expectation is that you can have complete communication inside whatever you bring to the peacekeeping mission. The U.N. would supply the capstone part that lets you connect to the higher headquarters. But they ask those questions now and they help them build their packs. They're also building contingency packages for communications now—the radios, satellite dishes, and so forth—on pallets that are ready to go in a couple of places around the world.

The last couple of items here. I think we still haven't made much progress in the organization from a C<sup>3</sup>I perspective of looking at the outside agencies that really affect information flow. I'm thinking in particular of the press, the NGOs, and lately the Internet. The Internet has become a huge player in the humanitarian assistance business, less so in peacekeeping. It's out there. It's just a huge flow of information going back and forth, and I think the Secretariat hasn't yet figured out how to tap into some of that, or to understand how it influences things.

You've all heard of the CNN effect? I think it's a bit overplayed, but it is true. They're frequently chasing events because media coverage is so intense and so immediate. It was almost like Alice in the looking glass. If you're not a Security Council member, you can't get into the Security Council's meeting room, but you can sit in this outer room, and while they're sitting around waiting for the Security Council to come out, everybody is watching CNN. You walk through the next door, and there's the CNN guy with the camera, whom they're all watching on the TV, interviewing someone. So within the space of about 100 meters, there is the spectrum: players, guys who would like to be players, guys who influence the action by their media coverage. They haven't quite figured out yet how to get that piece.

The U.N. is still an organization with lots of different cultures inside. I talked about the North-South divide. That is going to affect the operational control of how you do business here. I don't know how you solve it. Part of it is North-South, part of it is regional, part of it is ethnic or racial, part of it is civilian versus military. There's a big ci-

vilian/military split within the U.N. There are a lot of military guys who think the average civilian couldn't tie his shoes if he had to. There are a lot of civilian guys who think the military guys are screwing up a good peaceful organization, and they should get the heck out of there. They're both probably right on a given day. It's an issue.

This is probably the last piece I will include. I think there is an appreciation by a lot of people, but there's not a cultural imperative inside the U.N., that says, "What we do here in large part is information management, and our leaders and our senior guys have to understand how to move information in a way that gets things done." Information movement and management are cultural items that just don't exist for a lot of people yet. To them, information management just means, "Do I have a whole box or just an in-box or an out-box?" They haven't really thought about it as a tool that gets you ahead of the curve of events.

I'm telling you, that's about all I know about C<sup>3</sup>I. It's probably more than anybody wanted to know about C<sup>3</sup>I.

**Oettinger:** Very good. I want to open the floor to some more questions and further discussion and comments on all of this. Does anybody have any U.N.-oriented questions? If not, in the time that remains, can we prevail on you, Bob, to say a bit about your current life?

**Clontz:** I've been a civilian for about a year now, and I've worked for a firm called MPRI. You might have heard about the organization. We're the guys who are managing the train-and-equip program in Bosnia, among other things. The reason we got into conversation about the company is that there's been an interesting sort of shift in the last couple of years in what's generally called the defense contracting or the defense support business. Everybody's heard about the consolidation that has been going on: giant firms like Lockheed Martin and that sort of thing. We're sort of the other end of the paradigm of what's been going on.

Traditionally, support of the U.S. military by contractors has had the following structural elements, if you will. Someone

starts a business (usually someone with a commercial or business background), and defines a need they think should be met inside the U.S. military: almost exclusively support operations in the most generic sense—providing food, running a base, just logistical support sorts of things. For that, they would generally hire a small number of military personnel with some specific expertise to perform those functions.

The company I'm with represents, I think, a trend in some interesting new directions the other way around. We've got a bunch of military guys who started a company and hired a couple of civilians to do the bookkeeping and that sort of thing. First of all, it stood the internal relationship on its head. It said, "This is actually a military company with some civilian applications, as opposed to a civilian company with some military expertise."

The company got started about 10 or 12 years ago. This was before the Berlin Wall came down, but it was obvious that pieces were breaking out, and the military was going to get a lot smaller in a lot of places. As is traditionally the case when you do that, you wind up cutting out some infrastructure that you probably wouldn't have done if you thought about it a bit more. While you're necessarily getting smaller, you lose some internal sustaining capabilities. The guys who started my outfit said, "That's going to happen again. It has always happened. We probably ought to put together a team that can start doing some nontraditional support kinds of things."

What they started doing in that regard, first of all, was writing doctrine for the Army. I've got a team of about 30 guys down at Fort Monroe who write a stunning amount of doctrine for the U.S. Army, because they've got the institutional knowledge; it's what they all did while they were on active duty. It's a great advantage for the armed forces because it tends to be periodic work. When they don't need that to happen anymore, our teams go away, so there's no overhead inside the organization. They still get the benefit of experience, but they don't carry the overhead.

That has now expanded, not just from us, but from lots of other places. I think a number of people would be stunned if they knew

how many things in the military were now contracted out. Except for fighting at the tip of the spear, there aren't a lot of things that can't potentially be done by contracted people. There are some real questions and issues there about efficiency and national security and that sort of thing, and you've got to be careful of what goes out. But, for example, in addition to doing the doctrine, we teach ROTC on 15 campuses this year. That will be up to 45 in the next couple of years. When the National Guard got new major equipment (end items) in the last couple of years, we fielded that.

The reason all that stuff is kind of relevant is because it's a resource issue. If you have armed forces that are getting smaller, for everybody you have who goes into a support function, somebody's not in an operational slot. If I have a major teaching ROTC at the University of Idaho, somebody doesn't have an operations officer or an S-4 somewhere, and, frankly, that guy is probably not happy teaching ROTC. He would rather be in an operational unit somewhere. So, there's a real trend to identify what is done by the military that doesn't necessarily have to be done by the military. If it doesn't have to be done that way, how do you structure a relationship so there's no loss of efficiency and security and you can still do business? It's a growing perspective.

The U.S. Army has actually let a contract for long-term, detailed logistical planning for all its contingency operations. The Army doesn't do that anymore. A company called DynCorp provides the services. My company does the strategic planning. We're doing the contingency plans for future operations here. It's just a question of how many majors and colonels you have to do that. The advantage in the private sector is that you can pull together a team to do that kind of thing a bit more easily than we could inside the government. When I was on active duty, I would work at an installation, and we would have maybe six War College graduates who were able to do the long-range, deep sort of things. I have 38 of those guys, and I can move them around to any project I want to.

**Student:** Sir, what kind of interaction do you have with the Army and its CINC? Pri-



vatization of strategic planning is some kind of innovation!

**Clontz:** We do strategic logistical planning. Not the operational part.

**Student:** How much interaction do you have with the Army? How does the Army make sure that the products it gets from you are really something they can use?

**Clontz:** In a contract, you have a series of deliverables. It says, "We want you to provide us a plan that meet the following parameters. Tell us how many people it would take, what kind of resources it would have, and how much it would cost to do it." When we build that, we have to take that back to the Army, just as we did when we were all in uniform, brief the leadership, and say, "Here's how we think this thing works, and here's what it costs." They have an opportunity to pick it apart. When they do their computerized wargames and their field exercises, they pull one of those plans off and actually exercise the piece on the ground. If it works, then we get another contract. If it doesn't, then I get sent back and I'll never get a contract again.

It's a real zero-margin exercise. When you do one of these things, you've got to get it right every time. I have a staff of guys who have done this for 30 years. They know how to do this.

**Oettinger:** One of the reasons I wanted Bill to talk about this is that it's not an accident. These questions of outsourcing have become much more prevalent in the private sector as well. If you look back again in the seminar, we have a good account by a fellow named Chuck Stiles on the building of the Sinai peacekeeping, peace separation thing, which was during the Nixon and Kissinger period, and it was very ad hoc, off the top of the head, and cobbled together.<sup>10</sup> Stiles gives a good account of that. If you read that and then contrast it with what you're hearing by way of institutionalization from Bill, I think it will give you a sense of how in the military-

diplomatic sphere this outsourcing phenomenon, which has also become part of the flattening of organizations on the civilian side, is taking hold. That's why I wanted him to continue talking about that, because the boundary between what is inside and what is outside and what is civilian and what is military and so on is getting fuzzier all the time. Understanding some of this continuum is, I think, very important, and I'm delighted that we have the opportunity to quiz somebody who is doing that, living it.

**Clontz:** It's an interesting set of questions. You really have to invent it every day. There's great risk, obviously, when you contract out what had always been traditional military inside sources here. You've got to be extremely careful whom you do that with and how you do it. You don't have the same level of control that you have inside, so you pick them one at a time. But it has great potential, because the armed forces just don't have the resources to do everything themselves inside anymore.

Generally, when a new function or a new operation comes up, my experience is that inside the Pentagon and the major CINCs the assumption now is, "We're going to contract out big pieces of this. Which ones should they be?" It's no longer, "Do you think we ought to do this?" It's, "We're going to do this; which ones should we do it with?"

**Oettinger:** On a budgetary basis, what puzzles me is that it shows up in a different line. Have you thought about it a bit? Or can you explain to us a little about the relative political advantages of spending the money one way or another? It's still taxpayer's money.

**Clontz:** Absolutely. How it's budgeted, whose line item it shows up in, varies by the piece here. But, as a general rule, I think they're listed on two sides. There is a functional piece that says, "This much for logistics for field operations this year," and there's a contracting ledger, and those two overlap at some point. They're clearly identified as to which pieces are actually contracted out. Interestingly enough, when I first started in this business, I thought, "Gee, I wonder if Congress is going to have some problems with

<sup>10</sup> Charles L. Stiles, "The U.S. Sinai Support Mission," in seminar proceedings, 1991.



doing this?" Clearly not. Congressional mandates drove a lot of this.

**Oettinger:** Is this a Republican thing about putting more money in the private sector, or is it a bipartisan sort of thing?

**Clontz:** No, actually not. I suppose that supports it a bit, but what really drove it is that the armed forces are a lot bigger than they need to be, and we're spending more than we need to, so what's the fastest way to cut your armed forces budget? Personnel; always personnel. You get an immediate benefit right there. What we're saying is that on a given, specified project, I may or may not cost out doing business at less than the government. But when that mission is over, you have no obligations for insurance, retirement, all that sort of stuff, so the incremental cost gets dramatically lower. It's been going on in a big way, I guess, for about four or five years now. When the Army went to Haiti before the U.N. and as part of the U.N. contingent, Brown & Root, Inc., did all the logistics ... for an outrageous price. I can tell you that DynCorp does it cheaper, but that's for another forum.

There certainly are issues of accountability. These kinds of things tend to be omnibus services contracts. They're very complicated. If you don't build them carefully, you can, in fact, lose sight of money. There's a great potential there for waste, fraud, and abuse.

But, again, my experience is the armed forces are being fairly smart about breaking these things into discrete pieces and for fairly finite amounts of time. There are now three or four large contractors who can do the big services, and there are a lot of companies like us who can do the strategic planning. They've got more vendors. I think it started as Brown & Root and maybe one or two other guys. Now there is a community out there that can service those needs, and competition is starting to kick in.

It's an interesting prospect. I dealt with this as a field commander. I had contract services and like any other contracting vehicle, it was well drawn up. It was seamless and wonderful support. If somebody drew up a terrible contract, it's just insupportable for a guy in the field. You wind up running

your operational schedule on somebody's contract. That's not very useful.

The trend is clearly there. I think we're going to do more of it rather than less. The point is just to pick the right targets. There are some things that contractors probably shouldn't be doing.

**Student:** How do you handle, contractually, the possibility of things getting truly hostile, such as being under fire as opposed to just operating in a theater where we're doing something?

**Clontz:** We have a really interesting personnel contract. It says, "We're going to do our best to make sure you don't get shot. If you do, we're going to get you to the best hospital we can at the first chance we get. We'll pay you a lot of money for this. If this works for you, sign below. If not, thank you."

It varies from place to place. I'll give you a good example. We're about to start a contract in central Africa. I think that at least on an informal basis, and probably on a very straightforward formal basis, we'll certainly be in regular touch with the U.S. Embassy, and if somebody gets word, or gets intelligence that there's a threat aimed at our guys, I'm confident we'll get that word, even though there's no formal relationship.

Interestingly enough, where we don't have that is in Bosnia, because of the need to separate what we're doing with the train-and-equip program from the American forces in the IFOR. We don't talk to the American forces. We have no ties with them. We don't even go to social functions with them. When IFOR sends somebody to inspect one of the train-and-equip operations, it's a Brit or a French guy who shows up. So that's a place where we hope it does work out, because we don't have any particular edge there.

It's a bit easier for us than it is for most guys. One of the things our company is always concerned about is that we don't get lumped into Executive Outcomes, and the mercenary community, and that sort of stuff. So we don't go anywhere where we don't get a State Department license. We don't go anywhere where there's a conflict ongoing, and we won't put our guys anywhere where

it's necessary to put sidearms on them, even for their own protection.

Now, arguably, Bosnia ran pretty close there, but because our people are only in the federation areas (we don't go into the Serb-held areas, and almost never have to transit them) it's a manageable risk for us. That gives us assurance. If you're a bit more on the operational end of this sort of thing, it's a little bit dicier, but it hasn't been a problem

for us so far. The first 10 years have gone pretty well.

**Oettinger:** Sir, I want to thank you, and to give you something to remember us by. Enjoy!

**Clontz:** Super! Thank you very much. Thanks for your time; I really appreciate it. If you guys get the U.N. fixed, give me a call.



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