

INCIDENTAL PAPER

**Seminar on Intelligence, Command,
and Control**

**Desert Shield/Desert Storm and
the Future of Force Projection
John H. Cushman**

Guest Presentations, Spring 1991

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February 1993

Program on Information Resources Policy



Center for Information Policy Research



Harvard University

The Program on Information Resources Policy is jointly sponsored by
Harvard University and the Center for Information Policy Research.

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E-mail: pirp@deas.harvard.edu URL: <http://www.pirp.harvard.edu>
ISBN 1-879716-03-8 I-93-1

Desert Shield/Desert Storm and the Future of Force Projection

John H. Cushman

Lieutenant General Cushman, U.S. Army, Retired, enlisted in the Army in 1940 and served in a variety of positions until his retirement in 1978. After graduating from the U.S. Military Academy in 1944, he was commissioned in the Corps of Engineers and served in the Pacific and Japan. He earned a masters degree in civil engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. After joining the 22nd Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division in Germany, he served as battalion and regimental operations officer and battalion commander, and as liaison officer with the I Belgian Corps. He graduated from the Army Command and General Staff College in 1955 and served for three years on the faculty. He has previously served in the Office, Army Chief of Staff, in the Office of the General Counsel, OSD, and as a military assistant to the Secretary of the Army. In 1963-64, General Cushman was Senior Advisor, 21st Division, Vietnamese Army in the Delta. He served successively as Director of Supply, Chief of Staff, and commander of the 101st Airborne Division, 2nd Brigade. In 1967, he led the 2nd Brigade to Vietnam where it fought in the Tet 1968 battles and earned the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Palm. During 1968-70, he commanded Fort Devens, then returned to Vietnam for two years as Deputy Senior Advisor, Senior Advisor to the Commanding General, IV Corps and Military Region 4. In 1972-73, he commanded the 101st Airborne Division. He was later commander of the Army Combined Arms Center, Commandant of the Command and General Staff College, and commander of I Corps, defending the Western Sector of Korea's demilitarized zone. General Cushman is now a writer and consultant on theater forces command and control and warfare simulation.

General Cushman addressed the seminar on 21 February, two days before the start of the Desert Storm ground campaign.

Oettinger: Welcome again, General.

Cushman: Thank you. I was also here in 1981, in the early days of this program, so this is the second decennial lecture. I'll be back again, Tony, in 2001.

In 1981, I talked to the class about the inadequacy of command and control systems for theater forces. I said the words on their chart (figure 1). Tony was so fascinated by those words that he said, "Write a book to prove it." And that was our first book that came out in 1983. In that book, *Command and Control of Theater Forces: Adequacy*, I backed up my theories with all kinds of examples, and none of the many senior people who reviewed it took

exception to this assessment. I think it was an accurate assessment at that time. I would still say that a lot of it remains true.

This one is very true "for the typical senior commander, allied or U.S., whose forces must use these systems ... [the systems] represent the largely unplanned splicing together of ill-fitting components which have been delivered to his forces by relatively independent parties far away who have not coordinated adequately with him and his staff, or with each other." It's not as bad as it was, but I suspect that if you get the after-action report on what General Norman Schwarzkopf had to do to put together his command and control system, he'd have said, "That's what I found when I got here." We want to talk about that in this discussion.

Finally, "they neither exploit the present capabilities of technology, nor does the system for develop-

ment adequately provide that future systems will." We've got both very old technology and some very new stuff in the field now. My assessment is that Desert Shield/Desert Storm is going to be a landmark event in learning to provide communications systems and command and control systems that will work in the future. We are learning many things from Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In many ways it's a very cheap lesson in terms of the casualties. The whole objective, it seems to me, must be, among other things, to get the right lessons out of that. Now that leads me to my talk: "Desert Shield/Desert Storm." You have read the "yellow draft" of my paper written for Tony in November. While putting that into a final version based on comments, I'm taking that paper a step farther into, what I call, "The Future of Force Projection." It's my next project for Tony.

Our performance in providing the full range of means necessary for command and control systems for theater forces has been, and all too likely continues to be, gravely deficient. Although the means of command and control in the hands of U.S. and allied field forces may possibly be adequate for conditions short of war, they are seriously inadequate for war and hence for war's deterrence.

Theater forces' command and control systems are not well tied together, top to bottom. They are not being exercised adequately under the expected conditions of war. Great sections of them will probably not survive the attack against them which is sure to come in war. For the typical senior commander, allied or U.S., whose forces must use these systems, they represent the largely unplanned splicing together of ill-fitting components which have been delivered to his forces by relatively independent parties far away who have coordinated adequately neither with him and his staff nor with each other. And they neither exploit the present capabilities of technology nor does the system for development adequately provide that future systems will.

John H. Cushman, *Command and Control of Theater Forces: Adequacy* (Program on Information Resources Policy, April 1983) p. ES-3.

Figure 1
The Problems

This is the first chart (figure 2). I really like this chart. Those words on this chart have survived. Interestingly, Tony, you probably saw the TRADOC comment. They said, "Joint doctrine does not have any level called 'political direction.'" I thought that was a really interesting comment by the people from TRADOC, but we do have the other three terms and these are pretty well agreed.

Oettinger: Let me get this clear. Are these your terms or somebody's official terms?

Cushman: These terms here, as I said, are generally recognized by the professional and the think-tank community as four levels of direction. There is

a lot of medieval theology taking place to define the differences between them and you can write Ph.D. theses and term papers forever and nitpick these words in here. I haven't had many negative comments. Yes?

Student: I guess what struck me about this chart, particularly in the context of Desert Storm, is the lack of feedback arrows that go from the tactical direction and where the commands are issued to engagement of the enemy and the intelligence side of feedback, and then that begins a loop again.

Cushman: Well, of course, there's feedback, I just didn't put that in. You can embellish it. In fact that's




Figure 2

The Chain of War's Command and Control (Original)

a very good discussion point. There's got to be feedback. It doesn't go just one way. However, I'm talking direction.

I did have a very good comment from the Navy, which said, "Look, the rules of engagement don't come down from above. They are worked out and then recommended and all these participants get into it and then they come down here." But I am saying that the guidance for rules of engagement comes down. So, this is a very interesting chart. You can do a lot of thinking and discussing about it.

Desert Storm has received keen attention from political authorities who want to guide it, while not

specifying operations and tactics, so I add these words (figure 3). This is a very interesting war from the political policy aspect. President Bush and his advisors have not gone the President Lyndon Johnson route of picking targets, but I'm satisfied that there is an awful lot of good direction and feedback. It has to be with feedback on this kind of thing. I mean even to say, "Schwarzkopf, you finally got a good briefer, just keep General Neal there because he seems to be doing all right." You know, they went through a lot at first with the public information lieutenant colonels. They were just sacrificial lambs to the piranhas of the press corps




Figure 3

The Chain of War's Command and Control (Revised)

and, of course, the press were often dumber than you can imagine.

But I think that there has been a very strong sensitivity to this need for political direction. When the Khafji action took place, you had General Schwarzkopf, himself, come out to the press and put it in perspective. Also, I think the policy guidance reaction to the bunker shelter bombing has, no doubt, been: "Don't let that happen again." I'm sure General Schwarzkopf just didn't say, "Well, that's war for you," to the President. If he did, something's wrong. But Bush didn't say, "Now I want to see every target from now on. I want to analyze the target, or if I don't, I want Brent Scowcroft to." He left it to the responsible commanders. Any comment on this? Because I'm going to go off to something else.

Student: I tend to agree with the Navy route that the rules for engagement are thrown up as options and that the public information response is a new thing.

Cushman: New? I agree.

Student: A new thing to be considered and laid out. Not a new thing to happen, but a new thing to be elucidated. It's been happening since radio, but it's the first time I've seen it laid out like that.

Cushman: You mean, the first mention you've seen it in a chart like this?

Student: Yes, laid out like that, yes.

Cushman: Well, it's been in every war. I mean I know the Vietnam War was filled with it.

Oettinger: When the President of the United States suspends habeas corpus, jails editors, sits by the Secretary of War's telegraph, and so on, he's controlling those loops. I think it's critical in your discussions here and in your term papers that you distinguish between perennial truths in process, and I think this is an absolutely, perennial, timeless thing and the reinterpretation of it in a particular situation. You know, you immediately destroyed your own point by saying, "Yes but radio . . ." I say, "Well, but the newspaper . . ." We go back to Thucydides and killing the messenger and so on.

You waste a lot of time and effort in trying to show that everything is new. What is new are the details and the technologies and so on, which force you to reinterpret.

Cushman: I've got to give high marks to Schwarzkopf and company when dealing with the

press for staying away from body counts. I was a little alarmed when I read the *Los Angeles Times* interview where he said the enemy was on verge of collapse. Fortunately, my former outfit, the 101st Airborne Division, went out and captured 450 prisoners for him to look like he was on the verge of collapse. But basically, the principal is: Tell the truth, but don't tell too much. And they have been very careful. And so far the press has been careful, although I did notice ABC gave away the secret of finding hot targets out there on the desert the other day and that *The Washington Post* was very unhappy with that. *The Post* said, "We knew it all along but we didn't give it away because we were told it was putting information into enemy hands. We wonder who this guy in the Pentagon was who told ABC it was O.K."

McLaughlin: Bob Zelnick, the ABC correspondent, was very specific that they had asked and were told it was O.K.

Cushman: Yes, but it didn't say by whom, you see. Okay by the guy who told them? Who is maybe some hotshot lieutenant colonel wanting to become buddies with the press or something? Who told them? I'll bet they didn't go to Pete Williams for that clearance. So, I think it should not have appeared. There was no value to that. It was like the guy who, in World War II, put out the word, "Japanese depth charges going off too soon." That was in the press. And then the Japanese corrected their depth charges and that cost us a few submarines as a result.

So I think that a lot of principles are similar to what occurred with the media in Vietnam; that is in one of the volumes in the Army's history of the Vietnam War. It's extraordinarily interesting. And they come to the conclusion that that war failed not because of the press, but because the strategy was wrong. That's another good feature of this drill. I think it has been beautifully done.

Student: The thing I find interesting about the public affairs initiative during this war is the fact that we have finally come to realize that if you want to present the correct perspective of what's going on, you get operators out there to talk — somebody out of the J3, not out of the J2, and not from the public information folks because they're probably only good at sending out press releases announcing cocktail parties. We finally learned.

Cushman: It took them longer than it should have. First, they got these sacrificial lambs up there who

got eaten alive, and then it got to be so serious that General Johnston, the Chief of Staff, came out and settled things down in a briefing or two. Then Johnston said, "I'm the Chief of Staff around here, I don't want to be doing this everyday. Who have we got that we can put out there? Some general?" And they got Brigadier General Pat Stevens, who is a logistician and logisticians are great guys but he's not really an operator and he stumbled all over himself trying to define a reconnaissance in force. I watched that. He's a great guy and has got a gift of gab, but then they ate him alive one day because he was giving Khafji a spin that they said was different from the spin that they were getting and it really wasn't. The press got him and Schwarzkopf was probably watching that and he yanked Stevens and said, "I don't know what you've got to do tomorrow, Neal, but you're it." He's a deputy J3 with a good Boston accent, nice clean-cut looking fellow. He's blowing the same smokescreen, you know, he's not giving away anything but he's credible and makes a joke every now and then.

Oettinger: I'm still concerned that what we're talking about is the theatrical part of communicating. Now I don't deny that it exists or is important, but it's not the only part. It happens to be the most visible part and, therefore, the easiest to talk about, but again something has changed. When everybody in the field not only has access to E-mail but frequently to telephones or to appearances on television, you have a degree of personal communication by all sorts of means. This includes not only direct telephone communications, but the flow of cassettes and Xeroxes of this, that, and the other thing. Unfortunately, not until a long time afterward can the full effect of that be assessed, but the influence of these personal communications is as, if not more, influential than all of these theatrical processes that are described and discussed so publicly.

Cushman: I'd like to add something to that. You see that's the real truth — what happens and how it finally gets back. You can't kid the troops and you can't kid the people. It turns out that when the truth of events is different from what the spokesmen are saying, you've got a disconnect that really causes doubt. Are they telling the truth or not? I think the truth is it, but not all the truth. Just like my friend George Brown (who was once the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS]) told somebody who got himself in trouble with the media for speaking to them, "I didn't tell you you had to lie, but do you have to go blabbing the truth all the time?" So you

don't want to tell the whole truth because sometimes that's not the right thing to do. However, if it weren't for the fact that the morale is good, that the troops are well trained, that the commanders are on top of their jobs, that they are getting those helicopter blades fixed, and they are getting these things done — if it weren't for that fact, you'd be having a hell of a time trying to kid the American people.

Student: It seems like there's something in it. Coming from the intelligence (Intel) community, I can tell you that "probable, possible, and suspected" are parts of the Intel officers daily vocabulary of words. With the operators it's, "Yes, no, or I don't know." And that's not necessarily theatrics, but it's just more to the point.

Cushman: I want to say one more thing about information before we go on. There is this sergeant major who runs a radio over there. It's a show that is 50 percent news. That is, they've got half an hour of music and half an hour of news every hour and they're taking it from wherever they can get it. That's just marvelous. It keeps the troops informed. That means no sooner is it said by Schwarzkopf than it's heard by the soldiers, or said by Peter Arnett of CNN for that matter.

Well, listen, I offered up this Korea scenario as an alternative (figure 4). In 1950, they adopted resolutions and made the U.S. President the executive agent and from then on it was the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They had MacArthur, later General Ridgeway, and he wore two hats — Far East Command, where he had the U.S. forces, and the U.N. command, where he had all the forces. It was a single command and you may recall that I spun out a yarn — or scenario — in my November paper where they had a U.N. Command and they used the U.N. military staff committee and that was going to be the way I saw this unfolding in early November. I knew that Schwarzkopf had announced the other, but I thought unity of command was extraordinarily important and the operation probably wouldn't work without unity of command for the kind of war we're talking about. Well, basically, I've been proved wrong. I'll show you how I think Schwarzkopf dealt with that. I was looking for something like Korea except the U.S. was going to move its political direction to the Security Council and get the Military Staff Committee into the act. I was told by people with more experience in that realm than I've got, that that is asking a little more than you can get out of the U.N. Military Staff Committee. So I say here that there are some differences between Korea




Figure 4
Korea and Differences from Desert Shield/Desert Storm

and the Gulf: First, the USSR; second, no common single command. This is a key one. Third, in 1950, we had those ill-prepared forces nearby in Japan — four divisions of them — and they had to go in and get committed unprepared. Now this is the most prepared military operation in our history. Yes?

Student: It would also seem, however, that it's a situation that once again we have to be careful of as far as looking at what we would ideally want as a coalition kind of control structure in that we're not focusing on unity of command because of political and other reasons. And if we have some sort of tool for command structure the convenient nature of the battlefield that we're facing has allowed us to separate the nationalities of the forces and stare at an opponent that's not giving anything back to us. That's never really been tested.

Cushman: Yes, well General Schwarzkopf knew that he wasn't going to get this. He knew it in October. He may have known it sooner. He may have tried to get it. I happen to know that he understood that Arabs will never come under American command.

Student: There was a very interesting article in *The Washington Post* at the same time saying that the Pentagon did essentially recommend that the U.S. forces, at least nominally, should come under Saudi control and Schwarzkopf was very much against it.

Cushman: In my paper, I had that as an option too. A lot of those were spelled out in the options part of my "yellow draft," like you said. And then I said, "It's the Middle East." The difference between a two-sided war between North and South Korea and a war in the Middle East is not only the cultural one, but the number of different parties to the equation. I say it multiplies complexity by a factor of 10. So then what do we do here under these circumstances? Well, in my paper I had the Eisenhower-like directive.* Here are some of its words (figure 5). I have the impression that I was not far off in substance.

This is what the chairman of the JCS said for the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to Schwarzkopf. "In your capacities as Commander in Chief of the Central Command (CINCCENT) and with the agreement of the . . ."

Oettinger: Is this fictitious?

Cushman: Yes, it is fictitious. This is what I think Schwarzkopf was actually told somewhere along the line. "Look, Norm, you're CINCCENT and we've got the agreement of all the other members of the United Nations (UN). You are designated as the Primary Coordinator." Now that is not a very sexy title for a military officer. "You are designated as the primary coordinator for the military operations of the UN's coalition forces." Let me just talk for a minute about that. I want you to read it.

Oettinger: The French general in one of his briefings confessed to being OPCON (Operational Control) under the U.S., which is unusual. Coming from a Frenchman, it struck me as an admission that DeGaulle would never had made, so there's got to be something more than primary coordination.

Cushman: Oh, I'd say for the military operations of the United States coalition forces, that's the whole bag of 28.

Student: May I respond to your comment? France and the U.K. sent forces to U.S. CINCCENT so that as far as the Europeans are concerned, he is CINCCENT. However, so far as the Arabs are concerned, there's a separate chain for the defense of Saudi Arabia. When we go across the border, all bets are off.

Oettinger: But I find that you're taking that for granted. I find it miraculous.

Cushman: No, no. I want to get into this. I have a little experience with this from Vietnam. I had three tours in Vietnam. At first I was a division advisor down in the Delta, all the way in the southern part of Vietnam at Bac Lieu with the 21st Infantry Division. We had from the Ca Mau peninsula up to the Bassac River and I saw the war in '63 and '64 when we were mostly advisors plus a few helicopter units over there. Then I went back as a commander of the 2nd Brigade, 101st, around Hue. It was during Tet in '68 and I had learned a lot in the first tour about how to work with the Vietnamese and what was really going on in the countryside and I was now very astute. I've got to tell you, I really knew how to work with them because I knew it was their country. You can't go in and run their country for them, but on the other hand, we had the dominating means. Our 101st Airborne Division knew how to operate and I remember one little place where I had a battalion command post just south of Hue and I had a briefing for visitors and for my own people. We had about 14 different things to coordinate: the pipeline, the Pistol Pete (which was a U.S. Navy PT

*This was a take-off for Gen. Schwarzkopf of the combined Chiefs of Staff directive to Gen. Eisenhower for the mission of Europe in 1944.

The Eisenhower-Like Directive (Chairman, JCS, for SecDef, to Schwarzkopf)

- In your capacity as Commander in Chief, United States Central Command, and with the agreement of all other members of the United Nations coalition, you are designated as the primary coordinator for the military operations of the United Nations coalition forces in and near Saudi Arabia responsive to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
- When directed by the Secretary of Defense, you will undertake and coordinate operations aimed at the destruction of Iraqi armed forces and the liberation of Kuwait. In executing this task, you are authorized to conduct, and to coordinate the conduct of, sea operations in and from designated waters, air operations throughout Kuwait and Iraq, and land operations in Kuwait and into Iraq as necessary to recover and defend Kuwait and to destroy such Iraqi forces as immediately threaten Kuwait's territory.
- You are responsible to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under the provision of Joint Publication 1-01, Unified Action Armed Forces, you will have combatant command of all assigned United States forces. The governments of the United Kingdom [and others as named] have agreed that their forces present will be under your operational control. Forces of Saudi Arabia [and others as named] will cooperate according to arrangements for coordination worked out by you with each national commander. Direct communication with national representatives of nations in the United Nations coalition force is authorized in the interest of facilitating operations and for arranging necessary logistics.

Figure 5

The Eisenhower-Like Directive to Schwarzkopf

boat outfit), special forces, ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam), U.S. Marines, the Popular Forces, and the Regional Forces. We were the ones who were sort of making it all happen — without any operational control (OPCON).

When I commanded Fort Devens, trying to clean up the Nashua River, it felt very familiar because there's nobody in charge of the Nashua River. Everybody is interested, from two states, counties, towns, paper mills, and the Army Corps of Engineers. You have to have a way to pull it all together and that's what Norm Schwarzkopf has successfully

done. Now, he served two tours in Vietnam. He was an advisor for the Vietnamese airborne division, and he was a battalion commander. So that's all the title he gets for that whole effort.

Now the directive continues. It says, "When directed by the SECDEF, you will undertake and you will coordinate," in other words with his own means, "and you will operate . . ." I'll let you read that. Eisenhower's similar paragraph says, "You will enter the continent of Europe." Now it might differ in the details but that's what I think basically he's going to do. He can go into Iraq as necessary.

We're about to see him do that, incidentally. He's already in there. The 101st went in there with the Apaches and Scouts. Then finally he says, "You are responsible to the SECDEF through the Chairman." That's where he's going to get his strategic guidance from as coordinated with the other allies at the highest level. "Under the provisions of the UNAAF (United Action Armed Forces), you will have combatant command of all assigned U.S. forces. The governments of the United Kingdom and France, and others, as named, have agreed that their forces present will be under your OPCON. The forces of Saudi Arabia, Syria, and others, as named, will cooperate according to arrangements worked out by you with each national commander and direct communications lines." That, I think, is very close to his charter.

Now, we do not have a war college solution. I didn't think, frankly, that you could fight the kind of high intensity, high tech war with this arrangement. What did it in the air war was the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). I described the JFACC to you and out of self interest rightly understood, the Saudis, the Kuwaitis, the Italians, the French, they knew it was very dangerous out on the battlefield if they weren't following some agreed air tasking order. And so for their own benefit, they did, and that has worked out rather well. We have proven that you don't have to have court martial authority over your subordinates in order to get them to function well. As long as you've got a system that makes sense to them and there are no hidden agendas, and they're participating, it works out. For example, the British lost a lot of Tornados early on and so the British said, "Do you mind if we go in at a little higher altitude from now on?" And so, we said yes. Or the French said, "We're ready to attack in Kuwait now." So, we'll give them some targets that are easy to get. The fleet says, "Look, we want to do it a certain way with our fleet because this is what we're good at," but the fleet is getting refueled from the USAF KC-10. Anyhow, I think it is.

Let's go on (figure 6). This is a generic organization for waging theater warfare. You see, I've got this Theater Air under the CINC. I've got three combined arms land formations, which could be a Joint Task Force (JTF) or a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), or a corps. And they've got their divisions. And that is this air-land operation here. And then I said, "There's the air over here, but it's the same aircraft, incidentally, when we get into this. It's exactly the same aircraft, for the large part.

Your A-10s don't go out here and do any of this, but your F-16s from here can come over and do some of this. And then I've got the fleet in here with its force projection. (This is not the same force projection that I talked about in the introduction to my talk.) And I've got the Intel effort, the administration (Admin) logistics effort, and this command and control and command and control countermeasures, for attacking the enemy's communications with the means available. This air effort has very much gone in to do that and I look on this as a very useful construct. Now, the comments I'm getting from the reviewers say, "I don't like it." They say you've separated warfare into air, land, and fleet. The air campaign has got more to it than this and General Gray's comment, just received today by me said, "There's a theater campaign and then there's air, naval, and ground parts of it." I say there is actually an air campaign and I think that they have talked about it in those terms. There is an air campaign. There is probably a naval campaign that started with the blockade and embargo and still it is very limited — there's no real threat at sea to the fleet — and it's very closely mixed. I kind of like this picture and I'm going to stick with it. I'm going to try to persuade the people that write the joint doctrine of the merits of it. Incidentally, the J7 people have found this kind of interesting. However, this is very land-centric. I really don't understand this more complicated stuff like air warfare and, certainly, port and starboard and full fathoms, five, and all that kind of nonsense. I definitely don't understand it. I now live in Annapolis. and have an 18-foot sailboat, so I'm going to figure out all that. Yes?

Student: The danger is not necessarily the vision of the separation of the campaigns but where they overlap, which is where the essence of command and control danger comes in.

Cushman: Of course it is. You see, these Navy terms (fleet operational) are actually called warfare areas. They're not exact, but you have mine warfare, air, anti-air, surface, anti-sub, etc.. These are the warfare areas. I think that while it is intricate, it has to be done right. It's complex. You really do need computers.

To the air campaign, it's really targets that are important. But its not just targets, because it's air defense and it's Combat Air Patrol and it's refueling; but air only exists for the primary purpose of hitting targets. The thing is you have to have good judgment. It's not just a question of "line up all the targets and we're going to start some attri-




Figure 6
Waging Theater Warfare

tion." The attrition has to be directed at an objective. It has to have some strategy and operational art behind it. It's not just shoveling coal from one pile to another. But this is really nothing compared to the coordination. There are just a lot of people out here.

Oettinger: You developed this out of Europe and the reason why it is impressive is that it describes anywhere with greater or lesser emphasis. You make some of these circles fade in or out sort of anywhere, and what you are describing about the air part of the campaign is when you have no air opposition, and there's nobody in it at the moment except the air, and the land folks aren't in there. And when you have assigned different geographical regions to your plan, you have a problem, which at the moment is not a hell of a lot worse than air traffic control over the United States. The problems you have are the usual ones because some guy gets lost on the runway taxiing out or lands on top of another airplane. And these are, you know, the ordinary things of every day air travel. It's not that you're shooting, but you're sort of neither here nor there. That is why I want to make sure that everyone understands that it is an extraordinary feature of this particular instance. If those same guys were doing exactly what they were doing, but were doing it over the Soviet Union or over Cuba, it would be a different story.

Cushman: Actually, I developed this for a class I gave at Leavenworth last year on a Southwest Asia scenario. It was the Soviet Union coming in through Afghanistan and we had an air war and it was a big one, and it had to be solved with this because that is defensive, and so, there's an enemy in here.

Oettinger: But that part is not nearly the same piece of cake.

Cushman: Oh no. I see where you're going. Considering the enemy here in Iraq and the situation — we had it from the beginning. He just wasn't able to get started.

Student: Does the same thing fly if the remaining 450 aircraft come charging out of what is left and, all of a sudden, lights light up on that panoply of things that say, 'Radar'? Does that change the equation tomorrow?

Cushman: That changes it considerably, just the way Tony was talking about it. Now you have to get into "rerolling,"* possibly, something that was over

here. In the first place, if they think there's any possibility that Saddam Hussein is going to pull that trick, they're going to be ready for it and they will have their Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and their F-15s and there will be a hell of a dogfight. I don't think it will be anything like 400, but it might be 100 aircraft that he's got up over Kuwait to make life difficult for us.

Student: What do you do if, all of a sudden, you have an Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) problem that you did not have before?

Cushman: I made it far too simple. You cannot turn this over to the United Parcel Service and just say, "Deliver to this zip code in nine digits." There's more to it than that.

Oettinger: It might become a part of the United Parcel Service because it's probable that the higher management echelons of the United Parcel Service are better at their jobs than the higher echelons of the Air Force on such matters.

Cushman: Not necessarily, considering the way those zip codes keep moving around out here.

Oettinger: What I mean is that the Air Force promotes pilots. Pilots work single-handed, or double-handed, in cockpits with direction they get from controllers on the ground. They do not have career experience in dealing with as complicated a situation as you're describing. By the time they get promoted to higher commands, they don't necessarily know what they're doing. Now what may happen as a situation gets more complicated, is that while the ground component of the Naval Commanders may have some experience with this, it is not clear that the Air Commanders have that same experience. That's underrating the complexity of that.

Cushman: There's a lot of Air Force people that would agree with you on that. Now I want to get into a little more detail on this part, you see, because I say while naval warfare, ships at sea, and air warfare are primarily technological phenomena, land warfare is a social phenomenon. You have a lot of individuals. When you say to a destroyer, "Hard right rudder," the whole destroyer goes hard right rudder. When you say to a battalion commander, "Change direction of attack," he's got to issue orders down through a very complicated chain of command, and they've all got to get squared away and do that. It's not like marching down Fifth Avenue in a victory parade. It is much more complicated. Here (figure 7) are what I call, "Lines and

*Meaning to change the role of an aircraft, as in arming it for air-to-air combat as opposed to bombing.

disks of command and control." This is just one part of a hierarchy. This is a commander, any command. You can even say a platoon commander and these are squads, but more like a battalion, brigade, or division commander. And he's got some things he commands, some things he's got operational control (OPCON), but these are his kind of maneuvers. And maneuver controls in this air-land thing involve Marines or Army forces on the ground. And in every one of these disks there is a mix of one kind

or another if the thing is important. If this is a battalion, there is a tactical air control post (TACP) out here. These are a lot of et ceteras. I don't have enough room on this slide. That might be, say, tactical air, and he's got electronic warfare, air defense, intelligence, and so forth. Well, there you have somebody who is OPCON here, but his boss man is back there. This is like a Marine Division under an Army Corps and he's got all these Marines back over here who own his logistics, replacements,




Figure 7
Lines and Disks of Command and Control

and awards and decorations, and his court martial and so forth. So this is a very complicated problem in land warfare.

Now we're able to sort out the air with the JFACC and the single air tasking order. We are also able to sort out this limited Navy operation over there because it's been going on for several years since the Kuwaiti tanker reflagging operation where we had cooperation in mine clearing, and escort. None of those Navy guys ever liked to put the fleet under anybody else. It's just kind of antithetical for a Navy guy to have his fleet commander come under somebody else, even if he's a Norwegian frigate, he likes to do it if he wants to do it. So he'll read the signals up there and it will say, "Enemy in sight under full sail," as in Admiral Nelson's day, or he'll get his Talk Between Ships which says, "Watch your step over here, there are mines."

So now I want to talk about how all this was done by Schwarzkopf, given his grandiose title, "Chief of Coordination" (figure 8). I am postulating that Schwarzkopf said something like this in September or October. He is coping with this very practical problem of which I wrote in the yellow draft is the "Wall of the Component." Now those walls exist. We're stupid to pretend that they don't. Actually, those components provide for real strength. Even this new Special Operations component over here is acting like a separate service, and those have got their own ethos now.

Student: Their own budget.

Cushman: Budget, R&D (research and development), yes.

Oettinger: A parenthesis — I remind you of Ken Allard's* comments about why these folks exist and their importance. You're going to get the other side of that coin — a very difficult problem.

Cushman: Well, I think I agree with Ken Allard. You wouldn't have the bonding if you didn't have the Marine Corps birthday every tenth of November, you see. Now there are different degrees of this. It can get in your way. In World War II, the British Dragoons wouldn't take artillery support except from the Royal Horse Artillery, or some such thing, because they were also on horseback. This really gets in your way and I did quite a comprehensive study on that in the other book I did for Tony, the *Command and Control of Theater Forces*, using example after example of how this gets in your way,

but also showing it's also a source of enormous strength.

So what does this fellow do? He's got national contingents; he's a CINC; he's got these different guys coming in there. Well, I've put myself in General Schwarzkopf's shoes and I've issued some instructions. Do you remember my different approaches to component system and so forth? So, you say, "O.K., I've read Cushman's paper and here's what I'm going to do. I'm going to minimize these walls but I'm going to use a component approach." This, I think, is exactly what he's done. When I read General Alfred M. Gray's comments today, I could see that was what he thought has been done.

The commander of the Air Force will be the Joint Force Air Component Commander. His duties are spelled out in a long paragraph in the JCS Publication on about page 40 or so of the yellow paper. It was a breakthrough made possible by Goldwater-Nichols and permitted Schwarzkopf to say, "We're going to have a single air tasking order (ATO) and, Chuck Horner, you are my air chief*. You will write the ATO and you will see to it that it's executed and shifted around daily.


Oettinger: And the Marine air and Army air will be?

Cushman: They're tasked. If they don't do it in the early stages, the Marine air will get sent over to the JFACC. Now we're getting into air-land operations. You cannot handle the air that way, that is, sortie by sortie. You've got to put some air down here with this land formation, some more over here, and some more over here, and in that case, the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, which is the tactical air force of the first MEF, mostly under the Marines, except for the FA-18s, which go deep. They come under the JFACC. All that is according to procedures that have long since been worked out. General Schwarzkopf was not about to initiate any major departure from this. He did not want to have his family broken up because he is going to have some fancy idea that everything is alike, you see as my alternative systems approach in the yellow draft took it.

Now let's just go on with that because he's going to use a component approach, then he says, "Basically, the U.S. has two air-land formations in the desert. These are the I MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force) with its two divisions and its organic air, the third Army with its two corps and its air support."

*See preceding presentation by Lt. Col. C. Kenneth Allard in this volume.

*Lt. General Charles A. Horner, USAF, Commander, USCENTAF.



*Sometimes part of NAVFOR.

- Minimizing these "walls" I will use a component approach to organizing for war.
- Cdr 9th Air Force will be JFACC; Cdr 7th Fleet will have coalition naval operations.
- The U.S. has two air/land formations in the desert. These are the I MEF with its two divisions and organic air, and Third Army with its VII and XVIII Corps of some seven divisions total and its air support. Each of these formations is indoctrinated in its own ways of fighting, each is under its Service-designated commanders, and each has the full support of its parent Service. To maximize the effectiveness of each, I want to keep them reasonably separate. Time is short; teamwork within formations is vital; and there isn't time to teach Army divisions how to operate in a Marine formation, nor to teach Marine regiments or divisions how to operate inside Army corps or divisions.
- That means that I have to divide up the air/land battlefield. So I will place I MEF along the east coast where it can work closely with the fleet, and I will place Third Army inland. I MEF, even with its tank battalions equipped with M1A1 tanks provided by the Army, will be short of armor, so I am assigning it a reinforced Army armor brigade. And I am assigning the British 1st Armoured division to Third Army.

Figure 8
Schwarzkopf's Guidance, September–October 1990

Now you see, the doctrinal Marines, at time of peace before this broke, had three Marine expeditionary forces: one was the First Marine Expeditionary Force with headquarters at Camp Pendleton. It consisted of a 1st Marine Division and the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing. Don't ask me why they've got the 1st Division with the 3rd Wing, but that's the way they did it. You've got the 2nd over at Camp LeJeune, and you've got the III MEF in Okinawa with the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. What he did was send the I and II MEFs and put them together, and then he did away with the command echelon of the II MEF, so he's got a three-star general with two divisions, but not two Marine aircraft wings, because he's got the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing with all the organic air. That's what's over there now, and he says, "That's one of these air-land formations and the other is the 3rd Army with its VII and XVIII Corps, this Airborne Corps. Some seven divisions in total. And its air support which comes from the Air Force. Now each of these formations is indoctrinated in its own way of fighting. Each is under its service-designated command. Each has the full support of its parent service, that is to say, you can be sure the Army is busting itself to make this Third Army and its corps highly combat effective. And so are the Marines with their one MEF. So to maximize he says, "I want to keep them reasonably separate." He says, "Time is short. The teamwork kind of thing (we just talked about here) within formations is vital and there's no time to teach the Army how to operate inside a Marine framework nor to teach Marine regiments or divisions how to operate within an Army framework — keep them separate." That's his guidance. Now that allows him to decentralize the preparation for war.

So we continue on and he says, "That means that I have to divide up the air-land battlefield." Now he says, "I'm going to place I MEF the on the east coast where it can work closely with the fleet. And I will place Third Army inland." The 1st MEF has some better tanks now — M-1AK. But they're going to be short of armor so he's giving them a brigade of the 2nd Armored Division. You probably know that. Then he's taken the British 1st Armored Division and put it over in the Third Army. All of this comes out of the newspapers. It's just my impression of what he probably said. He figured that out early on. Then he says, "All right, now what do we do about the Saudis? (figure 9) Well, they make up a third land formation. Of their own choice, they're disposed forward. I visualize that Arab troops, probably under a single Arab command, but

not under my command (he doesn't own them), will advance into Kuwait in a sector of their own. In the interim, I am counting on these commanders to coordinate." This is what you saw at Khafji and so forth. I think that the I MEF not only got those two Marine Divisions and the Armored Brigade from the Army, I think they probably got the 82nd Airborne.

Student: You didn't say anything about the Marines and amphibious warfare.

Cushman: I say that here. He says, "When we take the offensive, I expect the I MEF supported by the fleet — naval gunfire and all that — to attack northward into Kuwait. I expect the third Army to come at the Iraqi forces from the West and an air-land blitzkrieg operation (this is all in the Naval Institute article that I wrote) such as the world has not seen since George Patton's time. The I MEF will use its 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing for tactical air, and Third Army will be supported by the Ninth Air Force (it turns out it's the same numbered Air Force under Hoyt Vandenberg that supported the Third Army in 1944). JFACC will task 7th Fleet's air to support either one or both, and of course JFACC, with air supremacy, will direct the air interdiction campaign. That's the way it seems.

Then Schwarzkopf talks about functions which cross all air-land sectors, such as intelligence, electronics warfare, at corps. Of course, he says, "You understand that I have the authority to move the tactical air anywhere I want to, including Marine air." Then he says, "O.K., Marine Corps and Army, you put in the command and control equipment for your own forces. Make it good. My primary concern is to assure interoperability and swift information exchange, especially Intel, and I'm counting on these commanders to train the troops." Now, what he has successfully done, if he does that, and I think that's exactly what he's done, is said, "I'm going to stay out of this. I'm going to give you guys your head. I want the U.S. Army behind you, third Army, I want the U.S. Marine Corps behind you, I MEF, and I want to see some first class performance and get your logistics and your acts together. Get your C², get your training up and we're going to do this."

Oettinger: Let me just add a footnote to that because in the light of what you've just said, we'll issue the revised version of the Naval Institute paper that Jack is referring to. I must confess that when I read it I had not gotten some of the subtleties you explained here today. Your approach in the original paper with systems and so on was a somewhat more idealistic one. In an ideal world we would achieve

- The Saudi armor and mechanized brigades and the Egyptian and Syrian armor and mechanized divisions and other Arab contingents make up a third land formation. For now, the Arab formations are by their own choice disposed along the Kuwaiti border. When we take up the offensive, I visualize that Arab troops, probably under single Arab command but not under my command, will advance into Kuwait in a sector of their own. In the interim, I am counting on the commanders of I MEF and Third Army to coordinate operations with Arab units in their respective sectors.
- When we take the offensive, I expect I MEF, supported by fleet naval gunfire and amphibious operations, to attack northward into Kuwait; and I expect Third Army to come at the Iraqi forces from the west in an air/land blitzkrieg operation such as the world has not seen since George Patton's time. I MEF will use its 3d Marine Aircraft Wing for tactical air, and Third Army will be supported by the Ninth Air Force (the same numbered air force incidentally that, under Hoyt Vandenberg, supported Patton's Third Army in 1944). JFACC will task 7th Fleet's air to support either I MEF or Third Army, or both. And of course, JFACC, with air supremacy, will direct the air interdiction campaign.
- Functions which cross all air/land sectors, such as intelligence, electronic warfare, and logistics will be coordinated at my level. And of course you understand that I have the authority and responsibility to shift any and all US tactical air (Marine air included) from one sector to another as necessary for mission accomplishment.
- I am counting on the US Marine Corps and the US Army to put into place in their respective air/land formations the very best command and control equipment possible from their inventories or producible in the time available; my primary concern is to insure interoperability and swift information exchange. And I am counting on the commanders of I MEF and Third Army, working closely with Seventh Fleet and Ninth Air Force, to train their troops to absolute top efficiency so that, when and if air/land operations begin, they will go very well indeed.

Figure 9

"Schwarzkopf's Guidance," September through October 1990, cont.

higher efficiency, effectiveness, or whatever, but the probability of getting there from here might be close to zero. Then what this recognizes is a compromise. You've got to work with the tools that you have because you cannot change them. This says I've got

the tools that I have, I leave them alone and I shuffle them, and I don't try to get into the details of the time to reshuffle them in the time that I haven't got.

Cushman: That's right and I think that's what Schwarzkopf decided back in October.

Student: It seems to me to be a very important element and he must have given enough information of what he expected when the fighting started to give the powerful motivations to the training and the coordination now and in the time they had available.

Cushman: I would say that this is pretty good motivation: He says to third Army, "When we turn you loose, I want the world to recognize they've seen a classic operation afterward." And I assure you, gentlemen, that's what you're going to see. Someone said to Schwarzkopf, "We've thrown the best at them." And he said, "No, the best is yet to come." I think he has played a very careful game here. He's let people talk about these enormous casualties — 50,000 body bags filled. My guess is, and I'll go out on a limb right now, there won't be more than 300 men killed in this operation and I think that that's too many. In fact, I would have said if it had been me, I'd have said to this (Third Army) Patton here, "And I want you to get by with less than 100 men killed. You make it so that it won't cost me more than 100 soldiers." And then he should say to the I MEF, "And don't you guys think it's heroic to go in and get yourself shot up." That's the Marine of the 1940s — Tarawa, Iwo Jima. I heard a very savvy Marine, a senior Marine officer at the Naval Academy give a class on land combat leadership to about 30 midshipmen, first classmen, the other day, and he said, "The Marine Corps does not buy casualties to show how macho you are. We're going to do it with maneuver warfare." Does that sound familiar to you? You see, that's what Al Gray is trying to indoctrinate because this is not your father's Marine Corps.

Student: That's the one that won the war.

Cushman: I know it. It's nice to have the Marines understanding that.

Here, incidentally, is the scheme (figure 10). I was not going to let you guys have this, you see, because I thought you might give it to the *Boston Globe* or something. But there is the I MEF up against all these fortifications. There's the Arabs, they're going to liberate Kuwait. They're going to get over here and get the Republican Guards out of their fox holes and if they're not out of their fox holes, they're going to destroy them one at a time. There's no sense attacking those guys. They're going to be in behind this crowd and instead of having 400, you're going to have 4,000, 40,000, and then finally 400,000 give up in this area. Yes?

Student: One of the challenges I think in the process of unleashing this Third Army in this thing is not only control measures. One of the problems is just doing it and it is a function of this and our operations at night that are going to determine a lot of things which will take care of the vehicles. It could be argued today that if night is a problem, just do it during the daytime. And the counter argument being that we've developed all these night systems and we haven't had a chance to test them in mass operations. Maybe we ought to test them and just use them. I could say there are arguments to both cases.

Cushman: I think what's happening in the Army, and I think some of this is true in the Marine Corps but in the Army, you may not know it, but it has been through about four years of really intensive preparation for this very war, concentrating, as many of us thought rather stupidly, on war with Russia, and not thinking about the Third World. Well, they've got these wonderful systems to fight the Russians and they have exercised something called the Battle Command Training Program — every division and corps commander and his staff and their subordinates, in war games against an OPFOR that has high quality in using warfare simulation. I described that in my first paper and you can be sure, and I know some of these people who are over there. I know, for example, Fred Franks who is the VII Corps commander. Fred Franks is nobody's dummy. He has probably got his operation very well together and they have capabilities like the 101st Airborne Division with all kinds of helicopters that can get out here and dot the area with strong points to link up the armor and that was what it was — the 101st with their Apaches and Scouts and their Chinooks are the ones they brought in. They probably put an airborne air assault battalion out there to secure it and brought in all those prisoners. The fact that they haven't been interfered with in this open space out here is very interesting to me. I don't see why the Iraqis didn't get out and try to attack that formation that was hauling 450 of their soldiers in a kind of administrative move back to Saudi Arabia.

Student: Assuming that General Schwarzkopf and General Franks know more than we do, and that they feel very strongly that the resolve of the Iraqis is just about gone, then we just do it in the daytime.

Cushman: I would do it in daytime. I think that we're not going to just exploit this night capability




Figure 10
Air/Land Scheme of Maneuver

just because we've got all that night vision equipment. We're going to get out here and the Republican Guard is still going to be intact. You've heard of the center of gravity. Have you heard that great buzz word — the "culminating point" and all that nonsense? Well, that is the center of gravity. The culminating point is where we want to arrive and get him worn out before we're worn out when we get up there.

Student: It appears to me that there may be one or two technical reasons for a night attack, one being the facility of chemical weapons, etc., and the inversions that occur in the day versus the inversions that occur at night. I've seen detection of munitions on the curves — up close and in person, in fact. The second is that the guys are giving up, or the guys that I would expect to give up are giving up.

Cushman: I'm not in a position in any way to say how this is going at night or not and so forth. We've got some guys over there and what they want to do is be effective. And I say they are probably going to be very, very effective.

Student: So far we're describing the military approach to this hypothetical land campaign. What strikes me the most about this is what I've seen this diagram or a diagram similar to it (figure 9), which is that we're sending the XVIII Corps wide to the West of the Iraqi defenses and Americans are sweeping around and coming in from the sea, or whatever. What are the political consequences of this when the Arabs are probably going to take a pounding and the Americans are going to walk out pretty much scot-free?

Cushman: Well, here's what I would say about that and it applies to these people too. I would say it

is professionally unsound and ethically wrong to tell either one of these formations to attack across those mine fields. We're going to get them in an indirect approach and this is all going to collapse and we're going to ask the army to come forward and take us through the mine field. This is a casualty producing thing of very considerable proportions and my Marine colonel who was briefing these midshipmen talking about it was describing to them the Iraqi defensive positions. You've seen those in *USA Today* and other places. It was kind of interesting to listen. One of the midshipmen, probably one who will go into the Marines, will say, "Tell me about that. What kind of casualties do you take?" And then he said, "Well, you take a lot of casualties. The first man probably gets killed. He has a rope behind him — the way the Israelis do it. They go forward with a rope behind them and the second man comes in, unties the rope from that man and he goes forward until he's killed." Afterward I said, "You call that maneuver warfare? You call that a way to fight?" Because he had earlier said that, "We're not the Iwo Jima guys anymore." He said, "Iwo Jima and Tarawa were tactical mistakes." I disagree with that. You see, he's reading Al Gray's stuff but he hasn't got the message yet. And I said to him, "If I was Schwarzkopf, I would say to these guys, 'You get over here. You stamp your feet. You have a war dance. You rattle the cymbals and the drums and you shoot artillery and you say, 'Hey, we're coming at you,'" and you stay right where you are because this is going to undo the whole damn thing. And I said, 'The idea that you have to have an amphibious operation just because you're amphibious-capable is sheer stupidity.'" There's no place up here that has got a really good definitive beach from my understanding of this.

So just get out there and have another amphibious demonstration — get the helicopters up and then fly them over there, get all the things ready, but only if they have any Marines on those ships. Have them down here because we don't want to have casualties. You know, I've got an enormous regard for their heroism and their gung-ho thing, but we don't want to prove ourselves by getting people killed. I really had that young colonel. He had to agree with me. It's not what you want to do. I just don't call that very smart tactics.

Student: What is the distance of the front?

Cushman: Here is the chart (figure 10). There's 100 kilometers. So this over here, this is about 50 kilometers of front. This is about another 50 or 60. Over here there are about 200 or 300 kilometers.

And the distance in here is about 100 or 150 kilometers. And you can be sure that they've got the pipelines laid. I mean, one thing we have plenty of is diesel fuel over here. And you can run the pipeline and get it all ready to go and those tanks use up a lot of fuel. My guess is you're going to find a very first rate operation. We'll find out. Now, you know, I could be all wrong, but I don't think so. I think I'm reading my former colleagues reasonably correctly.

Student: On your previous slide, you had one that said that the areas that cut across all warfare areas the CINC would retain. I notice you didn't have communications on there.

Cushman: Well that's central to do that. I'm talking long-range. No, I did say something about that.

Student: Well, I noticed you had communications and the folks having their own capability.

Cushman: Yes, I said we do interoperability. You see, down here where they're fighting these detail artillery and so forth, that's Marines and the Army. My primary concern is interoperability and swift information exchange and he has to have that.

Student: What I was thinking about was the Electronic Warfare annex, for deconfliction purposes.

Cushman: Somebody's got to think about that, especially if these guys get the idea over here that they're going to jam the enemy. Fortunately, they're a good way off, and in so doing, they jam the artillery and that's the Marines. The thing about it is that these guys are no dummies. They've been getting ready for this for six months — their intelligence annex and their EW annex and their protected frequencies are figured out by now.

You see I believe I'm correct that the SOI (signal operating instructions) change every day; that is, at a certain time — 0600 — you name it. At 0600 you get different frequencies for every net; you get different call signs. These are even in the secure nets. Now, I would hope that Schwarzkopf has said, "We're going to use the same frequencies and call signs for this whole operation. We're not going to be trying to change in the middle of operations." These guys don't have any electronic magic that can decode or attack our CPs or read our mail, not with the secure devices that we've got. So, don't go changing that unless it's something that is very easy to change, such as mobile subscriber equipment, which is all done inside the Signal Battalion.

Oettinger: You don't cheer me up because I can think of as many situations where the fog of war comes back in because of the number of screwups that are encountered because the COM security drill got carried through and everybody got confused. They got the codes wrong and couldn't talk to one another. That's outbalanced only by the number of instances where people did what you said but the codes are compromised and the other guy read them. I mean, that's how we did a lot of things during World War II.

Cushman: All I can say is that's a commander's judgment and I'm sure somebody does know what the EW capability of the Iraqis is. I think you have to decide that. I think that we grossly overdo it at the battalion and the brigade level by changing these frequencies around daily. You're right in the middle of an attack and everybody has to slap in this new code and here he is trying to get some artillery fire called in and his watch is just a minute wrong or something like that.

You know, I remember in Vietnam when we didn't change call signs for months. I remember the division commander of the First Cavalry Division, George Forsythe, a good friend of mine. I commanded the 101st Division at Fort Campbell and I was telling him, "Look, we don't do it here like we did in Vietnam anymore. We change our call signs. He said, "Well, we never did any of that." And I said, "Well, you can get yourself in trouble that way." He said, "Well, we wanted to scare the enemy." I said, "You are scaring me with that." I would just say it is not automatic that you're going to do that, particularly at the levels I'm talking about, which is small-unit levels in contact, you see, because you have got Vinson and other secure equipment that works very well and what they have to do in order to find something about that is traffic analysis. That takes time. That takes resources. Then the enemy has to say, "From this traffic analysis we think that's the 3rd Armored Division." By that time, the 3rd Armored Division is 50 or 60 kilometers behind him. Yes?


Student: For the last couple of years there has been a tendency to go back and change call signs at platoon and company and even battalion levels. The commanders have had the option to specify the crypto period for about five years. They've always had the option to do it but it's been reinforced to them that they can specify crypto periods and the length of time they do something and their boss has the option to say that's dumb and you're going to get killed.

Cushman: That makes sense. The only thing I would say to you is that I would decentralize that authority to the major commanders here and let them do it. Command nets, which are high priority, like INTEL, are very important and have a limited number of operators that are not in the heat of battle. I wouldn't go screwing around with what I've just talked about.

Oettinger: Unfortunately, there are so many lessons on both sides that the bottom line of this is, and I agree with Jack on that, the commander's judgment call, and it remains one of those things that no matter how much technology there is, there will never be a definitive answer.

Cushman: That's right. You see, what you have to have is people who understand the issues and the technical aspects of it. So you've got to know what a waveform is.

So much for Desert Storm. Now I'm going to take you to a different world. This is the new world of the 1990s. And in the early 1990s the United States established a new unified command known as the Third World Operations Command, or USTWOCOM, and he's got these components: ARTWO, AFTWO, and MARTWO, and SOCTWO. And CINCTWO created JTF 19 and here it is (figure 11). It's got my favorite division in it — the 47th, otherwise known as the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division minus a brigade. It's got a brigade of the 102nd Airborne; it's got a ranger battalion, which the SOCTWO says, "That's my battalion, what's it doing up there?" It's got a little Air Division with an airlift wing, and other Air Force units including tactical air support squadron, airborne collectors. It's got the 19th Marine Expeditionary Brigade with a ground combat and air combat, combat service element, and it's got PHIBRON, which is a Navy organization that lands a MEU (Marine Expeditionary Unit) BLT plus, and it's got these four amphibious ships. It's got a joint special operations task force with an advisory team. Then it's got a log command built around the 21st Airborne Course Support Command, but it has aerial ports and so forth. And then the Navy is not just this part. It's got other 8th Fleet including the U.S.S. *America* and seven combatants, an amphibious group, patrol force, log support, and other forces including the 10th Air Force, and Theater National Intelligence. This is a very interesting little command. This is the way of the future. I'm telling you, right off the bat, you're not going to be able to separate these guys so nicely — these Marines and these Army guys — it's going to be a smaller scene.



¹ Opcon to JTF 19 during amphibious phase only. Other (8th Fleet) Navy elms in spt include CTG 81.1 (*USS America* and 7 combatants; CTG 81.2 (Amphib Gp); CTG 81.3 (Patrol Force) w/12 aircraft; CTG 81.6 (LogSpt Gp) w/8 log ships; others.

² Includes elements 10th TASS and an array of airborne collectors which also support JTF 19.

³ Other forces also in support include 10th Air Force, theater/national intelligence assets, theater logistics, etc.

Figure 11
The Creation of JTF 19

In fact, USTWOCOM has an operations plan called Operation Plan 456 (figure 12). It goes into Tierra Verde. Tierra Verde has an enemy called Cucha. Insurgency within Tierra Verde, orchestrated and supported by Cucha, its hostile neighbor, has escalated in the Cucha attack and seizure of the Tierra Verde territory. Tierra Verde has requested U.S. military support to combat the invasion, to

restore its territory and to strengthen its armed forces. This is my little scenario. I don't know what ocean this is, but there's an off shore base complex not too far away.

Well now I want to talk about the problems of joint doctrine. This is an area that is unexplored. There is a test publication sponsored by the J7,




Figure 12
Tierra Verde

called *Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations* (figure 13). Incidentally, it has been suspended. All milestones are in suspension and no longer applicable until the end of Desert Storm. It has the first definitions of something called Force Entry or Forcible Entry. I'll let you read them. In fact, I won't let you go any further.

Someone told me over the telephone that this is the new word for amphibious operations. Actually the definition says — air and/or maritime — which, incidentally, none of them are defined in the joint dictionary either. So you have kind of an interesting open doctrinal void in here. We have terms that are under development. So I say, "There has been little joint doctrinal effort devoted to this concept of

From "Test Pub", January 1990, of Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations*, the first definitions of force entry and forcible entry:

Force entry operations — The introduction of an aggregation of military personnel, weapon systems, vehicles, and necessary support, or combination thereof, embarked for the purpose of gaining access through land, air, or amphibious operations into an objective area. Force entry into an objective area may be opposed (forcible entry) or unopposed (administrative deployment).

Forcible entry — Military lodgment by air, land, and/or maritime forces in the face of armed opposition.

There has been little joint doctrinal effort devoted to the concept of "force entry" or "forcible entry," using those terms as such (related terms, such as "amphibious operation," "airborne operation," "airhead," and "beachhead" have long been in use and well defined).

Joint literature on amphibious operations is extensive, comprehensive, and written and taught in great detail; not so for airborne operations.

Forcible entry operations will call not only for fleet and tactical air operations, to include airlift and sealift, but also for a mix of amphibious and airborne/airlanded forces (and special operations forces), with much of the force under single command.

There is a doctrinal or conceptual void here, not to speak of potential mismatches in command and control, organization, and equipment capabilities. A requirement exists: address force projection and its issues of deployment, employment, force mix, force effectiveness, jointness, doctrines, command and control, logistics, and so on.

Figure 13
Definitions of Force Entry and Forcible Entry

Force Entry and/or Forcible Entry," using those terms as such. What you have is amphibious, airborne.

Oettinger: Airheads is an old World War II term.

Cushman: The Army has had airheads for a long time.

So now I say that the next joint literature on amphibious operations is extensive and comprehensive. This is the most over-documented area of military operations that I can think of.

Oettinger: Let me suggest that, again, for some of you there may be some wonderful terms and things to read behind this because my view is to say, "Well, what we're looking at here has nothing to do with military think." This has a great deal to do with post-war budgeting and prerogatives and turfs, you see.

Cushman: Commander Pocalyko was very explicit about that. Pocalyko works in the Secretary of the Navy's office and he is thinking in terms such as what is it going to do for our next budget?

McLaughlin: Mike Pocalyko is a former student here.

Cushman: Yes, and he's a nice guy, a lieutenant commander, a helicopter pilot — a nice guy. So now I say Forcible Entry operations — this is an assertion — will call not only for fleet and tactical air to include airlift and sealift, but also for a mix of amphibious and airborne and air/land forces — that's what Tierra Verde calls for, and special operations forces. With much of the force under single command — that is the key issue — who commands? And then once he organizes a command, can he put the Marines under the Army or vice versa without creating a joint task force? So I say there is a doctrinal or conceptual void here, not to speak of potential mismatches in command and control, organization, equipment. A requirement exists — address force projection and its issues of deployment, employment, force projection, force effective, jointness, doctrine, etc., as a requirement. So now I'm going to let you in on Tony's and my next project, which is called *From the Bottom Up Command and Control of Theater Forces Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and the Future of Force Projection*. We're going to write a paper on that. Now I'm just going to show you some differences (figure 14). I've got Storm in here. I just said, "very large force, separable into components, much smaller, very short, not separable into components,

training required, C² and readiness (C² took time to build up), etc. So I said in my paper, *Command and Control*, issues on the mid-East coalition command imperative. Take it seriously and organize the force effectively for the battle. Establish a C³C system and train the force effective for battle. And this is where I'm leaving. Tony and I agreed that this is an interesting subject for us to pursue. So I'm pursuing it. That's the end of my talk. So now we've got six minutes before four.

Oettinger: That's remarkable timing.

McLaughlin: Are we setting up strawmen at Cucha?

Cushman: Listen, I didn't show you the outline. I have about four or five scenarios. This is a fictitious scenario. I'm going to have one with tanks. These guys don't have tanks. This doesn't mean that tanks are only good when the other guy has them. Tanks are better when you know the other guy doesn't have any tanks. That's when they're really useful.

Student: There's just one thing, sir. On the terminology on your chart, where you talked about the 10th tactical air support squadron, I guess, page 10, chart 10. If you're sending that to the Navy Proceedings, that TAS is a towed-array sonar system.

Cushman: Oh, is it?

Student: So they may say, "Were there submarines involved?"

Cushman: All right, I'm glad to know that. I think that this is the first shot being fired in the future force structure that is Desert Storm. And I also say that the thing about Desert Shield/Desert Storm is that it has put the Chairman and his joint staff in the driver's seat. Now, whether they'll be equally in the driver's seat when you start dividing up the limited funds and start deciding what the force structure of the future is, is questionable, but I think SECDEF is going to talk to them about this.

Oettinger: There were other scenarios we talked about this morning. For instance, that it is not unconceivable that in a little place in Serbia called Sarajevo, somebody from Ljubljana in the north assassinates a local politician in an obscure Slovenian-Serbian dispute, thereby inviting intervention by some White Russians who have fielded an army in order to disagree with Moscow. They're afraid to go to Moscow so they head toward Ljubljana or Belgrade, as the case may be, you know, etc. Or if you don't like that kind of scenario,

| Desert Shield/Desert Storm | USTWOCOM Oplan 456, and the like |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Very large force (500,000 strong) ➤ Months to prepare | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Much smaller (30,000) ➤ Very short notice |
| Imperatives: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Take it seriously ➤ Organize the force effectively for battle ➤ Establish a C³ system for the force that is of the highest quality possible ➤ Train the force effectively for battle | |

Figure 14
Desert Shield/Desert Storm and USTWOCOM: Differences

I'll give you an older one where in 1792, three years after the initial period of perestroika, a king was called in question and an obscure second lieutenant named Napoleon, or in this case, Napoleonsky, is disaffected by the fact that he's been demobilized and there's no place to go, etc., and starts putting together an army which all of a sudden marches out of revolutionary . . . blah, blah, blah, and heads westward. The neglect of European scenarios to me is foolish.

McLaughlin: Let me run the other side then, which is the whole slew of Third World exercises that were done. An awful lot of countries in Central and South America today, I think, when they petition the U.S. for assistance to prevent their takeover by the Communists are being told to shove it and I think that there will be a lot of Third World scenarios like that.

Cushman: Well that's a political question. I'll just say that we've had force projection around for a

long time. The United States is going to have to have a capability with some substantial forces for force projection within a budget and we want the best we can. In this draft that I gave to Tony, I've got the SECDEF's guidance to the Chairman in which it says, "Build me forces for a force projection that have these characteristics." Tell me if that's not good guidance.

McLaughlin: I assume an awful lot of Marines told you that looks like a super MEF.

Cushman: Well, if you want to give the Marines an airborne capability, that's another thing.

McLaughlin: 1942.

Cushman: Yes, and so did the Army have an amphibious capability in 1942, and later a big one.

Oettinger: It's exactly 1600. Thank you.



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ISBN-1-879716-03-8