

**Command and Control
of Theater Forces:
The Korea Command
and Other Cases**

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COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THEATER FORCES: THE KOREA COMMAND AND OTHER CASES
John H. Cushman
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In a well-balanced organization there is close correlation of responsibility and authority.

Report of Select Committee of the U.S. Congress on Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.

...to vest a commander with responsibility and no corresponding authority is eminently unfair.

U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations; Operations, 1949.

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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

- o Notwithstanding recent progress, serious inadequacies continue to exist in the command and control of multi-service/multinational theater forces and in the ways by which these forces' command and control systems are placed into the field.
- o Study of the Korea command and other multiservice/multinational cases reveals that, over the years, a pervasive and by now endemic weakening of the chain of U.S. operational command has had grave deleterious effect on the readiness and performance of U.S. multiservice forces, and has contributed to recent disasters such as the October 1983 Beirut Marine tragedy.
- o "The wall of the Service component" has always inhibited and often prevented command supervision of mission performance and mission readiness by multiservice commanders and has kept them from the exercise of proper influence over the evolution of the command and control systems of their commands. Although the combined command in Korea has done much to cope with this and with similar problems of a multinational nature, its prospects for command and control systems fall short of the high standard of excellence which is attainable.
- o The fundamental problem is that the authority and the capacity to exercise it possessed by senior officers in the chain of operational command do not match the responsibility and accountability borne by these officers. This problem occurs both in field commands and at the U.S. seat of government, and includes their authority and capacity to influence the command and control systems through which theater forces carry out the orders of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and coalition political authorities. This mismatch is both structurally unsound and manifestly unfair.
- o The underlying cause of this mismatch and of the consequent deficiencies in command and control is the prevailing Service-dominated culture of U.S. multiservice operational command. Within this culture the senior multiservice commanders lack the full operational command which the Congress in 1958 specified that they will possess. Similarly the Joint Chiefs of Staff, because of the committee system under which they operate for command and control as well as for other matters, are unable to

bring about the standard of excellence which operational command and control systems can achieve and which the American people have a right to expect.

- o Options for improvement of these conditions include continuing along the present path, changing the governing statutes, and major change with little or no revision of statutes.

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THEATER FORCES:
THE KOREA COMMAND AND OTHER CASES

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Foreword

This study has been a long time in the making. My thinking on the subject began in 1956 when I was a major on the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and with some others was drafting a revision to the Army's basic Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations.

An appendix in the 1949 edition of that field manual contained 25 principles stated by the Congressional Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, principles to which the Committee believed the U.S. armed forces should give serious consideration "in the hope that something constructive might be accomplished that would aid our national defense and preclude a repetition of the failure of 7 December 1941."

I was profoundly impressed by the Committee's conclusions on the duties of operational command, placed in the appendix at the direction of the Army Chief of Staff, and by the field manual's exposition.

I might point out that, in 1973-76 when I was Commandant of the Command and General Staff College, I made an effort, unsuccessful in the event, to have that 1949 appendix be part of the revision of FM 100-5 then under way. It has not appeared in any revision since 1949.

In 1958 I went to the Pentagon for duty in the office of the Army Chief of Staff. Our small group served the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army as they took

part in the revisions of Department of Defense directives made necessary by the 1958 amendments to the National Security Act of 1947. Among other changes, these amendments had established in law the concept that combatant commands were to be directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense and to the President.

In 1960 I wrote a paper, "The Question of Defense Organization," which spelled out my beliefs on how the Department of Defense and particularly the Joint Chiefs of Staff should operate under the organizational concept of the Service as provider of forces and the unified commander as the forces' employer. This fundamental concept had also been confirmed in those 1958 amendments. In December, my paper came to the attention of Cyrus Vance, who had been named by the Secretary of Defense-designate as his General Counsel and who was establishing a small group in the General Counsel's office to work on matters of defense organization.

Working there, and later for Cyrus Vance when he was Secretary of the Army, I became deeply involved in how the Department of Defense was, or might be, organized and operated.

In 1963 I went to Vietnam on the first of three tours in that country and never returned to the Pentagon for duty. In those Vietnam tours, later as commander of the 101st Airborne Division, and in my final assignment -- in Korea as commander of the ROK/US field army size formation responsible for defending the Western Sector of the DMZ and the approaches to Seoul -- I continued to develop my convictions on matters of defense organization and operation. After

leaving active duty, I became associated with Harvard University's Program on Information Resources Policy. I welcomed the opportunity to write on a favorite subject.

* * * * *

This study benefitted from the ready availability of information from personnel of the Korea command in visits I have made there over the past several years.

The present commander in Korea would want it understood that perfection is elusive and that he does not complain. Specifically, the Korea command does not seek major change in its charters.

Further, responsible staff officers of the Korea command emphasize that in the severe tensions created by events such as the September 1983 Soviet destruction of Korean Airlines Flight 7, the North Korean assassination attempt on the President of the Republic of Korea in Rangoon one month later, and the November 1984 firefight near the meeting site of the Military Armistic Commission at Panmunjom, the readiness and responsiveness of the ROK/US chain of command left nothing to be desired.

This work is written in the interests of the Korea command and of the Free World's multiservice/multinational commanders, wherever stationed. Bearing great responsibility, these men have neither an impressive constituency nor any lobby. Although their authorities uniformly fall short of their responsibilities, each of them takes the situation as it is and makes the best of it.

Each has his own view of the adequacy of his command's command and control system. In the case of Korea, the commander responsible as this study is completed believes that the ROK/US command and control system is working well.

Yet considering that the final test for which these commanders must be ready is not action in crisis but rather war itself, and that their mission of deterring war requires that they be ready for war, these multiservice/multinational commanders, including those in the Korea command, deserve better of the authorities who write their charters and frame the culture within which they operate.

It is toward such an achievement that this work is written.


Like others, I am a creature of my own experience. My work no doubt reflects a certain bias, especially toward strengthening the authorities of operational commanders. I have been candid in this work, but as objective as I know how to be.

Although I have been helped by many, I take full responsibility for this study and for any errors of fact, omission, or interpretation.

John H. Cushman

PART ONE

BACKGROUND



Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

This work is a sequel to the volume Command and Control of Theater Forces: Adequacy (hereafter referred to as Adequacy), published in April 1983 by the Program on Information Resources Policy and in 1985 by the AFCEA International Press, Washington, D.C.

This work is in large part a case study of command and control in the Korea command. Taking into account other material as well, it addresses fundamental issues germane to all commands of theater forces. Its intended readership, as is that of Adequacy, is anyone who finds its content of interest.

We said in that work that it is a matter of utmost concern of the elected leaders and representatives of the American people, and a policy objective of the greatest urgency and importance, that the command and control systems of theater forces be of the highest quality that technology, military foresight, and human ingenuity can provide.

Adequacy described significant inadequacies in the command and control systems of theater forces and in the machinery through which these command and control systems are put into place. It went at length into the causes of these inadequacies.

Using the general assessment of Adequacy as its basis, this work addresses in detail the command and control

systems of the multiservice/multinational forces of one specific theater, namely Korea.

Considering the Korea case and other material, it suggests options for improvement both for Korea and in the larger context of operational command and control, and explores the implications of these options.

There are three theater forces' commands with existing forces on which this type of more detailed, specific case study could be centered -- that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe; that of the U.S. Central Command responsible for Southwest Asia; and that in Korea.

This study examines the Korea command because, although complex in structure, it is less so than NATO's military structure; it illuminates issues present in any multi-service/multinational theater forces command; and it is a more mature structure than is that of the U.S. Central Command established in January 1983.

Command and Control

The U.S. Air Force's hard-bitten General Curtis E. LeMay once said, "Without communications, I can't command anything beyond my desk."

At the national level, something similar is true for what is called command and control. Without fully effective command and control, neither the President nor the Secretary of Defense nor the American people can be confident that their reasonable expectations for the performance of U.S.

and coalition military forces will be met -- in peace, in crisis, or in war.

This study addresses the command and control of theater forces.*

But what does "command and control" mean?

If you were to answer, "In the military context, command and control means everything!" -- in a real sense you would be right.

Every military organization exists to serve, and to act toward, some purpose. The more intelligently and coherently a military organization acts, whatever its means, the more effective the organization is.

Command and control is what moves a military organization to act.

*The theater forces of the United States and its allies are those multiservice, usually multinational, forces either deployed or in preparation for deployment in largely land mass areas of operation. They join strategic and maritime forces in a global fabric aimed at deterrence, crisis control, and, if necessary, the effective waging of war. Today these theater forces focus on Europe, Korea, and the Middle East/Southwest Asia. This use of "theater" is somewhat different from that of Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1, the Joint Dictionary, which says: "The geographical area outside the continental United States for which a commander of a unified or specified command has been assigned military responsibility." [1]

Anything and everything, therefore, that contributes to a military organization's ability to act intelligently and coherently can legitimately be called part of its command and control.

A military organization is made up of people, each one with some part to play. Whatever a military organization does, it does by the thought and actions of people. The people in a military organization are thus an essential part of its command and control.

Because the term first appeared in the United States military scene in the 1950s, in the vocabulary of those who were applying automation (along with radars, communications, linked command centers, and so on) for the first time to a major military function, namely the air defense of the United States, the term "command and control" -- and especially its derivative term, "command and control systems" -- has long carried a primarily technological meaning.^[2]

Command and control began as a term used mostly by civilians in think tanks or in technologically oriented organizations. Those of us who commanded military formations in the field and who were responsible for making our formations operate well in training and in combat took perhaps longer than we should have, in those days, to

realize that what we were doing was practicing command and control.*

In the 1960s and 1970s, command and control became the province of an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staff agency whose jurisdiction up to then had been "communications" and whose new realm was now "communications, command, and control" (in that order), plus "intelligence." This transition contributed further toward identifying the subject matter of command and control -- and the meaning of "command and control systems" -- as primarily technological.

What is the "Command and Control System"?

Here again, the answer could be "everything!"

Everything that contributes to a military organization's ability to act intelligently and coherently toward its purpose can be considered part of its command and control system.

Consider this typical thought sequence of a division commander in heavy fighting as he strives to accomplish his mission:

*However, it seemed only natural, as the U.S. Army went air-mobile in the 1960s, to use a radio-equipped "command and control helicopter" to do our non-technical jobs in combat.

Also, Martin van Creveld gives us valuable insights on the nature of command and control in his excellent paper, Command, which treats the evolution of C³ (identified as "command, communications, and control") from the dawn of recorded history to the present.[3]

- Where am I (my situation)?
- Where is the enemy?
- What is he doing?
- How can I thwart him?
- How can I do him in?
- Am I in balance (reserves, logistics, etc.)?
- How long will it take me to...?
- How long will it take him to...?
- How will it look in...hours?
- What is the most important thing to do right now?
- How do I get it done?

Anything and everything that helps that division commander determine the answers, or that through its influence affects the answers to these questions, can be thought of as part of that division commander's command and control system.

Examples: The downlink frequencies from a USAF TR-1, the signals-intelligence specialist who is monitoring controls in a Guardrail aircraft, the format and standard content of a battalion commander's battle report, the situation map display in the division commander's tactical command post, the skill and insights of his G2 (intelligence) staff, the communications links from his command post to the division and corps logistics activities -- all these, even though some may be far from his control, can be thought of as part of the division commander's command and control system.

And when that division commander issues the orders resulting from his decision process, anything in his force or supporting his force that plays a part in making happen, or not, what he intends to happen can be seen as part of his command and control system.

Examples: His organization for combat; the secure radio net over which his orders move; the clarity, brevity, and motivating tone of his mission-type orders; the fire direction nets in his division and corps artilleries; the anti-jam SOPs in which his radio operators are trained; the procedures through which close air support is called for and delivered; his appearance in person at the critical point; the understanding that his subordinates and his partners in action, including tactical airmen, have imbedded in their guts through their own indoctrination and experience as to the way in which that division fights -- all these can be considered part of his command and control system.*

Or, in the context of a 1983 Grenada-type operation, the hastily developed methods (frequencies and call signs, for example, and coordinating procedures) for tying together Air Force C-130 gunships, carrier-based A-7s, Army attack helicopters, and Army rangers and Marines on the ground --

*In Command, van Creveld calls some of this "leadership," which he distinguishes from "C³" (which he then shortens to "command"). He says that "Leadership consists of using various means -- a mixture of example, persuasion and compulsion -- in order to motivate people; command consists of using information in order to coordinate both people and resources in such a way as to carry out a mission." [4]

these too are part of the multiservice force commander's command and control system.

Or, the measures used by commanders and their staffs worldwide to keep from being surprised, from the most sophisticated of sensors, to agent and other human intelligence reports, to merely reading the newspapers -- these too can be called part of each field commander's command and control system.

In this study, as in Adequacy to which our Foreword refers, we do not include every last one of such things under "command and control systems." But we do mean not only command centers, computers, radars, communications links, and other such material components. We mean also the people -- the commanders, staffs, and others -- who use these means, as well as the doctrines, procedures, and organizational arrangements for their use.

Thus, we have a broad definition of command and control system. This is close to the definition used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, namely:

The facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missions assigned.[5]

At any level, the field commander's command and control system is actually a web of systems, extending from the top to the bottom of his command, with some parts of the system not actually under his command.

The command and control system of one commander is a subsystem of the system of the next higher commander. Any force, other than the smallest, has within it more than one command and control system, or subsystem. Large forces have innumerable such systems, linked and cross-linked horizontally and vertically.

Because no two forces are alike in their composition or in the situation for which they are organized, no "webs" or "webs of webs" that make up the command and control systems of forces are exactly alike.

How Are Command and Control Systems Put into Place?

The materiel components of these command and control systems are out there in the forces right now. They come from a variety of sources, often including those of the host nation. The radios and microwave links, command centers, people, and procedures exist today. The gear is a combination of both old and new equipment. As new equipment comes in, it has to fit into the old web. The command and control system of each commander thus includes a unique, situation-specific, living web of materiel components in its own continuing process of evolution.

The non-materiel components of these command and control systems -- the people and their organizational relationships, command arrangements, procedures, and ways of operating -- also exist out there today. And as people and conditions change, these non-materiel components also go through a process of evolution.

These systems' materiel components and their software are put into place by an establishment of national and Service "providers," for the use of the "users."

The users of command and control systems are those commanders (and their staffs and other command and control entities) who have an operational mission -- who must be ready to fight in time of war or to operate in crisis short of war. Some of these, such as air/land forces in Europe and Korea and the Navy at sea, face a potential enemy daily.

There are all kinds of users:

- o The commanders -- from the top commander in the force, down to the commanders of battalions and squadrons, or lower;
- o The many staff members -- for example, the corps and division and brigade intelligence officers and all their people;
- o The various command and control entities -- like the fire direction centers (FDC), the air defense command posts (AADCP), or the control and reporting centers (CRC).

We call these the real users:

- o Because these commanders and their people are in the closest touch with the actual command and control situation, problems, and processes;

- o Because they are responsible for mission success, and accountable for mission failure;
- o Because the command and control systems are mind extenders -- extensions of the commander's mind, and the minds of his staff and of the people in his command and control facilities, as they face their particular problem and strive to accomplish their particular goal.

We can expect that the commander of each web of systems is highly mission-oriented, alive to the high costs of failure, and personally committed to an effective command and control system.

The "providers" are (for the most part*) the national and Service establishments, each relatively independent, each performing the standard materiel cycle: determining requirements, developing items of materiel and arranging for their production, delivering those items and maintaining them -- and each managing the money and other resources for doing all this.

In Adequacy we described and critiqued in detail the process by which the existing machinery provides theater forces' command and control systems. We can summarize the performance of these processes by saying that:

*We say "for the most part" because, as we shall see, some field commanders are, in exasperation with the providers' performance, becoming their own providers.

- o They take far too long;
- o They waste far too much time and money with little success;
- o They produce systems with technology well behind the state of the art when fielded; and
- o The various materiel establishments produce systems that do not fit with each other when delivered.

Or, to put it into one sentence: Field commanders and fighting men of American theater forces (and of their allies alongside whom we will surely fight if war comes) are being denied the sort of timely quality and system harmony in their command and control systems that is well within the ability of American technology and industry to produce.^[6]

Adequacy of Theater Forces' Command and Control Systems

Adequacy arrived at a basic assessment of the adequacy of command and control systems for U.S.-allied theater forces:

Our performance in providing the full range of means necessary for command and control systems for theater forces has been, and all too likely continues to be, gravely deficient. Although the means of command and control in the hands of U.S. and allied field forces may possibly be adequate for conditions short of war, they are seriously inadequate for war and hence for war's deterrence.

Theater forces' command and control systems are not well tied together, top to bottom. They are not being exercised adequately under the expected conditions of war. Great sections of them will probably not survive the attack against them which is sure to

come in war. For the typical senior commander, allied or U.S., whose forces must use these systems, they represent the largely unplanned splicing together of ill-fitting components which have been delivered to his forces by relatively independent parties far away who have coordinated adequately neither with him and his staff nor with each other. And they neither exploit the present capabilities of technology nor does the system for their development adequately provide that future systems will.[7]

We said that this alarming assessment urgently called for its causes to be understood and as quickly as possible corrected, in the national interest.

The Causes of Inadequacy

Adequacy said that certain technical and conceptual failings have contributed to this inadequacy, world-wide, of theater forces' command and control systems.

- o We have not understood and appreciated the meaning of theater forces' command and control systems as living webs of systems, each web consisting of a full spectrum of individual components, each web different, and each web in a process of evolution out where that particular web of systems exists.
- o We have not appreciated, nor taken full advantage of, nor reinforced, the mission-oriented field commander's commitment to the timely evolutionary improvement of the specific web of systems that make up his command and control means.
- o For those line item components which can be called "mind extenders" or "aids to decision" to the commanders and staffs which use them, we have failed to use an evolutionary acquisitions approach which deeply involves the real user.
- o We have made insufficient use of readily available and adaptable commercial gear which can be brought swiftly off the shelf into the webs of systems serving commanders in the field.

- o And we have done poorly in working out an approach to system architecture and interconnects which can accommodate the needs for evolutionary change and for interoperability of forces.[8]

But Adequacy said that the following bureaucratic/institutional causes are more fundamental:

- o First is the failure of the Service provider to look holistically at the operational commander's entire web of command and control. This stems from the narrowly based, Service-oriented outlook which comes naturally and institutionally to a Service and which is most difficult to eradicate.
- o Next is the failure to give sufficient influence on the process of developing and fielding systems to the only authorities who are driven by their overriding mission responsibilities to look at the problem holistically, namely the multiservice and multinational major operational commanders of theater forces.
- o Then, there has been the failure to date of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make the Services meet the genuine needs of field commanders, and their allowing the Services to acquire command and control systems which do not look at the operational user's web of systems in a fully holistic way.
- o Finally, there is the general failure to evaluate command and control systems against operational mission performance under conditions of stark reality.[9]

Adequacy cited the basic cause of inadequacy in command and control as follows:

Responsible senior officers who are in the operational chain of command below the President and the Secretary of Defense, and who will surely be held accountable in the event of command and control failure, have not been given the means necessary to meet their responsibility and accountability.[10]

Korea as a Case Study

This volume takes up in large part the command and control systems of the Korea command, as a case.

The Korea command -- with its multiservice mix of forces from two nations, with the interplay of the two nations' differing cultural traditions and social and institutional natures, and with often-conflicting national interests within a common strategic goal -- is a useful vehicle to examine in some depth how, in a specific command, the various causes described above apply, and to learn if there are some general lessons from such examination.

The background and some special characteristics of the Korea command are covered in Chapters II and III, which follow.

However, any treatment of the Korea command must take into account the underlying natures both of command itself and of multiservice and multinational command in particular. Chapters IV, V, and VI address these matters in terms broader than those of Korea alone.

Following that, Chapters VII through XI are a broadly based assessment of Korea's command and control situation.

They take the approach that assessment must go beyond the borders of the Korea command's own jurisdiction and into the Service and national institutional forces which create the problems -- not only in Korea's case but elsewhere.

Chapter XII, at the end of Part Two, summarizes the conclusions of Chapters VII through XI, describes options available to deal with the conditions described in those chapters, and discusses the implications of those options.

Chapters XIII and XIV go beyond the Korea command to describe options for improvement, and the implications of those options, for operational commands in general and for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their Chairman.

Chapter XV presents a matrix for decision making.




Figure 1-1. The Far East




Figure 1-2. Korea




Figure 1-3. The Military Demarcation Line and Demilitarized Zone

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Chapter II

THE UNITED STATES PRESENCE IN KOREA

Origins

United States military forces are in Korea for one basic and simply stated purpose: To reduce to the minimum the likelihood of another Korean War.

There is a long history behind that purpose.

United States military forces first came onto the Korean peninsula at the end of the war with Japan in August 1945. Their entry was poorly planned, and its long-range implications were not foreseen.

Until the end of the 19th century, Korea, an ancient land with a distinctive race of people, had been for a thousand years a kingdom, during certain periods paying tribute to the Chinese emperor, independent in other periods, and frequently invaded by its more powerful neighbors. When modern times, with modern warfare, came to Northeast Asia in the late 1800s, the strategically located but militarily weak kingdom of Korea became a prize in the triangular contest of power between China, Russia, and Japan.

Victorious in its wars with China in 1895 and with Russia in 1905, Japan occupied Korea, deposed the last king of the Yi dynasty, and made the country a part of the Japanese empire. It remained so until 1945.

The Japanese were harsh rulers, and exploited Korea's resources for the benefit of Japan. They crushed successive attempts by Korean patriots to strike for self-rule and, toward the end of their dominion over Korea, went so far as to outlaw the use of "hangul" -- the Korean alphabet developed under King Sejong in the 15th century -- and even forced Koreans to accept Japanese family names.

As World War II's end came into sight, Korean "governments in exile," of which there were more than one in the factional style so typical of Korean politics, believed that their dream of Korean independence was about to come true.

But the Soviet Union, at U.S. urging, entered the war against Japan and in a lightning campaign defeated the Japanese in Manchuria and brought the Soviet armies to Korea's northern border.

United States war planners, seeking to keep the Soviets from occupying all of Korea, proposed that the USSR take the surrender of Japanese forces north of a certain line across the peninsula, and that the United States do the same south of that line. The Soviet Union agreed.

That line was the 38th parallel, about 30 miles north of Seoul.

General Douglas McArthur, who had been designated to receive the Japanese surrender, ordered the United States XXIV Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, to carry out the terms of surrender and to occupy and administer Korea south of the 38th parallel. General

Hodge's forces did so. The Soviets did the same in the north, and Korea has been divided ever since.

The Road to the Korean War

The Soviet Union quickly installed, as head of a Soviet-backed North Korean government, a Soviet-trained Korean Communist who called himself Kim Il-Sung. The USSR then proceeded to build up and train the North Korean Army, clearly with the thought that in due time the opportunity would come to unite the entire peninsula under Communist rule.

Meanwhile, after floating the idea of "trusteeship" for Korea -- an idea Korean patriots fiercely opposed -- the fledgling United Nations sought, through U.N.-supervised elections aimed at forming a national government, to bring all of Korea to independence and full membership in the family of nations.

North Korea permitted no election process. The South went ahead, and in 1948 a National Assembly was chosen by some 80 percent of the South's eligible voters, the Republic of Korea was created, and Syngmann Rhee was elected President.

In 1949 the United States withdrew the XXIV Corps and all combat forces, leaving only a Military Assistance Advisory Group to help with the organization and training of the South Korean Army, a constabulary force with little artillery and no armor.

On June 25, 1950, the tank-equipped North Korean Army -- backed by the Soviets who, like the North Koreans, evidently hardly thought that the United States would go to war over the matter -- attacked across the 38th parallel to bring the entire peninsula under North Korean sway.^[1]

The Creation of the United Nations Command

President Truman then surprised the Soviets. He committed U.S. air forces, then U.S. ground forces, from Japan to help the South Koreans defend their territory. He also took the cause to the United Nations.

In mid-1950 the Soviet Union was boycotting all proceedings of the United Nations, because, even though Mao Tse-Tung's forces had taken control of the Chinese mainland in 1949, the United Nations had denied Communist China the seat held by Nationalist China in the General Assembly and on the Security Council.^[2]

At the urging of the United States, supported by Great Britain and France, the Security Council quickly voted that its members should assist South Korea. On July 7, the Security Council voted to make the U.S. President its executive agent in carrying out the United Nations fight against North Korean aggression. In the same resolution, it recommended that U.N. member nations furnish forces to a military command under the United States and said that the U.S. would name the commander thereof.

Then, on July 10, 1950, President Truman appointed General Douglas MacArthur -- who was Commander-in-Chief, Far

East Command -- as Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command, as well.

When the Korean War ended with an armistice in July 1953, the United Nations Command included forces of 16 nations plus the Republic of Korea (not a U.N. member).^[3]

The United Nations Command still exists, as does the original 1950 United Nations resolution (no word of which can be changed without United States consent, in view of the U.S. power to veto a Security Council resolution). Seven U.N. members (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, and United States) remain accredited to the U.N. Command, but only the United States provides other-than-ceremonial forces.

1978: The Combined Forces Command

From the beginning, the CINC, United Nations Command, has reported directly to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (or, more correctly, to the U.S. President through the JCS).

A succession of four-star generals appointed by the President, from Douglas MacArthur through Mark Clark (who signed the 1953 Armistice Agreement) to William J. Livsey in 1984, has held the position of Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC). This title, and its authorities according to the United Nations resolution of July 7, 1950, have been one consistent feature of the Korea military command setup in the past three decades. Much else has changed.

One of the most significant changes was the creation, in November 1978, of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command. Before that time the military responsibility for defending the territory of the Republic of Korea resided, as it had since 1950, in the CINCUNC. CINCUNC's staff was composed entirely of U.S. personnel.

Although the idea of a "combined forces command" had been around for some time, the trigger for pursuing this idea to fruition in 1977 was the newly elected President Carter's decision, later reversed by him, to withdraw all U.S. ground forces from Korea by 1980.

To make possible, among other things, a Korean-American headquarters responsible for planning, and if need be conducting, Korea's defense, the American and Korean governments decided to form jointly the new command. When they did so, the CINCUNC took on another "hat" -- that of CINC, ROK/US Combined Forces Command (CFC) -- under which he was responsible for the defense of Korea, and his CINCUNC duties shrank to only those called for by the Military Armistice Agreement.

The terms of reference of the CINC, CFC, call for him to report jointly to the two Presidents* -- of the United States and of the Republic of Korea. A mechanism known as

*More precisely, the CINC CFC reports jointly to the senior national authorities of the two countries, namely each country's President and Secretary/Minister of Defense, through their respective Joint Chiefs of Staff.

the ROK/US Military Committee (a committee of two, namely the U.S. and ROK JCS Chairmen) provides strategic guidance to the CINC, responsive to the basic decisions of the two Presidents and of their respective defense ministers.

General Livsey as CINC, CFC, has a four-star Korean Army deputy CFC commander, a U.S. Air Force lieutenant general as chief of staff, and an all-Service, bi-national staff.

In addition to the positions of CINCUNC and CINC, CFC, General Livsey is also:

- o Commander, U.S. Forces Korea (COMUSK). U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) is a U.S.-only "unified command" (sometimes called a "sub-unified command," because it is part of the larger "unified command" known as the U.S. Pacific Command, the headquarters of which is in Hawaii). As COMUSK, General Livsey reports to the U.S. Navy admiral in Hawaii who is Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (USCINCPAC).

- o Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA). EUSA is the "U.S. Army component" of the USFK. Its functions, both in peace and as projected in case of war, are essentially administrative and logistical. As EUSA commander General Livsey has substantial authority over U.S. Army military personnel (court martial authority, for example) and for the allocation of Army resources (he manages the EUSA budget, for example). Because administration and logistics are "national" and "Service" responsibilities, he

has nothing like this authority wearing his other "hats." As Commanding General, EUSA, General Livsey's chain of command is to the Department of the Army, in the Pentagon (essentially, this means that he reports to the Army Chief of Staff).

- o Commander, Ground Component Command of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command. This designation preserves the fiction (for fiction it is) that every multi-service command has a "ground (or Army) component," an "air (or Air Force) component," and a "naval (or Navy/Marine Corps) component." For land forces this principle has been honored more in its breach than in its keeping. There is no separate staff for CFC's Ground Component Command; the subordinate land force field armies report directly to CFC, and in effect General Livsey in this hat reports to himself.
- o General Livsey would also function as the Commander, United Nations Ground Component Command, should a ground element from a nation accredited to the U.N. Command be reintroduced to Korea, for example in the outbreak of war.
- o Finally, General Livsey, as the Senior U.S. Military Officer Assigned in Korea, serves as the U.S. member of the ROK/US Military Committee, Permanent Session. The Senior Officer (representing the Chairman, U.S. JCS) and the Chairman, ROK JCS, sit together as the Permanent Session of the Military Committee. In concert, they decide day-to-day matters concerning the combined command. When these two cannot, or

should not, resolve a matter, they refer it to the Plenary Session of the ROK/US Military Committee. The Plenary Session consists of the Chairmen of the two JCSs, the CINCPAC, another designated ROK representative and General Livsey in his capacity as CINCCFC. In the Plenary Session CINCCFC is viewed as a bi-national position, while as the Senior Officer in the Permanent Session General Livsey represents purely U.S. interests. Either way General Livsey is in the position of being involved in orders to himself. The Service Chief members of the ROK and US JCS are not members of the Military Committee, except in a general, advisory way through the two Chairmen. [4]

"Multiple Hatting" as a Way of Life

Thus, General Livsey has seven "hats." Some of his subordinates have almost as many.

The Deputy Commander, US Forces Korea, a USAF three-star general, is also: Deputy CINC, United Nations Command; Chief of Staff, Combined Forces Command; Chief of Staff, CFC's Ground Component Command; and (in peacetime) Commander, Air Component Command of the CFC.

The J3, or Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, of USFK's headquarters, a major general of the U.S. Army, also serves as: C3 (for "combined" as distinguished from "joint" operations chief) of the headquarters, CFC; as G3 (for "general staff operations chief" of a U.S. Army formation) of headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army; as J3 of the UN Command;

and as C3 of the Ground Component Command, CFC (which title, like that of Ground Component Commander only preserves the fiction of a separate "ground component").*

On the other hand, the Chief of Staff of the U.S.-only USFK has no duties in the ROK/US Headquarters, CFC. His only other hat is that of Chief of Staff, Eighth Army.

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (C⁴S) of USFK is an interesting case. He comes to that job because, as the commander of the Army's 1st Signal Brigade in Korea, he is also the information systems staff officer of Eighth Army -- notwithstanding that his chain of command as brigade commander is directly to the U.S. Army Information Systems Command in Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Wearing the brigade command hat, he is not commanded by, but is "opcon"** to General Livsey. The Chief of Staff, EUSA/USFK, is the senior rater on his efficiency report.

The ACS of C⁴S was formerly called the J6, USFK, and was at one time deputy C6 (Communications-Electronics) staff

*The "G" of G3 derives from the U.S. Army "general staff" position designations which originated with World War I's American Expeditionary Force in Europe and were later built into U.S. Army staff doctrine. When joint staffs became organized, post World War II, the "J" there replaced the "G." Then in Korea, when the "combined" staff of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command was created in 1978, the "C" was introduced. To date, the "C" is a Korea-only convention.

**"Opcon" means "operational control." See discussion beginning on page 4-7.

officer) in headquarters CFC and number-two man to the ROK Army brigadier general who is the C6. Now his duties are no longer ROK/US; that is considered by many as a defect, rather than a help, in solving the manifold problems of ROK/US communications.

On opposite sides of the parade field of Yongsan U.S. Army military post in the city of Seoul, there are two headquarters buildings. The larger, of recent construction and oriental design, houses the headquarters of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command. Across the parade field is the older headquarters building of U.S. Forces Korea/Eighth U.S. Army (the two combined into a single headquarters).

General Livsey has offices in both buildings, but rarely conducts daily business in the latter -- possibly only when there is a matter to be discussed which has purely U.S. interest, and not always then.

The same applies to the USAF lieutenant general who is General Livsey's USFK and UNC deputy; he spends most of his time as the CFC Chief of Staff (he also has a ROK Army major general as his deputy C/S).

The day-to-day custodian of USFK (and EUSA) activities is the U.S. Army major general Chief of Staff of USFK/EUSA, who has no official duties in CFC or the U.N. Command.^[5]

Why all this double, triple, and more, hatting? The answer lies in the peculiar culture of military organizations, and in the meaning of command and of degrees of authority less than command.

We have in Korea a multiservice and multinational command.

However, to set up all the separate headquarters required by "joint doctrine" results only in bureaucratic layers and complex proliferation. It is actually much cleaner organizationally to "multiple hat."


In Korea there is also a coalition -- a combination of military forces of two sovereign nations. Although there are only two nations, which makes the problem simpler than in NATO's Europe, it still is a coalition.

Political authorities and military leaders of a coalition accept that there must be unity of operational command; disunity courts defeat. Some way must be found to provide for this unity of operational command, while at the same time preserving national lines of authority and responsibility for certain functions which nations insist must remain theirs.

The answer, therefore, is multiple hatting -- along with mutual good will in a shared cause.

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5	2-11	<u>Ibid.</u>



Chapter III

THE COALITION

"Friendship Forged in Blood"

At the headquarters of the ROK/US Combined Field Army near Uijongbu north of Seoul are three flagstuffs, for the flags of the United States, the Republic of Korea, and the United Nations. Nearby there stands a stone pedestal with four Chinese characters inscribed at the top which mean "friendship forged in blood."

These words describe one essential characteristic of the ROK/US coalition. They refer to the bonds established between the two nations in the Korean War. More than a generation later, Americans in Korea continue to hear Korean people say, "We will never forget what your country did for us."

In the war's aftermath America went on to sustain poverty-ridden Korea with economic and military assistance. Now, decades later, Korea is economically self-sufficient. Its "miracle" has produced an economy which approaches that of a European nation, with corporations in the top rank of Fortune's international 500 and a ranking as seventh among America's trading partners.^[1]

Korean-American relations have had their ups and downs in these 30 years. The most recent "down" was when the Carter administration, from 1977 to almost its end in 1981,

pursued its policy of withdrawing the U.S. Second Infantry Division from Korea, without any considerations of the threatening behavior of the North. This raised doubts in the minds of Koreans, among others in Asia, as to America's commitment to Korea's defense. It also raised anxieties as to the likelihood of another war.

Despite the unhappiness of some Koreans out of the government at what they see as undue U.S. support to the overly authoritative style of the present ROK government, Korean-American relations today are generally smooth and stable.

The coalition is strong and is one of mutual support.

Consider the support in resources which the Korean government provides to U.S. forces in Korea. Known as the Combined Defense Improvement Program, or CDIP, this calls for the ROK to provide on the order of \$1 billion in goods and services per annum, to include rent-free use of land and buildings, the construction cost-free of major military facilities, transportation and warehousing of materiel, maintenance of military equipment, and morale-enhancing programs for U.S. military members.^[2]

The Effects of Culture

Coalitions involve nations, and nations, even when they share essential values, differ in culture. Differences in culture need to be taken into account in command and control systems.

We especially need to consider, in Korea, the effect of the particular language and culture of the Korean people and the culture of the Korean military which springs therefrom -- and the interaction of all that with American ways both military and not.

Consider, first, language.

The Korean language is unique. So is the Korean alphabet and way of writing. It is an "invented" system, known as "hangul," which permits the construction of syllables from some two dozen letters, each representing a distinctive sound. Putting the syllables together creates the words of spoken and written Korean.

Koreans also use Chinese characters in writing. Chinese is an ideographic script; each character has a meaning, or more than one meaning. (Chinese characters are also strung together to make words which may or may not be connected to the character's original meaning.) Although their meaning is usually the same, Chinese characters are pronounced differently in Korean than in Chinese. In school Koreans learn to read and write Chinese characters and classical, or literary, Chinese but do not learn to speak modern, spoken Chinese.

To get around the problem that many Korean words have two or more meanings, and to convey certain subtleties which the Korean word does not precisely convey, much Korean military writing and frequently Korean military briefing charts are laced with Chinese characters. Korean telecommunications traffic is only in the Korean alphabet.

Korean is a well-developed, rich language, resembling English in this respect. But it has an important distinctive feature: Its usage in ordinary life and in official life is permeated with "honorifics." One speaks different Korean to one's servant or military subordinate than to one's social equal, and the latter differs markedly from how one would speak to a person who is in a superior or honored position (one's father, for example, or a senior governmental official).

This sharp distinction between what are considered classes of people pervades the Korean culture; the Korean language is simply its manifestation. It stems from a deeply rooted heritage of Confucianism, which teaches profound respect for elders and those in authority (as well as trust between friends). It also stems from a long history of authoritarianism as a way of life.

The chemistry between Koreans, including Korean military men, and Americans, including its military, is deeply affected by this phenomenon. Americans, who tend to look at other nations and peoples as like their own -- or, if not alike, "they should be like us" -- often do not appreciate the cultural difference.

Language is a particular problem. Korean is difficult to learn. Military tours are short in Korea and Korean is spoken in no other country, so few Americans learn more than a smattering of the Korean language. English is taught to Koreans from elementary school through high school, but English is as difficult for Koreans to speak fluently as Korean is for Americans.

Although headquarters signs and some documents are in both languages, English is the governing language in the headquarters of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command, the Combined Field Army, and the ROK/US air headquarters at Osan. English is also the language of the tactical air control system; ROKAF pilots and ground air control personnel use it well (although pilots of reinforcing tactical air coming from the U.S. sometimes have difficulty understanding or being understood).

Some teletype terminals in these combined headquarters print in "hangul." Korean desk officers speak Korean by radio and telephone to their counterparts at subordinate headquarters. Written orders go in both English and Korean from the Combined Field Army to its Korean corps headquarters, and in both languages from Headquarters, CFC, to its subordinate commands, with information copies to ROK-only headquarters such as ROK Army and ROK JCS. Below the combined headquarters levels, Korean is used.

Koreans, even some who have had considerable experience with English, have special difficulty with the use of the word "yes." A Korean reply sometimes uses "yes" to convey "no" in answer to an American's question, but the American understands the answer as "yes."*

In the last several decades, Koreans have taken on many ways that make them look like Americans to the superficial

*For example: American question, "Didn't you go home last night?" Korean answer: "Yes." (meaning, "I didn't go home.")

observer. These are ways of dress, tastes in entertainment or sports (baseball, for example), the Christian religion, and so on.

In addition, the ideals which underlie American and other democratic societies -- ideals such as freedom of speech, a free press, due process of law, and free elections -- have an enormous appeal to a sizeable number of Koreans, many of whom have been educated in the United States and have seen what these ideals mean in practice. On the other hand, stemming from deep historical roots there is in contemporary Korean society a substantial cultural disposition toward authoritarianism. When reinforced by the threat posed by North Korea's open hostility and greater armed might, this provides those who would wield the state's power in a more authoritarian way a considerable base of popular support.

The Korean Army, built from scratch during the Korean War and in the decade following, was closely modeled on the American Army -- as was the Korean Air Force and Navy on their U.S. counterparts. The Korean military copied some American ways without realizing that they were not appropriate to the Korean setting. But, again, much of the resemblance with the American way is superficial.

Generally, Americans and other Westerners find the Korean people to be tough, hardy, hard-working, family-loving, devoted to education, musical (and so on, some of this being a stereotype). But, generally, it takes some time for Americans, including military people, to really get inside the Korean character.

Although many Koreans want to know more about us and study us carefully, including our language and history, the typical Korean frame of reference is so divergent from ours that only a scant few -- and even fewer in the military -- grasp the essentials of our American socio-economic-political nature.

Because all of the above considerations of culture affect the meanings of words and ideas, and thus communications between people, they have a profound effect on command and control broadly defined.

The Evolution of the ROK Armed Forces

The ROK armed forces have changed considerably in the last 30 years.

The framework for their materiel modernization in recent years has been the first Five-Year Force Improvement Plan, called the FIP, initiated in 1977, and its successor (FIP-II) which began in 1982.

Typical of this force modernization has been the replacement, in active divisions and brigades, of M-47 tanks dating from the Korean War with more modern M-48A3s and M-48A5s. The "A5," with its 105mm main gun, is the practical equivalent of the M-60 tank with which U.S. tank units are now largely equipped. The upgrade of M-48A3s to A5s was carried out in Korea, entirely by the Korean industrial establishment.

These five-year plans have meant far more than tank modernization. In the early 1980s, for example, the plan

has included improvements in field artillery, in anti-tank missiles, in air defenses, and in logistic support. South Korea's own 155mm self-propelled howitzers are in production. The program has seen the ROK-US co-production of aircraft and helicopters as well as continued purchases of new aircraft and tactical air control systems. And it has brought about the building of naval combatants and their equipping with modern anti-ship missile systems.^[3]

In 1984 the ROK government spent about \$4.5 billion for its defense, roughly the same as in 1983. This was about one-third of the national budget, and some six percent of the nation's gross national product.^[4]

The result, on the peninsula today, is an active army of 20-plus active divisions, two of them mechanized; two divisions of marines; a multi-wing tactical air force in which obsolescent fighters are being phased out in favor of F4s and F5s; and a modernizing coastal defense, minesweeping, and antisubmarine warfare navy with a modest amphibious capability.^[5]

To this must be added an increasingly ready and well-equipped force of reserve divisions, quickly available should a mobilization be called.

Even though its share of the ROK defense budget by no means matches its proportionate strength within the ROK armed forces, both in numbers and in the influence of its senior officer corps the ROK Army is by far the dominant service in the ROK military structure.

In recent years, a highly capable and influential network of business and industrial leaders has emerged in Korea, government economic planners increasingly guide South Korea's economic destinies, and a well-educated and increasingly affluent middle class has developed.

Despite the growth of these and other institutions, the ROK Army remains the country's dominant political arbiter. Indeed history tells us that the political future of the Republic of Korea largely depends on how the ROK Army or those who would take control of it exercises its potential influence as an institution.

North Korea's Threat

A factor that, perhaps more than any other, binds the ROK/US coalition together is North Korea. North Korea's garrison-state, despite its having only half the population of the South as well as in recent times considerably less economic strength, has so marshalled its energies and resources to generate military forces stronger than those of the South in virtually every category -- and has trained and developed these forces into a very threatening attack capability.

The North's massive buildup began in the late 1960s. Since then some 25 percent of the North's annual gross national product has been spent on military preparations.^[6] North Korean armed forces have grown to more than 780,000 men; its inventory of major weapons of all kinds has essentially doubled. The North has now some 40 divisions, in large part mechanized and truck mobile and becoming more so.

It has an advantage in artillery, tanks, and maneuver battalions over the South of two or more to one.

The North Korean air force has grown to 700 fighters and bombers, including several dozen of the MIG-21 class. It has built jet airfields and underground facilities for aircraft and stores.

North Korea's navy is a versatile force of some 500 combatants, with a large complement of submarines and high-speed landing craft.^[7]

The North Korean armed forces train intensively. They practice for sea and air insertion of highly trained battalions and brigades of ranger/commandos and other special operations forces into the rear areas of the South, as well as for their attack, together with special shock troops, across the DMZ.

North Korea rehearses these and other offensive operations often, in exercises of ever-increasing size and scope. The North is self-sufficient except for fuel, aircraft, missiles, and advanced electronics. It can sustain about 60 days of high-intensity combat.

Like its Soviet counterparts -- and as might be deduced from the capture 15 years ago of our electronic-monitoring ship, the USS Pueblo, along with its crew and its records -- the North can be presumed to have an offensive radio-electronic combat or REC capability of some significance.

These means are in the hands of perhaps the world's harshest dictatorship, determined to be prepared to unite

the country by force if an occasion of acceptable risk presents itself.

No Easy Command Task

Holding down the duties of General Livsey, as leader of the coalition's military instrument, is a challenge to even the best of men.

Tactical, operational, strategic, indications and warning, diplomatic, cultural, psychological, logistical, industrial, human relationship and other considerations impinge on his mental processes every waking hour.

He certainly has no shortage of bosses. He looks to two presidents, to their respective defense ministers (and their staffs), and to their respective Joint Chiefs of Staff (all nine of them).

He also, and always, looks to CINCPAC. Even though the U.S. Pacific Command is "higher headquarters" for only one of his seven hats, it is important to be on good terms with that headquarters. PACOM's terms of reference include operational command of the U.S.-only sub-unified command in Korea. In practice, regardless of the various UNC and CFC charters, the Pacific Command is most often looked at as General Livsey's channel to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Likewise with the U.S. Ambassador. The CINC's and the Ambassador's outlooks sometimes differ, but they must act as partners -- and the Ambassador is the senior partner.

The senior U.S. commander in Korea also has to watch the political situation inside Korea -- to be aware of what is happening among the intellectuals, the students, labor, the missionaries, and all the rest.

He has to keep in close touch with the Korean military, especially since the Korean Army has installed the last two Presidents. (The Korean President therefore takes a personal interest in what is going on in the ROK Army.)

The top commander knows that, whatever his charter says, he can get little done by fiat. Persuasion is needed.

Because he is in charge of keeping up his side of the Armistice Agreement, he has to watch the DMZ closely every day. This is a tricky business at all times and sometimes dangerous indeed. Across the DMZ is a tough and unpredictable antagonist, never letting up on his propaganda, or his infiltrators, or his posturing along the DMZ -- capable of triggering a crisis with an assassination attempt on South Korea's leadership or an ax murder of American officers when the commander chooses to do so.

The commander can never relax his alertness. Day-by-day and hour-by-hour he must think about the enemy -- never ceasing to ask himself, "What is he up to? What is he thinking of doing?" He has only one chance to not be surprised.

He sets policy for and represents the interests of all U.S. forces in Korea. For his Eighth Army troops he has all the responsibilities of a troop commander -- discipline,

training, administration, housing, fire prevention, maintenance, food service, recreation, and all the rest.

As if all this were not enough, he has one overriding personal responsibility: to use all his talents and wisdom to ensure that the ROK/US forces under his command are as ready for war as they can be, given the resources he and they are provided -- and, if the resources are not enough, to make the necessary case for what more is needed.

That is his mission -- to be ready for war, and thereby to do his part to ensure that there will be no war. If he fails in that, history will judge him harshly no matter how well he was at the time meeting others of his manifold responsibilities.

To be ready for war, however, responsible commanders need a structure of command.

Here we get into the crux of the matter: how to arrange the command of forces made up of more than one Service or of more than one nation.

In Chapters IV, V, and VI which follow, we address this subject in terms broader than those of the Korea command alone.

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Chapter IV

LESS THAN FULL COMMAND*

The Idea of Command

The idea of command is as old as the idea of military forces. Its basic concept was stated by the Roman centurion to Christ at Capharnum:

For I too am a man subject to authority, and have soldiers subject to me; and I say to one, "Go," and he goes; and I say to another, "Come," and he comes; and to my servant, "Do this," and he does it. (Matthew VIII: 8,9)

Command thus embodies the authority to issue orders and the right to expect that orders will be obeyed.

In military operations in war, lives and often the nation's vital interests are at stake. Disciplined obedience is essential. With military command, therefore, comes awesome authority to punish disobedience.

Consider this extract from article 90 of the new Manual for Courts-Martial, United States. Retaining the language of its predecessors, it became effective August 1, 1984:

*To the well-informed military professional this chapter may seem unnecessarily elementary. It is written for a larger audience, most of whom are less well-informed on the various concepts of "command."

Any person subject to this chapter who --..., willfully disobeys a lawful command of his superior commissioned officer; shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct....[1]

"Full command" means that the full scope of the military activity of his subordinates is within the authority of the commander, that the commander's right to expect that his lawful orders will be obeyed is unconstrained. That centurion who expected obedience, like his company commander counterpart today, had "full command."

As we shall see, the commander of a U.S. Army or U.S. Marine Corps division, or of any single-Service formation today, has full command.

At the more senior multiservice and multinational* levels the words "command" and "commander" retain their noble ring. Even more imposing are the terms "Commander-in-Chief" and the less common "Supreme Commander."

*As in Adequacy, we use the term "multiservice" to mean essentially the JCS Pub 1 definition of "joint," namely "Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of more than one Service of the same nation participate." [2] And we will use the term "multinational" to mean essentially the JCS Pub 1 definition of "combined," namely "Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies." [3] We say "essentially the JCS Pub 1 definitions" because the latter are encrusted with doctrinal and other JCS-given meanings which we do not wish to incorporate intact into this paper. We prefer the terms "multiservice" and "multinational" to avoid becoming entangled in matters of "agreed doctrine" in this paper written for laymen.

But the reality is this: For whatever reason, justifiable or not, the command exercised by those who bear the titles of Commander, or Commander-in-Chief, of multiservice and multinational formations is substantially less than full command. As we shall see, the range of authority that these commanders have over their jurisdictions is considerably less than the range that the full command of the company commander or division commander gives them over theirs.

These limits are placed there by essentially two parties: by the U.S. military Services and by the nations themselves.

Limits on Multiservice and Multinational Command

The earliest scope of full command was that which, in the era of clubs and spears, the tribal leader, entrusted by the tribe with responsibility for its members' safety and well-being, was given or which he took for himself.

When tribes became nations and their leaders became kings and weaponry grew more advanced, this scope was essentially unchanged: Raise the forces, make them ready, and lead them in battle.

When tribes and nations in those times joined forces in common cause against an enemy, their leaders or their kings -- realizing that some degree of unity of effort was necessary -- relinquished some part, but never all and rarely the most part, of command.

In the 18th and 19th centuries, kings led their forces in battle less and less, and parliaments raised the nations' forces more and more.

And then to the forces -- which from ancient times had been fairly well divided into armies, which fought on the land, and navies, which fought at sea -- there was added the new dimension: men and their machines that flew through the air.

Different nations have coped differently with the idea of command within their national forces. The American Constitution created the equivalent of a king elected for a four-year term -- a president who is Commander-in-Chief, but who shares power with the Congress made responsible for raising the forces.

Well into the middle of the 20th century, the American system also made the military Service (that is, the Army, and the Navy with its associated Marine Corps), under its Service Chief (in due time the Army Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations*) responsible both for the providing of its Service's forces and for their employment in operations. (This was so, even though the Army Chief of Staff, under the Secretary of War, did not command -- this authority being held by field commanders but not by him --

*The Commandant of the Marine Corps is not a subordinate of the Chief of Naval Operations, but Marine Corps forces in the fleets are part of naval operating forces which, at the time here described, were responsible through the fleet chain of command to the Chief of Naval Operations.

while the Chief of Naval Operations did indeed command the Navy's operating forces.)

In the American system and in others, when land forces of one Service and sea forces of another Service came together for operations in a common task, they did so much as the forces of tribes and nations had done in more ancient times. They did it through cooperation, with their respective Service commanders on the scene relinquishing some part, but never all and rarely even most, of what they called "command."

In 1903, after the War with Spain had revealed gross deficiencies in interservice relations, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy signed a common order that created the Joint Army and Navy Board. The Joint Board, as it came to be called, consisted of four Army and four Navy senior officers, detailed to this in addition to their other duties. The Joint Board's charge was to address "all matters calling for the cooperation of the two services."^[4]

In due time, one product of the Joint Board became the agreements documented in Joint Action of the Army and Navy (JAAN).

The version of the JAAN in effect in 1925 set forth the doctrine of "paramount interest," which stated that, when Army and Navy forces were required to operate together, the "Service of paramount interest" would be responsible for the operation. The version of JAAN in effect in 1941 described "mutual cooperation," not unified command, as the favored method in joint operations.^[5]

Only after the disaster at Pearl Harbor found mutual cooperation seriously wanting did the idea of unified command of U.S. forces become a reality.

In the framework of multinational, or coalition, forces, what was meant by "command" had been from time immemorial worked out for each situation case-by-case. The first effort to set forth what might be called the principles for coalition command began after Great Britain and the United States formed their Grand Alliance for the prosecution of World War II and had established the British-American "Combined Chiefs of Staff." Consequently the embryonic U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff was formalized.*[6]

World War II saw the maturing of these notions of command. Then the United States in the post-war period -- in which the Services were assembled in a Department of Defense with its statutory Joint Chiefs of Staff -- saw the codification of many of these notions. The language and ideas then codified have been further elaborated. They govern how command is organized in U.S.-only forces; they also influence how command is organized in coalition forces to which the United States contributes.

*During this 1941-42 period, agreements on usage established that the word "combined" would convey "forces of more than one nation," and "joint" would be applied to "more than one Service." [7] However, the word "joint" does not apply to operations involving forces of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps alone. [8]

"Full Command"

The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,^[9] (the "Joint Dictionary") contains a number of definitions applicable to the subject of "command."

Each definition carries a notation as to whether it applies to DoD (the U.S. Department of Defense and all its parts); to NATO (the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization); to CENTO (the now moribund Central Treaty Organization); or to the IADB (the Inter American Defense Board, which is a mechanism for coordinating military matters for the United States and certain Latin American nations.)*

The first definition for us to look at is "full command," subscribed to by NATO, CENTO, and the IADB.

Read it carefully:

full command -- (NATO, CENTO, IADB) The military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national Services. [underlining added] The term command, as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. (NATO, CENTO) It follows that no (NATO) (CENTO) commander has full command over the

*Although the Korea Command is not mentioned in the Joint Dictionary, definitions have been applied in Korea essentially as written, either by specific ROK/US agreement, or by incorporation into agreed operations plans, or inferentially.

forces that are assigned to him. This is because nations, in assigning forces to (NATO) (CENTO), assign only operational command or operational control.[10]

Note two points in the sentence underlined:

One, "full command" is what the king once possessed, or the tribal leader -- namely, "every aspect of military operations and administration." Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, and Genghis Khan all had "full command."

And, two, today, as defined, "full command...exists only within national Services." For example, in U.S. forces, it exists only in the U.S. Army, or Navy, or Air Force, or Marine Corps, as a Service, or within a Service's single-Service formation in the field or in the fleet.

Although the rest of the definition does not mention the term "Service," the reality is no less clear: Just as no multinational commander has "full command," so no multi-Service commander has "full command," but rather "opcon" (for "operational command/operational control") with "full-command-less opcon" retained by the Service chains of command.*

While, as this study will develop, it is possible for commanders with considerably less than full command to get things done through leadership, motivation, strength of character and other intangibles, two litmus tests can

*These terms are discussed in detail beginning on page 4-13.

determine where command influence really lies. One is "Who can punish?" -- for example, through court-martial action. Another is "Who can reward?" -- for example, through promotion or assignment. Except in the rarest of situations, the power to affect reward and punishment significantly lies entirely in Service channels.

Another, less tangible perhaps, litmus test is "Who gets operational information first -- the national or Service channel, or the multinational/multiservice channel?"

To explain: When an operational chain of command commander finds that the command-less-opcon chain receives situation information sooner than he does, he knows he has a problem. In the minds of his opcon subordinates, in operational matters he may be less important than their Service or national boss.

Sometimes this sort of behavior is unwitting, with no improper intent, and is quickly corrected. Such was the case in a U.S. Marine Corps intelligence collection unit which I visited in 1977 shortly after it had arrived on the Korea Demilitarized Zone's Western Sector which I then commanded. When I asked the lieutenant to whom he sent his intelligence reports, the first headquarters he named was Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, in Hawaii several thousand miles away. Although the Marine unit on the DMZ was not opcon to me, we quickly worked it out that its collection reports would first be sent to appropriate nearby posts, including the all-source intelligence center at my own headquarters.

If the behavior is more deliberate and pervasive, and the opcon commander knows about it, he must take action. He really cannot tolerate such a situation. In my time in command of Korea's Western Sector the command-less-opcon lines of my ROK corps commanders went to the four-star commander of Third ROK Army (TROKA) south of Seoul. The corps commanders were highly responsive to the CG, TROKA. I once found that the operations watch officers in my command post, and I, were learning of important, mission-related, events along the DMZ (which was my responsibility) not from the corps but from TROKA, to which the corps had first reported the event.

In such a case, making a big fuss doesn't help much unless the command-less-opcon boss cooperates. My relations with the commander of TROKA being in good shape, I was able with my own word to the corps and with his help to get things straightened out fairly well -- even though occasional lapses still occurred.*

All command arrangements, as worked out for any specific multiservice or multinational situation, revolve around defining what part of "full command" the multiservice or

*Less easy to straighten out than for me in Korea, this phenomenon is said to be especially pronounced in the command-less-opcon channels of the U.S. Navy. There is, on the Pentagon's 4th floor near the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Navy's Command Center, to which flash regular operational reports from the fleet, many times reaching the CNO before they reach the unified commander to whom the fleet formations are opcon and containing greater detail as well.

multinational commander will have (this is known as "operational command" or "operational control;" see page 4-14 below), and what part remains in the Service (or national) channel.

From our discussion in the following pages one might infer that we see the idea that "full command... exists only within national Services..." or their single-Service formations as not a helpful concept. Not so; it is both a helpful and a necessary concept.

Full command, which covers "every aspect of military operations and administration," brings with it "full responsibility," and insures the effectiveness of the basic fighting units that make up multiservice and multinational formations.

The commander with full command is responsible for, and concerns himself with, everything: all aspects of training and readiness; all aspects of his people's well-being. His subordinates and indeed all his people, confident (in the best of worlds) that both their mission needs and their individual needs are being looked to and taken care of by the competent and concerned commander, then send their loyalties upward just as his go downward. This is the fundamental source of the strength both of the Service and of the well-led single-Service formation.

The basic organizational and institutional problem is to reconcile these notions of "full command" with the kind of less-than-full-command authority that the commander of a formation made up of more than one Service or nation must

have if he is to be able to cause his command to function as a fully effective team.

In an organization chart of a multiservice/multinational command, one will often find three kinds of "lines." We will use these three lines in this paper. They are shown in Figure 4-1:

- o The solid line (————) describes the situation of "full command." We will usually call this simply "command."
- o The dotted line (.....) describes the "operational command" or "operational control" exercised by the multiservice/multinational commander. We will usually call this "opcon."
- o The dashed line (-----) describes the "full command" of the national or Service commander, minus the "operational command/operational control" which goes elsewhere. We will usually call this "command-less-opcon."




Figure 4-1
 "Lines" of Command

Defining the Dotted Line

Let us now look at how the dotted line of "less-than-full-command" is defined within the U.S. Department of Defense and in NATO.

Read carefully; these definitions have been arrived at after precise examination word-by-word.

We start with the DoD definition of "command." It differs slightly from the definition of "full command" on page 4-7.

command -- (DOD) The authority which a commander in the military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.[11]

Now, look at the DoD definition of "operational command."

operational command -- (DOD) Those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational command should be exercised by the use of the assigned normal organizational units through the commanders of subordinate forces established by the commander exercising operational command. It does not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training except when a subordinate commander requests assistance. (The term is synonymous with operational control and is uniquely applied to the operational control exercised by the commanders of unified and specified commands over assigned forces in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, as amended and revised (10 United States Code 124).)[12]

Let's look at the definition of operational command/operational control sentence by sentence.

The first sentence says what operational command/operational control is:

Those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.

The second sentence tells how it should be exercised:

...by the use of the assigned normal organizational units through the commanders of subordinate forces established by the commander exercising operational command.

The third sentence tells what it does not include:

It does not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training except when a subordinate commander requests assistance.

The final sentence of the definition (the one in parentheses) says that, in the lexicon of the U.S. Department of Defense, there is no distinction between the meanings of "operational command" and "operational control;" there is only the fact that the term "operational command" is uniquely applied to those designated commanders of U.S.-only "unified and specified commands" established under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

The following U.S.-only unified and specified commands, also known as "combatant commands," exist at end-1985:

U.S. Aerospace Defense Command (Headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado);

U.S. Atlantic Command (Norfolk, Virginia);

U.S. Central Command (MacDill Air Force Base, Florida);

U.S. European Command (Stuttgart, Germany);

U.S. Military Airlift Command (Scott Air Force Base, Illinois);

U.S. Pacific Command (Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii);

U.S. Readiness Command (MacDill Air Force Base, Florida);

U.S. Southern Command (Quarry Heights, Panama);

U.S. Space Command (Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado);

U.S. Strategic Air Command (Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska).^[13]

There are no allied forces in these U.S.-only combatant commands (although some of the commanders thereof, under other titles, do command forces of other nations). Each has its designated commander-in-chief, or "CINC," so these commands are often miscalled "the CINCs." The CINC is not the command, but the commander.

The Aerospace Defense Command, the Military Airlift Command, and the Strategic Air Command are "specified commands," made up of forces of only one U.S. military Service, the U.S. Air Force. The other six are "unified commands," made up of forces of two or more Services (although, day-in and day-out, only naval forces are assigned to the U.S. Atlantic Command).

As to these unified and specified commands, the relevant words of the 1947 Act, as amended, are:

With the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the President, through the Secretary of Defense, shall establish unified or specified combatant commands for the performance of military missions, and shall determine the force structure of such combatant commands to be composed of forces of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, which shall then be assigned to such combatant commands by the departments concerned for the performance of such military missions. Such combatant commands are responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for such military missions as may be assigned to them by the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the President. Forces assigned to such unified combatant commands or specified combatant commands shall be under the full operational command of the commander of the unified combatant command or the commander of the specified combatant command. All forces not so assigned remain for all purposes in their respective departments. (underlining added)[14]

Thus, according to the law, "military missions" are the responsibility of duly established combatant commands, commanders of which have (undefined by law) "full operational command" over assigned forces.

(The word "full," in the statute, was not written into any DoD definitions of operational command/operational control. One wonders about the legislative history that placed that word "full" in the law, and at the internal JCS and OSD discussions that eliminated its use in JCS publications, and that also substituted the words "operational control" as "synonymous" with "operational command.")

The act then goes on to say:

Under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense each military department shall be responsible for the administration of forces

assigned from its department to such combatant commands. The responsibility for the support of forces assigned to combatant commands shall be vested in one or more of the military departments as may be directed by the Secretary of Defense. (underlining added)[15]

Thus, "administration" and "support" are the responsibility of the military departments, and the law thereby establishes at the highest level the basic conditions of less-than-full command: Mission performance through the operational channel, and administration/logistics support through the Service channel. This distinction prevails through the full structure of multiservice/multinational command relationships, down to the lowest echelon.

(As we shall see later, the strength of the military departments and their Services as they perform their statutory responsibilities for "administration" and "support" of Service forces inhibits both the unified commander's exercise of command and control and his influence on the evolution of his command and control systems.)

Vignettes to Illuminate the Meaning of "Opcon"

The reader, especially the non-military reader, may find these definitions monumentally uninteresting. But be assured that what they deal with -- authorities, working relationships, responsibilities, obligations -- are the basic stuff of military operations.

The ideas come alive in specific situations, where real people under stress work within (and sometimes outside) the definitions' bounds to accomplish real tasks.

Let me describe a few situations from my own experience in only one period of command.

And, to illustrate the point that conflicts deriving from the ideas of "full command" and of "opcon" as something less than "full command" are ubiquitous in the military scene, I point out that the vignettes which follow do not speak to issues between Services or national formations. The units in question are entirely U.S. Army.

In September 1967, then a full colonel, I took command of the Second Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Our new division commander was Major General Olinto M. Barsanti; a more demanding and hard-driving commander than General Barsanti will rarely be found.

It took only a few days from his arrival for our division to know that General Barsanti was in full command. He had been told that in a few months the 101st Airborne Division would be deployed to Vietnam, to join its First Brigade, already there. He aimed to have us ready.

Now, the theory under which the 101st Airborne Division, like other divisions of the U.S. Army, was then organized went like this: Its airborne infantry battalions were designed to be self-sufficient. Unlike the battalions of the infantry regiments which fought in World War II and Korea organic to their regiments, these battalions were put together (for example, with their own maintenance platoons) with the idea that they could readily be made opcon to different brigade commanders, in temporary command arrangements depending on the situation.

The theory of the organization was that the classic difference between opcon and full command would prevail. The brigade commander would be concerned with operations and the battalion commander would be responsible to, and would receive his help and guidance from, division for administration and logistics.

The practice was quite different. Like other division commanders of his time and today, General Barsanti ignored this theory. Time was short. Results were what counted. To him, results depended on a strong chain of command. There would be none of this business of brigade commanders' not being concerned with administration. Brigade commanders were to command certain designated battalions, and they were to be concerned with everything.

Let's review some key words of the definitions cited above:

full command...covers every aspect of military operations and administration.... (page 4-7)

command...includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. (page 4-14)

Our brigade commanders did not command the means necessary to pay their soldiers, or to provide them medical care, or to issue them clothing or equipment. Those means lay outside the brigade, and indeed were not entirely within either the division or Fort Campbell, the installation which General Barsanti also commanded.

But these are nit-picking details. There was no doubt that each brigade commander had command, and something close

to full command, of his assigned three infantry battalions. In the Second Brigade these were the 1/501 Airborne Infantry Battalion, the 2/501 AIB, and the 1/502 AIB.

Nor did we have command over all the means necessary for our brigade missions. For example, a brigade cannot fight without artillery support, and the artillery battalions of the division, in garrison and often in the field, were under the command, and close to full command, of the Division Artillery Commander. Of course he, like good artillerymen, took it as his obligation to see that the direct support battalions of his division artillery (in our case the 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery) did their duties for the brigades and their battalions as all artillery battalions should.

It was likewise for the engineer company of the 326th Engineer Battalion which was to be in what was called direct support of our brigade, and for the many other members of each brigade's "slice" of the division.

With these relationships well understood and accepted throughout the U.S. Army, we had no problem whatever with this less-than-full-command over mission-essential resources.


Thus within that and other divisions of the U.S. Army there existed a web of well-understood and well-accepted relationships in a fabric of mutual obligation and mutual trust. This made it possible for us brigade commanders, and for our battalion and company commanders as well, to operate effectively and with confidence -- even though we did not

(nor could we in practice) have full command of all the resources we called on for performance of our missions.

We should keep this message in mind when we get into multiservice/multinational operations.

In December 1967 the 101st Airborne Division deployed by air to Vietnam. Then, in late January just before the 1968 North Vietnamese Tet (Chinese New Year) offensive, our Second Brigade, with its three infantry battalions and all the rest of the "brigade slice," moved by air from Cu Chi near Saigon to the vicinity of Hue, far to the north, where we were placed opcon to (meaning "under the opcon of") the 1st Cavalry Division.

So, our new command situation looked like Figure 4-2 (recall the meanings of the various lines, as explained on page 4-12):



(The 1st Cavalry's 2nd Brigade was engaged elsewhere to the south, opcon to another division.)

Figure 4-2

The Command Arrangement

The three or four weeks after Tet saw the heaviest fighting of the Vietnam War; the battles in the 1st Cavalry and 1st Marine Division sectors around Hue were among the fiercest. In the fluid tactical situation of the time, our Second Brigade was stretched. We found ourselves often with battalions of the 1st Cavalry Division and USMC elements opcon to us, and with our Second Brigade, 101st, battalions opcon to brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division.

Our 101st Airborne Division commander was hundreds of miles away. But the full-command-less-opcon lines within the division and within the Second Brigade remained strong.

Yes, our brigade was opcon to the 1st Cavalry Division, and, yes, we took our orders from its commander. But in a very meaningful sense the Second Brigade and its battalions still belonged to the 101st.

Even though our Second Brigade battalions might be opcon to one of the 1st Cavalry's brigades, they were still our brigade battalions. Even though they fought under another's operational control, we at brigade kept track of their operations, we counted and tracked their casualties, we processed their recommendations for awards for heroism (two Medals of Honor were later awarded to men of the Second Brigade's 2/501st Infantry for action in February 1968 under the Third Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division).

A vignette illustrating the meaning of the dashed and dotted lines:

When I believed that our opcon Second Brigade was not being treated as well in the matter of helicopter resources as were brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division (we had taken no 101st lift helicopters north with us), I said as much in a not-well-received letter to the 1st Cavalry Division commander, and sent a copy to my division commander. (General Barsanti was nonplussed by this.) Well-advised or not, this is not the kind of thing an organic brigade commander will do. But my brigade was not organic. We had a certain independence. Although we were opcon, there was no doubt that

strong command-less-opcon lines were left to the Screaming Eagles.

Another vignette: Later, the rest of the 101st joined us around Hue and our brigade came back under the division's full command. Soon a battalion of the 101st's Third Brigade was placed opcon to the Second Brigade for a couple of weeks. A few days after it joined us, I learned that some rounds from its 81mm mortar platoon had fallen short on one of its companies, with minor casualties. So, I took it on myself to write the battalion commander that that sort of thing was not acceptable in the Second Brigade. I thought no more of that event until I was informed by division headquarters that the Third Brigade commander had evidently convinced someone at division (it may have been the division commander) that, although not intended for the battalion commander's file, the letter was not an appropriate action by me. I was not the full command commander of that battalion, so it was without official effect. (I was satisfied that it had had an adequate immediate effect, however unofficial, so that was the end of that.)*

The message in these vignettes is that, even between combat formations of one Service (in this case, the U.S. Army), the full-command-less-opcon channel is strong indeed. It is often strong enough to get in the way of the commander who has only opcon. His opcon unit has an independence not matched by those organic to him.

*In the same circumstances, I might well have taken the same position as the Third Brigade commander. These are tensions natural in command-less-opcon and opcon.

One final point needs to be made.

Later in this work we will discuss how a senior multinational commander (in this case, in Korea) can pull together the diverse elements of his command very effectively, through a commonly accepted and germane operational concept (in this case, the Korea command's "air/land battle" concept).

The 1st Cavalry and 101st Airborne Divisions and the U.S. Marines were by no means the only fighting formations in our area of operations around Hue in 1968. The Vietnamese were there; we were fighting in their country. To be specific, we were fighting in the territory of the redoubtable 1st ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) Division, under its superb commander, Major General Ngo Quang Truong. The "regional forces" of Thua Thien province were also there, as were the "popular forces" of several of its districts. Over these Vietnamese we Americans had no command authority whatever, and even within Vietnamese channels the 1st ARVN Division did not have full command of the province forces.

I need not go into the "how" of it, but a common, mutually understood, Vietnamese-U.S. concept of operations made it possible for all these elements to work together, even though opcon between U.S. and Vietnamese forces never existed.

So the final message is that, if the necessary motivational and conceptual effort is made, it is possible to compensate in multinational operations, sometimes to a substantial degree, for the absence of clear command


authority -- through a well-thought-out and consistent common approach and the open communications lines that should accompany it.

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Chapter V

LIMITS ON MULTISERVICE COMMAND -- CASE STUDIES

Tensions such as those described in Chapter IV exist when any commander has less than full command. It is in military systems' natures that factors such as pride, loyalties, and shared beginnings are ever-present -- and that in times of stress the strong-willed full command commander is in a position to, and often will, either resist making his unit opcon at all or assert a continuing high order of ownership even after a formation has been chopped to another's opcon.

Couple this with the driving determination to accomplish the mission with the means at hand -- owned or not -- which the best of commanders, multiservice or not, bring to their tasks. Add to this the fact that in multiservice and multinational situations the commander responsible for the mission's accomplishment will always have less than full command over some, maybe most, of his forces. It is clear that conflicts between the opcon and command-less-opcon commanders cannot be avoided.

In this chapter, concrete cases will illustrate some of these tensions. These cases deal with highly competent real people, many of whom are still on the scene today, coping with real situations, involved by circumstances with forces larger than they are, and possessed of fallibilities which the best of humans will often have.

Considering the statutory and cultural framework within which these commanders in multiservice formations have long been forced to operate, the resulting tragedies can be viewed as classically Greek -- inevitable.

Service Pride, Doctrine, and Cussedness

This chapter is about limits on multiservice command. The reader will soon find that such limits exist because the most senior officers in the military Services' command chains insist on them. To so insist becomes these officers' very nature when they assume such positions.

This insistence rests on two basic causes: Service pride, and Service doctrine.

Unit and Service pride and doctrine can be sources of great strength at lower levels of command. When brought to bear at higher levels, and in joint command, they can be sources of weakness.

Consider the British regimental system. This system produces proud, strong, steadfast, self-reliant, highly trained battalions of infantry and other combat arms, as good as or better than any fighting units in the world.

But in the wars of 1914-18 and 1939-45, the very qualities of tradition, cohesion, independence, and pride which made British battalions so superior in battle contributed to poor performance by British divisions in combined arms operations where cooperation with others was essential. [1]

Military pride is often linked to doctrine. Doctrine, in a military organization, is the set of shared beliefs that condition the way the organization and its members think and act. It can range from simple tactical doctrine, such as that which prescribes the way field artillery relates to infantry and armor, to the fundamental policy convictions of a military Service. The latter is sometimes called basic Service doctrine.

The particular nature of each Service's mix of pride and doctrine varies with the Service.

In the U.S. Army, for example, the individual's loyalties and pride tend to focus on his branch (say the infantry, or field artillery), or to his specialty (say, rangers or Special Forces), or to his unit (say, the 101st Airborne Division), rather than much to the Army as an institution. And these are not the fierce, institutionally reinforced loyalties of the British regimental system. Nor is existing basic Army doctrine a strongly binding, inspirational force.

The Navy, although not as heterogeneous as the Army, does have its diverse set of specific loyalties -- those of submariners, for example, and aviators. But above this Navy people are united by a common link to the sea, an environment with its own ways and cementing traditions. The Navy's doctrines, both basic and operational, on how things are done under, on, and over the sea is a strongly binding tie among all sailors.

The Air Force has from its earliest Army Air Corps days incorporated some diversity between, say, the bomber and the

fighter airman. But, like seafolk, airmen are united by their environment -- now called aerospace -- and by its technology. And from post-World War I to the mid-1980s, airmen have believed in "airpower," a term broader than the Air Force alone. They have also fought for, and largely achieved, the idea of an independent air arm.

The Marine Corps -- which with its size and triphibious composition would be a respectable armed force for any middle rank power (it is twice the size of Canada's total forces) -- is in its pride, unity, and cohesion much like a 1500-man British regiment.

There are no branch insignia, regimental badges, or division shoulder patches in the Marine Corps; shoulder patches showed up during World War II but quickly disappeared at war's end. (The U.S. Army has both regimental insignia and shoulder patches; indeed, its members can wear a patch on each shoulder, on the right shoulder the patch of the division in which the member served in combat.) There are few special badges. Infantryman, artilleryman, aviator, logistician -- all wear exactly the same uniform, all share the same fierce pride, all keep the same set of traditions. All are simply "Marines."

In Washington and in the field, the Marine Corps holds to its doctrine as if the Corps' survival depends on it. There is good reason; the very existence of the Marine Corps as a single air/land/sea force depends on acceptance of the fundamental strategic/operational concept of amphibious operations. The Marine Corps' experience, especially during the 20th century, has been one of a protracted, but by now successful, battle against obstacles of all kinds (including

for years the opposition of the Army and its Air Corps and later the U.S. Air Force), to put this concept into place and to achieve the substantial and fully integrated means it has believed it needs to carry out the concept.

Without its basic doctrine -- that is, without a rationale to justify self-contained and fully integrated air/land/sea capabilities -- and without the corresponding detailed operational and tactical doctrine that knits those capabilities together with those of the Navy in operations, there would be no Marine Corps as we know it today.

However, the effect on multiservice operations of all these Service doctrines, especially the strongly held ones, and of the pride and unit cohesion which belonging to a Service or to a Service formation engenders, is unfortunately not unlike that of the British regimental system on the British Army's combined arms: detrimental.

As we shall see, when misapplied by Service proponents in the multiservice scene, the attitudes that Service pride and Service doctrine engender weaken the cohesion, integration, and effectiveness of the multiservice force in preparing for battle and consequently in battle itself.

"Cussedness" may be too strong a word for such misapplication, but it conveys the idea.

Case 1: The Air Force versus the Marine Corps, 1968-84

The Vietnam part of this case involved "the Air Force" versus "the Marine Corps," in which situation the unified

commander looked at the issue from the Air Force's Service point of view. So, in Vietnam, it was actually a case of the Marine Corps versus the unified commander as well.

Regardless of which Service, if either, was right, the following is a case in which I do not doubt that each considered the other's doctrine-inspired actions to be akin to cussedness.

The 1960s saw deep differences in Air Force and Marine Corps doctrine about command and control of air operations. They came sharply to light in the Vietnam War, when both Air Force and Marine fighters were operating from bases in South Vietnam. One such case occurred in early 1968.*

From the early days of Marine Corps participation in the Vietnam War, all Marine air and ground forces were located in the northern part of South Vietnam, known as Military Region 1 (MR 1). Consistent with established Marine doctrine and practice, Marine air received its daily tasking directly from the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF). That air which was not needed by the U.S. Marines was made available to Seventh Air Force for other tasking, supporting U.S. Army and Vietnamese forces. (There was substantial U.S. Air Force and Vietnamese Air Force air in MR 1 as well.)

*This case is repeated from Adequacy, Chapter III, pages 98 to 101.

During the heavy fighting around Khe Sanh and following the North Vietnamese Tet offensive which erupted January 26, 1968, General William C. Westmoreland, Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) decided to take measures to make better use of his tactical air, especially in MR 1.

On March 8, General Westmoreland named his Deputy Commander for Air, USAF General William H. Momyer, as the single manager for all tactical air operations in South Vietnam, giving him operational control of all fixed wing aircraft there. This had its greatest impact in MR-1, where USMC air was immediately affected.

The Commanding General, III MAF, objected strongly. The Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, soon brought the matter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JCS could not agree and referred the matter to the Secretary of Defense to resolve. On May 15, 1968, the Secretary of Defense decided the issue in favor of COMUSMACV.

The Marines were still not satisfied, and on May 30 something of a compromise was arranged. Thereafter planned tactical air sorties were divided: 70 percent were allocated on a weekly basis through a preplanned tasking order day-by-day, and the remaining 30 percent were assigned on a daily basis. This procedure was designed to provide a specific and fairly constant number of sorties to the major ground commanders, including the III MAF, in accordance with priorities established by COMUSMACV. Thus modified, the single-manager system continued in effect throughout the remainder of the U.S. involvement in South Vietnam. [2]

The split in Marine Corps and Air Force thinking as to the tasking of United States Marine Corps air assets assigned to a joint command continues, with the Navy usually on the side of the Marine Corps and the Army usually agreeing with the Air Force.

An early 1980s JCS debate illustrates this controversy. This debate arose in part out of operational planning for the employment of the multiservice Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF).

Although in every war since 1917 Marine Corps forces have fought in sustained land operations inland, the Marine Corps, by statute and by tradition, is built primarily for amphibious operations. The Marine "air-ground team" with its organic air has always been justified from an amphibious rationale.

However, for sustained Marine Corps operations ashore, long after any amphibious operational phase has ended, recent Marine Corps doctrine calls for the same "Marine Air Ground Task Force" or MAGTF as organized for amphibious operation to be organized and to fight as such inland under higher multiservice or multinational command.

The Marine Corps goes on to contend that all helicopters and fixed-wing (including fighter and reconnaissance) aircraft assigned to a Marine Air Ground Task Force even in sustained operations far inland are organic assets of the MAGTF Commander and must remain under his operational control.

(The Marines have long made an exception to this principle for its aircraft that are given an air defense mission; these will operate under the theater air defense authority, i.e., the senior Air Force commander.)

The Air Force acknowledges that a MAGTF should retain operational control during an amphibious operation, but contends that after the amphibious phase operational control should be centralized under a single tactical air authority, which would be the USAF "air component commander" for sustained operations ashore.^[3]

In the JCS debates, the Air Force cited its consistent experience, including that of Vietnam, that the Marines would not yield operational control of USMC air assets to an air component commander.

For a time it appeared as if the JCS would accept the Air Force view. For example, one JCS memorandum stated in part: "...air forces must be employed as an entity under command agreements that preclude dissipation and fragmentation of effort....Unity of effort is best achieved when planning and control of the air effort are centralized at the highest level practicable under the unified authority of a single air commander."^[4]

However, in March 1981, the Joint Chiefs of Staff after much discussion agreed on a JCS Memorandum which prescribed the method of tasking the air elements of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force assigned to a Joint Task Force. This outcome favored the USMC view and read as follows:

The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Commander will retain operational control of his

organic air assets. The primary mission of the MAGTF air combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground element. During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets will normally be in support of the MAGTF mission. The MAGTF Commander will make sorties available to the Joint Force Commander, for tasking through his Air Component Commander, for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided to the Joint Force Commander for tasking through the Air Component Commander for the support of other components of the JTF, or of the JTF as a whole.[5]

The JCS memorandum concluded, however, with these words:

Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the theater or joint force commander, in the exercise of operational control, to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among his subordinate commanders to insure unity of effort in accomplishment of his overall mission, or to maintain integrity of the force, as prescribed in JCS Pub 2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."[6]

In a single statement, these 1981 words of the JCS illuminate the conflict between doctrine and especially JCS and Service doctrine on the one hand, and the operational commander's mission, on the other.

The first paragraph quoted above says what the JCS doctrine is. In this case it generally agrees with Marine Corps and not Air Force doctrine.

The second paragraph says that mission overrides doctrine in an emergency, and that the theater or joint

force commander who has the mission also has the authority to override the doctrine.

However, one must note those last 10 words: "as prescribed in JCS Pub 2, 'Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).'" In light of what we will say about UNAAF in the pages which follow, this clause could indeed be limiting to a joint force commander.

How The Limits are Written

Because of the inherent tensions of command, no words governing U.S. joint operations are more meaningful than those which deal with issues of command, and especially with what is meant by that lesser form exercised by the commander of the multiservice formation -- "operational control." What that commander gains, the Service commander who had "full command" loses.

From the beginning, those who have developed and negotiated these words have done so in the framework of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There the most influential protagonists are the Services, including the Service Chiefs themselves. While the Services' avowed aim is to arrive at language which permits the multiservice commander to accomplish his mission, their more fundamental and governing drive has consistently been to limit the authorities of the multiservice commander and to protect those of the Service formation commander who is under his "command."

That this is so is evident in the carefully crafted words found throughout the definitions in JCS Pub 1, cited in pages 4-7 to 4-15.

The most governing of these words are that (underlining added):

- o "Full command...exists only within national Services." (definition, page 4-7, above), and
- o "Operational command...[or operational control] does not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training except when a subordinate commander requests assistance...." (page 4-14, above)

These governing ideas find further extension in the language of JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).^[7]

The origins of much of what is written in UNAAF lie in the March 1948 Key West Agreement, arrived at by the new Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (which at that time had no Chairman, nor a Marine Corps member) shortly after enactment of the National Security Act of 1947 and the creation of the "National Military Establishment."

This conference, and the one which followed it at Newport, Rhode Island, in August 1948, produced the first

JCS-agreed "Functions Paper" with its statements of Service roles and missions.*

Shortly after the Newport Conference, the JCS established a Committee for Joint Policies and Procedures, assigning to that committee the mission of preparing what three years later would be published as Joint Action Armed Forces, or JAAF. That first JAAF incorporated the 1948 Key West Functions Paper. In 1959 JAAF was renamed UNAAF.

In those embryonic early years during which the doctrines of the newly "unified" defense establishment were being forged, one abiding interest of both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Air Force Chief of Staff was to protect the integrity of their Service operations in

*President Truman's 1946 proposed legislation for the new Department of Defense visualized that the respective functions of the Services would not be written into law, but rather that the President would issue an Executive Order defining the Service functions. Largely to protect the Navy and Marine Corps (whose statements of functions eventually took some 45 lines in the 1947 act, compared to nine lines for the Army and eight for the Air Force), the Congress wrote basic Service functions into the new law. Nonetheless, as he signed the National Security Act of 1947, the President issued an Executive Order defining the functions of the armed services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Executive Order and the new statute differed somewhat, the language of the statute being favored by the Navy. As soon as he took office, Secretary of Defense Forrestal sought to replace the Executive Order with a new "functions paper" issued by him. In due time, he was told by the JCS that they could not agree on the wording of such a paper. One key purpose of the Key West Conference was to force the JCS to come up with an agreed paper on the subject.[8]

whatever multiservice field operating commands were then established or would be established.

That Army Chiefs of Staff such as Eisenhower and Bradley did not then share these Navy and Air Force concerns derived from Army theater commanders' experience in World War II. Commanders such as Eisenhower and MacArthur had directly commanded both the centrally controlled Army Air Forces and one or more Army land formations and at the same time were double-hatted as administrative and logistical commanders. This way of organizing and operating reflected the essential nature of land formations. Unlike fleets and air formations, land formations do not move easily about the theater; neither can they operate alone, nor do their characteristics favor centralized direction on a single-function or single-Service basis over a wide area.

But, although World War II's arrangements suited the postwar Army, the Service-dominated codification of postwar joint doctrine immediately began to substitute a rationale which would erode the basis for applying, postwar, the logic of World War II's arrangements.

The Idea of the Service "Component Command"

The new JCS-conceived rationale, divisive in its long-term effect, was that of the "Service component command."

The 1951 JAAF, negotiated by the Joint Committee on Policies and Procedures and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff whom its members represented, included these lines:

Forces assigned to a unified command will normally consist of two or more components each of

which will be commanded directly by an officer of that component.[9]

This was the first statement in JCS doctrine as to the Service "component command."

It came naturally to the U.S. Navy to seek to insure that the naval forces of a unified command would be a separately established Service force. U.S. naval forces had operated under an all-Navy chain of command before unified commands existed; the fleets continued to operate as single separate naval commands under MacArthur and Eisenhower theater command throughout World War II.

It was inconceivable to the Navy that its operating forces in a single theater might be split up into separate smaller commands under a non-Navy theater commander. Navy logic was that to do so would, to no useful purpose, destroy the flexibility and integrity, and the efficiency, of fleet operations -- and would place those who knew little of the sea in close command of the fleets, their organization for combat, and their logistics.

On the other hand, the U.S. Army Air Forces, which became in 1947 a separate Service, had no such long-established precedents. As late as the North African invasion of November 1942, Army doctrine had visualized "air support commands" subordinate to land formation commanders within a theater of operations.^[10] This was despite the strongly held view of pre-war Air Corps thinkers that to do so violated the idea of independent air operations and inhibited the flexible application of what had become accepted as air power.

However, operations in 1942 and 1943 in North Africa gave United States forces their first experience in combined and joint operations in a land theater. General Eisenhower's British-American air and land command structure was complicated at best. His air resources were few. They had to be used one day in attacks on the enemy's ports, the next day attacking his troops and lines of communications, and a day later against his shipping. Some form of centralized control was required.

The solution adopted was what the British had arrived at during operations in the Western Desert since 1940. Air Vice Marshal Arthur V. Coningham, who had commanded the Western Desert Air Force, stated the desert-evolved doctrine:

The Soldier commands the land forces, the Airman commands the air forces; both commands work together and operate their respective forces with a combined Army-Air plan, the whole operations being directed by the Army commander.[11]

In February 1943, when Coningham took command of the U.S.-British North African Tactical Air Force, the desert-evolved methods of command went into effect.

Then, in July 1943, there appeared the Army's FM 100-20, which (in a section entirely in capital letters) stated that:

Land power and air power are co-equal and interdependent forces; neither is an auxiliary of the other.... Control of available air power must be centralized and command must be exercised through the air force commander.... The command of air and ground forces in a theater of operations will be vested in the superior commander charged with the

actual conduct of operations in the theater, who will exercise command of air forces through the air force commander and command of ground forces through the ground force commander.[12]

There, in official U.S. doctrine, although it did not use the words "ground component command," was the first establishment of the idea.

The careful reader will note that in two phrases quoted above, however, there lay a contradiction.

Air Vice-Marshal Coningham had said:

The Soldier commands the land forces, the Airman commands the air forces, both commands work together and operate their respective forces with a combined Army-Air plan, the whole operations being directed by the Army commander.

But FM 100-20 had said:

The command of ground and air forces in a theater of operations will be vested in the superior commander charged with the actual conduct of operations in the theater, who will exercise command of air forces through the air force commander and command of ground forces through the ground force commander.

This goes directly to the point: Need there be, in logic or in doctrine, a separate "ground component command" -- an operational echelon commanding all subordinate land formations? Some call this "theater army."

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff have promulgated in UNAAF that the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy (with the

Marine Corps) will, in a unified command, each have a separately organized "component command."

One problem with the UNAAF, and with this sort of JCS agreement, is that it deals only with U.S.-only command organization, and that in virtually every case theater air/land battle forces will be multinational.

Today, where theater air/land forces are deployed in a command structure, uniformly multinational, in Europe and Korea, there is no operational headquarters known as "theater army."

The convention is followed in Korea's ROK/US Combined Forces Command with the designation of a subordinate Ground Component Command. But this is simply a convention. There is no separate headquarters for such. General Livsey is both CINC, CFC, and commander of the "Ground Component Command;" his CFC staff serves him in both functions, and his subordinate land force formations along Korea's DMZ report in practice directly to CFC.

General Livsey does command the U.S.-only Eighth Army of some 33,000 members including the U.S. 2d Infantry Division. But Eighth Army is not an operational headquarters; it performs only administrative and logistic functions; the 2d Infantry Division is responsible through another channel to General Livsey for operations.

In Europe, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) is, and will be in war, an administrative and logistical headquarters -- responsible in peace for training and other readiness but

with no responsibility for planning the operational defense of Europe.

The responsibility for Europe's defense rests with the allied chain of command. In Europe's Central Region, CINC AFCENT (Allied Forces Central Europe), a general of the German Army, who commands both land and air forces is responsible. One of CINCENT'S two army groups (Note: there is no operational "theater army" in AFCENT) is commanded (under another hat) in peace, and will be commanded likewise in war, by the CINC, USAREUR.

Nonetheless, UNAAF visualizes a "ground" or "Army" component command which, as for the Air Force and Navy components, will be an operational command.

The Chain of Command According to UNAAF

UNAAF also spells out in unmistakable terms the authorities of the Service component commander versus those of the unified commanders (or joint task force commander in the case of a temporary multiservice command). To show their limiting nature, we will repeat some of them here in detail.

Among its first paragraphs, UNAAF, using and expanding on the language of statute, sets forth the "organization for the strategic and operational direction of combatant forces," saying that:

The chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and through the Joint Chiefs of

Staff to the commanders of unified and specified commands.* [14]

In the following paragraph, UNAAF defines "the chain of command for purposes other than the operational direction of unified and specified commands." (underlining added)

It says that this chain of command:

...runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. This chain embraces the preparation of military forces and their administration and support.[15]

And, in the most meaningful of words, UNAAF, expanding on the statute, says that:

...each of the Military Departments and Services, coordinating as appropriate with the others, has the responsibility for organizing, training, equipping, and providing forces to fulfill certain specific combatant functions and for administering and supporting such forces. This responsibility includes the formulation of tactical and technical doctrine for the combatant functions involved, the internal structure and composition of forces, the type of training to be given, and the types and quantities of equipment and supplies to be developed and procured. This undivided responsibility in a single Military Department and Service of preparing forces for a broad field of warfare (underlining added) insures that US combat forces are effective. It utilizes existing departmental and Service facilities effectively.[16]

*The JCS are given no such "chain of command" position in the law. The law says only that "...combatant commands are responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense...."[13]

Later, UNAAF reinforces this point:

It is essential that there be full utilization and exploitation of the weapons, techniques, and intrinsic capabilities of each of the departments and Services in any military situation where this will contribute effectively to the attainment of overall objectives. To effect this, the Functions Paper assigns to the Services both primary functions and collateral functions. (underlining added)[17]

UNAAF then goes on for 27 pages to describe in detail these Service functions. This is the "Functions Paper."

Then, in 37 pages following the Functions Paper, UNAAF lays out the carefully phrased and limited authorities of operational commanders. These pages begin with definitions of "command," of "mission," of "objective," and finally of "operational command," which is defined as on page 4-14 above.

UNAAF goes on to say:

Within unified commands, operational command will be exercised through the Service component commanders (subject to the exception addressed in subparagraph 30215c(1)(f) below) or be exercised through the commanders of subordinate commands, when such commands are established by the unified commander in accordance with criteria and procedures set forth herein. (underlining added)[18]

That last word "herein" means "in the UNAAF," where lie at every turn "criteria and procedures" which limit how the commander can establish subordinate commands.

For example, the "exception" in paragraph 30215c(1)(f) cited above permits the unified commander, in an emergency,

to exercise operational command, outside the channel prescribed, and:

Directly to specific operational forces which, due to the mission assigned and the urgency of the situation, must remain immediately responsive to the commander. Such specific forces must be identified by the commander and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense. (underlining added)[19]

About the internal organization of unified commands, UNAAF says, in a paragraph entitled "Maintenance of Uni-Service Integrity":

The command organization should integrate components of two or more Services into efficient teams while, at the same time, preserving to each Service its uni-Service responsibilities. The commander of any force must give due consideration to these responsibilities. Furthermore, organizational integrity of Service components should be maintained insofar as practicable to exploit fully their inherent capabilities. (underlining added)[20]

In authorizing the commander of a unified command to establish joint task forces and unified commands subordinate to him, UNAAF adds:

Normally, missions requiring operations of a uni-Service force will be assigned the component commander of that Service. Under exceptional circumstances and with the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commander of a unified command may establish a separate uni-Service force, the commander of which operates directly under him.[21]

We need quote no more. The language of limitation not only is pervasive, but it always tilts the authorities in favor of the Service and the Service component commander and

always limits the authority of the mission-responsible multiservice commander.

The UNAAF language, reinforcing and reinforced by the culture, sets up a barrier between the operational commander and his Service opcon formations. We can call this barrier the "wall of the component." Helpful the idea of "component command" may be from a logistical or sustaining point of view. But the practical operational effect of the "wall of the component" is always inhibiting and, as we shall see, can be devastating to mission readiness and mission performance.

The Power of the "Service Component" as an Idea

Outsiders little appreciate the power of the idea of the "Service component," or the way the Services strive to keep command in Service channels and away from the multiservice commander.

Wherever one goes, one can see the pervasive influence of the ideas that only the Service has full command, and that, even in an opcon situation, the Service component, with full-command-less-opcon, is the guardian of a Service formation's independence.

As the history in pages 5-14 to 5-19 indicates, the idea of the Service component command as an operational headquarters did not strongly motivate Army doctrinal people in the early postwar days and later. But, to my own dismay at least, this divisive Service-oriented idea, with its attendant compartmenting effect on multiservice command

organization, seemed in the mid-1980s to be gaining considerable power in Army circles.

This idea drives U.S. Army doctrinal thinkers toward the idea of "theater army," or of resurrecting the "field army," as an operational, as well as administrative and logistical, command.

Indeed it was largely this idea that led in 1983 to the reactivation of the Third U.S. Army as the operational "Army component" of the U.S. Central Command -- and to the designation of the Third Army as an operational as well as administrative/logistical headquarters.

A short history of that development is in order.

For several decades up to the 1970s the field army echelon, with both operational and administrative/logistical functions, and with its subordinate corps (which had no administrative/logistical units assigned but were tactical organizations only), had been part of the standard organization of U.S. Army field forces. This concept had served well in World War II and Korea.

In 1972, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Creighton W. Abrams, decided essentially on his own to eliminate the "field army," and by implication the "theater army," echelons of U.S. Army operational force command. He did so largely because of his experience as commander in Vietnam, in which he directed operations of several

corps-sized forces without the need of an intervening Army headquarters responsible for operations.*

For 10 years the Army and the Air Force tried to cope with this decision -- not in practical terms, because the established operating forces in the field (in Korea and in Europe) were doing well without an intervening all-U.S. Army operational headquarters. The Army-Air Force problem was instead one of doctrine.

When the U.S. Central Command in January 1983 was created from the former Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), the issue became one of both doctrine and practice. Because the newly created force had had no practical operational experience, nor was it deployed facing an enemy as in Europe and Korea, the inter-Service stresses which accompanied the establishment of the RDJTF and its successor

*At about the same time, General Abrams eliminated the headquarters, in Hawaii, of the Army's component command, known as U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), of the unified U.S. Pacific Command, along with its four-star commander's billet. He redefined the function of that headquarters to one which could be performed by a two-star Army general commanding a newly created "CINCPAC Support Activity." Like the decision to eliminate the field army echelon, discussed in these pages, that decision of General Abrams did not stick either. The Army found that it could not live in a framework in which the Navy and Air Force each had a full-fledged component command in the Pacific and the Army did not. The Army headquarters in Hawaii is now called U.S. Army WESTCOM, or Western Command; it is commanded by a three-star general. It, however, is still not in the Service channel of command to Eighth U.S. Army, the Army component command in Korea.

USCENTCOM led to doctrinally based, more than logically based or experience-based, solutions.*

The Army's solution was foreseeable. In the form of Third U.S. Army, as a component command of CENTCOM, the Army resurrected the idea of theater Army or field army as an operational, as well as administrative/logistical, command echelon. Thus there was created for the CENTCOM commander an unnecessary operational headquarters.

The situation is thus ripe for conflict: A CINC with overall command, and, directly under him, a "land force commander" with not just logistical but operational responsibility for all Army (but usually not Marine) land operations. Put two strong-willed (three, including a Marine) commanders in this situation, put them in the stress of battle, and you not only invite conflict but through compartmenting you also slow down the pace of operations.

To make the point very simple, why not have CINCENT command two or three land formations directly, without going through another headquarters? Let the Third Army commander

*When the enemy of a theater force is not directly across a "DMZ" or an "Iron Curtain," Service and joint "doctrine" tend to prevail over reason in a clash between the two. Consider the product of three years of TAC-TRADOC negotiations known as J-SAK, for Joint Attack of the Second Echelon, eventually blessed by Army-Air Force agreement.[22] The idea of the "land component command" pervades this agreement, just as if there were such a structure in actual theaters of operation. As we have seen, neither in Europe nor in Korea is there a separate operational land component command. Further, this Army/Air Force agreement differs considerably from the practice established for years in NATO's Central Europe command.

serve CINCENT as his all-Service logistician where he really needs help.

It is unlikely that the redoubtable General Abrams would have approved what took place in CENTCOM in 1983.*

*Among my papers is one which B. H. Liddell Hart gave me years ago on "How to Quicken Manoeuvre and Gain Flexibility." His words are germane here:

Every soldier knows that it is of vital importance to quicken the tempo of operations and ability of manoeuvre. That is the way to gain the advantage in modern battle.... Mobility means...much more than merely movement along the road or over the ground.... (It means) new weapons which...paralyz(e) the enemy's resisting power and mobility in counter-action... (and) developing new means of communication and transmission of orders....

But...while pursuing research along these lines, we should not overlook the possibilities of a simpler and shorter way -- by simplifying the system of control and, in particular, shortening the chain of command...(E)ach added link in the chain tends (a) to cause loss of time in getting information back and sending orders forward, and (b) to weaken the commander's power by making his impression of the situation more remote and diminishing his personal influence.... The fewer the intermediate headquarters, the more dynamic the operations tend to become.

Liddell Hart quotes "Clausewitz's...argument on this score." His quote of Clausewitz:

The Commander-in-Chief must pay dearly for (the) convenience (of having) only three or four subordinates to command.... In the first place, an order loses in rapidity, force, and exactness if the ladder down which it has to descend is too long... (and) secondly the Chief loses generally in his own proper power and efficiency the wider the spheres of action of his immediate subordinates become.... Each (subordinate) commander looks upon himself as having a kind of proprietary right in his own Corps, and always opposes the withdrawal from him of any portion of it for a longer or shorter time. A little experience of War will make this evident to anyone.

The power of the "Service component" as an idea evidently contributed to the failure of the Iran Rescue Mission of April 1980.

For an official explanation of the failure of the Iran Rescue Mission the public can read only the report by the JCS-established Special Operations Review Group of senior retired and active duty officers, an unclassified version of which was released in August 1980. [23]

The report reveals: an unnecessarily ad hoc and changing command structure; inadequate practice to achieve teamwork; undue compartmentation of Service components in the preparation phase; conflicts of Service interests which were unsatisfactorily resolved; and lack of clear command responsibility and authority for achieving full mission readiness.

All of these -- so familiar to anyone who has observed the piano-wire-like web that the JCS with its UNAAF and other constraints permit to be woven around multiservice commanders in the interests of Service prerogatives and maintaining Service identity -- were surely contributing factors to this failed mission.

They cannot be explained away by a need for absolute secrecy in the mission's preparation.

Now we come to describing in detail the case studies on limits in multiservice command which are the subject of this chapter. These cases are here to show how limited in practice, by the words and by the culture, has been the reach of

a multiservice field commander's authority. The first case is a classic example of the devastating effect of the "wall of the component."

Case 2: Beirut Marine Tragedy, 1983

One of the most catastrophic failures of mission performance* in American military history took place on October 23, 1983, when terrorists destroyed a U.S. Marine Corps barracks and killed 241 American servicemen in Beirut, Lebanon.

The Department of Defense commission that investigated this disaster, its chairman Admiral Robert L. H. Long, U.S. Navy, Retired, concluded that there was "a lack of effective

*It can be argued that the failure in the Beirut Marine tragedy was not in "mission performance" but in "internal unit security," the logic being that the Marine unit's mission was to maintain a "presence" in Lebanon and that the unit did not fail in that mission. However, we use the term "mission performance" here in a broader context -- namely, the mission, no less clear by being implied, of the force to act and operate in Lebanon so that U.S. national interests and objectives could be maintained. The catastrophic loss of life resulting from this "failure in internal unit security" fundamentally and harmfully altered the equation in Lebanon from the U.S. national policy point of view. Hence our characterization of the tragedy as a failure in mission performance.

command supervision of the Marines' security posture before the event."*[24]

The consequences of this failure of command supervision were profound.

Just a few weeks before, the U.S. Congress had by a comfortable margin passed a Joint Resolution committing the Marines to their mission as part of the Multinational Force then attempting to shore up the Gemayel government as it sought to gain control of Lebanese territory and to bring about the withdrawal from Lebanon of both Syrian and Israeli forces.

Within days after the successful terrorist attack, the pendulum of American public and Congressional opinion swung to opposition to the commitment of Marines to this mission. The anti-Gemayel forces could then see the handwriting on the wall; if they could keep up the pressure, the drumbeat of opposition voices would eventually force the Americans to withdraw. They kept up the pressure, and the Americans withdrew -- relieved to be able to do so. Syria, a nation supported militarily and politically by the Soviet Union,

*The Long Commission said further that: "...although it finds the CINCUSEUCOM (Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command) operational chain of command at fault, it also finds that there was a series of circumstances beyond the control of these commands that influenced their judgment and their actions..."[25] This softening of the Commission's judgment, and the near-exoneration which followed, did not sit well with many.

took the dominant role in Lebanese politics, and American policy suffered a major setback in the Middle East.

Whether, without this catastrophe, American policy would have been more successful is moot; Lebanon is a difficult place for any outsider to influence. But there is no doubt that the shock of October 23 profoundly and adversely affected American ability to bring political-military influence to bear in Lebanon and quite possibly elsewhere.

Let us examine the chain of command which the Long Commission found at fault.

We are led, first, to review how command is organized in multiservice formations which include a naval component. I will describe this in terms of naval command in the Western Pacific.

To begin with, in the operating forces of the U.S. Navy, there are two kinds of command -- "type command" and "tactical command."

A naval force in an operating area at sea is organized according to "tactical command." The fleet commander (in the Western Pacific, the Commander Seventh Fleet), although rarely called so, is an "officer in tactical command" (OTC). With that authority he can, for example, organize certain of his assigned combatant ships into a "carrier battle force;" its designated commander, a flag officer (a rear admiral), would be the OTC thereof.

But each combatant ship in that carrier battle force would also be in another chain of "type command," responsive in that chain not to the battle force commander but to a shore-based authority (for, say, the destroyers an authority known as Commander, Naval Surface Forces Pacific, or COM-NAVSURFPAC).

In the Pacific, it is the latter authority who is responsible for the ship's readiness, for its personnel administration, for scheduling its rotation and its shipyard visits, and that sort of thing.

Under command arrangements which we will not discuss in detail, naval operating forces include Marine Corps amphibious forces, both when embarked and when engaged in amphibious operations.

For example, units of the 3d Marine Division, normally stationed on Okinawa, would engage in amphibious operations as part of the Seventh Fleet. In that event, the next higher commander for "tactical command" would be in the chain of command of the Commander, Seventh Fleet. The Commander, Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPAC), would remain the "type commander." But for normal division activities ashore on Okinawa, only the FMFPAC "type" command line is operative.

Navy/Marine Corps doctrine is that, when an embarked USMC formation, such as a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), is with the fleet at sea or assaulting a beachhead, that force, under its OTC (say, a USMC colonel) is in turn under the OTC of the next higher force (e.g., an amphibious task group, commanded by a U.S. Navy officer as OTC).

There are good reasons for this in the context of amphibious operations, for which the U.S. Marine Corps is primarily organized and equipped and which forms the essential justification for its existence. The same doctrine would apply to Army forces in a ship-to-shore assault.

But let's examine the application of this doctrine in the 1983 Beirut case.

The commander of the destroyed barracks, and of most of the personnel billeted there, was the commanding officer of the USMC Battalion Landing Team (BLT), a Marine Corps lieutenant colonel.

The BLT was in turn part of the 24th Marine Amphibious Unit (24 MAU), under the command of a Marine Corps colonel there on the scene. There were within 24 MAU in microcosm the very tensions of operational control and command-less-opcon that we have addressed in Chapter IV.

24 MAU consisted of three components: the BLT, a composite Marine helicopter squadron, and a service support group. These three were subordinate, organic units respectively of the 2d Marine Division, the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, and the 2d Force Support Group, all based on the East Coast of the United States. These were in turn parts of Fleet Marine Force Atlantic (FMFLANT), the Marine Corps "type command" of the Atlantic Fleet.

The 24 MAU commander in Beirut had opcon of each of the three components. However, "type command," or "full-command-less-opcon," for each of the MAU's three parts went to their parent units thousands of miles away.

Thus, the BLT had its command-less-opcon line to the 2d Marine Division at Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, as did the helicopter squadron and service support group to their stateside parent units. These three type command headquarters had prepared their respective parts of the MAU; they retained responsibility for administration and logistic support of their deployed units. Not to say that he should have, but the Marine colonel commanding the 24 MAU did not enjoy full command.

Nonetheless, there seems to have been no question in the minds of the Long Commission, or anyone else, that this colonel commanding the 24 MAU, with his authority of opcon alone, was responsible for the unsatisfactory conditions within the BLT. Nor was there any doubt in Marine Corps command channels that a MAU commander, with opcon alone, had adequate command authority.

The channel of "type command" for the 24 MAU went directly to the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic (CG, FMFLANT), in Norfolk, Virginia; thence to the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, in Washington.

Operational command of the 24 MAU went through the Sixth Fleet. The MAU, although ashore, was a task organization of the fleet. Its designation was TF 62.

Operationally, however, in Navy terminology, the MAU commander was also Officer in Tactical Command, CTF 62 (Commander, Task Force 62), reporting to the commander of the amphibious task force, TF 61, off-shore. That commander, CTF 61, reported to the Commander Sixth Fleet,


either on his flagship or at his shore headquarters in Naples.*

The Commander Sixth Fleet in turn reported to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR), with a headquarters in London. CINCUSNAVEUR was the U.S. Navy "component commander" of U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), the Commander-in-Chief of which was General Bernard W. Rogers, U.S. Army. CINCUSNAVEUR was however "double hatted" as CINCSOUTH (Commander-in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe) in the NATO chain and was physically located in Naples. As component commander, CINCUSNAVEUR had full command over the Sixth Fleet.

General Rogers, located at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, near Brussels, Belgium, also served as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), a NATO position. He was assisted in his USEUCOM duties by General Richard L. Lawson, U.S. Air Force, Deputy CINCEUR, located at USEUCOM headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany.

Thus, the chain of command was as shown in Figure 5-1, which uses the line symbols of pages 4-12 and 4-13.

*However, the December 19, 1983, report of the Investigations Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services on "Adequacy of U.S. Marine Corps Security in Beirut" describes a "confusion concerning the chain of command," stemming from the statements of both the MAU commander and the Sixth Fleet commander that the former reported directly to the latter, not to CTF 61.[26]



*The "command line" from the Secretary of Defense to CINCEUR is shown as "solid" because the SecDef's responsibility for and authority over CINCEUR, like CINCEUR's responsibility for mission accomplishment to him, is by statute essentially unconstrained.

**See footnote, page 5-35.

Figure 5-1
Beirut Marines' Chain of Command

Now, note this well: For the disaster at Beirut, the Long Commission report held the "dotted line" (opcon) chain of command fully responsible. It made no mention whatever of the (dashed line) channel of type command, or command-less-opcon.

Although CG, FMFLANT and his subordinate commands trained the MAU and its parts and prepared them for deployment, and although these USMC Service authorities and the Commandant himself, and members of their staffs, had visited the MAU, the message sent by the Long Commission is that the Marine generals in this type command chain bore no responsibility at all for security measures not taken in Beirut.

When the Long Commission charged "a lack of effective command supervision" of the Marines in Beirut, it unmistakably meant a lack of effective supervision by the operational chain of command.

We can brush aside all the many extenuating circumstances that explained, but that cannot fundamentally excuse, the lapses in the operational chain of command supervision which led to this tragedy. It is clear that these officers should have been held responsible for what happened.*

*General Rogers, USCINCEUR, said as much himself when he testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee a few days after the event. With the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps sitting alongside him, General Rogers said: "Anything that happens or fails to happen in (the U.S. European Command) is my responsibility." [27]

Curiously, the Long Commission found that USCINCEUR had well before October 23 established a Special Assistant for Security Matters (SASM) in headquarters USEUCOM with specific responsibility for analyzing security within EUCOM against terrorist attack. The Commission noted that, after the terrorist bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut six months before the Beirut Marine tragedy, an SASM team had visited the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation in Beirut, had evaluated its security, and had recommended anti-terrorist measures. The Commission stated that, had the Marines in TF 62 also taken such measures, the likelihood of terrorist success would have been substantially reduced.

The Office of Military Cooperation was a USEUCOM agency, under USEUCOM command, with a relationship to that headquarters identical to that of the Military Assistance Advisory Groups which USEUCOM directly commanded elsewhere in its area of responsibility.

Why, with his opcon of the Marines, did General Rogers, CINCUSEUCOM, or his deputy, or some member of his staff, fail to order the SASM to survey the Marine dispositions in Beirut, as well? The Long Commission said that he could and should have done so. Why was that not done?

This burning question goes right to the heart of the matter.

An explanation may be found in this passage in the report of the House Investigations Subcommittee as to the Marines' "curious refusal [in a different, earlier, instance] of anti-terrorist training assistance."

The subcommittee report reads:

General Rogers testified that his command offered the Marines anti-terrorist training in November 1982.... General Rogers said that his offer was turned down "in view of the training the Marines are provided before they are deployed, plus the training they get there, plus their coordination with the Lebanese." [28]

I submit that the reason General Rogers did not order his EUCOM SASM Team to inspect the Marines lies in the same culture of "full command" and "operational control (less than 'command')" that is written into the many words of UNAAF we have examined, and that shows through in my own experience as a brigade commander, even in an all-Army situation, cited on page 4-18 and following above -- as when I did not get far with a letter to the commander of an opcon battalion commenting on the quality of his mortar firing.

Like every multiservice commander does day-in-and-day-out, General Rogers came up against the "wall of the component."

We have to face it. The multiservice commander with opcon is inhibited not only by the wording of his opcon authority which:

...does not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training except when a subordinate commander requests assistance. [29]

He is also inhibited by the culture, by the "system," by the tangible and intangible resistance he encounters, especially when he is from another Service, when he essays

to survey and then to jack up such standards as local security, housekeeping, and the like of a unit of an opcon Service. Marines are touchy; so are Army troops.*

General Rogers, or his deputy, or any EUCOM staff officer contemplating an inspection of the Marines' security, had, I am satisfied, in his subconscious an image of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and of the Commander, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, and of the Commander of the Second Marine Division at Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, and perhaps of the admirals in the "tactical command" chain -- an image that these authorities would take a dim view of a security inspection such as that given to the EUCOM Office of Military Cooperation.

These Marine or Navy commanders requested no assistance, nor would they be likely to. It may also be doubted that they would have welcomed such an inspection. It is simply not in their, or any similar, culture to do so. Good units, expected to have good local security, do not appreciate an inference to the contrary from outside the family.

In finding General Rogers and his EUCOM chain of command responsible, the Long Commission sent a profoundly significant message to the U.S. military.

*This situation is one of an Army general in senior command over Marines. As Case 3 below reveals, the inhibitions work the other way, as well.

In effect, that message is: Heed this, you commanders. You are responsible for readiness and for mission performance. If, because of any reluctance you might have about getting inside the details of another Service's unit operations, a part of your command is not ready and you fail to prevent disaster -- you have been negligent, and the report of investigation will say just that.

Furthermore, in making no mention whatever of the "type" chain of command, the Long Commission sent a further message: Do not rely entirely on the "Service channel" of command to insure the readiness of your formations.

Saying it another way, the Long Commission's message was: Commanders! Penetrate the wall of the component! Do not let that Service-imposed wall inhibit mission performance!

This latter message is reinforced by the Marine Corps Commandant's disclaimer that he was "not in the chain of command," as shown in another passage from the House Investigations Subcommittee Report:

The report reads:

General Kelley, the Marine Corps Commandant...had visited in September...just a few weeks before the bombing and had no suggestions:

Mrs. Bryon (questioning Colonel Geraghty, the MAU commander). When the commandant visited in September,...though he was not in the chain of command, as he has stated numerous times before this committee, (underlining added)...[30]

The report of the House Investigations Subcommittee goes on to say:

General Rogers, the European commander, expressed a decided aversion to "second-guessing" the local commander. With regard to the MAU, he said that "it is impossible for (the JCS chairman) to command from Washington, it is impossible for me to command from Belgium, it is impossible for my deputy to command from Stuttgart...." He believes that "when you get so far away from a battalion you should let the people on the ground command it, supervised by the next echelon of command."

Nevertheless, several weeks after the bombing, General Rogers took action when he determined that the MAU security posture was not being modified adequately to respond to the threat. He found that too many people were still being housed in a single building and directed that they be dispersed.

The above excerpts from the testimony reveal that although the MAU received a great deal of high level interest before the bombing, it was in the nature of "familiarization" visits by senior commanders or responses to requirements set out by the MAU commander. Only after the bombing disaster did responsible higher echelon commanders begin to evaluate independently the security posture established by the ground force commander. All during the period in which the situation was deteriorating, however, the higher command levels had access to the same intelligence Colonel Geraghty received. Their headquarters received, or had the capability to receive, complete information on the situation of the MAU and the actions taken on the ground. The higher commanders were familiar with the interpretation of the mission which, as Colonel Geraghty testified, had not changed since the marines entered Lebanon in September 1982, despite the worsening situation. Moreover, they were aware, or should have been, that the marines were concentrated in a few buildings within a confined area.

The subcommittee concludes that the higher elements of the military chain of command are also accountable for failing to exercise sufficient oversight of the MAU. That requisite oversight expertise is available and can serve a critically important function is evident from the changes in security effected with the guidance of higher headquarters since the bombing.

The subcommittee is startled that higher level commanders did not reevaluate the MAU security posture in light of the increasing vulnerability of the unit in the weeks before the bombing.[31]

Thus, the American people, through the House Subcommittee, have spoken in the same language as the Long Commission: The operational chain of command is fully responsible. It has a duty to inspect.

There is no way that General Rogers or his people at EUCOM could fail to get that message of the Long Commission and the House Subcommittee. But the question is: is the message clear to operational (opcon) commanders and to their troops everywhere American troops are deployed, or are being kept ready for deployment?

The prevailing culture which led to the disaster of Beirut was reinforced by the words of UNAAF. But there was in 1984 or 1985 no indication that either UNAAF's words, or

the underlying culture, were under review in the light of these reports.*

Some Reflections on Case 2

Americans, even some Americans in uniform, tend to be loath to make stern judgments on failures in military command performance.

The hard-line soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine himself has a stern code -- well expressed by these words reportedly framed on the wall of a bar outside Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia:

To err is human; to forgive is divine....
Neither of which is Marine Corps policy.

After a disaster such as Beirut, along with Americans' disappointment, and along with their wanting to know "who is

*In February 1984, as the Marine Amphibious Unit in Lebanon was being withdrawn from the Beirut airport to ships offshore, Pentagon officials made known a change in the chain of command for U.S. forces in Lebanon. Instead of going from EUCOM through naval headquarters as shown on page 5-36, the chain of operational command would go directly from EUCOM to a new command, called Joint Task Force Lebanon, in Beirut. The JTF commander would have authority over the Marine detachment providing security to the U.S. embassy, the military mission handling arms sales to the Lebanese, and the U.S. Army trainers with the Lebanese Army. If a Marine unit were to be ordered to return to Lebanon, officials said that it too would come under the new JTF.[32]

responsible" for the disaster, there also well up in our body politic sentiments of sympathy, even forgiveness. The one who is being blamed begins to acquire his defenders. Extenuating circumstances are pointed out. The harsh dictates of the code, "The commander is responsible for all his unit does or fails to do," begin to erode, or soften, in the public mind.

Thus it was for the commanders in the weeks after Beirut.

Indeed, in the days and weeks after Beirut, even the leadership of the Marine Corps itself, shocked by the loss of so many Marines' lives, and sensitive to the proud reputation and spirit which motivates members of the Corps in good times and bad, had no stomach to impugn the performance of the Marines on the ground.

The reaction of the Marine Corps Commandant himself was to defend the local commander, and to justify that commander's lapses by, among other logic, questioning the mission on which those Marines had been sent by the President of the United States.

The idea of questioning the mission had already surfaced in the Congress, where the Marines' mission in Lebanon ballooned into a political issue of the first order.

Finally, the President -- who, according to the newspapers, had over the weekend read the Long Commission report, and by all accounts had an interest in minimizing its adverse effect both on his policies and on public

opinion of those policies -- made his statement accepting full responsibility for the tragedy.*^[33]

Military institutions have an obligation to establish and enforce codes of performance higher than those of the people at large and of their representatives. Only by adhering to the most stringent -- fair, but stringent -- standards can a high level of performance be sustained.

Unlike water, these standards can to a degree rise above their source -- the final sustaining source in this case being American public opinion and its expression in the Congress and President. But not by much.

It is nonetheless worth the effort of military institutions, and their leaders, to jack those levels up, and to keep them up, as high as it is possible to make them. Such would seem to be their minimum obligation to the people they serve -- even though those people may not express their need for such stringency.

*The next day I was in our local post office. The clerk at the counter said to me, "Well, general, what do you think about the President taking responsibility last night." I replied, "Americans are a forgiving people." I, and he, then allowed that there might be many bereaved families who would be looking for a more complete explanation than that of the President. Whereupon he said, "Well, when I was in the Army (in World War II), my platoon sergeant always told us 'Don't bunch up.' It looks like those guys didn't get that word."

Custer, whose men (and he) died because of a lapse in his command judgment at Little Big Horn, had his defenders. Admiral Short and General Kimmel at Pearl Harbor had theirs. And both General Koster, division commander at My Lai, and Lieutenant Calley, company commander, among others, had theirs, the latter eventually being paroled by the President.

The aftershock of October 23, 1983, continues. It is reflected in press discussions of purported differences between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense about the circumstances under which U.S. troops should be committed in support of U.S. interests. The Secretary of State's view:

Americans have sometimes tended to think that power and diplomacy are two distinct alternatives. This reflects a fundamental misunderstanding. The truth is, power and diplomacy must always go together, or we will accomplish very little in this world. Power must always be guided by purpose. At the same time, the hard reality is that diplomacy not backed by strength will always be ineffectual at best, dangerous at worst....

Our great challenge is to learn to use our power when it can do good, when it can further the cause of freedom and enhance international security and stability.

There is no such thing as guaranteed public support in advance. Grenada shows that a President who has the courage to lead will win public support if he acts wisely and effectively. And Vietnam shows that public support can be frittered away if we do not act wisely and effectively.

Americans will always be reluctant to use force. It is the mark of our decency. And clearly, the use of force must always be a last resort, when other means of influence have proven

inadequate. But a great power cannot free itself so easily from the burden of choice. It must bear responsibility for the consequences of its inaction as well as for the consequences of its action.[34]

Secretary Shultz could well have added: We should not let the Beirut disaster, or our Vietnam experience, turn us away from the careful and proper use of military force in future situations. We should realize that it was possible to have done both Beirut and Vietnam much better. With proper command and control, using that term in a broad sense, the Beirut disaster would not have occurred, and, in at least one devastating instance (to be described below), Vietnam would have been better waged.

The fundamental lesson of the Beirut case is this: The operational chain of command is responsible.

Case 3: My Lai, 1968

The Beirut disaster was the consequence of American military acts of omission. Its perpetrators were not Americans; they were outlaw members of a terrorist organization.

My Lai, on the other hand, was an American act, one of commission. This reprehensible event occurred in March of 1968, in the hamlet of that name in northern South Vietnam. Its perpetrators were officers and men of an ad-hoc battalion-size task force, Task Force Barker, of the 11th Light Infantry Brigade (11th LIB) of the U.S. Army's Americal Division.

The Peers Report tells the full unsavory story. [35]

Demoralized by casualties long taken from the mines and snipers of an enemy they could neither see nor find, and ordered to clear that enemy from a cluster of hamlets, these troops killed civilians, women and children, in cold blood.

As in the Beirut tragedy of October 1983, a failure of command supervision due in part to reluctance of the headquarters of one Service formation to get into the details of operations of a formation of another Service directly contributed to the event.*

When the facts of My Lai emerged months later, the public furor and resulting inquiry centered in large part on the alleged "cover-up" of the event -- on the failure of the Americal Division authorities to investigate and take immediate action on the reports which began to come to their notice soon after the acts had occurred.

All too little attention was paid -- by the public, or by the press, or by the Congress, or by the Department of Defense and its chain of command itself -- to the conditions within the Americal Division that permitted such an atrocity to be perpetrated to begin with, and to the derelictions in the chain of command before the event that allowed those conditions to exist. These were conditions of poor command supervision.

*In the Beirut case, Headquarters, USCINCEUR, was however not a Service formation headquarters, but the headquarters of a unified command.

I have spoken in Chapter IV about the 101st Airborne Division, and about our hard-driving and insistent division commander, Major General Olinto M. Barsanti.

Like the 11th Brigade, our division had arrived in Vietnam only in December 1967.

The time of the operations I described in Chapter IV, the first half of 1968, was the same period as that of My Lai. The conditions under which the two divisions fought, operating in enemy-infested populated areas, were much the same. But the nature of command supervision within the two divisions was totally different.

In our division we had an atmosphere that not a leaf would fall without its being known. Although we were given plenty of scope to exercise initiative, and although we operated under mission-type orders, our superiors were in close touch; they were with us often. General Barsanti, wounded six times in World War II and Korea, was wounded twice more in action with the 101st. He set high standards, and he was everywhere.

On the other hand, the Peers Report describes how the Americal Division had been a division only since September 1967. For five months before that it had been known as "Task Force Oregon," which in April 1967 had combined under one headquarters three separate light infantry brigades each

of which had been operating independently until that time.* The new division commander had just been "frocked" as a major general. Although allowed to wear the two stars of his new rank, he did not have the actual rank; his name had not yet been reached on the new promotion list.

Each of the three brigade commanders of the new division had until then been in command of an independent formation.** In the prerogative-sensitive, hardheaded way of some field commanders, in various degrees they let it be known to the newly created division headquarters and its staff that they were unhappy about coming under its supervision. This was especially so for the 11th LIB, newly arrived in December, the commander of which was one of the most senior brigadier generals in the U.S. Army and four U.S. Military Academy classes senior to the newly frocked division commander, and who departed the scene for retirement from the Army only two days before My Lai.

I am told on good authority that only weeks before My Lai this senior brigadier general commanding the 11th LIB

*The division's name stemmed from the circumstances of its creation. During World War II, on the island of New Caledonia in the Southwest Pacific, a new Army division was likewise formed, taking command of three Army National Guard regiments; that was the original "Americal Division."


**The three brigades of the April 1967 Task Force Oregon were not the same three of My Lai in March 1968. In December 1967, one of the original three brigades had been replaced by the newly arrived 11th LIB.

had been displeased at the responsible assistant division commander's visiting his area and his brigade. The brigade commander is reported to have told the division commander that "he didn't want to see him [the ADC] around any more." And evidently he did not. [36]

The result was inexcusably weak command supervision in the Americal Division. The colonel who took command of the 11th LIB, the brigade responsible for My Lai, only two days before the atrocity, and who had been for some time the deputy brigade commander, was part of a situation of poor command supervision, and the concomitant poor attention to standards, to begin with.

As an Army formation, the Americal Division's command-less-opcon chain was directly to what was known as Headquarters, U.S. Army, Vietnam (USARV). But USARV had no operational responsibilities whatever; it was an administrative and logistical headquarters. Vietnam being for the most part an Army-manned theater, General William C. Westmoreland, U.S. Army, who was Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), with a multiservice staff, and who was responsible for all U.S. operations in-country, was also "double hatted" as Commanding General, USARV.

The next higher command in the operational chain of command for the Americal Division was the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) with headquarters at Danang, which was in turn responsible to COMUSMACV. (See Figure 5-2.)



*General Westmoreland, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, was "double hatted" as Commanding General, U.S. Army Vietnam.

Figure 5-2
 Americal Division Chain of Command

There was no doubt that the Commanding General, III MAF, had operational control of the Americal Division, and that the supervision of all aspects of that division's operation was within its sphere of responsibility.

From the "Peers Report":

The Americal Division was under the operational control (OPCON) of III MAF. III MAF published an extensive set of force orders...that provided guidance and policy to the US Marine forces, and other US forces in ICTZ (I Corps Tactical Zone) including the Americal Division.

...[III MAF] Force Order 3121.5....stated that..."a conscientious effort must be made to minimize battle casualties among noncombatants and destruction of their property".... [as to] non-combatants, III MAF Force Order 3460.3 specifically directs that "No violence will be done to their life or person, no outrages of any kind will be committed upon them, and, pending delivery to higher headquarters, the wounded and sick will be cared for." [37]

I am given to understand that officers of the III MAF were aware of conditions of poor performance and a weak chain of command in the Americal Division in early 1968 but that, because it was an Army formation, they were reluctant to give it anything like the command supervision and basic jacking-up of standards it should have received, and which it would have certainly received if it were a Marine formation -- or if the III MAF had been an Army headquarters.

It is unlikely that III MAF suspected that the Americal Division's lack of discipline extended to tolerating practices such as that which took place at My Lai. (The Peers Report of the investigation revealed that My Lai was not the

first, although it was by far the most flagrant, such event.)

But, if the next higher headquarters had vigorously checked on the Americal Division from its beginnings, and if the deplorable conditions of command supervision had been duly reported to the next level of operational command, or to the Army authorities responsible for the division's manning, the likelihood of a My Lai's taking place would have been a good deal less.

Again, as in Beirut 1983, the lesson is clear: Culture-induced weakness in the operational chain of command is a recipe for failure.*

And although, strictly speaking, the Army's Americal Division was not a "Service component" of III MAF, the practical effect of the "wall of the component" was clearly there in the minds of those at that Marine headquarters.

Some Reflections on Case 3

The memorandum for Lieutenant General William R. Peers, signed by both the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff on November 26, 1969, directed him only to "explore the nature and scope of the original U.S. Army investigation(s) of the alleged My Lai (4) incident...." (Underlining added.)^[38]

*Failures in the command-less-opcon (U.S. Army) chain of supervision also contributed to the conditions that led to the atrocities at My Lai.

Any comment by the Peers Report about the causes, be they failures of operational command supervision or other causes, that may have led to the event were incidental to the basic purposes of the investigation.

One wonders why, unlike in the Beirut Marine tragedy described in Case 2 above, the investigation into the My Lai atrocity did not address the operational chain of command's responsibility for the conditions that allowed the event to take place to begin with.

One can only speculate on why General Peers' charter was limited in this fashion. Perhaps it was that, unlike the 1983 Beirut case, the appointing authority for the investigation was not the Secretary of Defense but the Army's leadership. This would tend to cause an investigation to deal only with the Army's responsibility as a Service -- namely, its responsibility for the good order and military discipline of its members wherever serving, including their performance in conducting investigations required by events brought to command attention.

It may well not have occurred to anyone to have instituted a "Long Commission-type" investigation into the operational chain of command's responsibility for My Lai. Certainly, such an investigation would have opened up quite a different kind of subject matter. As did the Beirut tragedy investigation, it would have called into question the issues of the responsibility of senior command, all the way to the President himself -- along with such fundamental issues as the mission, and of the environment, and of why the forces were there at all.

It certainly would have highlighted most vividly the fundamental issues addressed in this chapter -- the meaning of, and the extent of authority and responsibility conveyed by, the term "operational control."

There will be no "Long Commission-type" review of My Lai. But suffice it to say that we cannot have it both ways. We cannot say that, in Beirut, the operational chain of command was fully responsible both for the disastrous event and for not having taken the measures to prevent it -- and that, in My Lai, the operational chain of command was not responsible for the atrocious event and not responsible for the command supervision that would have made it less likely to occur.*

There is an issue of fundamental truth here. To me, and uniformly among those who have held operational command and with whom I have discussed this matter, the truth is self-evident: The Long Commission is right; the operational chain of command was responsible at My Lai.

Four days after submitting his report in accordance with his instructions as to its scope, General Peers sent a memorandum to the Army Chief of Staff which expressed his additional views "while they are still fresh in my mind."

Among these are some timeless insights applicable to the responsibilities of operational command. They are worth our review:

*See footnote, page 5-55.

Commanders at all echelons are responsible for the actions and the welfare of all the men under them....

All officers, irrespective of their position, are responsible for taking corrective action on the spot....

An effective combat commander must from time to time require troops to do things which at the moment may be against their will....

In perhaps his most telling comment, he said:

Directives and regulations, no matter how well prepared and intended, are only pieces of paper unless they are enforced aggressively and firmly throughout the chain of command....

He concluded the statement of his views with these words:

The combat commander at any level who fails to keep these considerations uppermost in his mind...invites disaster.[39]

One wonders why, time and again, it has taken a disaster such as Beirut, or an atrocity such as My Lai, or a catastrophe such as Pearl Harbor, to remind us of fundamental truths such as these.

The most fundamental of all these truths is the operational chain of command is responsible.

Reflecting on the advice of General Peers might lead one to ask, "What kind of multiservice formation commanders do we want, anyway?"

There can be no other answer than this: We want multi-service operational commanders who fully accept the proposition that the operational chain of command is responsible -- and who are willing and ready to penetrate the "wall of the component" to meet their responsibilities.

The Chain of Operational Command Is Responsible

"The chain of (operational) command is responsible."

This thesis is fundamental to the logic of this study.

But what does this simple proposition mean? What are its requirements, and what are its limitations, in theory and in practice?

Let's look at the simpler cases of command -- those of full command in single-Service formations.

For the U.S. Army, the basic requirement has been simply stated in regulations and custom as long as its officers can remember. It goes something like this:

The commander is responsible for everything his unit does or fails to do.

Indeed, General Rogers, in his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee after the Beirut Marine tragedy, cited the principle in his acceptance, as opcon commander, of responsibility for that tragedy.

But, "for everything?" Even in the tight chain of command relationships of a single-Service formation, is the responsibility that complete?

Obviously there must be some sense of proportion.

A Sense of Proportion

In 1953, when I was a major and infantry battalions were part of regiments, I commanded an infantry battalion in Germany for about six months.

Our regimental commander was determined to reduce the number of AWOLs (absences without leave) in the regiment. One of his techniques was to act as if each soldier who came up on a company's daily morning report* as AWOL was the personal responsibility of the company commander and battalion commander. Whenever a soldier's AWOL became a morning report entry, that very morning the company commander, his first sergeant, and the battalion commander were standing in front of the regimental commander's desk explaining why.

In those days, a soldier who was reported absent at the morning formation was not placed on the morning report as AWOL until he had been gone a full day -- that is, until the formation the next morning. He then became a "morning report entry" for that day, in the morning report turned in the following morning, actually two days after he was first reported absent.

So there developed a ritual in that regiment, in which, as soon as a soldier was absent at the morning formation,

*The morning report describes the personnel situation as of 2400 hours, or the midnight just passed.

the first sergeant, possibly a company officer, and maybe others fanned out in the nearby towns and possible hangouts of that soldier to find him and bring him in before he became a "morning report entry."

We played this game in our battalion for a while after I took command. But it became tiresome. We found that we were spending far more time than proper on soldiers who were absent, and not enough on those who were present.

So I told my company commanders that we would no longer go looking for absent soldiers. We would not worry about each and every statistic. We would devote ourselves to building a good unit, with good training and good administration. We would take good care of our men; we would use their time well; and we would let the statistics of AWOLs and so forth take care of themselves.

We did this for two or three months, and something interesting happened. The statistics on AWOLs, and on other indices the regimental commander was counting, became better.

It was one of this regimental commander's techniques to call into the regimental theater, the first week in each month, all officers and noncommissioned officers down to platoon sergeant, and to go through a review of statistics, battalion by battalion, for the month before.

One month he did so, and I learned for the first time that our battalion had had not a single "DR," for "delinquency report," in the entire month. (A "DR" is a report written up by military police who patrol nearby towns, on a

soldier for, say, being "out of uniform," or "off limits," or "drunk and disorderly," or speeding in a military vehicle.)

I must say that this was an unheard-of achievement for a battalion in Germany in those days. And I had not known that we were making this record until I saw the regimental statistics. We were simply not paying attention to each and every item like this.

The point of this story has to do with a commander's sense of proportion. The commander's responsibility for "everything" does not mean for each and every AWOL soldier. But it does mean the basic climate of the unit, the good order and discipline, the quality of the training. And if circumstances warrant for a single event, it means the responsibility for that event however minor or grave.

Years later, when I took command of the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, there was an extraordinarily fine infantry colonel serving temporarily on my staff. This colonel had recently been a brigade commander in Vietnam. He had been selected for brigadier general on a list published while he was in brigade command.

But just as the brigadier general's list was being published, a battalion fire base of his brigade had been attacked and partially overrun in a fierce NVA (North Vietnamese Army) attack. The commander in Vietnam, General Abrams, ordered an investigation. The brigade commander was held responsible for permitting the conditions which allowed the NVA attack to succeed.

The colonel's name was removed from the promotion list. He finished his Army service honorably and well, but he never made brigadier general.

To some this may seem a harsh punishment. But at work here is the sense of proportion. It is a grave event to lose, through preventable conditions, the most part of a fire base, and the lives of the men who man it, for which you are responsible.

On one Vietnam tour it fell to my lot to spend some time aboard USS Cleveland, a ship of the U.S. Navy amphibious forces operating near our area. From that ship's flag plot, I was responsible for coordinating operations by ship- and shore-based U.S. Army helicopters, ship-based USMC helicopters, and U.S. Air Force airborne forward air controllers, all aimed at providing Army helicopter gunship support to Vietnamese and Cambodian forces which were engaged in clearing Highway 4 from Pnomh Penh to the port of Sihanoukville on Kompong Som Bay. Indeed, as an Army brigadier general, I was the "SOPA" (senior officer present afloat).

The skipper of USS Cleveland, a Navy captain, and I became friends. He was an obviously able officer and a naval aviator of substantial reputation. Selected for "deep draft" command, he had clearly been singled out as a candidate for selection to admiral.

But he knew that he would never be selected. His previous assignment, just before taking up his present command, had been as air wing commander on an aircraft carrier in the Tonkin Gulf. One day, as the aircraft of one

of his squadrons were being fueled and armed in the hangar deck in the midst of an air operations cycle, a missile under one aircraft's wing was somehow armed. It fired off and a catastrophic fire ensued on that carrier.

The case was black and white: He was wing commander; the fire took place while he was wing commander; so ended any further prospect of promotion.

The Navy's is a harsh and unforgiving code. That is one reason for the continued excellence of the U.S. Navy.

That many who are responsible for greater disasters than the loss of a fire base, or who could logically be held more responsible for a disastrous event than could this naval officer for his particular catastrophe, are not called to account, while others less blameworthy are sometimes called to account for events less serious, is simply evidence that life is not always fair.

Officers of all Services who take command recognize that commanders are expected to inspect, and in other ways to maintain standards, so that such events do not occur. They also recognize -- indeed they accept -- that to become the victim of unfairness is a risk that accompanies military command.

To continue the subject of "a sense of proportion":

One night in 1977, while I was commanding the Korean-American forces responsible for defending the DMZ's Western Sector and the approaches to Seoul, a fire (later traced to

poor electric wiring) destroyed the Post Exchange at our compound at Camp Red Cloud, north of Seoul.

And, then, about 10 nights later, another, less damaging, fire unaccountably broke out in the building to which we had moved the Post Exchange.

The next day I had a telephone conversation with the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, General John W. Vessey, Jr. He growled at me something like this, "What's going on up there with those fires in your Post Exchange?"

Four-star general, Commander-in-Chief? Talking to a three-star general about post exchange fires?

Yes!

General Vessey was not thinking just about my house-keeping. He was reflecting on the basic state of my command.

He was all too aware that, among other responsibilities, I was to be looking north, to the North Korean dictator Kim-Il-Sung and his legions, and that I was not to be surprised.

And he knew that being on your toes in the little things is a sign that you are on your toes in the big things. Neither of us could ever be forgiven if we allowed an enemy attack to take us by surprise.

To a senior commander, nothing is more satisfying than to have within his subordinate chain of command officers and noncommissioned officers who share a well-developed and lively sense of responsibility for achieving high standards of performance day-to-day, and whose fully functioning command methods enable them to see that those for whom they are responsible perform accordingly.

And hardly anything is as satisfying to a soldier as to be in such an organization, where -- among other essentials -- his time is well used, he is doing a good job and is recognized for it, the mission of his unit is being well performed and his part in that is appreciated, and his welfare is in good hands.

Such chains of command do not come about automatically. They are the product of such factors as tradition and leadership.

This is no place for a discourse on leadership and building good units, but note the three components:

- o The standards;
- o The sense of responsibility;
- o The methods.

A comment on "methods":

After I retired from the Army, I was for a while a consultant on management techniques in a civilian sphere.

One day, with a client, I encountered an especially able manager.

Out of curiosity, I asked his boss, "Is he an MBA?"

"No," came the reply, "but he does have an MBWA."

"MBWA?" I asked. "What's that?"

His reply: "Management by walking around."

Command Supervision in an Operational Chain of Command

Now, how do we approach the idea of "a sense of proportion" in an operational chain of command? What should an opcon commander look at, and jack up if necessary, by "walking around"? To what areas should he set the staff and other inspectors responsible to him to look into?

We can only look at the matter, case by case.

But we can use as our criterion the following: How significant is the matter with respect to the mission of the command?

Because, according to the law (see page 4-15), DoD regulation, and established practice, and as reinforced by the findings of the Long Commission and the House Subcommittee, the opcon commander is responsible for mission performance.

In the case of the Marines in Beirut, in October 1983, the conditions in the battalion landing team's billets

turned out to have been most significant. Correcting those conditions before they were revealed to be unsatisfactory by a terrorist attack was essential for mission performance of the MAU in Lebanon.

The operational chain of command, responsible for mission performance in support of U.S. policy in Lebanon, was responsible for detecting and correcting those unsatisfactory conditions.

So says the Long Commission, and so dictates military logic.

In the case of the Americal Division at My Lai the responsibility was no less clear, despite the cause of the failure's being less tangible: the state of the unit's chain of command and its compliance with standing orders.

Let's set up a hypothetical case of responsibility for an opcon commander.

Let's say that a senior commander, of whatever Service, has opcon over a unit of another Service. Let's say that the opcon unit is an aviation unit ashore. Since the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps all have aviation units, and since even Navy aviation operates ashore (in the Vietnam Delta in 1970-72 we called the shore-based Navy helicopter gunships "Sea Lords"), this sets up a reasonable any-Service case.

Let's say that in a visit to this aviation unit, under his operational control but not under his full command, the senior commander discovers in talking with pilots that they

are not familiar with important rules of engagement which his headquarters has issued.

A sense of mission demands that the senior commander immediately take corrective action. A sense of proportion permits it.

Let's say that that senior commander then observes a safety hazard in the ammunition storage area.

A sense of proportion demands that he comment on that matter also.

Let's say that the senior commander then sees an indication of poor maintenance practices -- sloppy conditions in a maintenance shop.

By now, the senior commander has enough reason to be concerned about the overall state of that unit's readiness.

A sense of proportion and concern for his mission demand, first, that he tell the unit commander right there to get his unit in order, and second, that he quickly get in touch with the Service chain of command and let the next higher commander in that chain of command (full command less opcon) know that something seems to be wrong in that unit.

And, finally, a sense of proportion and his concern for the mission demand that he -- or a command or staff inspector responsible to him -- go back a few weeks later and check to be sure things are right.

Without such, our commander is not meeting his command responsibility.

But, for deep-rooted reasons, that is by no means the way it is done in our culture today.

The "Limits" are on "Command Supervision"

As we have seen in the two cases just discussed, the culture, reinforced by the words of the UNAAF, sets up limits. And these limits are on "command supervision."

These examples have spoken a good deal about relationships between U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps and between officers of those Services in command positions, in field commands.

These Army-Marine Corps issues are by no means the only kinds of issues in field commands.

The issues are similar, and are no less acute, when U.S. Navy or U.S. Air Force formations are involved. And instances in which such issues emerge with these Services -- well known to commanders and staffs of multiservice commands -- are equally troubling, if perhaps less dramatic than those of Beirut and My Lai.

The fundamental point here is not whether the words that define "operational control" (synonymous with "operational command") are adequate as written. They are. For in the first few lines of the definition of "operational command" on page 4-14 is included one simple, overriding function of command, namely:

"...the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission."

These words nailed the responsibility for the Beirut tragedy on General Rogers. Those Marines were at Beirut on a mission which it was his responsibility to see accomplished. The UNAAF definition gave him the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish it.

And the words need say no more. For if an opcon commander is allowed to determine that some form of authoritative direction is necessary to accomplish a certain mission, he has no problem.

But the culture was against that. And in the ordinary case the system permits the commander no such leeway. For it is in the system's nature that the Service subordinate with whom the opcon commander uses that logic can go around his opcon commander through the Service chain of command, as far as the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves, to disabuse that opcon commander of the notion that his such-and-such authoritative direction was really necessary to accomplish the mission.

And a Service component commander who disregards his Service Chief's (or Service staff's, reflecting the Service Chief's) desires soon finds himself without Service friends and Service advancement.

The result: A "wall of the component" culture of command in multiservice formations that no single-Service commander would tolerate in his own command.

It takes a tough-minded and skilled opcon commander to work his way around this system of Service channels.

Let me use another personal experience to make the point of an opcon commander's skill.

The commander in question was General John W. Vessey, Jr., then CINC, United Nations Command, in Korea. This was 1976 and 1977, before the creation of the Combined Forces Command. As CINCUNC, General Vessey was responsible for the defense of the Korean peninsula.

I was one of General Vessey's subordinate land formation commanders, commanding I Corps (ROK/US) Group, defending the Western Sector of the DMZ. My headquarters had recently instituted a series of "air/land battle simulations" of the defense of our sector, in which the corps commanders "fought" their defensive plans in very realistic "battle" against an "enemy" with a mind and means of his own. The air/land battles were bloodless, existing only in the simulation.

These simulations quickly began to cause problems to the tactical air commander in Korea. They revealed that we could not actually carry out our processes of planning and executing air/land operations as we were saying we would do them in time of war; the procedures were clumsy and inappropriate.

Unknown to General Vessey, his opcon Air Force component commander began to use his channels through the USAF Service chain of command -- through the Pacific Air Command (PACAF), in Hawaii -- to complain about our battle

simulations, and about the damage he believed they were causing to his operational methods.

Somehow, General Vessey learned about this "eyes only" message traffic. I gather that he did not take kindly to this sort of reporting, and using this channel, as to activities within his command's jurisdiction of which he approved and for which he took responsibility -- and that he so informed his Air Force component commander.

General Vessey then took another step. He invited the PACAF commander to visit Korea and to visit my headquarters. Without informing me of the background of the invitation, he asked that I describe our battle simulation work to the PACAF commander.

I did so. A very short time later, there was a new Air Force component commander in Korea, personally selected by the Commander, PACAF.

The direct relief of a commander of one Service by his senior commander from another Service is a very painful event. Contributing to the touchiness of Army-Marine Corps relationships on this subject is the memorable 1944 action by Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, U.S. Marine Corps, then commander of the V Marine Amphibious Corps fighting in heavy combat on Saipan with the U.S. Army's 27th Infantry Division under his operational control.*

*Of course, the 27th Infantry Division, like the Americal Division in Case 3, was not a "Service component." The term did not exist in 1944.

Reacting to what he considered the Army division commander's lack of aggressiveness, and assuring himself in advance of the support of his own chain of command, General Smith relieved the division commander on the spot.^[40]

An entirely predictable storm of controversy erupted. Nothing like this peremptory relief from command by an opcon commander from another Service has occurred since.

Yet to relieve a subordinate from command is the ultimate resource of the force commander. Denied, in a practical sense, a decisive influence as to this resource, he is himself justified in asking to be relieved of the responsibility of command -- either for his command's operations or for its state of readiness.

In this 1944 case, Lieutenant General H. M. Smith, USMC, legitimately claimed for himself this ultimate sanction of field command.

Case 4: Nightmare Range, 1977-1984

Cases 2 and 3 have described situations in which commanders in a multiservice chain of command had the authority of opcon but were inhibited by the culture from meeting its responsibilities.

Case 4 which follows describes a situation in which the multiservice commander (in Korea) did not, and does not, even possess that authority of opcon.

This case (also taken from Adequacy) is a personal vignette from my time as Commanding General of the I Corps (ROK/US) Group in Korea, in 1976-78.^[41]

From time to time, the 3d Marine Division, stationed on Okinawa, sent one of its artillery battalions to Korea to take advantage of the excellent artillery practice available at Nightmare Range near the DMZ in the I Corps Group sector.

Shortly after the first such visit took place during my time in command of the Western Sector, I was visited by the Commanding General of the 3d Marine Division. I remarked in passing that it was my intention, if the North Koreans should attack while the Marine artillery battalion was in my area of responsibility, to place the battalion under operational control of the 2d Infantry Division Artillery so that the battalion's fires could be most effectively used in the defense of Korea. I remarked that it might be good to say as much in instructions to the Marine battalion, and to have the same understanding in the operation plans of the United Nations Command, with its headquarters in Seoul, which was responsible for the defense of the DMZ.

The division commander demurred, pointing out that it was Marine Corps doctrine that Marine units fight together under the Marine division/wing command concept. I remarked that if war should come I would be surprised indeed to find the Marine artillery battalion waiting for a Marine division or other Marine formation headquarters to show up, before the battalion engaged the attacking enemy. I said that the former Marine Corps Commandant, the famous Major General John A. Lejeune, who had commanded a Marine brigade under the same Second Division in World War I, and who later

commanded the full Army division, might if he were alive take exception to having the Marine artillery either sit out the battle or operate without higher artillery headquarters' fire direction.

Well, these ideas were never written into any plan. I did later arrive at an understanding with the Marine battalion commander that it would be best if he and his operations officer visited Second Division Artillery and exchanged call signs and frequencies, and got some idea of how operations might be conducted in time of war.

Later, General Vessey, CINC United Nations Command in Seoul, who was ultimately responsible for the ROK/US defense of Korea, told me that he too was not able to get the Marines to agree to these words in the operation plan. Presumably he thought it futile, or unduly entangling bureaucratically, to press the issue through CINCPAC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

That it was never written into anyone's plan was clearly because it might establish a precedent, not in accord with doctrine, that might be cited against the Marines on some future occasion.

But, one might be justified in asking, was not that Marine artillery battalion in General Vessey's area of operations to begin with? Did he not have operational control of it? Could he not simply pass opcon to I Corps Group whose commander could likewise pass opcon to the 2d Infantry Division?

The answers to these questions are all "No." General Vessey did not have opcon of that Marine artillery battalion to begin with. In fact, he had in his charter no written command relationship whatever.

To explain why he did not tells much about the application of the JCS definitions in practice.

Although the Marine artillery battalion training in our sector was far from the sea and was hundreds of miles away from any naval combatant forces, it bore the designation "Task Element (and an identifying number, say 79.1.4.1)" -- which identified it, even in its base camp, as part of the Seventh Fleet.

In Navy lingo, the "OTC" was the artillery battalion commander. His next superior in "tactical command" was probably a U.S. Navy flag officer offshore somewhere, possibly even the Seventh Fleet commander himself. His next higher commander in the chain of "type command" was perhaps his artillery regimental commander, on Okinawa, thence surely the 3d Marine Division Commander (double-hatted as CG, III MAF), and FMFPAC.

Neither I, as commander responsible for the defense of the sector in which the battalion was located, nor General Vessey, as the multiservice/multinational commander responsible for the defense of Korea, figured in either chain of command. According to UNAAF's provisions, General Vessey's U.S. Forces Korea had a "naval component." But its commander, COMNAVFORK, did not command that Marine artillery unit in any way; his task was simply to "plan and coordinate" its activities for the Commander, Seventh Fleet.

Let's say that, unlikely as it would have been, this Marine artillery unit through negligence had fired a training volley on a nearby village and had killed people there, or that the pilot of one of its helicopters had negligently strayed across the DMZ or into a restricted area. Those of us in the U.S. command chain in-country would have had no substantive part whatever in the investigation of that incident, nor in any disciplinary or other corrective action. Indeed by statute, DoD directive, or JCS-delegated authority, we could have borne no official responsibility for such negligence.

But more, we also had no authority to tell the battalion commander what to prepare to do in time of war.

For General Vessey, in 1977, to have undertaken to place in his operation order a provision for operational control of this USMC artillery battalion in time of tension or war would have taken him into a tangled web of doctrine, precedent, and Service suspicion profitless to enter. So he chose not to make an issue of it.

Some Reflections on Case 4

When I included this case three years ago in the predecessor volume to this one, Adequacy, I detected a certain, and to my mind quite understandable, ambiguity in the frames of mind of some Marine Corps officers, including generals, who read it.

The case clearly implied that the Marines were more concerned with their own institutional independence than in

the ROK/US force mission and readiness in the face of an enemy.

It was rather difficult for Marines to justify objecting to an operation plan which would, at DEFCON ("defense condition") 3, place this field artillery battalion, positioned some 15 miles from the DMZ, opcon to the Second Infantry Division and thence to that division's artillery commander where it could quickly become fully ready for war.

I was not talking about that battalion's status at DEFCON 4, the normal training state of alert for U.S. forces in Korea. I was talking about its status at DEFCON 3 -- the next higher state of alert, called when General Vessey or his superiors concluded from intelligence or other events that there was an increased possibility of enemy attack -- or at DEFCON 2, an even higher state of alert.

And I was talking only about establishing in an operation plan the responsibility for establishing before DEFCON 3 or 2 through normal coordination those matters which a professional force should settle in advance to insure effective field artillery operations in combat: the battalion mission, the location of the initial battalion position, fire planning, liaison with supported units, ammunition resupply, and so on.

The Army officer commanding the forces of the coalition, General Vessey, was not acting as a Service commander but rather a unified commander assigned a clearcut mission. I could not conceive that in the opposite situation, an Army

field artillery battalion amongst the Marines, the Army as an institution would bow its neck in that way.

I thought that we -- the Army and the Marines -- might have learned something about working together since the days before Pearl Harbor.

In Adequacy I had quoted the report of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Pearl Harbor attack, which said that:

...The whole story of discussions during 1941 with respect to unity of command is a picture of jealous adherence to departmental prerogatives and unwillingness to make concessions in the interest of both the Army and Navy.

The same comment is applicable to the near dispute between Admiral Kimmel and General Short as to which of them should command Wake and Midway when the marines were replaced by soldiers.

It is proper to suggest that, had both the commanding officers in Hawaii been less concerned between November 27 and December 7 about preserving their individual prerogatives with respect to Wake and Midway and more concerned about working together to defend the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier in the light of warnings they had received, the defensive situation confronting the Japanese on the morning of December 7 might well have been entirely different.[42]

Here, four decades after that debacle, we had what we chose to call a "unified command" in Korea. Why not give its commander appropriate influence over the real readiness of his command for war?

Although this seems to be overriding military logic, there has since 1977 been no change whatever in the status

of that field artillery battalion in any operation order of the Korea command.

But it is no longer only an artillery battalion; the units of the 3d Marine Division training in the sector of the Combined Field Army in 1985 include from time to time a reinforced infantry battalion. This unit operates not just in the vicinity of the Nightmare firing range; it is regularly right up there even closer to the DMZ.

Believe it or not, the chain of operational command of this Marine maneuver unit, only a few kilometers from the ever-tense DMZ and Kim Il Sung's legions, is and has been (like that of the artillery battalion) through the fleet, in this case the Seventh Fleet.

Like the Marine artillery battalion of 1977, there is no provision in the CFC/USFK operation plan for the defense of Korea for that unit to become opcon to CINC CFC/COMUSK, either in time of war or in a DEFCON short of war.

Knowing from two years in command of that sector that it is foolhardy to assume that warning time would be sufficient to extricate those Marine units from the front line areas in event of imminent attack, and that even if one should want to move them rearward such an operation calls for command control so as not to conflict with other preparations, I find this hard to take.

The Korea command has tried. Officers of the J5 (plans) division of headquarters, U.S. Forces Korea (the division itself being headed up by a Marine Corps general officer), have spent many hours discussing the issue with

the Seventh Fleet and its Marines, but to little avail. As of this writing (December 1985) the result is no more than a draft "memorandum of agreement" between USFK and III MAF/Seventh Fleet which, in the agonizingly slow negotiations which characterize the development of such, will spell out such things as resupply, fire support coordination, and so on for that Marine artillery battalion, and for the basic organization for combat, initial missions and assembly areas for the Marine reinforced infantry battalion.

When a simple addition to the USFK/CFC operations plan would suffice, this process is not exactly the hallmark of the professional military establishment the American taxpayers have a right to expect.

To be fair, I should repeat a footnote from Adequacy on the original vignette. It cites conversations I had with Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC, Retired, the Marine Corps official historian. General Simmons, who has fought these doctrinal battles often and who as a historian understands well their nature, did not defend the 1977 reaction in my office of the 3d Marine Division commander. But he did explain it as a not atypical reaction of any senior Marine Corps officer who will often read into a proposal such as mine a hidden motivation and specific attempt to, in his words, "split the Marine Corps, by taking its ground units away and giving them to the Army, and taking its air away and giving it to the Air Force."

The fundamental issue which this case raises is whether or not the officer who has been named U.S. unified commander in Korea will be allowed to have in his operation plan a

provision for operational control in time of war or increased tension over a field artillery or infantry battalion 10 miles or so from the ever-tense DMZ.

The answer is that he will not. In 1985, those units as they are stationed there near the DMZ are not under the command, or operational control, of the unified commander in Korea in any way. For eight years there has not been, nor is there at end-1985, any document that says they will be so opcon at DEFCON 3, 2, or 1 or at the outbreak of war.

This gives another reason for devoutly hoping that war or a serious war-threatening incident will not break out.*

*General Livsey believes that my treatment in these pages of the III MAF and of the USMC as a whole is pretty tough and that, while what I say may be accurate, the incumbent commanders of III MAF and FMFPAC have been extremely cooperative with the current CINC. The CG, FMFPAC, considers that as to JCS-sponsored exercises in Korea there is not a problem with opcon of USMC forces ashore, and that smaller training exercises (i.e., those of which I am speaking) can be resolved locally if commanders work together.

True, to a degree. But, with due respect to both these estimable commanders, I offer that if an avoidable tragedy, not now foreseen, were to occur and a later Congressional investigation should reveal that not even in times of increased tension were these Marine formations near the DMZ under General Livsey's opcon, and that even the dotted lines of command of Beirut and My Lai did not exist, both officers would have difficulty explaining to the members of Congress sitting in judgment that particular lapse in operation plans under their respective jurisdictions. It is simply not a military way of doing things.

The Congress Probably Didn't Want It That Way

The complications in this chapter's cases stem in part from the inherent cussedness of senior commanders, and their long-established natures (for Service commanders) of not wanting to relinquish ownership and (for multiservice commanders) of wanting to be in command when they are named to be in command.

Within the U.S. military's operational chains of command, these normal bents of human nature are reinforced by the law of the land, which decrees that the Services will be separate and that they will have certain clearly defined responsibilities for the preparation of forces, and by the words of UNAAF which sets up a clear invitation to the Service chain of command to say to the opcon commander, "What's mine is mine, and what's yours is to be negotiated."

The prevailing culture has affected not only issues of plans and operations. As we shall see, the "wall of the component" has affected equally gravely how command and control systems are placed into the field.

If, in 1946 and 1947, one were to have tried to convince the Congressional committees engaged in framing the National Security Act of 1947, the basic provisions of which as to the Services' authorities remain in place today, that, just as the structure ordained by law before Pearl Harbor had contributed to that disaster, the words they were writing in 1946 and 1947 would in due time lead to disasters such as the Iran Rescue Mission and the Marine tragedy in Beirut, would inhibit a Marine field commander from intervening in an atrocity-prone subordinate Army formation, and

would leave a unified commander in Korea without authority to direct coordination of Army-Marine field artillery support or clear control of a Marine maneuver battalion in his forward area -- the Congressmen would have been disbelieving.

They would have been equally disbelieving if told that the language and culture of the "wall of the component" would decades later make extraordinarily slow and difficult the processes of providing multiservice commanders with the means -- the command and control systems -- with which they and their multiservice commands were to carry out their responsibilities.

One can guess that probably they would have said, "No. We intend that (just as the JCS definitions later provided) the multiservice field commander will always be able to exercise the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. And we expect that in their service to the American people field commanders will properly exercise that authority to prevent disaster."

How does one break down this culture of the "wall of the component?" Surely not by breaking up the fleets and tactical air in a theater of operations; there is good basis in reason and experience for going with something resembling the present system. But it neither seems logical nor justified by experience to extend the same notion into the realm of land formations and their operations. And there must be some reform in the culture so that multiservice commanders can get down inside these single-Service, or single-function, formations to the extent they must to accomplish their missions.

The problem is not so much that faced by General Smith on Saipan; his problem was the exercise of command prerogatives and supervision in the heat of combat.

The problem is rather the meaningful exercise of command direction and command supervision day-to-day toward achieving the fullest possible operational readiness of a command, in the normal environments of peacetime. Here, the tangible and intangible limits of the culture do not favor the commander's full exploitation of what is granted him by the definition -- "the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission."

His command's readiness is the opcon commander's responsibility at every level. As the Long Commission made clear, if something goes wrong, the opcon commander is responsible. He cannot sidestep the responsibility by saying that it belonged to the Service chain of command.

The problem, in practice, is how to provide the opcon commander the confidence that he can rightly exercise "the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission" -- not only in the heat of combat, but in the day-to-day actions necessary to assure the readiness of his command.

In the two years following the report of the Long Commission, not one word of what the UNAAF says about command and operational control has been changed.

The final three Chapters of this work will discuss how to provide the opcon commander with the authority he needs. Suffice it for now to say that the solution lies in giving him authorities commensurate with his responsibilities.

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
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Chapter VI

LIMITS ON MULTINATIONAL COMMAND -- CASE STUDIES

In practical operational situations, U.S. multiservice commanders are also multinational commanders. It is unlikely to be otherwise, because any foreseeable U.S. multiservice operations will certainly take place on the territory of nations other than the United States, and forces, however small, of other nations will be involved.

The multinational operational commander, who must reconcile both national and Service interests, finds that some doctrinal concerns which seem to loom large to the Services become less important. For example, although some "doctrine" may prescribe a separate "ground" component, multinational organizations in both Korea and NATO Europe have no such operational headquarters. Similarly, in NATO Center the doctrinal fixations of the U.S. Air Force about how to handle "battlefield air interdiction" have given way to local solutions deemed more suitable by the responsible commanders on the scene.

Reconciling multinational concerns raises for the commander a whole new order of problems, which we now explore.

Service and National Basic Drives

We have said that the limits on multiservice command within United States military forces derive from the

institutional strengths of the military Services -- that is, from the powers and authorities vested in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps as Services. The basic drive of these Service establishments is to maintain their institutional powers and their authority over their Service resources, all the way down the Service formation chains of command.

We have said that the Services instinctively resist an increase in the powers and authorities of a multiservice commander; this increase can only mean less power and authority to them, as Services. The agent of the Service in a multiservice command is called the "Service component command;" one basic drive of the Service is, therefore, to maintain the independence and separateness of that Service component command.

However, when the bullets begin to fly and the pressures of combat are on, some of these Service doctrinal drives give way to even more elemental considerations -- those of survival and of the operational success of the U.S. national effort. In battle, and indeed in immediate preparation for imminent battle, the more narrow Service concerns disappear in the face of the concerns of the national force as a whole. The common danger and elemental patriotism bring the Services together.

Unlike Service concerns, however, those of nations tend to loom larger in times of stress and uncertainty. It seems as if the stress of battle and the possibility of failure tend to split coalitions, rather than bind them.

And nations are truly independent entities, while ultimately the Services are not.

Mutual Trust and Mutual Interest

Of all the intangibles of coalition command and control, mutual trust between coalition partners is perhaps the most important.

Consider Korea. Korean-American mutual trust has fluctuated over the years. Despite the unity forged in 30 months of fighting side by side, it was never more strained than in the first half of 1953, just before the signing of the Armistice which ended the Korean War's combat phase.

During the 18 months of the truce negotiations -- "fighting while talking" -- President Syngman Rhee was implacably opposed to any armistice agreement that confirmed the division of Korea. He vowed he would put his signature to no such document.^[1]

But the newly elected President Eisenhower, who had run for office promising that he would end the Korean War, was determined to have an armistice. As one incentive for Rhee to agree to an armistice, even without a Korean signature, President Eisenhower took the initiative in arranging what became the U.S.-Korean Mutual Security Treaty of 1954, which committed the United States to come to Korea's aid should Korea again be attacked. That treaty exists to this day.

During the truce negotiations, the fate of the North Korean prisoners of war who were in the custody of South Korea became a major issue. Rhee was adamant; he would have

no part in returning these prisoners to North Korea against their wills.

However, toward persuading the North Koreans to sign an armistice, the U.S. had held open the possibility that the prisoners would be returned.

Then, even as the United States and North Korea were discussing the disposition of the prisoners, the ROK Army's prison camp commanders opened the gates and most of the North Korean prisoners of war dissolved into South Korea. The Americans had been thwarted. In their eyes, the order to thwart had come from Syngman Rhee. Mutual trust had taken a blow.

Thirty years later, the Republic of Korea's very survival still depends on that nation which saved it in 1950 -- the United States of America.

And, today, in the face of the sworn enemy to the north, who tried once by force to unite the peninsula and who gives every sign of readiness to try again, and who has two powerful Communist neighbors immediately adjacent to its territory, mutual trust remains all-important.

The government and people of the Republic of Korea watch closely for any signal that the United States, its government, or its people may be wavering in their firm commitment to the defense of Korea. Concern about the genuineness of the U.S. commitment can quickly turn to apprehension. When apprehension grows, irrational notions can surface.

Toward the end of the 1960s, when the United States began to withdraw from Vietnam, and then carried out the withdrawal of one of its two divisions from Korea, Korean concern about the dependability of the United States seems to have turned to apprehension.

One of the moves which some Americans thought the ROK government was showing signs of considering in those days, because it might not be able at some future time to count on the United States, was to proceed with the development of its own nuclear weapons capability.

That crisis passed, but trust was shaken again in early 1977 when, soon after his inauguration, President Carter made known his intention to withdraw over a period of three to five years most U.S. ground forces including all of the U.S. Second Infantry Division from the Republic of Korea, leaving only U.S. tactical air and logistic support. There was no mention of any pre-conditions -- to include any corresponding actions by North Korea -- for such American ground force withdrawal.

President Carter had arrived at his judgments on Korea at least a year earlier. Indeed, his proposition to pull U.S. ground forces from Korea was a feature of his campaign for the presidency. Toward making the decision more acceptable, the idea of compensatory measures, to be executed over a period of time and designed to strengthen the ROK armed forces to make up for the departure of the Second Division, became part of the policy package.^[2]

It was clear that such compensatory measures would not substitute for the removal of the Second Infantry Division.

That force had for the many years of its forward deployment fulfilled the well-appreciated mission of deterrence to any North Korean attack. Such stability as existed on the peninsula derived very largely from its presence and from the certainty of immediate U.S. response to a North Korean invasion which that presence meant. To lose entirely this certainty of U.S. response was an idea devastating to Korean confidence in the U.S.

It was less well understood that the division also performed an indispensable truce-keeping function which only a U.S. combat formation could fulfill. The United States President, upon North Korea's aggression in 1950, had been named in a United Nations resolution as U.N. executive agent for the Republic of Korea's defense. The division's presence guaranteed the ability of the President to preserve the conditions of the 1953 Military Armistice Agreement which his agent General Mark Clark, then CINC, United Nations Command, had signed and which ended the fighting phase of the Korean War.*

President Carter's judgment and open announcement caused a great deal of unnecessary concern not only in Korea but also among U.S. allies. One increment of the troop withdrawal was actually carried out.

*For a 1976 example of the utility of the Second Infantry Division in this role, see pages 7-11 and 7-12. The lessons of this incident were not picked up by Mr. Carter, either as candidate or as president.

In due time President Carter changed his decision. As a result of analysis conducted in 1978 and 1979, the U.S. intelligence community determined that the North Korean Army had, not 25 divisions as had been assessed to that time, but half again that many. When this news was presented to President Carter, it finally became evident to him that his policy of troop withdrawal was bankrupt; he "suspended" further troop withdrawals. The facts gave him no other choice.^[3]

Within hours after his inauguration in January 1981, President Reagan, who had been informed of the policy background and the 1979 intelligence estimate, rescinded the withdrawal policy and made the decision to invite President Chun Doo Hwan of the Republic of Korea to Washington as one of the first official visitors of his administration.

Mutual trust has since been on a high plane.

Case 1: France, 1944

To illustrate the independence of national forces in coalitions, let us now consider a few case studies in multinational command.

Our first case in which multinational operational command was something less than what the definition on page 4-14 states is illustrated in a narrative from August 1944, in France.

Then, the Free French 2d Armored Division, commanded by Major General LeClerc, was part of the U.S. V Corps, under General George Patton's Third Army, and General Omar

Bradley's 1st Army Group. That was the "opcon" or "dotted" chain of command, as shown in Figure 6-1.




Figure 6-1

Chain of Command, France, 1944

But the "national" chain of command, if one can call it that, was to Charles deGaulle -- who at that time was in no way regarded as a "chief of state." DeGaulle was still struggling to assert his authority over the liberated territory of France.

Nonetheless LeClerc's first loyalty was to deGaulle. DeGaulle insisted that Paris be liberated by French troops. He had on August 21 told General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, in effect that if Eisenhower did not release the 2d Division, then in Normandy, to liberate Paris, he, deGaulle, would order the division to do so himself.

Eisenhower, long favorable to such a scheme in any event, then placed the 2d Division in the chain of command described above.

As the 2d Armored Division moved on Paris, Generals Bradley, Patton, and Gerow -- good soldiers all -- had one image of what that dotted line of "operational control" meant. But Charles deGaulle and General LeClerc had another image, if the 2d Division were not allowed by its "dotted line" chain of command to liberate Paris. And if it should have come to a fundamental test, the deGaulle/LeClerc view would no doubt have prevailed.^[4]


Case 2: Korea, 1950

Our second case is in Korea, late September 1950. The United Nations Command, under General MacArthur, had just completed the Inchon landing. ROK and U.S. Army forces, under the command of Eighth Army, were pursuing the

shattered North Korean forces. The ROK/US forces were nearing the 38th Parallel which had divided North and South Korea from 1945 until the North Korean attack in June 1950.^[5]

In Washington and the United Nations, the central issue in those last days of September was whether the United Nations forces should cross the 38th Parallel.

Advancing north on Korea's east coast was the I Corps of the ROK Army. The command situation of I Corps was as shown in Figure 6-2.



- = "full command"
- = "operational control"
- - - - = "full command" less "opcon"

Figure 6-2

Chain of Command, Korea, 1950

The dotted line from Eighth Army to the ROK I Corps means essentially "operational control" (See DoD definition of "operational command," page 4-14, above.)

The July 14, 1950, letter written by Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea, to General Douglas MacArthur, then new military commander for the United Nations in Korea, reads as follows:

Dear General MacArthur:

In view of the common military effort of the United Nations on behalf of the Republic of Korea, in which all military forces, land, sea and air, of all the United Nations fighting in or near Korea have been placed under your operational command, and in which you have been designated Supreme Commander United Nations Forces, I am happy to assign to you command authority over all land, sea and air forces of the Republic of Korea during the period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities, such command to be exercised either by you personally or by such military commander or commanders to whom you may delegate the exercise of this authority within Korea or in adjacent seas.

The Korean Army will be proud to serve under your command, and the Korean people and Government will be equally proud and encouraged to have the overall direction of our combined combat effort in the hands of so famous and distinguished a soldier who also in his person possesses the delegated military authority of all the United Nations who have joined together to resist this infamous communist assault on the independence and integrity of our beloved land.

With continued highest and warmest feelings of personal regard,

Sincerely yours,

/s/SYNGMAN RHEE^[6]

MacArthur in turn told Lieutenant General Walton Walker, Eighth Army commander, to direct the actions of ROK Army forces.

We do not know what written instructions President Rhee had issued the ROK on the subject. He may simply have directed the ROK Army Chief of Staff to place himself under the United Nations Command.

We draw the line solid (————), meaning "full command," from the ROK President to the Chief of Staff, ROK Army. Because General MacArthur, as CINC, Far East (a unified command), was also "double-hatted" as commander of all U.S. Army forces in the Far East, the line is also solid from MacArthur to the Commanding General, Eighth Army (EUSA) (not the case with U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force field commands in the Far East).

The dotted line (.....) from the Commanding General, EUSA, to C/S ROK Army and thence to the I ROK Corps is meant to convey what we now call "operational control." The dashed line (-----) from C/S ROK Army to I ROK Corps means "full command, less opcon." From I ROK Corps to its divisions, the line is again solid, that is, "full command."

Despite its ambiguities, this arrangement had by September 1950 been working well. Those ROK Army units that were placed under U.S. corps or divisions followed the directives of the U.S. commanders. Those ROK forces not so placed received their direction from Eighth Army through the ROK Army Chief of Staff. Such was the case with I ROK Corps.

As September's last days approached, no subordinate commander of Eighth Army, Korean or American, had yet received any directive, or authority, to cross the 38th Parallel.

Not until September 29 did MacArthur himself receive such authority from Washington. Not until October 2 did he tell the ROK and U.S. forces of his command that "your troops may cross the border at any time."

But for the divisions of the ROK I Corps, General MacArthur's October 2 permission was irrelevant. President Rhee in a mass meeting in Pusan September 19 had said that he did not expect the U.N. forces to stop at the 38th Parallel, but if they did, "we will not allow ourselves to stop."

On September 30, the 3d ROK Division of ROK I Corps crossed the 38th Parallel. The orders to do so undoubtedly came from President Rhee through the ROK Army Chief of Staff.

In this particular instance, the dashed line from C/S ROK Army to I ROK Corps had become quite solid, and the dotted line (.....) from CG EUSA to I ROK Corps had looked more like this (. . . .).

Reflections on Cases 1 and 2

These two cases have one aspect in common.

Both with the Free French forces in France, 1944, and with the ROK Army forces in Korea, 1950, the United States

had been and was the main provider of the means of war. Both these forces fought with American weapons, they consumed American fuel, they fired American ammunition -- all provided through a logistics system that was almost entirely operated by troops of the U.S. Army.

This was not your usual case of operational control through an operational chain of command, and administration and logistics support through a different (either Service, or national) structure, as set up by publications of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for U.S.-only forces, and by allied agreements (in NATO, for example) for multinational forces.

No. In the 1950 Korea case, the real provider was neither the ROK government nor its military establishment. At that stage of the war, the ROK Army was just being re-established after having essentially been destroyed in the first weeks of the war. It had no means of its own to speak of. It used American means.

The 1944 France case was similar. There was then no French nation, as such, fighting on the side of the Allies. What the Free French forces had in the way of resources were mostly U.S.-supplied, along with some British means.

Yet, even under such conditions, where the very means for their operations were provided by the United States, two formation commanders -- each responding to national authority -- either were insubordinate (as in the case of the I ROK Corps and its 3d Korean Division) or were evidently quite willing to be insubordinate (as in the case of the 2d French Armored Division) when it came to a conflict between

their national concerns and the concerns of the operational chain of command.

Case 3: Korea, 1979

Twice since the Korean War, the U.S. general officer with multinational command in Korea has been faced with a situation in which ROK Army forces under his putative operational command have been moved, in a time of political crisis, by national authorities without his consent. The first of these was when Major General Park Chung Hee (later President of the Republic of Korea) used ROK Army forces responsive to him to seize power in 1961.

The second time was in December 1979. Certainly a treatment of the present situation of multinational command in Korea should consider the basic framework of that latter event. [7]

The crisis began when an assassin, a trusted associate who was at dinner with the President at the time, took the life of President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea in October 1979.

The nation was immediately plunged into a situation for which it was poorly prepared. Opposition parties had long derided the Yushin Constitution which President Park had engineered; to them it was only a vehicle for Park to continue his authoritarian rule. Its provision for peaceful transfer of executive power lay in a sort of electoral college of several thousand members, almost entirely supporters of President Park. This body had only recently re-elected Park by close to a unanimous vote.

Nonetheless, the Yushin Constitution was the law of the land. Under its provisions, the Prime Minister took up the duties of the President after the President's death.

The ROK Army quickly began to dominate the political scene. Limited martial law was declared by the new President. Almost immediately, an unknown ROK Army major general emerged as a power to be reckoned with. This was Major General Chun Doo Hwan, a personal favorite of President Park and a leader among the first four-year class to graduate from the Korea Military Academy (KMA).

Major General Chun, who in 1985 is the President of the Republic of Korea, was, at the time of the Park assassination, the commander of the Defense Security Command. After the assassination, he became the head of a Joint Investigation Headquarters, a position which the Defense Security Command commander then automatically assumed under martial law.

Major General Chun took charge of the investigation into President Park's assassination. Through a network of KMA classmates and other officers loyal to him, he became more and more influential.

In early December 1979, Major General Chun informed the acting President that it would be necessary to take into custody, for questioning, the ROK Army Chief of Staff. That officer had been at another dinner in the same compound when Park's killer had pulled out a pistol and shot the President. Major General Chun's justification for taking the ROKA Chief of Staff into custody was based on his alleged complicity in the assassination.

Averring that he had authority to do so, on the night of December 12, 1979, Major General Chun moved to take the ROK Army Chief of Staff into custody. Without informing the American generals in the opcon chain, he ordered parts of the 9th and 30th Divisions of the ROK Army and other units of I ROK Corps into Seoul to support that move. These units did so, leaving their positions in I ROK Corps.

Figure 6-3 shows the organizational relationship of the 9th and 30th ROK Divisions in the ROK/US Combined Forces Command, then commanded by General John A. Wickham, U.S. Army, and to Headquarters, ROK Army.

In the opcon chain, the 9th and 30th ROK Divisions reported (through a "solid" line) to the I ROK Corps, which in turn reported (through a "dotted" line) to I Corps (ROK/US) Group. The Commander, I Corps Group, was both opcon to CFC and, as a U.S. Army officer, under full command of General Wickham as CG EUSA.

In the command-less-opcon (dashed) line, the I ROK Corps next higher headquarters was Third ROK Army, thence ROK Army Headquarters.




Figure 6-3

Chain of Command, Korea, 1979

It is not known how, or whether, MG Chun dealt with the ROK Army authorities in the "dashed" chain of command when he ordered these I ROK Corps units to move. But it is known that he did not inform the American generals in the "dotted" chain.

It is no secret that these Americans were outraged. But by the time General Wickham heard that parts of his divisions had been pulled off the front line and sent to Seoul to support Major General Chun's act -- and that his line to these units of I ROK Corps was no longer "dotted," but non-existent, events were already too far along to do anything about it.

Successful Coalition Command: Eisenhower and Ridgway

These three cases illustrate how really tenuous is the multinational "operational chain of command" when subjected to the most severe tests of "will they obey?"

It comes down to this: Let's say that you are the "operational commander" over a formation of another nation's Army. Your question to yourself is: When I call the commander of that formation on the radio or telephone, or when I send him a message or look him in the eye, and I give him an order -- will he obey? Or, even more demanding: In a tough situation, will he act, in the absence of orders, according to my statement of his mission and my concept?

The three cases also reinforce the principle that a key measure of the strength of a chain of command is the degree to which it incorporates the power to punish and the power to reward.

Yet, history has shown that coalition field commanders can do well with the limited powers inherent in multinational command. Two successful commanders come to mind: Dwight D. Eisenhower in Europe 1944-45; and Matthew B. Ridgway in Korea 1951-52.

In early 1944, President Roosevelt named General Eisenhower to be Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, for the assault on the continent and the operations that would follow it. Eisenhower was already an experienced commander of coalition forces. In organizing the November 1942 British-American invasion of North Africa, in carrying out that invasion, and in restructuring on the scene his coalition command's organization, he had demonstrated a sure grasp of multinational command.

Before Normandy, he was again to demonstrate his mastery of the art. For one thing, he made clear that he would tolerate on the part of no officer of his staff criticism of another officer that reflected a national bias.

He is reported to have said something like this, "You can call another officer an S.O.B. and get away with it. But if you say that he is a British S.O.B., you will be relieved and sent home, on a slow boat, unescorted."

An American corps commander in England who chose to violate the spirit of Eisenhower's instructions was in fact sent back home.

This technique of enforcing a spirit of unity from the top down in the interest of successful accomplishment of his mission reinforced the sense of purpose of the command and bound his subordinates to Eisenhower in a most effective way.

Further, General Eisenhower was not reluctant to push his mission-derived moral authority to the ultimate: an offer to be relieved of his post if he were not granted the

authority that he considered necessary for mission accomplishment.^[8]

Such a confrontation took place some three months before the invasion. The issue was whether or not the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, would have operational command over the strategic bombardment air forces that had been established by the allies and were by then directly under the control of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Air Marshal Harris of the RAF Bomber Command and Lieutenant General Spaatz of the Eighth Air Force were the field commanders of the four-engined bomber formations carrying out the Combined Bomber Offensive against Germany and its occupied territories. They believed that their commands should not be under the operational control of the invasion force commander, General Eisenhower. They had the support of their respective Service Chiefs and of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

But General Eisenhower insisted that, for integration of effort in the interest of his successful mission accomplishment, these strategic air forces must be under his operational control. He wrote General Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, that if he were not given such operational control, the Combined Chiefs of Staff would have to find another supreme commander for Operation Overlord.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then decided to place the strategic bomber forces under Eisenhower's command for the necessary period before, during, and after the invasion.^[9]

General Ridgway's superb example of coalition leadership was in the winter of 1950-51, in Korea. There he took command of Eighth Army, with its Korean, American, and other national contingents. Demoralized by the surprise Chinese Communist intervention and onslaught, the Eighth Army was in retreat to the south of Seoul and behind the Han River.

General Ridgway turned Eighth Army around. He inspired the force, imbued it with a fighting spirit, suffused it with a coherent operational concept, and took it into an offensive campaign which before long had recaptured Seoul, had driven the enemy well to the north and then threatened to destroy him -- leading the North Koreans and Chinese to ask for talks on a cease-fire.

The example here is one of sheer force of character, conceptual grasp, and driving leadership toward mission accomplishment.^[10]

These two are wartime examples. The problem of peacetime motivation is more difficult. There the coalition commander does not have before him the motivation of combat or the possibility of failure, nor can he call up these graphic images so vividly to his subordinates in the coalition and to his coalition masters.

Coalition Command -- Centrifugal and Centripetal Forces

We have seen that the most powerful of the forces tending to drive apart the members of a coalition is that of the national interest through the national chain of command.

When the authorities of one nation conclude that in a particular case their own national (or even personal) interests override what they see to be the interests of the coalition, the meaning of that "operational control" line on an organization chart immediately becomes open to question.

When the disagreement becomes profound and is magnified by considerations of national prestige and an independent nation's independent course, the line of operational control can disappear (as happened when Charles deGaulle, President of the French Republic, withdrew France from NATO's military command in 1960).

There are other centrifugal forces. For example:

- o Disagreement with the coalition concept of operations. Here the issue is not coalition interest versus national interest, but rather how the coalition interest is to be achieved. (For example, should the defense of Europe's Center be well forward, giving up the minimum territory in West Germany?)
- o Disagreement with priorities. (For example, Montgomery's differences with Eisenhower in the fall of 1944.)

The history of multinational command tells us that, if a coalition is to hold together and work effectively in war (as it did for Eisenhower in 1944-45, and for Ridgway in 1951-52) strong "centripetal" forces must be brought into being.

Among these are:

- o A commander who is willing to tell recalcitrant coalition members, or their political authorities, that he will not serve under conditions in which his authorities are intolerably weak or open to question;
- o Goals and objectives fundamentally agreed to and mutually accepted by the members of the coalition;
- o A way of operating (call it the concept of operations) likewise mutually agreed to and accepted;
- o Mutual trust and confidence among the members of the coalition and the commanders of the members' forces;
- o A recognition among the members of the coalition that there is more to be gained by working together, executing operations under a common concept and under the coalition's leadership, than there is by working separately.

This latter, phrased by Alexis de Tocqueville in his Democracy in America as "self-interest rightly understood," seems to be what motivated the French, even though formally not part of the NATO military structure, to join in the air defense framework of NATO's Central Region.

Modern Command and Control as a Centripetal Force

In the case of France and NATO's air defense, even in the early 1960s it was evident that the technical dimensions

of air defense command and control, when combined with the realities of time, space, and speed of aircraft, did not permit France to run a separate and independent military course.

Modern command and control had by the 1960s become a centripetal force -- a new reality of multinational readiness for war.

In the 20 years since that time, the technical dimensions of command and control have penetrated all the forces and systems of the multinational commander -- into intelligence, electronic warfare, the deep battle, the air battle. Coalition forces are coming to realize that there can a fully effective and fully ready force requires fully effective and fully functioning command and control systems, operating in a climate of agreed strategic and operational concepts.

Some Conclusions on the Limits of Operational Command

It seems possible to generalize on some of the distinctions between multinational and multiservice operational commands, on the nature of the limitations inherent in each form of command, and on how commanders cope with such limitations in practice.

The limits on multiservice operational command are inherently institutional and doctrinal. They tend to apply far more in the peacetime order of things, when national interests are not vividly at stake. Their effects on mission failure do not become evident until the catastrophe, be it a Pearl Harbor or an Iran Rescue Mission, occurs.

There is little scope for "leadership" or "commander-ship" in the multiservice scene alone, as a means for overcoming these institutional obstacles. The Service channels also have their strong, even charismatic, leaders -- and only those leaders have the essential ability to punish or reward.

On the other hand, the scene of an established multinational commander allows the command considerably more scope to work out practical ways of reconciling not only divergent national interests but those of the Services as well.

First, in the multinational scene, there is a basic identity of underlying national interests to begin with, or there would be no coalition arrangement.

Further, as in Europe and Korea, because these coalitions face a clear operational challenge day-by-day, there is a local motivation to work out practical, as differentiated from theoretical or doctrine-based, solutions. Even nations that take great pride in their independence, as for example France in its relationships with the Central Europe air defense system, cannot avoid the realities of the situation.

Further, as the Eisenhower and Ridgway examples attest, there is greater scope for leadership and motivation than in the multiservice-only command.

A Missing Sanction: Authority to Convene Courts-Martial

Because in a world of separate nations the authority of trial by military court-martial can exist only within

national chains of command, multiservice commanders do not, and cannot, carry in their charters this ultimate punitive sanction over subordinates of another nation.

As we noted on page 4-2, the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice endows U.S. unit commanders -- the Army or Marine battalion commander, or the Navy destroyer skipper, or the Air Force squadron commander -- with a decisive sanction: the authority to refer charges to trial by court-martial when a subordinate fails to obey his lawful command.

We noted that, in wartime, the punishment for such is "death, or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct...."

The UCMJ goes on to say "and if the offense is committed at any other time,... such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial may direct."

Senior commanders of single-Service formations, such as division commanders, have through their general court-martial-convening authority the power to proceed with the invocation of this final sanction. Used or not, its potential lies there as silent reinforcement to their command authority.

A multinational commander has no such sanction over any military member of another nation. He can speak to a disobedient subordinate in harsh terms, he can recommend disciplinary action, he can even threaten to resign his post, but he cannot bring about on his own authority a trial by court-martial of another national -- for disobedience, or for any other offense.

In that respect, he is powerless. Unless the military or political authorities of that other nation choose to enforce his orders with their own sanctions under their own military law, his orders can be disobeyed with impunity.

Cases 1, 2, and 3 have shown what it means not to have court-martial authority over a commander of another nation in a tough situation.

But what about a multi-Service commander, with respect to a military member of his unified command or joint task force?

The answer is that the President has the power to grant multiservice commanders the authority to convene courts-martial, and that he has delegated this power to the Secretary of Defense. But the Secretary of Defense has made very limited use of that power.

Article 17, Uniform Code of Military Justice, as enacted in 1950, reads in part as follows:

Each armed force has court-martial jurisdiction over all persons subject to (the UCMJ). The exercise of jurisdiction by one armed force over personnel of another armed force shall be in accordance with regulations prescribed by the President.[11]

And since 1950, Article 22, UCMJ, has said essentially that general courts-martial may be convened by the President of the United States, by various other authorities, and by

commanders and "any other commanding officer in any of the armed forces when empowered by the President."^[12]*

Carrying forward the kind of language in effect at least since 1969, the 1984 edition of the UCMJ has this to say:

So much of the authority vested in the President by Article 22(a)(7) to empower any officer of the armed forces who is the commander of a joint command or joint task force to convene a general court-martial for the trial of members of any of the armed forces in accordance with Article 17(a) and this rule is delegated to the Secretary of Defense. A commander who has been empowered to convene courts-martial under this rule by the President or the Secretary of Defense may expressly authorize a commanding officer of a subordinate joint command or subordinate joint task force who is authorized to convene special and summary courts-martial to convene such courts-martial for the trial of members of other armed forces under regulations which the superior commander may prescribe. (underlining added)[13]

The tools are thus there to be used. Multiservice commanders can be empowered by the Secretary of Defense to convene courts-martial.

However, the practice of every Secretary of Defense who has had this authority has been to use it only upon the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

*Note for non-military readers: A general court martial is required for certain serious offenses; it can award the most severe punishments allowed by the UCMJ. Special and summary courts-martial are constrained in the nature of cases with which they deal and in the punishments which they can award.

The Secretary of Defense has, on his own initiative or on the initiative of his General Counsel, taken no action to use his long-standing authority to empower any unified command or joint task force commander to convene a general court-martial and to authorize his subordinates to convene special and summary courts martial.

The Services argue that the Service military justice machinery in theaters of operations is already present and sufficient, and that the unified commanders do not have the resources (staff judge advocates, their assistants, legal clerks, and so on). However, no increase in administrative staff is necessary; the multiservice commander's cases would be very few, perhaps none in an entire tour of command.

Like so many issues in this study, this is a question of power. The underlying Service motive would seem to be that what the multiservice commander gains, the Service loses. Indeed, a Service would lose its power to protect its Service member in a multiservice chain of operational command. But the Service's own authority for court-martial and non-judicial punishment would remain undiminished. The multiservice commander simply gains reinforcement of his authority for operational command.

Only three Joint Task Force commanders, after JCS recommendation, have been empowered by the Secretary of Defense with any court-martial authority whatever. These are:

- o Commander, Iceland Defense Force;
- o Commander, Joint Task Force, Azores;
- o Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.^[14]

Authorities have been granted in these three cases because the Services, and their Judge Advocate Generals, could see no way, in view of each task force's isolation, to provide themselves for the administration of military justice.*

The rationale for the latter, Cdr RDJTF, was based on the necessity for that force to be prepared to move swiftly to an area with no Service military justice apparatus. Even so, the jurisdiction of that three-star commander was limited to non-judicial punishment only -- authority which every company commander has as a matter of course. It did not encompass summary or special, much less general, court-martial convening authority.

Because the RDJTF was, in former times, subordinate for its training to the U.S. Readiness Command, and because in January 1983 it made the transition to become U.S. Central Command, both CINCREC and CINCENT then picked up the same authority which the Secretary of Defense gave to Commander, RDJTF.

*There is a fourth "joint command" (neither a unified command according to the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, nor a joint task force) to the commander of which the JCS has recommended and the Secretary of Defense has granted authority to convene courts-martial. This is the Field Command, located at Sandia Base, New Mexico, of the Defense Nuclear Agency. The latter is the DoD agency responsible for acquiring, storing and safeguarding nuclear weapons.

Through this these two Commanders-in-Chief gain no more than authority for non-judicial, otherwise known as company commander's, punishment.*

This puny authority for enforcing his orders is what makes so hollow in truth the brave term "full operational command" with which the Congress has endowed unified command Commanders-in-Chief.

But we must be careful here! We are proposing to let the multiservice commander in on one of the most cherished of Service prerogatives: the disciplining of its own people according to its own standards. We have to know why we would do such a thing.

The reasons are both symbolic and real. Even though he may never use it, to give a multiservice commander court-martial authority is of utmost symbolic significance. But it cannot be a hollow symbol; the authority must be there -- real and usable. And it must be given for good reason.

The reason cannot be that we so lack trust and confidence in the subordinates of, or in the leadership powers of, any given multiservice commander that we have to give him this punitive authority so that he can work his will in his command. No. Fear of court-martial is the least of the motivations of, and the least likely to be used by, senior commanders.

*In March 1985, Department of Defense Directive 5510.3 was being revised to give CINCENT general court-martial authority.

The basic reason for making this move is this: To send a message, to give an unmistakable signal to members of the operational chain of command, to make entirely clear who their operational boss is, and to make that boss's authority meaningful and equal to that of the other bosses in the Service chain of command.

The message is this: The operational commander now has General Court-Martial (GCM) convening authority. He now needs to rely on no one else's judgment and decision to appoint an Article 32 Investigating Officer; and in his sphere of operational responsibility, he can decide on his own authority to convene a general court-martial.

Mind you, he has not sole authority to punish. Any Service member remains subject to the court-martial jurisdiction of his Service chain of command.

This one factor brings about a profound change in the climate of operational command/operational control. Now, when any CINC says "Do this" in his chain of operational command, the members of that chain understand that the CINC

has the power to recommend judicial action. Their Services can no longer protect them.*

To Command or Not to Command

The last three chapters have taken us through a maze of single-Service, multiservice, and multinational variations in the concept of what we choose to call by one word, "command."

*I can understand why a Service chain of command would be justified by experience in wanting some leeway in precise obedience to the orders of another Service's general or admiral. Witness the discomfort of Major General O. P. Smith, commander of the 1st Marine Division of X Corps in November 1950, operating out of Wonson, North Korea. In the light of the reports of Chinese Communist intervention, General Smith questioned (correctly, it turned out) the wisdom of the corps commander's orders to drive north-westward along a single highway to the Yalu. Had he not put his own cautious interpretation on these orders, the 1st Marine Division would have suffered more grievously than, in the event, it did.[15]

One must, however, place some faith in the competence of field commanders. To extend a system of checks and balances into multiservice field commands is in due time to invite disaster.

Further, there is an ultimate check. The same rule that permits a joint commander to be given general court-martial authority goes on to say that:

In all cases, departmental review after that by the officer with authority to convene a general court-martial for the command which held the trial, where that review is required by the code, shall be carried out by the department that includes the armed force of which the accused is a member.[16]

In small single-Service commands -- the ship, the squadron, the battalion -- the situation is simple: full command.

At higher levels within larger single-Service formations -- the Army and Marine division, the Navy battle group -- colonels and Navy captains often do not command much of the means needed for their missions, but a higher single-Service commander with full command usually does command most of them; and his authority insures teamwork.

Service compartmentation begins to interfere when the means of more than one Service are required for success. Navy-Marine Corps teamwork is an exception: Centuries of working within a single military department the sea Services have ironed out their mutual ways of operating. But service compartmentation is a problem when either or both of the sea Services and/or Army and/or Air Force formations must operate together under single "command" (but, as we have seen, not really command).

Further, when forces of more than one nation are involved, national structures, national authorities and national prerogatives severely limit, indeed prohibit, anything that resembles full command.

The issue can be put very simply. Is the commander to command, or is he not to command?

To the Services, and to nations, the answer to so stark a question is equally clear. The commander is by no means to be given full command. The JCS, with the Service chiefs,

through UNAAF give the operational commander "the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission;" but the JCS then build restrictions into the UNAAF and preserve them in the culture.

There is a fundamental principle at issue here: If you want something done right, put a good man in charge of it, give him in reasonable measure the means and the authority he needs, and then hold him responsible for the results.

But in multiservice commands, Service pride, Service upbringing, Service doctrine, Service cohesion -- all so important in developing Service fighting capabilities -- get in the way.

And, in multinational commands, the nation itself gets in the way.

Something else often gets in the way. We might as well mention it: personalities.

Commanders come in all types, but one trait all successful commanders have in abundance is that combination of motivation to succeed, self-confidence, and a sense of their own prerogatives of command which can be wrapped up in one word: ego.

Some successful commanders wear their egos out in the open. In the flyleaf of his book on General Mark W. Clark, Martin Blumenson first quotes from a letter of General Alphonse Juin to General Clark, July 22, 1944, as that Free French general departed the American's command:

"I shall keep of you the image of a great leader, the memory of a prompt and lucid intelligence, always perceiving clearly through the smoke of battle."

Blumenson then quotes from the report of General Jacob L. Devers, Chief of the Army Field Forces, rating the performance of General Clark, Commander of the Sixth Army in San Francisco, July 1948:

"A cold, distinguished, conceited, selfish, clever, intellectual, resourceful officer who secures excellent results quickly. Very ambitious. Superior performance." [17]

That latter set of words describes a set of characteristics that may rub people wrong in a multiservice command.

Others (Vessey in Korea comes to mind), no less results-conscious, no less self-confident, and no less aware of what should be the prerogatives of command, find less obtrusive ways of gaining those prerogatives.

But gain them in reasonable fashion multiservice commanders must, or mission failure stares them in the face.

The issue then becomes: What is reasonable? If we want to have a high assurance of good results, what is to be given the typically qualified, typically motivated, multi-service/multinational commander -- in either the general case, or in the situation at hand?

Before dealing with this question, we will in the next five chapters look at further examples of how Services and nations limit the reach of command. These chapters are a

detailed assessment of command, and of the command and control situation in the Korea case.

They are intended to illuminate, with a specific case study, how the limits on a multiservice/multinational commander prevent him from achieving in peacetime those otherwise fully achievable, high-quality command and control systems that he should have in readiness for war.


And then, in Chapters XIII, XIV, and XV, we will address options for correcting what we have found wrong with the command and control of theater forces from this study of the Korea command and other cases, and the implications of those options.

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PART TWO

KOREA ASSESSMENT



Chapter VII

ORGANIZING THE KOREA COMMAND'S FORCES FOR WAR

This chapter focuses primarily on the charters of command in Korea. Chapter VIII, next, addresses the intangibles.

Writing the Operation Plan for Korea

A commander organizes for an assigned mission in a very straightforward way. He (actually his staff, with his guidance and ultimate approval) writes an operation plan, or "oplan" (often written OPLAN).

Military units operate on the basis of orders. So, when the time comes to execute the operation plan, the commander converts the plan, or parts of it, to an operation order or orders.

The form of an operation plan is simple: Situation (own forces, enemy forces, area of operations); Mission (both as expressed in orders and as derived); Task Organization; Instructions to Subordinate Units; Coordinating Instructions; Administration and Logistics; and Command and Signal.

Without a plan, there is confusion. Even if the plan is not followed to the letter, a well-prepared plan fosters

harmony. The process of its preparation and coordination smoothes the processes of its execution, whether it is changed or not.

One mission, perhaps the dominant one, of the senior commander in Korea is the defense of Korea. So he writes an operation plan, giving it a number, for "the defense of Korea."

For other missions, such as the security of the DMZ and its seaward extensions, he prepares other operation plans.

As we have seen in Chapter II, General Livsey, the senior commander in Korea, wears more than one hat. So for each mission he prepares more than one operation plan.

There is one (OPLAN, say 1234) for the Combined Forces Command. There is one (bearing the same number under a different headquarters designation) for U.S. Forces Korea, another (same number) for the United Nations Command, and another for Eighth U.S. Army.

The governing oplan for the defense of Korea is the one General Livsey writes for CFC. The other plans support that one.

Other commanders, not under General Livsey's jurisdiction but supporting him, write their own oplans, generally using the same number. For example, the Commander Fifth Air Force in Japan has an operation plan with a like title, "the defense of Korea."

The basic form of his oplan may be simple, but the content of General Livsey's operation plans is not simple at all. Except for its Paragraph 2, Mission, which can be stated in two or three lines, the rest of his oplan is very complex.

This is so in large part because many of the forces on which General Livsey as CINC, CFC, must rely for accomplishing his mission in peace, crisis, and war are not under his operational command at all in peacetime. Indeed, a large part of these do not come under his command even in war.

This is normal in military structures. A battalion commander does not own all the resources necessary for his mission, nor does a division commander. Nor will General Livsey.

But, while the way, say, battalions within divisions operate is determined essentially by practical considerations, such as how the field artillery can best do its job for the battalions within the context of the division's operations, the way in which General Livsey's command organizes and operates is in a far deeper sense influenced by what we can call "politics" -- or considerations of Service and national policy.

The Effect of U.S.-Only Politics

Here we use the word "politics," not in a pejorative sense but in the sense of considerations of matters of high policy.

Let's look at the U.S.-only military, Service, and joint policy (politics) players, each with his own policy outlook for Korea:

- o There are the chiefs of the four U.S. military Services in Washington, both as Service chiefs and as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chairman, JCS. We have said before that the Service chiefs have no choice but to see the world primarily as custodians of their respective Services' well-being. Service custodianship is perforce their primary function.

The Chairman, however, is not Service-oriented. He identifies with the field commander. In this case there are two field commanders. One is CINCPAC. The other is (depending on how one looks at it) CINC CFC/CINCUNC, who reports directly to the JCS, and in the same person, COMUSK, who reports to CINCPAC.

- o There is CINCPAC, the admiral of the U.S. Navy who is Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. all-Services Pacific Command (PACOM), in Hawaii. He looks at the world primarily from the viewpoint of his mission.

CINCPAC, and especially his staff, might be inclined to see the Korea commander as the PACOM subordinate, rather than in his broader capacity as CINC CFC reporting directly to the JCS.

- o There are the commanders of the Service component commands under PACOM -- namely, the four-star admiral who commands Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), the

four-star Air Force general who commands Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), the three-star Army general who commands the Army's Western Command (WESTCOM), and the three-star Marine Corps general who commands Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific (FMFPAC).*

As we described in Chapter V, the natural drives of these air and naval Service component commanders, and of the Chiefs of Service to whom they report, is to retain "full command" of their operational forces. That this drive does not motivate WESTCOM with regard to Korea is because WESTCOM does not include Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA).

- o There are the chains of Service command in the Pacific under these air and naval component commanders, to include such formations as may be stationed in or near Korea. These commands, since they are for the most part under the "full command" of the air or naval Service component, see the world

*The relationship between CINC PACFLT and CGFMFPac is ambiguous. FMFPAC is one of PACFLT's type commands -- like COMNAVAIRPAC which has administrative jurisdiction over the carriers and the U.S. Navy air squadrons in the Pacific -- and as such comes under the administrative jurisdiction of CINC PACFLT. But the real boss of FMFPAC (the one who controls his money, his policies, and his people) is the Commandant, USMC, in Washington. Over the years it has been no easy matter for the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps to negotiate the wordings of the relationships up, down, and laterally in field commands. Suffice it to say that after a couple of hundred years the seagoing Services have come to understand one another and have figured out ways to make some complicated dotted lines work in practice.

in much the same way as do their bosses. (As we have seen, the CINC CFC/Commander USFK is already "double-hatted" as the "full command" EUSA commander; to some extent he is therefore in conflict with himself.)

- o There are other agencies, particularly those in the intelligence business, that have people or activities in Korea or serving the mission of its readiness and defense.
- o There are policy planners and policymakers in the Department of Defense, including the Secretary of Defense himself.
- o And there are the U.S. Ambassadors in Korea and Japan and the hierarchy and policy planners in the State Department.

Now, let us see how some of these players view their roles on the Korea stage.

First, CINCPAC. Take a look at the globe. Turn it, if you can, so that you can see PACOM's entire realm -- from Africa's east coast northeast to the Aleutians and south to the Straits of Magellan.

Whatever of a military nature takes place in this realm and on much of its rim -- whether it be the Soviet shooting down of a Korean airliner over Sakhalin, or the shadowing of a Soviet naval presence off British Columbia, or the support from New Zealand of a U.S. Antarctic exploration, or the

general nuclear war stationing plan for Trident/Poseidon submarine launchers in the Western Pacific -- is of concern to CINCPAC.

Before World War II, what the Navy called "CINCPAC" was a U.S. Navy-only single-Service command, with a few Marines. After Pearl Harbor, CINCPAC became PACOM, a Navy-dominated unified command that shared the region with General MacArthur's Army-dominated unified command and with the allied commands in Persia, India, China and Burma. Until well after the Korean War, MacArthur and his Army successors retained command of the Japan-based Far East Command. But since the late 1950s, CINCPAC has owned his present domain.^[1]

Through the Vietnam War, the U.S. chain of command from Washington to Vietnam went through CINCPAC in Hawaii.

Against his own canvas, CINCPAC can be forgiven for looking at General Livsey's area of operations and concerns for Korea as matters of smaller scale. Important as is the defense of Korea, CINCPAC has more to think about than that.

CINCPAC and his air and fleet component commanders often turn their thoughts to the needs for general, that is to say all-out nuclear, war between the United States and the Soviet Union. This also colors their thinking about command arrangements in Korea.

Consider PACFLT. Fleets are ocean-based. They move readily, carrying their logistics with them. They do not like to be tied down. Nor do they like to be told exactly how and with what they are to accomplish their missions.

CINCPACFLT, with his Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific, therefore insists that that fleet's operations associated with Korea's defense be what is called "in support." For what to him and to most observers are good reasons, CINCPACFLT will have no part of placing any of his fleet elements under the operational command of the land-oriented General Livsey. In this policy view he has the full support of the Chief of Naval Operations, who in no uncertain terms brings that policy opinion to the JCS. (The extreme to which this can be carried in peacetime is described in the tale of the U.S. Marine Corps artillery and infantry units near the DMZ, pages 5-74 to 5-85 above.)

Or, consider PACAF. The Air Force looks at "airpower" as something like "seapower" -- to be moved under airmen's control and to operate in a large frame. Thus the Fifth Air Force, which is a major PACAF command with its headquarters and some of its squadrons in Japan, takes jurisdiction over USAF airpower in the large region of the Pacific that includes Okinawa and Korea as well as the approaches to Japan itself.

The U.S. Navy's notion of "operations in support" intrigues the airmen of PACAF and the Fifth Air Force. As airmen, born and raised in the traditions and climate of the independent air arm, they resist the piecemealing of airpower.

The result, in peacetime, is that -- although the Fifth Air Force has a subordinate command known as the 314th Air Division with its aircraft and logistics on Korea's soil -- General Livsey has few USAF aircraft under his day-to-day operational control. And in 1983 or so, CINC CFC began to

encounter a PACAF view that, even in war, USAF tactical air should be, not opcon to him, but "in support" -- like the Navy.

And take the Army. Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA), the "Army component" of U.S. Forces Korea, does not come under WESTCOM; its Service channel is directly to the Army Chief of Staff in Washington.

But in 1983 some Army planners began to take a larger view of EUSA. They began to think of making EUSA a "Northeast Asia" land forces command, with an "Eighth Army rear" in Japan. Indeed, this thinking gained some authority and support, even to the idea's floating into State Department channels. There it was evidently resisted by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Mike Mansfield, who saw no point in raising the political ramifications of tying the U.S. Army in Japan and Korea together under a single U.S. Army command.

Airmen of the Fifth Air Force might get away with such an idea, but not the Army.

These outlooks of CINCPAC and his component Services color their respective views on command arrangements for the U.S. (and allied) land, sea, and air means with which General Livsey must defend Korea. The result: Convolutions, legalisms, and complexities unimaginable to an outsider. These occur most graphically in the writing of the subparagraph titled "Friendly Forces," under paragraph 1, "Situation;" in "Task Organization;" in "Instructions to Subordinate Units;" and in the "Coordinating Instructions" of General Livsey's CFC operation plan.

The Influence of U.S. National Interest

The national interest is the equivalent, to nations, of what the mission is to an operational command.

Far more difficult to place into words than is the commander's mission, a nation's national interest as seen by those who govern it ultimately determines a nation's outlooks and actions on the world scene.

Among nations, in the Free World at any rate, coalitions exist only as long as they are perceived by each member nation as serving that nation's national interest.

One national interest of the United States is that there be peace in Northeast Asia. The Republic of Korea has the same national interest. The preservation of peace on the Korean peninsula has since 1953 meant to both countries that they maintain a strong military coalition on that soil.

Military logic dictates that the forces of that coalition have a single commander.

U.S. national logic then dictates that, in the U.S. national interest, that commander be an American, and, further, that on the scene he must have practical control over the use of military forces in Korea.

To the U.S. this means that there must be means in place to insure that, in a crisis involving the North Koreans which may entail the use of force by the coalition and the possibility of war, the American commander will

issue the orders in operations, and that these orders will be obeyed.

The particular political circumstances of Korea underscore that point in a special way.

The United Nations resolution of July 1950, still in effect today, made the U.S. President the executive agent of the United Nations for the coalition military operations that it authorized for the defense of Korea. The resolution also authorized the U.S. President, then President Truman, to designate the military commander of the United Nations Force. [2]

The military Armistice Agreement of July 1953, which established the now three-decades-old truce which ended the war's fighting, has only one signature from our side -- that of General Mark W. Clark, the CINC United Nations Command at that time. [3]

When, at a single ceremony on June 1, 1984, General William J. Livsey took command of his various commands, including the United Nations Command, he assumed the burden that had since 1953 been passed on to succeeding CINCs of the United Nations Command -- the responsibility to maintain intact the provisions of that Military Armistice Agreement.

No event of recent times illustrates more vividly the need for the U.S. coalition commander to have certain control over his means in a crisis, whether ROK/US or U.S.-only, than does the incident in the DMZ in August 1976, when North Korean guards attacked a work party of South Koreans engaged in legitimate trimming of shrubbery in the Joint

Security Area established by the 1953 Armistice Agreement. Using the axes of that work detail, these North Koreans murdered the two American officers in charge of it.

With that act, North Korea challenged the authority of the U.S. President and his designated United Nations commander.

When the U.N. Commander, General Richard G. Stilwell, two days later carried out his plan to uphold the provisions of the Armistice Agreement and also to rectify certain long-standing North Korean infringements of that agreement, he had available to him the practical means of American control over the details of the ROK/US forces' execution of that plan. This included the U.S. Second Infantry Division under his full command.^[4]

This was a well-conceived and well-executed operation. It was a good and essential thing that General Stilwell had the necessary U.S.-only means available.

The Influence of the ROK National Interest

The basic drive of the Republic of Korea, in its own national interest, is the security of its territory. For this, in the face of the implacable opponent to the North, the American presence in the ROK/US coalition is essential.

But there are other highly significant drives for the Republic of Korea. Among those that affect General Livsey's oplan is the ROK desire to be -- not a junior partner -- but a recognized full and equal partner in its own defense.

Call this a desire for full nationhood, meaning to Korean military men "military maturity" and not "military adolescence." That their North Korean enemies make no bones that they have for decades been free of any outsiders in their chain of command adds point to this desire. As the Republic of Korea has gained economic maturity and independence, its military officers, especially those commissioned since the late 1950s, are, many of them, displaying to their American friends and associates an urge to be in greater control of their country's military destiny.^[5]

The ROK armed forces were first virtually destroyed and then rebuilt almost from scratch during the Korean War. They fought bravely and well. In that war and for some years after, the ROK armed forces had American advisors as far down as the battalion level. In due time, U.S. advisors at lower unit levels disappeared. For a time there were U.S. advisors only at division level and above, then at corps and above. Finally all American advisors with field units were gone.^[6]

During the Vietnam War, at the request of the U.S. President, the ROK sent two of its Army divisions and a Marine brigade to Vietnam. These units distinguished themselves.

Until the late 1960s, the U.S. Army's I Corps with its two U.S. divisions held that sector of the DMZ that secured the shortest approaches to Seoul. When one of these divisions was withdrawn in the early 1970s, the ROK Army's I Corps took charge of that sector, leaving under U.S. control only the two guard posts overlooking the Joint Security Area

in the DMZ. These were still manned by the U.S. -- by the Second Infantry Division.

At the same time, the U.S. I Corps became the ROK/US I Corps Group. This was a field-army-size formation with opcon, for the DMZ's defense, of three ROK Army corps and a ROK marine brigade. Its commander was an American three-star general; its deputy commander was a ROK Army major general; its staff was two-thirds Korean and one-third U.S.

I Corps (ROK/US) Group was responsible for the defense of Korea's Western Sector. The First ROK Army (called FROKA) defended the other half of the DMZ -- the Eastern Sector.

In 1978 there began the process by which the Third ROK Army (which theretofore had relinquished opcon of all its front line units to the American-commanded I Corps Group, retaining only "command less opcon") began to assume ever greater responsibility for the defense of the most critical areas of the DMZ -- the approaches to Seoul.

Toward ROK Military Maturity

On December 16, 1983, there took place a significant event in the evolution of the armed forces of the Republic of Korea.

On that date, in a change of command ceremony in Seoul, a new Chief of Staff, General Chung Ho Yong, a member of the first four-year class of the Korea Military Academy, took command of the Republic of Korea Army.

General Chung's class was commissioned as second lieutenants in 1955. His elevation to the position of ROKA Chief of Staff completed the 30-year process, given renewed impetus after the death of President Park Chung Hee in 1979, through which a "new generation" of ROK Army leadership, the four-year Academy graduates, has taken charge of the ROK Army.

From the 1950s through the early 1970s, the materiel support of the ROK armed forces was aimed at maintaining the obsolescent equipment of World War II vintage with which the ROK forces were equipped by the end of the Korean War.

But for most of the past decade, as South Korea's burgeoning economy has brought it into the ranks of the world's industrialized nations, the nation's resources have been increasingly aimed at force modernization.

Less visible to the outside world than the materiel gains of the ROK armed forces has been their steady maturation. Started from scratch in 1948, and destroyed and then rebuilt in the Korean War, these forces -- always noted for their hardiness, courage, and discipline -- and their operating doctrines have in recent years become those of a modern, highly professional, and highly regarded military establishment.

Behind General Chung Ho Yong is an Army officer corps made up of three decades of graduates of such classes. They, and their Air Force and Navy colleagues, can be expected to continue this growth in professionalism.

The evolution of the ROK armed forces in its non-materiel, or operational proficiency, aspects is typified by the change, during 1983, of the role of the Third ROK Army, colloquially known as TROKA.

TROKA, with its headquarters near Seoul, has always been an important field command. But until last year, unlike the First ROK Army (FROKA) on the Eastern Sector, TROKA was not responsible for the defense in time of war of its part of the DMZ. This mission, along with operational command of most of TROKA's forces in event of a North Korean attack, was assigned to the ROK/US Combined Field Army, the redesignated I Corps (ROK/US) Group.

Now that is changed. TROKA today shares in the defense of the Western Sector. TROKA, the Combined Field Army (CFA), and FROKA are the three major land formations along the DMZ. One might say that this is overdue recognition of the maturity and self-sufficiency of the ROK Army.

An American observer of things military -- especially one who has not had an opportunity to visit the ROK/US military command in several years -- who travels through the headquarters in the command structure responsible for the defense of the peninsula today will be surprised at what he sees.

He will see, as for example at the headquarters of TROKA, professionally staffed command centers and intelligence operating establishments alongside them. He will see staffs (both ROK/US and Korean only) fully familiar with the terminologies and concepts of the "air/land" battle. He will see the integration of land and air forces, ROK and

U.S., practiced day-to-day in training. He will, from time to time, see multiservice and bi-national field exercises of impressive scope and a degree of military sophistication that rivals, and in some respects surpasses, that of NATO.

Behind the ROK armed forces in these headquarters and disposed in their field locations, at their air bases, and in their fleet operating locations, the visitor can see, if he chooses, the military training, logistics, and support establishment of a modern nation.

It will resemble in some ways that of the United States, to be sure. It could not be otherwise, given the close relationship between the two countries' armed forces which has prevailed for more than 30 years. But it will be a Korean structure, unmistakably so.

The drive to "military maturity" has by no means ended in Korea. ROK military authorities can be expected to seek greater, and more visible, command.

Coping with this drive toward increasing ROK influence in his command structure, and at the same time accommodating the U.S. need for adequate U.S. control mentioned above, is no doubt one of General Livsey's major concerns.

The Role of JUSMAG-K

In this achievement of ROK military maturity, the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group-Korea, or JUSMAG-K, plays an important, both limiting and supporting, role.

While a line on an organization chart might show that JUSMAG-K comes under USFK "command," the situation is more complex than that. In Korea, as for U.S. military assistance groups in other countries around the world, JUSMAG-K is part of the "country team" coordinated by the U.S. Ambassador. Its reporting channel is to CINCPAC and the Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency and through these to the counterpart agency in the Department of State where the annual assessment of security assistance is coordinated for presentation to the Congress.

Over the years since the late 1940s when the U.S. advisory and assistance effort began, the strength and role of JUSMAG-K and its predecessors has evolved -- from a peak strength of about 2800 in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when advisors were with ROK units at division and below and the U.S. role was both "advisory" and "assistance," to a manning of some 200 in 1984 when the word "advisory" no longer appears in its title.

In the mid-1980s, following the growth in the ROK's capabilities to analyze its own situation, to buy or produce its own materiel, and to manage its own logistics and training programs, JUSMAG-K sees its role as (1) helping ROK authorities decide where they need assistance most, (2) providing a channel for the two-way flow of information, and (3) assisting in the resolution of special problems.

One key area of assistance involves ROK force modernization. Here JUSMAG-K assists ROK authorities in establishing requirements and in the selection and acquisition of materiel. In particular, JUSMAG-K helps in the development

of a mature materiel program management capability in the ROK military establishment.

JUSMAG-K supports ROK defense studies and analyses, exporting to its counterparts in the ROK Ministry of Defense techniques developed in the United States over the years.

JUSMAG-K is also concerned with logistic support of the ROK forces, toward their sustainability should war come and toward reasonable interoperability with the forces of their U.S. coalition partner.^[7]

The Deployment of Land Forces

As 1984 ended, the First ROK Army (FROKA) was guarding the eastern half of the 200-mile boundary between North and South, including the 150-mile Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the Han River Estuary. In the Western Sector, formerly the province of I Corps (ROK/US) Group, there stood two front-line field armies -- TROKA (for Third ROK Army) and CFA (for Combined Field Army).

Most of the Republic of Korea Army's 31 active and reserve divisions are deployed under these three field armies. Joining these ROK forces, and stationed astride the approaches to Seoul in the Western Sector, is the United States Second Infantry Division.

These land forces are, in theory, under CFC's "Ground Component Command," but, because there is not, nor is there likely to be, a separate headquarters for the ground component, the practical effect is that the three subordinate

field armies, with their forces under them, report directly to CFC.

All of this looks straightforward on an organization chart or operations map of these frontline forces.

But consider some of the practical problems of making such a mix of ROK/US land formations function in war.

Consider the intelligence function, for example.

Intelligence information and the means for its collection (some, but not all, of which are highly technical electronic means) are "compartmented." Within all nations' intelligence systems, access to certain of this material is highly restricted. In U.S.-only operations channels there is something known as SCI, or Sensitive Compartmented Information, for which special clearances are required.

The term "all-source" is often used to describe intelligence which includes such SCI-type matter.

It is well known among the Korean military that certain information that the U.S. possesses about North Korea is -- because of the sensitivities of the technical and other means through which it was gained -- not generally shared with Koreans. The nature of intelligence organizations being what it is whatever their nationalities, it can also be presumed that not all ROK-gathered intelligence is generally shared with Americans.

In both peace and war, however, some of the most valuable information comes through these special channels. Ways

must be found to make the relevant information available to those field commanders and staffs who must have it, regardless of its source.*

The answer, for the front line formations in Korea, has been to establish within the headquarters of each field army a Combined (that is, ROK/US) All-Source Intelligence Center (CASIC). The U.S. contingent of the FROKA and TROKA CASICs as shown on the USFK/EUSA organization chart includes the U.S. Special Security officer (SSO) through whom SCI information as required and appropriate can be made available to the ROK/US CASIC personnel. For CFA, the CASIC is an integral part of what is already a ROK/US headquarters.

These CASICs perform collection management, analysis, production, and dissemination of "all-source" intelligence information from both US and Korean sources in support of their respective field army operations.

Consider operations. Ways must be found to insure closely coordinated air/land operations despite the use of two languages. An organizational device similar to the CASIC insures coordinated execution of ROK/US operations within FROKA and TROKA. This is known as the Combat Support Coordination Team (CSCT). A CSCT is made up of U.S. Army and Air Force personnel specially chosen and trained to work

*This has been an irritant, to say the least. But I am told that U.S. "all-source" information is shared with Koreans considerably more in the mid-1980s than it was in 1976-78 when I served in Korea.

closely with its respective headquarters staff to insure coordinated ROK/US operations, with emphasis on close coordination of tactical air support.

The USFK/EUSA organization chart shows one, CSCT-1, for FROKA and one, CSCT-3, for TROKA. Again, CFA needs no such CSCT; its staff is already ROK/US.

Or consider administration and logistics. For FROKA and TROKA, there is no particular organizational or command problem; their respective commanders each have "full command" -- which includes responsibility for, and command of the necessary means for, administration and logistics.

Not so for the Commander, CFA; he has only opcon of his forces. The ROK Army divisions and other units under his opcon are under TROKA's "command less opcon;" the TROKA commander and the TROKA staff plans and manages the provisions of administrative and logistics support to those units, in peace and war. (To be sure, this is to be done according to the priorities established by the Commander, CFA.)

To the practiced, experienced commander with his and his staff's hands well on the intricate means of command and control, all these and other complexities of command are simply part of his job. But they do complicate substantially the webs of command and control through which influence is exercised.

Air Forces

Air command and control presents a similar challenge.

The Combat Air Command of the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) provides the bulk of the tactical air capability for the defense of Korea. Although outnumbered by the North Korean air force, the ROKAF is a well-trained, highly capable, and increasingly modern force.

On Korea's soil, reinforcing the ROKAF and trained and equipped to fight alongside it, are based the few but formidable fighting squadrons of the United States Air Force's 314th Air Division.

Close by, in Iwakuni in southern Japan, are the nearest U.S. tactical air reinforcements; these are squadrons of the U.S. Marine Corps 1st Aircraft Wing.* On Okinawa is the rest of that wing, along with USAF squadrons available for Korea's reinforcement. Further south, in the Philippines, is additional USAF tactical air. And in Hawaii and on the U.S. mainland is even more.

Although CFC's Air Component Command, under which this air would operate in Korea's defense, contains day-to-day no USAF means, it is commanded by a USAF lieutenant general. In normal times that general is also CFC's Chief of Staff

*We won't attempt here to sort out the legalisms of opcon or not of the fighter squadrons of the USMC 1st Marine Aircraft Wing when and if they start operating off airbases on Korean soil. Suffice it to say that the terms of reference make the issues in the story of the Marine artillery battalion on Nightmare Range (Chapter V, pages 5-74 to 5-85) look simple.

(as well as Deputy CINCUNC and Deputy COMUSK). It is common knowledge that in times of tension, and in war, the Commander, Fifth Air Force, in Japan, comes to Korea to take charge of CFC's Air Component Command (which presumably would in due course begin to include some USAF means).

Interestingly enough, the USAF 314th Air Division is not in normal times part of General Livsey's command -- neither as CINC CFC, nor as COMUSK. The 314th's "solid line" (which means full command on an organization chart) goes to Fifth Air Force, thence to PACAF (Pacific Air Forces, the Air Force component of U.S. Pacific Command, PACOM) in Hawaii, and from there back to the USAF (Service) headquarters in Washington.

The Air Force component of PACOM's sub-unified command known as USFK is called Air Forces Korea, or AFK. In normal times the USAF forces actually assigned to AFK are minimal. It takes an order by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, which takes some time to obtain but which can be presumed to be forthcoming in a period of serious crisis, to give operational control of any substantial part of the 314th Air Division's fighting squadrons to General Livsey. (See General Stilwell's vignette, page 7-32.)

In contrast, ROKAF's Combat Air Command, commanded by a ROKAF lieutenant general, is -- like the ROK Army corps and

divisions deployed along the front lines -- opcon to General Livsey's CFC day-in and day-out.*

To coordinate the details of tactical air support with the field armies, there are three ASOCs (Air Support Operations Centers) one co-located with each field army headquarters. The CFA ASOC is U.S., with ROKAF liaison officers; the FROKA and TROKA ASOCs are ROKAF with USAF liaison officers.

In the tactical air control center (TACC) at Osan Air Base, ROKAF and USAF officers working together plot minute-by-minute the flight paths of tactical air on our side of the DMZ and, as picked up by one means or another, air activities across the DMZ as well. From this TACC go the split-second instructions to aircraft in the air and to the radars which track and control them when the unexpected happens. From this TACC would go the alerts to both ROKAF and USAF air on the ground.

As the senior commander in Korea, General Livsey is responsible that whatever is done in that TACC (whether it

*This limit on the day-to-day command authority of CINC, CFC, as CINC, CFC, over U.S. air forces has its parallel in the arrangements for the U.S. Second Infantry Division. That unit is not day-to-day under CINC, CFC's, command. However, General Livsey, as Commanding General, EUSA, commands the 2d Division in all respects, and as COMUSK has "operational command" (carefully defined as to its limits) over USFK's "Army component" -- namely, EUSA. His lines to the 2nd Division are both "dotted" and "solid;" thus the benefits of "multiple hatting." [8]

be responsive to a defecting North Korean MIG, or to a hijacked Chinese airliner, or whatever) is done right, and is done in accordance with the instructions issued to him.

Somehow, a way must be found -- notwithstanding the many limits on General Livsey's authority, only partially described in the above -- to be sure that what goes on in that TACC is done right and well.

A way has been found; security considerations prevent describing its details here. It lies in further multiple hatting of the commander of the USAF 314th Air Division.

Naval Forces

Scant as is General Livsey's day-to-day authority over the United States Air Force squadrons in Korea, it is substantial compared to what he wields over U.S. naval forces -- which is exactly zero.

No U.S. naval fighting forces report to General Livsey -- whichever of his several "hats" he wears.

The "naval component" of USFK, known as U.S. Naval Forces Korea or USNFK, consists only of a 200-member headquarters called U.S. Naval Forces Korea. The combatant forces of the "Navy Component Command" (NCC) of his Combined Forces Command are all ROK Navy, no U.S.

The NCC is commanded by a ROK vice admiral, and the Commander, USNFK, is double-hatted as his deputy. Six officers of the USNFK staff are also double-hatted to the

NCC, and a U.S. Navy officer is assigned full time to the NCC headquarters at Chinhae.

The U.S. Seventh Fleet, which from time to time patrols the waters around the Korean peninsula, is part of the Pacific Fleet which is in turn the naval component of the U.S. Pacific Command (headquarters of the latter two being in Hawaii). No subordination of that fleet or any of its parts to General Livsey is foreseen.^[9]

This makes good sense to the Navy and, after one thinks about it, it makes good sense to most others as well. U.S. sea-going forces have their own nature and needs.

Obviously there must be, in times of crisis and war, the closest coordination between the Seventh Fleet and the ROK Navy. And there must likewise be the closest coordination between the air/land operations of the Combined Forces Command defending the peninsula and the carrier-based aviation of the Seventh Fleet which will certainly assist in that defense. Ways are worked out for such coordination.

The Basis of General Livsey's Command Authority

All these organizational devices and systems must be made to work in harmony. But what is the basis of General Livsey's command authority as he goes about doing so?

Except for the some 24,000 U.S. Army troops of EUSA, over which he has full command, General Livsey's authority over his ROK/US command is entirely opcon.

Let's look first at the ROK forces.

For opcon as well as for other definitions, the military authorities of both the United States and Korea have tacitly agreed to use what is said in JCS Publication 1.

The ROK Army "Dictionary of Military Terms" is (like much else in the ROK Army) pretty much taken from U.S. Army and JCS definitions. Opcon is however a term the nuances of which are not easy to explain to Korean commanders. Their notions of command authority derive from an ancient culture in which the family head, and the king, had absolute authority.

Before the ROK/US Combined Forces Command (CFC) was created in November 1978, responsibility for defending the territory of the Republic of Korea resided in the CINC United Nations Command.

CINCUNC's staff was entirely U.S., but CINCUNC's forces were mostly Korean. By the terms of President Rhee's letter to General MacArthur of July 14, 1950 (see page 6-13), these ROK forces were opcon.

CINCUNC's opcon was continued in force by the Mutual Defense Treaty and by the Agreed Minutes and Amendments Thereto, signed 17 November 1954.^[10]

One provision of this 1954 document stated:

Retain Republic of Korea forces under the operational control of the United Nations Command while that command has responsibilities for the defense of the Republic of Korea, unless after consultation it is agreed that our mutual and individual interest would best be served by a change;....^[11] (underlining added).

Two decades later, this provision figured in the consultations which resulted in the establishment of the bi-national Combined Forces Command.

One significant difference between the UNC and the CFC command arrangements was that in the words of the former the U.S. CINC exercised opcon over all land, sea, and air forces of the Republic of Korea. The CFC agreement recognized what had long been the understanding, namely that ROK forces not directly concerned on a daily basis with the nation's forward defense would not be placed under CINC CFC's opcon. These would include, for example, training commands, garrison forces in the southern portion of the Republic, and other specialized forces.

These latter forces were retained under the control of the Service components of the ROK military structure. Some of them, such as ROKA Special Warfare Command, are to be passed to the opcon of CFC if specific events occur. Others, such as the Second ROK Army (SROKA), the field army responsible for the southern portion of the Republic, function under the control of the Headquarters, ROK Army, under all situations.^[12]

Thus from the original "command authority" (which President Rhee called "command" but which was essentially "opcon"), the arrangement progressed to (1) "operational control" of all forces in 1954 and then to (2) "operational control of specific elements" of the ROK military under the 1978 structure.

Now, to look at General Livsey's command authority over U.S. forces in Korea. This stems from two sources:

Over Eighth Army he has full command-less-opcon -- as an Army formation in his capacity as its Commanding General. This is his "U.S. Army hat." Added to the opcon that he has as COMUSK, General Livsey thus has full command.


Over the Air Force and Navy components of the unified command (subordinate to PACOM) known as U.S. Forces Korea, he has only operational control in his "COMUSK hat." We have discussed opcon at length in Chapters IV and V.

Day-to-day, however, these Air Force forces are very small, and the U.S. Navy combat forces do not exist.

The complexities of the U.S. command lines in Korea are to some extent shown in Figure 7-1, USFK/EUSA Command Relationships.

USFK/EUSA COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

31 December 1982



Source: Office of the Command Historian, USFK/EUSA, The Military Experience in Korea, 1981-1982, 1983. Reprinted by permission. [13]

Figure 7-1

USFK/EUSA Command Relationships

The reader may note from Figure 1 that it takes five different types of lines to illustrate General Livsey's authorities, or lack of them, with respect to U.S. forces in Korea.

That Eighth U.S. Army is only opcon to the Commander USFK presents no practical problem; General Livsey is double-hatted as EUSA commander and as such has "full command" of EUSA and the Second Infantry Division within it.

More troublesome is the fact that General Livsey's opcon of his U.S. Air Force component, U.S. Air Forces Korea, amounts only to "support and coordination" with respect to most of the two air wings involved.

In a crisis, these convolutions of U.S.-only and ROK/US command can present quite a problem.

The "tree-cutting" operation which followed the August 1976 ax murder of Americans in the DMZ (see pages 7-11 and 7-12) is a case in point.

General Stilwell has said that in executing his oplan for the tree-cutting operation, there was "one glitch."

He said that:

When you go to a higher alert status in Korea, the US Forces, which are not under UN command normally, chop to the UN command.* So at midnight

*There being at that time no Combined Forces Command, General Stilwell's command authority in 1976 was that of the CINC, United Nations Command.

before we kicked off this operation I sent a pro forma request: "These US forces have to come under my UN hat." CINCPAC agreed and sent the message on to the JCS. So I ran the operation as it was designed to be run, with me in command of both US and Korean forces. But later on we found out that the JCS had never acted on my message. Thus, in effect, I exercised improper authority; and Admiral Gayler (CINCPAC), who is prone to intervene from time to time, was in a very valid position to have given me orders that totally conflicted with what I had underway. However, he assumed, as I did, that the forces had been passed to the UN command. In retrospect, the JCS determined that they didn't have the authority to make that transfer, though we had been exercising it for twenty years. When push came to shove, the JCS said, "No, we've got to get that to the President." Well, I think we have now corrected that.[14]

A Review of the Limitations in Word

Over ROK forces, General Livsey has in his charters of command considerably more peacetime authority than does his fellow four-star American, General Bernard W. Rogers, who is Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), over his multinational forces.

In peacetime, SACEUR "commands" no assigned forces. Although he makes the most of his limited authority, SACEUR like NATO's other military commanders is responsible only for planning and preparing for wartime missions. Day-to-day, his "forces" are responsible to national authorities; they come together under the multinational chain of command only in training exercises. (One exception is that the air defense network of Allied Command Europe, with some limited air defense missiles and aircraft, is always operational under SACEUR and his NATO chain of command.)

Day-to-day in his role as CINC CFC, however, General Livsey has opcon of a half dozen corps and some two dozen divisions of the ROK Army and their supporting troops, over two ROK Marine divisions and major fleet elements of the ROK Navy, and over the ROKAF Combat Air Command.

This is in fact, over ROK forces, more opcon than General Livsey has over U.S. forces in Korea. The U.S. has chopped opcon of no U.S. forces to General Livsey as CINC CFC. Although he has full command of the U.S. Army forces in his Commander, Eighth U.S. Army hat (as well as opcon in his Commander USFK hat), as COMUSK he has no U.S. fleet elements under his opcon, nor is he likely to have, given the U.S. Navy attitudes to opcon. And as COMUSK, his opcon "air component command" known as U.S. Air Force Korea is small indeed; the 314th Air Division reports essentially lock, stock, and barrel, directly to the Commander, Fifth Air Force, in Japan.

Anomalies result when a so-called component commander, putatively owning some amount of military capability, actually has very little capability day-in-and-day-out.

Consider the case of Air Forces Korea, a component command of U.S. Forces Korea.

There is very little in this command day-to-day. The combat formations of the U.S. Air Force on Korean soil belong to the 314th Air Division. Although the commander of the 314th Air Division is double-hatted as Commander, Air Forces Korea, in the latter capacity he owns hardly anything.

Indeed, as Commander, Air Forces Korea, he does not -- nor does General Livsey, COMUSK -- own the command and control structure for tactical air operations which the U.S. Air Force has put into place in Korea for day-to-day control of air operations and for use if war should break out.

In his other "hat" as 314th Air Division commander, he does own that command and control structure. But day-to-day, this command and control structure, on the ground in Korea, belongs not to General Livsey but to the Commander, Fifth Air Force, in Japan, to whom the 314th Air Division reports.

The air command and control structure is encompassed in an organization known as the 5th Tactical Air Control Group. Combined with its ROK Air Force counterpart, the two make up the Korean Tactical Air Control System, or KTACS. The KTACS functions day-to-day and is always in readiness to make the transition to tension or war.

The USAF's 5th TAC Group has four squadrons:

- o One Tactical Air Control Center Squadron mans the hardened TACC at Osan. Day-to-day it plots and tracks the air situation, both south of the DMZ and north of it.

- o Another Direct Air Support Squadron provides the people for the Air Support Operations Center that is co-located with the command post of the ROK/US Combined Field Army at Camp Red Cloud. It also provides the tactical air control parties (TACPs) with their

Air Liaison Officers (ALOs) for the subordinate units of CFA, including the 2d Infantry Division.

- o A third Tactical Air Support Squadron provides the airborne forward air controllers and their aircraft (formerly OV-10s, being replaced by the more effective LA-37s) which will in time of war assist in controlling tactical air, both ROK and U.S.

- o And a fourth Tactical Air Control Squadron mans the radar stations known as Control and Reporting Centers and Control and Reporting Posts (CRCs and CRPs) on mountaintops distant from Osan, which track enemy air and from which the ROK/US tactical air effort is directed on its missions. [15]

In practice, airmen of these squadrons operate in command centers and tactical air control facilities alongside their ROKAF counterparts in the fully functioning KTACS. The anomaly is that the Korean participants in this system are opcon to General Livsey day-to-day; he has this opcon as CINC CFC. But the USAF participants are not. The Koreans know that, and wonder.

Note, however, that this absence of day-to-day opcon of U.S. forces on the ground in Korea does not have the same effect as it does in the case of the Marine field artillery and infantry battalions near the DMZ, discussed in Case 4 of Chapter V (pages 5-74 and following).

In this USAF case, the Korea command's oplan clearly provides for opcon of the 314th to COMUSK in time of increased tension and in war. This gives General Livsey

leverage to direct these USAF units to be ready, in their day-to-day operations, for war. In the case of the Marines, there is no such provision in any oplan, hence no real leverage.

The ROK military authorities look somewhat askance at a state of affairs in which the Americans give a CFC commander-in-chief (an American) less in the way of opcon than they do. Regardless of how it is explained, it looks as if the ROK/US CFC means less to the United States than it does to them.^[16]

They also see that, even in General Livsey's USFK capacity, the U.S. has committed few air and no naval forces, day-to-day.

To be sure, each of these can be explained somehow. But something seems to be amiss nonetheless.

The Forward Defense, Air/Land Battle, Concept

How does a commander like General Livsey compensate for his shadowy command authorities in planning for his basic mission?

An effective means for pulling together the defense of Korea and ensuring the readiness of the command and all its parts, and of those other forces not opcon in any way, in a common and consistent theme is to articulate an operational concept -- and then to bring all parties together to follow it.

This idea was undertaken in the mid-1970s. The concept was then known as the Forward Defense. It was developed, articulated, and started toward fruition by the then CINC-UNC, General Richard G. Stilwell, and his subordinate in the Western Sector, Lieutenant General James F. Hollingsworth.

The key to the Forward Defense Concept was that the defending ROK and U.S. forces would no longer visualize a replay of the Korean War, in which the city of Seoul was relinquished twice to the enemy and twice recaptured.

Rather, reinforced in the first days of the war not by U.S. divisions but primarily by U.S. tactical air and logistic support, the Forward Defense concept makes use of obstacles, the terrain, massive firepower, and coordinated offensive-defensive operations to stop the enemy well forward of Seoul.

This was an electrifying change in defensive thinking. It meant that Seoul -- the Republic of Korea's intellectual, cultural, political, and economic heartland, only 25 miles from the DMZ -- would not be evacuated, but defended, and that the enemy would be severely punished for crossing the DMZ. [17]

For the first few years, the Forward Defense was less a reality than a concept. The means for making it a reality -- ammunition, troops, the necessary operational procedures and techniques, and so on -- were yet to be acquired.

In due time these means were for the most part brought into place. And as they were, the operational concept was

extended. Here Korea's command has adapted to Korea's special situation and capabilities the "air/land battle" thinking lately being generated in the United States. Because of terrain and other operational considerations, the time and distance factors of the generic air/land battle concept are however significantly modified in Korea.

CFC's "air/land battle" thinking looks at the "close-in battle" and the "deep battle" as a single fabric. The ROK/US command's purpose is to fight a "succession of battles" -- at the line of contact, against the second echelon of attacking forces, and against the third and following echelons. The command intends to "see deep" -- with good intelligence collection and analysis -- and to "attack deep" -- with firepower and other means.^[18]

However, defending the Republic of Korea, in the face of North Korea's military capabilities and their likely use in war, and in the execution of the most demanding operational concept, and with the combined ROK/US forces and their command setup, requires for its success a command and control system, or web of systems -- not simply the physical means, but the trained people and the procedures -- of impressive character and content.

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13	7-31	Finley, <u>U.S. Military Experience in Korea, p. 245. (See reference 2.1.)</u>
14	7-33	Stilwell, "Policy and National Command," p. 145. (See reference 7.4.)
15	7-36	Briefing, J-3 Section, Headquarters U.S. Force Korea, October 1984.
16	7-37	As ROK Col. Taek-Hyung Rhee states on p. 44 of his paper "Combined Operations of ROK-US CFC: Overview from a Korean Perspective": "The basic problem seems to stem from a lack of balance in the

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<u>No.</u>	<u>Page</u>	<u>Citation</u>
16 (continued)		current make-up of CFC OPCON Units, a problem which may cause future discord between the US and South Korea. South Korea may continue to distrust the reliability of the US defense commitment, even though she feels satisfied with the symbolic political gesture of the US. The CINC CFC's ability to conduct effective combined operations may, however, depend on whether the US can assuage South Korean doubts about US intentions regarding the attachment of US combat units to the CFC." (See reference 7.5.)
17	7-38	Command Briefings, Headquarters I Corps (ROK/US) Group, 1976 and 1977.
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Chapter VIII

THE INTANGIBLES OF COMMAND AND CONTROL IN KOREA

The Issue: The Substance of Command

To summarize the written command authority, or lack of it, possessed by the senior commander in Korea:

- o His opcon of U.S. Air Force forces day-to-day in peacetime is very limited; he has no command or opcon whatever over U.S. Navy forces nearby; and over U.S. Marine Corps battalions on his territory near the DMZ he has not even the authority of an operation plan that assigns such units to his opcon in crisis or war. He has full command of only the U.S. Army forces on the scene.
- o Land, sea, and air forces of the Republic of Korea are, by decision of the President of that nation, placed under his opcon day-to-day in peacetime. But we have seen in our cases how tenuous is such opcon when national interests collide with the interests of the multinational commander whose authority, in the final analysis, has little substance behind it.
- o His practical, solid, control of resources and therefore of programs that require resources extends only to the resources of the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea.

General Livsey is not one to complain about the limitations described above. He is committed to do all that he can within those limitations. Nonetheless, fundamental questions arise:

- o First, can and does General Livsey really control plans and operations?*

That is, in the military operations in crisis and in war of this multiservice/multinational force in Korea, will there be in all parts of the force the necessary common operational approach, the necessary responsiveness, adherence to direction, conformance to the operational concept and, ultimately, obedience to the senior commander's orders?

- o Second, can and does General Livsey adequately influence the evolution of the command and control systems of his force?

That is, in the preparation and development in peacetime of the integrated systems of command and control of this multiservice/multinational force, are coherent system requirements developed and set forth by and for the senior commander in Korea, and is there practical conformance by user and provider to these requirements?

*Some readers might take exception to the use in this text of the commander's name, as inappropriate or as dating the treatment. I use the commander's name to highlight the fact that responsibility for mission accomplishment is not vested in title alone but in a person, and that it is a very personal matter.

In other words, as to the broadly defined command and control systems of his force, does General Livsey have the substance of command?

The substance of command depends on both written words and intangibles. We have seen what the written words say about General Livsey's authority. The rest of this chapter addresses the intangible aspects of the substance of his command.

The Advantages of Multiple-Hatting

One major intangible possessed by the senior commander in Korea is that his authority in each one of his many jurisdictions is enhanced by the authority he possesses in the others. Skilled commanders can make a great deal of this situation.

General Livsey is, at the same time:

- o CINC, Combined Forces Command, responsible to the two Presidents, ROK and U.S., for the defense of the territory of the Republic of Korea. In that capacity he has been given day-to-day operational control over the majority of the armed forces of the Republic of Korea. However, as CINC CFC, he controls no resources, neither people nor money.
- o CINC, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), in which capacity he is responsible for maintaining the 1953 Military Armistice Agreement, reporting through the JCS to the U.S. President. He has no resource control as CINCUNC, either.

- o Commander, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). As commander of this U.S.-only "sub-unified command," under Pacific Command, General Livsey is a UNAAF-defined "opcon" commander. Here he has formal input to resource allocation judgments at CINCPAC and in the JCS/OSD processes, but no practical fund control.

- o Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA). EUSA is the "U.S. Army component" of the USFK. As EUSA commander General Livsey has "full command" -- to include personnel management authority over U.S. Army military people and authority for the allocation of Army resources (he manages the EUSA personnel authorization slots and the EUSA budget, for example). USFK's housekeeping operations are supported through the Department of the Army budget as "line items" in EUSA's budget; General Livsey can therefore press his case for money for USFK purposes, inside the Army system.

- o Commander, Ground Component Command, of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command. There is no separate staff for CFC's Ground Component Command; the subordinate land force field armies report directly to CFC. The major advantage of his wearing this "hat" is that General Livsey and his staff do not have to contend with another headquarters when considering what to do with CFC's land formations in plans and operations.

Other Positive Intangibles

There are other intangibles that give strength and leverage to the position of the senior commander in Korea:

- o His power as a spokesman for resources and policy support for the ROK armed forces;
- o The power, through his influence in JUSMAG-K, to affect what the ROK Armed Forces receive in the way of technical and material help;
- o The support of an administration that makes clear that the U.S. is a trusted friend and ally;
- o The Koreans trust in him, both as a person and as the responsible commander, deriving from their perception that he has the best interests of their country at heart;
- o The fact that modern military operations can be effective only with integration of effort;
- o The intellectual force of a well-thought-out and well-articulated operational concept; (See the section on the Air/Land Battle Concept, beginning page 7-37.)
- o The need for the Koreans to have his good will, and the degree to which they value it;
- o Finally, his own qualities of leadership.

Potentially Negative Intangibles

Countering these, there are intangibles that if active and not taken into account, may tend to diminish the strength of the senior commander in Korea:

- o ROK nationalism and national pride, which can easily cause resentment if he "throws his weight around" or fails to be tactful;
- o The natural drive of the ROK for equal status in the ROK/US councils of defense affairs;
- o Transient political shifts, such as turbulence in or a change of ROK executive power, which perturb the entire chain of command;
- o The need to allow the ROK armed forces to determine their own future in any event;
- o Discord at his level, whether it be intra-U.S. (such as with the Embassy), or ROK-US;
- o A lack of harmony with CINCPAC, who is the U.S. "Czar" in the Pacific;
- o The fact that, neither as CINC CFC nor as COMUSK, does he have much money -- or much influence on how those who are under his opcon, or those who provide him with means, spend their money;
- o The degree to which he must compromise in order to "keep peace in the family," whether it be the U.S., or the ROK/US, family;
- o And, most difficult of all, the strength of the Service channels, with their money and influence, in his own sphere, in the PACOM components, and in Washington.

Responsibility for the Mission

General Livsey has one major intangible going for him: the powerful force carried by the concept of his personal command responsibility for the mission.

Leaving Korea aside for the moment, the fundamental task of each senior commander is simply this: to use whatever authority and resources are made available to him in the most effective way possible toward the accomplishment of his assigned mission.

The mission responsibility of a field commander can be looked at as two kinds of responsibility.

The first can be called "operational responsibility" -- the responsibility to accomplish his operational mission. For a field commander facing a likely enemy in Central Europe or Korea, this might mean "defend my sector, should war come."

The second can be called "readiness responsibility" -- the responsibility to accomplish his readiness mission, namely to achieve the highest level of force readiness for his command within the resources provided.

The commander's "readiness responsibility," although perhaps less urgently motivated in peacetime than is his operational mission in battle, is nonetheless equally real.

After Pearl Harbor, the Congressional Joint Committee which investigated that disaster arrived at 25 principles which it offered to the Army and Navy for their serious

consideration "in the hope that something constructive might be accomplished that would aid our national defense and preclude a repetition of the failure of December 7, 1941."^[1]

One of these was about command responsibility. It said:

No consideration should be permitted as an excuse for failure to perform a fundamental task....^[2]

The 1949 revision of the U.S. Army's FM 100-5, Operations, transmitted the Congressional Pearl Harbor Committee findings to the Army. It said:

...[The commander's] fundamental responsibility is to carry out his mission. No excuse or explanation can justify or even temper his failure to discharge that responsibility.^[3]

The Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee addressed both the "mission accomplishment" and the "readiness for mission accomplishment" responsibilities of the commanders involved. There was no way to separate what went on in Hawaii on the day of December 7, 1941, when the Japanese achieved devastating surprise, from what the authorities there and in Washington had done or failed to do in the days, weeks, and even months and years before that date.

Accountability

When the President of the United States sends a four-star general or admiral out to take command, whether of U.S. forces only or of U.S. forces combined with those of other

nations, in some distant part of the globe, the President says to that commander, in effect:

"I am holding you responsible for the performance of your mission."

But he is saying more than that. He is saying:

"And I am holding you accountable to me and to the people of the United States if you fail."

Those may not be the President's exact words. Indeed, the President may not even think about the subject in that way. But nonetheless, that's the way it is in fact, whether so explicitly stated or not. Witness Pearl Harbor, and the Beirut Marine tragedy.

In war, mission failure and mission success become readily apparent. Not so, in high command position, in peacetime. Too often, it takes a Pearl Harbor or other disaster in which the command fails for the inadequacies of a high commander's peacetime performance to be revealed.

As in the Pearl Harbor case, General Livsey is not only responsible for readiness for any eventuality but is personally accountable for failure. His ability to remind both those whom he directs and those on whom he depends for resources of this fundamental fact, and to let them know that he does not intend to fail, is another major intangible he has going for him.

Making the Most of Mission Responsibility and Accountability

The fundamental responsibility and accountability of the senior commander in Korea is in the two first capacities

of those listed on pages 8-3 and 8-4 -- namely as CINC CFC and CINCUNC. To make the most of his intangibles of power he must make the most of this fact.

As CINCUNC, his is the responsibility to maintain the conditions of the 1953 Armistice Agreement. As CINC CFC, his is the responsibility to defend Korea. In the two capacities together, his is the responsibility to preserve peace and maintain stability on the Korean peninsula -- and the responsibility toward that end to maintain the highest possible state of readiness of the ROK/US command for any eventuality, from the most minor clash along the DMZ to a full-scale North Korean invasion.

These are overriding responsibilities. In one, as CINC CFC, he is responsible to the Presidents of the two nations of the coalition, the United States and the Republic of Korea.

In the other, as CINCUNC, he is responsible to the President of the United States, in the latter's capacity as executive agent for the United Nations.

Notwithstanding that much of his time, and a large part of his negotiations as to what he can and cannot do, are concerned with the authorities he carries as COMUSK and CG, EUSA, the responsibilities he has under these two titles are small indeed compared to what he bears as CINCUNC and CINC CFC.

Authority and Capacity

Webster's definition of authority is "legal or rightful power; a right to command or to act." JCS Pub 1, the Joint Dictionary, has no definition of "authority."

The Joint Dictionary does say this, however:

responsibility -- 1. The obligation to carry forward an assigned task to a successful conclusion. With responsibility goes authority to direct and take the necessary action to insure success.
(underlining added)[4]

U.S. Army Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy and Procedure, (in its paragraph 2-1, Chain of Command) says that "It is Army policy that each individual in the chain of command is delegated sufficient authority to accomplish assigned tasks and responsibilities." [5]

The last of the principles offered to the U.S. military by the Congressional Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack was the following:

XXV. In a well-balanced organization there is close correlation of responsibility and authority. [6]

The U.S. Army field manual that transmitted these principles to the Army had this to say about Principle XXV:

...to vest a commander with responsibility and no corresponding authority is eminently unfair. [7]

Authority, however, is not enough of itself. Authority conveys only the right to act in a certain way, or to demand that others act in a certain way and to expect compliance.

To guarantee that events will take place as wished, capacity is necessary.

For example, if, in battle, one has authority to direct the commitment of force in a certain way but does not have the communications capacity to convey the necessary order, the authority alone is useless.

Or if, in preparation for war, one has an implied or even "granted" authority to insist that certain command and control measures be taken but not the technical or institutional capacity to define and coordinate these measures, such authority, whatever it is, cannot be put to work.

The Typical Imbalance

We have seen throughout this work that the senior multiservice/multinational commander's granted authority (especially his readiness authority) and his capacity (especially his command and control capacity) simply do not match the great responsibility and accountability for mission accomplishment and mission readiness which he bears.

This is because nations, and Services, seek always to retain authorities -- and, as providers, they tend to limit capacities. The result is that what is written into the charters of senior multiservice/multinational commanders consists in very large part of limitations on their authority.

The drafters of command charters, especially in peacetime when the consequences of failure do not come vividly to mind, seem to be motivated very substantially toward

retaining authorities for those who are the providers of the forces, and toward denying authorities for the commander who must employ the forces.

Stemming in part from this limited authority there exist also deficiencies in capacity -- not so much in human talents as in the practical means of command and control required to bring about what is desired, in peace or should there be war.

The Commander's Use of Moral Authority

However, although the "legal" or "charter as written" authority of a senior multiservice/multinational commander is usually scant indeed, there rests with that commander by virtue of his command position an immense moral authority waiting to be put to use.

This moral authority derives from the commander's undeniable personal responsibility for the mission, and from his ability to remind all who report to him of the consequences of failure -- and to point out his, and their, accountability to themselves and to history should the audit of war reveal that they have failed, whatever the reason, to meet their responsibilities.

This moral authority is not self-activating. It can reach its full effect only if the senior commander is able to present vividly to his subordinates, and to those outsiders who would place limits on him, the practical consequences of failure if he is not granted what he seeks, including what he must have in the way of command and control systems.

With it, he can imbue the command with a lively appreciation of his, and their, accountability should the mission fail -- not toward raising their anxieties but rather toward motivating their energetic and intelligent preparations.

With it, he can gain the maximum in motivation from those who provide him with resources.


The commander who fails to take full advantage of this moral authority is, to that degree, remiss in meeting his personal responsibility and accountability.

This moral authority rests with the four-star American general in command in Korea. Intangible though it may be, it is his strongest asset, if well used.

Is that moral authority, combined with all the other positive intangibles, enough? Sadly, and as this study shows in Chapters IX, X, and XI following, it is not.

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Chapter IX

HOW WELL TIED TOGETHER?

Adequacy of the Korea Command C² System

If one were to ask the American four-star generals who have commanded in Korea in the last decade -- from Stilwell and Vessey, through Wickham and until mid-1984 Sennewald -- which one of the fields of their activity most tested both their authority -- tangible and intangible -- and their capacity to get things done, each would likely say that bringing about real improvement in their systems of command and control has been among the most frustrating.

It is a tribute to the perseverance of these commanders that, in spite of the obstacles, they have brought about substantial progress during the past 10 years.

No doubt the latest commander, General Livsey, soon after his assumption of command on June 1, 1984, began to encounter his own difficulties in making things happen in this field.

We move now to an assessment. We will describe the results of these commanders' efforts and the present adequacy of the Korea command's command and control system, broadly defined.

Through this assessment we will shed light on the basic issue: Does this particular field commander, in Korea, have

the authority and the capacity to match his responsibilities for command and control?

Our assessment will make up this and the next three chapters. Chapter headings will conform to the following sentences from the second paragraph of the general assessment set forth in Adequacy and reproduced on pages 1-12 and 1-13 of Chapter I. That assessment said that theater forces' command and control systems:

- (1) "...are not well tied together, top to bottom...."

and that they

"...represent the largely unplanned splicing together of ill-fitting components which have been delivered to his forces by relatively independent parties far away who have coordinated adequately neither with him and his staff, nor with each other...."

(Covered in this chapter, Chapter IX)

- (2) "...are not being exercised adequately under the expected conditions of war." (Chapter X)
- (3) "...will probably not survive the attack against them which is sure to come in war...." (This subject will not be treated; any such specific assessment cannot be made in the open literature.)

and

- (4) "...neither exploit the present capabilities of technology nor does the system for their

development adequately provide that future systems will."[1] (Covered in Chapter XI.)

The Standard of Excellence

Before proceeding with our assessment, let us establish the standard against which we are measuring the Korea command's command and control system.

We call this standard "an attainable standard of very high excellence."

We say that such a standard is what the statesmen and the people of the United States and Korea have a right to expect from the two countries' combined military forces on the peninsula and from the people who command and support those forces.

The logic supporting such a standard of excellence goes like this:

Command and control systems are the means through which the will and policy guidance of the highest United States and Republic of Korea national authorities are transformed into responsive and effective action by the coalition military forces which those two countries have created.

These national authorities have a right to expect that the forces will possess command and control systems which permit them to act responsively and well whatever the challenge.

In view of the benefits provided to the Presidents of the two nations and to their national political authorities by command and control systems of the highest quality in peace, crisis, and war; in view of the operational advantages in all levels of conflict conveyed by command and control systems superior to those of the enemy; and in view of the grave consequences if command and control systems should fail to function properly, it is in the highest interest of the political authorities of both nations, and it should be a policy objective of the greatest urgency and importance, that the command and control systems of theater forces be of the highest quality that technology, military foresight, and human ingenuity can provide.

That is our "standard of excellence."

Such a high standard appears entirely attainable by the Korean command, given reasonable resources and a high order of skill in their application.

The Communications Parts of the System

Let's deal first with the charge that theater forces' command and control systems "...are not well tied together, top to bottom...."

And, while recognizing that a command and control system consists not only of communications -- but of sensors, and information processing, and people and their training, their organization, and their procedures -- let's concentrate first on just one of the essentials: communications.

The degree to which the communications parts of the Korea command's command and control system are "not well tied together" reflects the circumstances through which they came into being.

Like theater forces commands elsewhere, the Korea command has suffered from the fact that -- although its command and control system must be looked at, should be built, and must function in crisis and in war as an integrated web of systems -- in practice the communications parts of the system were for the most part independently designed and built, and they were not designed to fit.

Korea's top-level communications systems include, for example:

- o The "DCS (Defense Communications System) Backbone." This is a chain of microwave towers running from the port of Pusan northwest to Seoul and beyond. It is built and managed for the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) by the U.S. Army Communications Command (USACC).
- o The ROK Army system. This is a similar chain, running somewhat to the west of the DCS Backbone.
- o The ROK Air Force system. A like system with different paths.
- o The Korea pipeline system. This largely underground system follows the fuel pipeline running from Pohang, near Pusan, to near Seoul.

- o The Ministry of Communications (MOC) system, which provides civil and governmental communications throughout Korea.

When these systems were installed no meaningful consideration was given to their interconnection. Each, alone, can be vulnerable to crippling attack. However, linked with interconnects and suitable switching they can make up a highly survivable, multiple-path, top-level system.

Actions by the Korea Command on Communications

Actions by the Korea command in recent years to tie these and other communications systems together have included:

- o TPICK. The Telecommunications Plan for Improvement of Communications in Korea (TPICK) was first articulated in 1978 by a task force including representatives from USFK, USACC, PACAF, CINCPAC and other agencies. It was the first plan to address the integration of all types of existing and new communications in Korea. TPICK addressed near-, mid-, and long-term solutions to communications deficiencies. TPICK's objective has been to pull together in a single framework all the many ROK and U.S. communications initiatives toward a more survivable, higher quality, responsive, and interoperable system capable of supporting the defense of the peninsula. TPICK, updated annually, has been a means for identifying and obtaining the necessary resources for implementation of its initiatives, including such major projects as the Korea Telephone Upgrade (which

provides for Electronic Switching Systems at 24 sites throughout Korea) and the Korea Fiber Optics Cable System (provides survivable, high quality, high capacity DCS connectivity from Camp Red Cloud to Pusan).

As of early 1985, TPICK no longer drives the integration of communications in Korea. Planning for communications integration is now accomplished through the USKF Command and Control Systems Master Plan in a standard format for inclusion in the USPACOM C² Master Plan, and through a CFC C² Master Plan under development (see page 9-20).^[2]

- o STEP-K (Satellite Telecommunications Employment Plan -- Korea) does much the same as TPICK toward integrating satellite communications terminals in Korea.^[3]
- o In 1981, for the annual ROK-US field exercise known as Team Spirit, the command activated a TCCOC (Tango Combined Communications Operations Center). ("Tango" is the name of CFC's wartime underground command post south of Seoul.) The TCCOC pulls together the many ROK and U.S. communications systems and links that serve the command's operations, and sees to it that the full web functions, whatever comes.^[4]
- o The ROK Interconnect Concept Plan of January 1983 describes the steps being taken under TPICK to provide a more survivable, interconnecting grid

communications system which will interconnect the DCS, ROK Army, ROKAF, and MOC systems. [5]

Execution of this plan has permitted more alternate routing; use of the host nation military and commercial systems has increased flexibility and survivability.

The Korean Telecommunications Authority

A major development has been extension of the authority of the ROK government of the Korean Telecommunications Authority (KTA). Effective in October 1983, KTA began to own and operate all civilian and military long lines communications systems in the Republic.

The KTA has taken over the ROK Army's and ROK Air Force's backbone microwave systems, and is combining these not only with the nationwide Ministry of Communications' system which has been serving Korea's civil needs but also with systems run by the Korean National Police, the Korean National Railroads, the Korean Highway Authority, the Korean Electric Authority, and others.

The KTA has first-rate top management and technical direction and looks forward to an advanced digital switching system throughout the country in a few years. In due time, the KTA should produce an all-purpose national system which not only serves well the nation's civil needs but which will provide a responsive, high-capacity, integrated, and highly survivable long-lines military network in war.

The Combined Forces Command is following this development with great interest. By virtue of its own integrated approach to command and control system evolution, CFC is in a position to work closely with the new KTA toward a high quality military telecommunications capability on the peninsula. [6]

The Tyranny of the Protocol

But command and control involves more than communications links. It involves "information exchange" in the broadest meaning of that term.

The key to command and control is the speed, precision, and teamwork with which battle information (of our own forces as well as our knowledge of the enemy) is gathered, maintained up-to-the minute, processed, analyzed, and distributed to those in the webs of echelons who need it.

It is a truism, instinctively known to the skilled commander, that the most effective command is a mission-oriented command, concerned only with how best to get on with the job, and within which the flow of information is free, open, natural, and uninhibited by any constraint other than how to keep information from the enemy.

This leads us to consider the fundamental issue of the interoperability of especially digital traffic among and within the various ROK, U.S., and ROK/US field commands.

In today's world of digital information transfer, knowledge moves from place to place in a stream of "bits." The "protocol" lines up these bits so they can be read. And

the ingenious microprocessors on small chips, which are imbedded in the means of communications that move digital information and in the computers that will increasingly "process" it at all headquarters levels, do not accept information without the correct "protocol."

It is strange to introduce the language of diplomacy and polite society into the realm of war, but it is nonetheless true that if you don't have the right protocol you don't get the information.

The protocol is an agreed arrangement of the bits in the bit stream. It might say, "Our basic data element is so many bits long." And it could say that "the first six bits will tell you to 'listen and take notes;' the next five bits will tell you who is sending the message; then there will be a space of two bits after which you will see to whom the message is being sent."

The protocol might then say, "Our code will translate various pieces of the bit stream into letters and numbers to form a message which you can read and take to your commander. Or it will form a piece of 'data' to be placed into your own computer."

The protocol is detailed, binding, and implacable. If it's not right, you simply do not pass information digitally. (You can still pass information by voice telephone, or voice radio, but that is "analog" information. It lacks the speed, precision, and high data rate available with digital information flow.)

Interestingly, even in the U.S. Services alone, when the different communities who purport to represent the artillerymen who fight the air/land battle, and the airmen, and the logisticians, and the intelligence experts, and the air defenders, and the amphibious fighters, and the commanders and operations officers, and all the rest, began to develop the protocols for sharing information within their various spheres, each community developed a different protocol. Hard to believe but, because commonality and interoperability costs more than specificity, it's true.

And in the Korea command as elsewhere, the overriding problem has been to gain control of the protocols for information exchange -- U.S., ROK, and ROK/US.

A Case Study: The Korean Air Intelligence System (KAIS)

As their command and control systems take shape one way or another, operational multiservice/multinational commands encounter the clash of two fundamentally opposed ideas.

- o One, the tyranny of the protocol, just described, which calls for the parts of the "C² system web" to harmonize in detail, and
- o Two, the "go it alone" attitude so natural to the Service and national providers of the various parts of the C² system web.

What follows is an example of how the real needs of the Korea command were for the most part not taken into account as a single system was designed, built, and installed within the Korea command in recent years.

That system is the Korean Air Intelligence System, part of the United States Air Force's CONSTANT WATCH.*

CONSTANT WATCH is the nickname for a four-phase command and control system project undertaken and jointly funded by the U.S. and ROK Air Forces, costing many tens of millions of dollars in USAF funds alone. The objective of the program has been to provide a major upgrade and consolidation of the Korean tactical air command and control capabilities -- including a large intelligence-managing capability, known as the Korean Air Intelligence System (KAIS).^[7]

*Headquarters, PACAF, and others may well take exception to this description of how KAIS was built. I have followed the KAIS development since 1978. From the beginning my own conviction was that such a high-cost, potentially multipurpose theater intelligence system should by all means provide a terminal or other direct information outlet to the command posts at I Corps (ROK/US) Group and other major front-line formations. Then came my dismay that as designed and as first built KAIS would have terminals neither at those commands nor at CINC CFC's command post. I am satisfied that in its discussion of policy this account is correct. I know that from the beginnings of KAIS there was within the Air Staff's AF/IN (Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence) concern and disagreement about its air-forces-only orientation. Technical and funding considerations may well have had more influence than I give them in this account. Although there may be other factors, not mentioned, leading to the "blue-suit-only" PACAF view, one factor seems to have been the Carter administration's announced intent to withdraw U.S. ground forces from Korea by 1983 and to rely on U.S. tactical air and logistic support only for deterrence and defense in Korea (see pages 6-5 to 6-7). A final comment: Things have improved; in the mid-1980s no one, I believe, could get away with such a single-Service system over the Korean theater commander's objection.

Phase One of CONSTANT WATCH, which included a large part of the KAIS, was at end-1984 essentially completed.

By end-1984 the first phase of KAIS was in operation inside the concrete, partly underground Tactical Air Control Center at Osan Air Base, known as the HTACC (the "H" is for "hardened").

KAIS is an automated system for intelligence processing and information exchange. It takes in intelligence and information from many sources, some of them highly classified high-technology sources, and maintains a targetting data base for the use of Korea's Air Component Command in time of war.

But until recently the KAIS has been a "blue suit only" operation. From the start, it was built to serve only the air side of the air/land battle.

It is characteristic of air intelligence to look primarily at "targets." This follows from the nature of the tactical airman's way of influencing the battle, namely striking at targets with air-delivered weapons.

However, land commanders and air/land commanders see intelligence as more than simply targeting information. They see it also as a way to judge the enemy's capabilities as they lie out there on the battlefield, and his intentions -- and from this a way to defeat him using all means, not simply air.

The same information, collected in the same way as for air intelligence but put through a different process of

analysis, is extraordinarily valuable to the air/land, or land, commander for his purposes.

The tragedy, for tragedy it is, is that not much more in the way of computer algorithms, or communications links, or hardware, was needed for the fruits of the KAIS to have been made available also to other-than-air commanders in the Korea command.

The result is that what the air/land, and land commanders of the Combined Forces Command (the CFC commander himself, and the commanders of TROKA, FROKA, and CFA) have is a good deal less than what they could have had, at reasonably little additional expense.

Only late in its building process was KAIS extended with a terminal or two in the CFC war headquarters.

If KAIS had been done the right way from the beginning, the web of systems serving the Korea command would have been (1) more survivable, because of the hardening of its intelligence processing, (2) more linked through its interconnections, (3) characterized by more teamwork and speed in its information exchange, and (4) an example of how to speed the introduction of high technology.

That PACOM's Air Force component command, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), was building KAIS as a single-Service system was well known not only at PACOM headquarters but to CINCPAC, the PACOM commander-in-chief, himself.

CINCPAC discussed the matter with General Wickham, then CINC CFC, and advised General Wickham to get control of KAIS so that the system would serve the full command's purposes, not simply those of its tactical air. General Wickham understood the matter's import, and did what he could.

He sent a message, COMUSK to CINC PACAF, asking that KAIS be reoriented to meet his needs. CINC PACAF replied that it was too late; the project was too far along.

PACAF had the bit in its teeth. The KAIS program was using Air Force money. PACAF was the program manager. Neither CINC CFC, nor CINCPAC, nor their staffs were able to control the way that money was being spent.

The result: lost time, misspent money, and lost operational capability in Korea.^[8]

The 1979 OJCS/OSD Visit to Korea

It was toward helping the commander in Korea that, in September 1979, the newly established Command and Control Systems Directorate of the JCS and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C³I) got together on a trip to be jointly undertaken by their representatives to the Korea Command.

This trip was in support of Defense Department-approved recommendations of the 1978 Defense Science Board Task Force on Command and Control Systems Acquisition.

The purpose of the trip was to look into the idea, advanced by the DSB Task Force, that there should be "more support to, and involvement of, using commands" in C² systems acquisition. The team chief was Rear Admiral Milton Schultz of the JCS's new C³S Directorate.^[9]

In its visit to Korea, the team informed General John A. Wickham (then the CINCUNC/CINC CFC/COMUSK/CG EUSA) staff of pending action by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to provide funds and spaces for C² activities of unified and specified commands, and of the ongoing survey of commands to obtain nominations for projects to be funded (in a program to be known as the "CINC initiatives") in fiscal years 1980 and 1981.*

General Wickham showed a keen interest in this subject. In a September 28, 1979, message to CINCPAC, copies to the JCS and OSD, he cited the OJCS/OSD team visit and set forth his most urgent needs for CINC initiative funds to support high payoff projects in the amount of \$1.7 million.

General Wickham also said that it would be beneficial if a team from the U.S. could undertake an in-depth analysis of C² systems in Korea. He strongly supported establishing, as soon as possible, a ROK/US C³ requirements analysis group in Korea, and asked for U.S. technical personnel for such a group, which would be responsive to the CINC, ROK/US Combined Forces Command.^[10]

*KISS (see page 9-22) originated with CINC Initiative funds of FY 1981.

CINCPAC, on October 6, noted in a message to the JCS that \$250,000 of CINC initiatives money had been tentatively identified for Korea, and agreed with General Wickham that "a greater technical capability is required" (it modified this to "within PACOM").^[11]

In his report to the JCS on the OJCS/OSD team visit, Lieutenant General Hillman Dickinson, Director for C³S Systems, noted, among other matters, the need for a ROK/US systems analysis/systems engineering capability to support CFC.^[12]

For some four years since this OJCS/OSD team visit, little was done to provide the command with this systems analysis/systems engineering capability to support CFC.

If the requirements analysis capability requested in 1979 by General Wickham had been quickly provided, he might have been able to exercise the technical influence which, given the necessary command influence and support, would have resulted in the KAIS' being an all-command, rather than an air-only system.

But it was not provided to him on the scene -- either then or for more than four years after.

An Imbalance of Power

Although so flagrant an example may not be possible in the mid-1980s, the KAIS case is a graphic illustration of the severe imbalance of power between the multiservice commander on one hand and the Service establishment/component command structure on the other. It vividly illustrates the

ill effect of the "wall of the component" in the processes of providing command and control systems to multiservice field commands.

How does it happen that the Washington-level Services and their components are so powerful when it comes to these resources of money and people, and the multiservice, often multinational field commanders are so weak in comparison?

Why is it that even the four-star major operational commanders of the theater forces deployed against an enemy in Korea is less influential in terms of how much money is to be spent and for what than is a Service establishment? Why was General Wickham for so long unable to get personnel resources for command and control systems requirements determination?

One flip answer is: "The Golden Rule" -- which says "He who has the gold gets the rule." The Services have the money. So they rule.

But it's more than that.

The Services' power stems from the fundamental interest of each Service in preserving undiminished its Service responsibility for the "preparation of forces," and therefore in limiting the role of the field commanders in that realm, even in the matter of command and control systems.

This is not a selfish interest. It is quite natural, given the Services' mission, structure, and tradition.

The Services and departments are the permanent and real institutions of the military establishment. A field command, no matter how large or long-standing, is transient, artificial, and weak, in comparison.

Getting a Handle on C³I

By late 1980, General Robert W. Sennewald, then CINC CFC/COMUSK, had decided he needed a better mechanism to control the evolution of command and control systems in Korea than was available to him in the TPICK (see page 9-6).

Further -- and this was a significant choice -- he wanted that mechanism to be in the hands of his senior operations staff officer, and not to be an extension of the sphere of his communications-electronics staff chief.*

Then General Sennewald set up his CFC/USFK C3/J3 (assistant chief of staff for operations, dual-hatted in both headquarters) as chief of a "C³I Steering Committee" responsible for pulling together the C³I effort for the entire Korea command. The C3/J3 in turn named a member of his staff as chief of a "C³I Working Group," responsible to the Steering Committee.

At the same time, the C3/J3 created, and then began to augment, a small C³I section in his staff. This C³I section

*Not all field commanders saw the issue as did General Sennewald. PACOM's solution was to make the communications-electronics staff chief into a Director of Command, Control, and Communications Systems. The U.S. Readiness Command did likewise using the title: Director, Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems, or C4S.

began to produce a C³I Master Plan for USFK, the U.S. side of the command. This C³I Master Plan in turn became a segment of the C³I Master Plan for the Pacific Command, which then went into the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a contribution to the JCS C³I Master Plan.

By late 1984 the C³I staff had grown in numbers and available talent, and a ROK Army major had joined it to help with the creation of a CFC C³I master plan which was to reach out to all parties with a part to play -- ROK and U.S., all Services, and ROK civilian as well as military. [13]

Thus in 1985 the Korea command had both the means and the concept to begin to get a pretty good handle on its C³I situation.

SORAK, SIAMS, KISS, AND TACCIMS

We can look at how the Korea command's control of the evolution of its command and control systems has grown by taking up one at a time the above array of acronyms.

SORAK (named after a mountain on Korea's east coast) was the nickname of a 1982 idea offered by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to provide to the Korea command an all-encompassing system of state-of-the-art and advanced sensors, downlinks, and information processors which would satisfy at one fell swoop the high-technology intelligence needs of the command. [14]

Even before the command had voted on the matter, SORAK became a line item in the DARPA budget. But the command

said, in effect, "too complex, too risky, too costly, and not interested." So SORAK perished.

SIAMS (for Sensor Information Automation Management System) was a local generic term for the Korea command's need to provide timely processed intelligence to field echelons. The Army's ERADCOM (Electronics Research and Development Command) proposed to meet the SIAMS need with a derivative of the intelligence analysis and fusion system known as BETA (Battlefield Exploitation and Target Acquisition) managed by a joint Army-Air Force program office.

But this BETA-like SIAMS would be a "hub and spoke" system, with at its "hub" a central processor, and at the ends of each "spoke" (in field commands) a terminal. One deficiency which some perceived in this solution was that it did not provide for independent (yet linked) intelligence-processing power at each of the many hierarchical and distributed nodes (field armies, corps, divisions, etc.), each of which has its own intelligence situation and analysis requirements.^[15]

In due time, the ERADCOM proposal, never funded, fell by the wayside.

One reason that SORAK and SIAMS-BETA never got off the ground was that the Korea command intelligence staff finally began to get its own handle on the problem.

Toward an Integrated Intelligence System in Korea

The command saw its most troublesome problem to be how to manage the evolution of an automated, integrated, and

distributed intelligence information processing system that serves the full command and that, as it evolves, takes full advantage of available and emerging technology.

The basic problem is that, in Korea as elsewhere, the ability of sensors to collect information is outstripping the ability of the users of the information to sort it out and use it. The many high technology sensors which are becoming available to the Korea command, and whose output grows each year, are now beginning to generate a volume of data that the intelligence centers receiving it cannot handle.

Automation was the obvious answer. KAIS (the Korean Air Intelligence System, build as part of the ROKAF/USAF CONSTANT WATCH project) was to be automated, but it was only a partial, air-forces-only, solution to the automation problem.

The command then moved to correct its top-level automation deficiency with an Army-funded, CINCPAC-sponsored, MITRE-supported, project called KISS (Korean Intelligence Support System). KISS will be a highly survivable, computerized, continuously updated ROK/US data base. It will be accessible by all parts of the ROK/US command.

KISS is an adequately funded, multimillion dollar evolutionary acquisition concept, to be built in four phases.

Phase I, which is being accomplished in-house using MITRE technical people in Korea and Hawaii, will see the

assembly and installation of existing DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) and other software, such as the IDHS (for Intelligence Data Handling System), on a DIA-procured 21 Victor computer. Phases II, III, and IV (each a one-year project) will also be incremental, or evolutionary, in design and installation.

KISS support to the intelligence system will include automated message handling, analyst-to-analyst communications, analyst files, local databases, collection management, indications and warning, exercise support, and English-Hangul conversion.

The KISS managers in Korea and their technical people in Hawaii are now making KISS and KAIS interoperable, with working interfaces. This will not be easy, inasmuch as KAIS was built non-standard and as a stand-alone system.^[16]

However, the Korea command's plans for intelligence integration go beyond the KISS project. KISS will serve only the headquarters of CFC and USFK, with extensions (terminals) no lower than the next echelons of command -- the three field armies and the headquarters of the air and naval component commands.

Other intelligence automation initiatives are underway. For example, CINC CFC's intelligence staff has produced "guidelines for intelligence automation in Korea" for 1984 through 1988. Taking into account the current automation projects -- such as KISS and KAIS -- and the establishment of CASICs at the field army headquarters (see page 7-19), the CFC has set forth requirements which the command's ROK/US intelligence system must meet if it is to evolve

effectively as an integrated system over the next five years.

CFC has said that systems to be introduced into Korea must not only be supported with people and resources for project management, operating, and maintenance, but that the systems must also be able to operate on Korean civilian electric power and be switchable smoothly to organic generators.

CFC has said that survivability -- through mobility, hardening, redundancy, and the like -- is essential.

But most significantly, CFC has made it clear that each discrete intelligence system must be capable of sharing the intelligence information that it generates and maintains, with all the other nodes in the Korea command's intelligence community. CFC goes on to say just how such sharing can and will be achieved, specifying the central role played by General Livsey's ROK/US intelligence staff at CFC, as well as by his U.S.-only J2 staff in USFK (key people of which are "double-hatted" to CFC).

CFC's intelligence staff has gone further. They have laid out a set of definitions for intelligence terms such as "correlation" at the levels of the "sensor," the "discipline" (such as signal intelligence, human intelligence, photo intelligence), and "fusion" (also called "all-source").

Capping all of this is a determination by CINC CFC and his intelligence staff to look at the full Korea command's

intelligence web, or web of webs, as a single integrated ROK/US system.

Further, the command has made known to its U.S. masters in Hawaii and the Pentagon that it badly needs a flexible and evolvable baseline automated tactical intelligence system for managing intelligence assets and for processing and distributing what these assets collect -- which can also be a "working example" to the ROK forces within CFC as to what can be achieved quickly.^[17]

KISS does not address automation at levels below the field army, known as "echelons corps and below" or ECB. In Korea, the corps and division echelons are 90 percent or more Korean Army and ROK Marines. Obviously these must be Korean systems.

To address this problem, CFC's intelligence staff has developed a concept known for the time being as CTIC, the Combined Tactical Intelligence Concept. Expecting that the ROK armed forces will find the idea advantageous, CFC visualizes for the CTIC, first, the experimental installation of stand-alone microcomputers (something like Microfix) in a few division and corps headquarters, and then the expansion of these ROK Army-wide, followed eventually by their netting, echelon to echelon.

Finally, TACCIMS (for TANGO Automated Command and Control Information Management System) and its installed precursor, known as "the FY 85 interim project," represent the first real fruits of the embryonic C³I section of C3/J3 and of the C³I Steering Committee/ Working Group mechanism and approach, with its modest MITRE technical support.

Satisfying as it is to see this mechanism beginning to bear fruit, we will postpone for now the discussion of TACCIMS and the FY 85 project; these two are more relevant to the question addressed in Chapter XI, namely: "Are they exploiting technology?"

TACCIMS is being designed to have resident software to convert protocols and data from the variety of systems that must interconnect -- AUTODIN, KISS, WWMCCS, and so on -- so that a user will be able to cross any barriers he perceives.

(In 1984, the C³I section of C3/J3 did not see the problem of protocols as "tyranny," as described above. Rather, in the light of what can be done with resident software, the head of that section saw protocol matching as "only an inconvenience." Considering the problems involved in making KISS and KAIS interoperable, this seems to have been an overly sanguine assessment.)^[18]

Coordinating Across National Boundaries

We also need to look at the larger problem: coordinating across national boundaries.

Deriving less from the "go it alone" attitude found in Service establishments and more from the condition that their projects are conceived and funded in a totally separate process, national provider establishments have their independent orientations as well.

The senior commander in Korea has one set of mechanisms for dealing with the U.S. Services; his mechanisms for

dealing with the ROK providers of their components of his bi-national means of command and control must be quite different.

In 1978, with the TPICK scheme, General Vessey put into place a rudimentary mechanism for looking at what the two nations provided as a single entity. But TPICK addressed communications only.

In 1983, with the development of the USFK's first Command and Control Master Plan, General Sennewald extended the TPICK concept into other components of command and control for U.S.-provided systems.

In 1984 and 1985, the command moved ahead on KISS and TACCIMS, each to be an evolutionary, U.S.-procured, system usable for CFC's purposes.

But problems persist in extending the master plan idea across national boundaries. These are problems of programming, of funding, of arriving at a common concept, of putting together a ROK/US technical systems analysis capability and of merging ROK-provided and U.S.-provided capabilities into a single coherent ROK/US concept and system.

The rush of technology and of new programs stemming from technology threatens to overwhelm the achievement of an integrated ROK/US system.

Leave aside such long-standing U.S. developments as JTIDS (Joint Tactical Information Distribution System) and JINTACCS (Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and

Control Systems), neither of which has yet to make its way into the ROK/US command and control system.*

Consider only the new military communications technology, derived in some part from the civilian concepts of cellular radio-telephone now being installed in cities across the U.S. and Europe, known as MSE, or Mobile Subscriber Equipment.

MSE, long a gleam in the eyes of many military signalers, was in early 1984 made a major U.S. Army acquisition program; the Army is committing some large sums of money to it.

MSE is a total common-user area communications system, designed to replace other existing and planned command and area systems from the corps rear boundary to forward of the maneuver brigades.

The MSE train is moving fast. An RFP (request for proposal) was released to industry in July 1984. The decision on contract award was made in late 1985. The first delivery of MSE equipment, on a corps-by-corps basis, was planned for 1987.^[19]

*In 1984, the U.S. JCS asked the ROK JCS to consider the use of the U.S. JCS-developed set of formats known as JINTACCS (as created by committees representing the Joint Staff, the four Services, the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency in the functional areas of intelligence, fire support, operations control, etc.) within the ROK's own armed forces.

But the Koreans also have civilian cellular radio, and the ROK armed forces are now considering MSE for their own military use.

And what about interoperability? What about such commonality between these two MSE systems, if both are deployed in Korea, as may be appropriate and desired?

As a start on answering such questions, the embryonic C³I Master Plan for the full ROK/US Combined Forces Command began to take shape in 1985.

There is a more fundamental problem, however, from which all of the above stem. It is this: Neither in the ROK Ministry of National Defense, nor in the U.S. Department of Defense, is it yet a matter of policy that the two defense establishments will work together under a common scheme to provide a single, integrated, bi-national command and control system for the ROK/US Combined Forces Command.

The common development of such a policy statement by both parties is necessary for the timely resolution of critical issues and obstacles that prevent the Korea command from moving ahead on an integrated command and control system. These issues include:

- o The releasability of U.S. communications security equipment and techniques to the ROK government and forces.
- o The interfaces in Korea of ROK and U.S.-developed systems with the WWMCCS (the U.S. Worldwide Military Command and Control System).

- o Agreement on the need for ROK/US assessment according to a common systems analysis outlook, responsive to the needs of the ROK/US command.

Toward the latter, which is essential for command-wide ROK/US command and control planning, the two U.S. technical personnel from The MITRE Corporation, on station at headquarters, USFK, in Yongsan since mid-1984, are only the most modest start.*

They are at best an encouraging contribution toward General Livsey's gaining some control over the evolution of his command and control system.

This modest support is, however, far from adequate for the task faced by the ROK/US commander on the scene:

- o It is too small.
- o It has as yet no ROK component.
- o It has no accepted ROK/US charter.
- o There is inadequate machinery to permit its findings to influence either the funding schemes of the two nations' providers, or their technical schemes.

*MITRE personnel devoted to the KISS project, only, arrived in Korea in early 1983.

Conclusion: The CINC Needs More Clout

Because of the efforts of successive CINCs to get effective control over their command-wide command and control system, the outlook today is much improved. CFC has gotten a handle on C² management.

Nonetheless, in the words of one senior CFC staff member entirely knowledgeable about the problem, substantially more real authorities and capacities must be placed in General Livsey's hands:

- o "The theater commander will never be able to take advantage of his unique knowledge and perceptions of theater operations in developing a command and control system until he has some real way to impact the budget process."
- o "By the time a theater commander has a chance to comment on any system development, that development has usually progressed to the point that its development path is predetermined and unalterable (especially for a single theater's needs)."
- o "There is no established mechanism by which a theater commander can make his needs known to the budget and development community. Each project is run on a unique basis, reporting to different authorities and operating under different rules."
- o "The theater commander needs authority and ability to use discretionary funds to meet unique theater

needs that are not being addressed through Service programs."

- o "As long as the Services pursue independent development efforts, the results will be fragmented when employed in theater. The commander now has no way to articulate his interface requirements to developers of different Service systems."

- o "Theater staff resources are presently inadequate to develop, acquire, and field those systems that are identified as 'off-the-shelf opportunities.' With proper staffing, his staff would only duplicate problems which are now imposed on us by Service development efforts."^[20]

Although things are moving, those words written in early 1984 are still largely true. Much more needs to be done if the senior commander in Korea is to have meaningful influence over how his needs are met, and overcome these two deficiencies cited in Adequacy, which said that theater forces' command and control systems:

"...are not well tied together, top to bottom..."

and that they

"...represent the largely unplanned splicing together of ill-fitting components which have been delivered to his forces by relatively independent parties far away who have coordinated adequately neither with him and his staff, nor with each other..."


We will take this matter up in further detail in Chapter XI, "Are They Now Exploiting Technology?" Our treatment of the options and the implications of these options must wait until Part Three, and in particular Chapter XII, "Strengthen the Operational Commands."

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Chapter X

BEING EXERCISED ADEQUATELY?

We are Not Realistic

In the section with the above title, Adequacy had something to say that is worth repeating here:

...If you were to go out to where the actual theater forces are in NATO and Korea, or if you were to have observed the plans and exercises of the RDJTF, or if you were to look at how those theater forces held in readiness for deployment with these three commands train, you would find that, too often:

- o They train and practice with command and control systems much of which will not exist under enemy attack in war.
- o They have not designed their operating methods for training in peacetime to accomplish the essential needs which must be performed using those limited means which can be made to survive in war.
- o And, they do not practice under the conditions which the forces will likely encounter should war come....

Our problem is that we tend to build our systems so they function well in peacetime.

But many peacetime systems will collapse in war. They have not been tested against the conditions of war.

This chapter addresses that part of the charge in Adequacy which said that theater command and control systems "are not being exercised adequately under the expected conditions of war."

The Korea Command's Exercise Program

There are essentially three kinds of exercises for military formations:

Field exercises exercise actual forces. (Air units do not call these "field" exercises, but simply "exercises." Naval units call them fleet exercises, and the Marines call them amphibious exercises.)

Since exercises involve real forces, they exercise the machinery for moving and coordinating these forces. They can provide excellent practical experience for the participating commanders, staffs, logisticians, and others. New concepts and procedures can be tried out, and new equipment can be given a workout, under field conditions.

But field exercises, especially large ones, are costly. Because of such constraints as restrictions on maneuver damage, restrictions on heavy use of the electromagnetic spectrum for jamming, the need to constitute an "enemy" force from among our own resources, and the fact that we cannot cause real battle damage or knock out real command facilities, field exercises seriously lack warfare's realism.

Command and control systems are especially denied a realistic war-like test in a field exercise.

Command post exercises (CPXs) involve only headquarters and staffs. They are useful for training staffs and exercising communications. But command post exercises are generally conducted according to a pre-scripted "scenario" from which is prepared a "master scenario events list." They usually do not employ the full range of the elements of a contest between opposing forces, with all that means to the realistic exercise of commanders, staffs, and their command and control systems.

Battle simulations are a variation of command post exercises. Like the CPX, no troops or air units are involved -- only the commanders, staffs, and the air/land battle command and control apparatus (TACPs, ALOs, ASOCs, the TACC, and the like).

Battle simulations combine the features of the CPX with the features of a wargame. There is a realistic enemy, with a mind and means of his own. There is realistic portrayal of the actual outcomes of the countless clashes of forces in the particular terrain, weather, and other conditions of the battle.

The Korea command has a well-developed program of exercises.

An annual ROK/US command post exercise is conducted toward the end of each summer. This very large-scale exercise involves not only ROK and U.S. military forces but the entire Republic of Korea government. Its purpose is to

exercise the full scope of the ROK/US, military-civil, effort which would be required in the event of a North Korean attack.

Since this is a command post exercise, only the headquarters of the participating military units are involved. Except for communications units, few troops -- land, sea, or air -- take part. The practice has been not to extend the participation beyond the headquarters of large formations, such as division and corps.

As in any command post exercise, the communications system and the various command centers are given a good workout in these annual exercises. But communications are not tested under the realistic conditions of war.

Each year, generally in the spring, the annual Team Spirit exercise takes place. Unlike the annual command post exercise, for which there is a single scenario, Team Spirit is an umbrella-type event, under which are conducted a variety of exercise activities. Most of these are actual field exercises, with both U.S. and ROK land, sea, and air forces participating depending on the nature of the exercise. In recent years participation has included sizeable contingents deployed into Korea from the United States.^[1]

Again, command centers, communications systems, and -- to a degree -- measures to counter the opposing sides' command and control systems are given a workout in these Team Spirit exercises.

In addition to these two annual, very large-scale events, there are field exercises, command post exercises,

and, to a degree, battle simulations at all echelons of command, within ROK and U.S., and ROK/US formations, the year around.

Seeking a Realistic Substitute for War

The purpose of all peacetime exercises is, or should be, to train for war. From the viewpoint of the command and control systems of a force, the purpose of an exercise should be to subject those command and control systems to the full range of tests that they would receive in war. Exercises that do less than that risk conveying to their participants the wrong impressions of what command and control would be like in war.

Warfare is a deadly duel, a contest between opposing forces, each with its own minds, each with its own means, each set of minds bent on thwarting the other, on destroying or neutralizing the forces of the other, on placing its forces in a position that renders forces of the other weaker or entirely powerless in comparison -- and each with its own command and control systems.

Thus the relative skill of the opponents in the conduct of war, along with the quality of the opposing command and control systems that permit that skill to be applied, is a determining, even decisive, factor in the outcomes of battles and war.

Consider an air/land, or air/land/sea, battle force of one, two, or three hundreds of thousands of men and their fighting units, their tanks, guns, and aircraft, their logistics, and all the rest.

How well this force performs in war is in large part determined by the performance of that two or three percent of the force who make up its essential web of command and control -- the high- and mid-level commanders (say, down to brigade level) and their staffs. These are the people who "command and control" the force in war.

The opportunity for these people to develop air/land battle skills -- that is, to master the conduct of air/land warfare, through its actual conduct or through its realistic practice on a large scale -- and to test the command and control systems the forces must use in war, are not now available. Field exercises and command post exercises and today's rudimentary battle simulations are far from the reality of war.

"Command and Control Warfare"

The fight, the duel of commanders and their forces that is battle, is also a fight for information and accurate perception.

Whether we use command and control technology or not, we seek information. And the enemy seeks to deny us information, to block or jam our sensings.

We seek an accurate perception of the reality of the battlefield. The enemy seeks to disorient us, to confuse us with deception, to distort what we perceive, to confront us with alarming events not foreseen, to keep us behind the situation, so that what we decide is already wrong even as it is decided.

When we have decided what to do, the enemy seeks to jam, or intercept, the communications through which we put events in motion. He seeks to collapse both our will and our ability to work our will.

And we must seek to do all these things, and more to him.

Although not until recently labelled as such, throughout the history of warfare there has been "command and control warfare" in which each side sought to affect the other's mental/psychological ability to "command and control."

In former times skilled commanders used ruse, stratagem, deception, surprise, dominating the pace and direction of events, and the like to create in their opponents the disorientation, fear, or panic which gave these commanders first the psychological and then the material upper hand.

High technology has not changed this timeless feature of war.

In the electronic age, however, the dimensions of C^2 warfare are considerably enlarged. C^2 now includes not only the minds of opponents, but also the attack, and the defense, and the preservation, of the very means of command and control -- command posts, communication links, radars, command nodes, and so on.

This highly technological form of warfare includes in abundance the electronic means of warfare -- frequency jamming, high-tech intelligence gathering, pinpointing enemy

command nodes and their linkages, minute-to-minute decisions on what message traffic to jam and what to listen to, and insuring that what we attempt to do to the enemy does not disrupt our own side's ability to command and control even more.

Direct attack on command centers and nodes, and on communications links and nodes -- by artillery and tactical air, by specially trained special purpose forces operating in the enemy rear, by partisans and guerrillas -- is also part of C² warfare.

In the U.S. lexicon, all this has come to be known as C³CM, for "command, control and communications counter-measures." In the Soviet forces, the term for the electronic part of the C² battle is REC, for "radio-electronic combat."

The Soviets take this subject seriously, and no doubt the North Koreans do as well. In any combat with Soviet, or Soviet-influenced, forces, our side can expect to encounter an enemy who can not only defend against C³CM but who will use it highly effectively against our own battlefield information system.^[2]

The typical situation in U.S. and U.S.-coalition air/land force commands is that the ability to orchestrate the technical components of the offensive side of the C² battle is rudimentary at best. New equipment of all kinds is moving into the hands of the forces, both air and land. But the ability to coordinate and control its use is far from developed.

Defensively, one finds serious physical as well as electronic vulnerability in the communications links and nodes themselves, as well as in the often-exposed and easily identified command centers.

One of the most serious responsibilities of senior air/land commanders is to improve this situation in their commands.

Simulating the Experience of Command and Control in War

The only way we can hope to realize the experience of this "C² warfare" is through battle simulation, considerably improved over what we have today.

"Simulation" has a variety of meanings. But here we are talking about simulation of a particular kind -- not the simulation of warfare as in an analytical model, but the simulation, for its participants, of the experience of warfare -- and especially the simulation of its command and control.

There is a profound difference.

Computer simulation of military operations for purposes of analysis has been around for decades. That has always been the field where the big money is spent for computers and software.

The kind of "battle simulation" we are talking about got its start in life in the U.S. Army only in the early 1970s. No computers were involved.

Its first use, to my knowledge, was at Fort Benning, Georgia, at the Infantry School. Field commanders in the Vietnam War had suggested that, instead of new battalion commanders' learning the techniques of conducting airmobile operations from a radio-equipped helicopter on the job in Vietnam, they be given the rudiments of such experience in a helicopter mock-up, in a classroom back in the U.S.

There, from the mock-up, they could "look down" on "battlefields" laid out on terrain models below and coordinate airmobile operations of their battalions in imaginary but realistic combat.

With each battalion commander in the helicopter would be his battalion S3 (operations), his artillery liaison officer, and his TACP (tactical air control party) chief.

On the terrain model there would be an active tactical situation. Unseen controllers with radios would act the parts of company commanders reporting their locations and actions, of artillery forward observers calling in fire missions (smoke puffs would appear at the right time and place), of "lift" helicopter commanders approaching the landing zone, and of close support air mission leaders delivering their ordnance.

Note the purpose of this simulation. It was to give its participants a realistic practical experience in the command and control of tactical operations.

The battalion commander and his heliborne command team were seeking to perfect their techniques of coordinating and directing Vietnam-type heliborne operations. They wanted to

achieve the split-second timing and teamwork of artillery fires, close air support, and helicopter gunships that would "prep" the landing zone and then, in the final seconds, keep the enemy's heads down so that at just the right time and place the troop carrying helicopters could touch down unharmed.

By 1972, the Infantry School was writing the requirements for an automated battalion-level battle simulation, to be called CATTS (Combined Arms Tactical Training Simulator). In CATTS, the controllers who played the roles of the company commanders of the battalion were seated at consoles, with color graphics terminals. Using their headsets and mikes, they emulated the give and take of combat radio transmissions. The computer's software represented the tank and infantry companies, the artillery batteries, and so on, and produced the results of the clash of arms on the battlefield.

CATTS aimed at two purposes. It aimed to exercise the battalion commander and his staff in the techniques of troop leading and battle command and control. It also aimed at increasing the participants' understanding of action-reaction on the battlefield.

Nothing like CATTS had been built before. After much travail, including spending a good deal more money, and taking considerably more time, than had been visualized at first, CATTS was completed and then installed, not at Fort Benning but at Fort Leavenworth, in 1976. There it remains, training several dozen battalion commanders and their staffs each year.

In the meantime, General Robert Dixon, commander of the Tactical Air Command, was looking for something that would do for tactical air battle staffs in modern warfare what TACs "Red Flag" exercises at Nellis AFB -- with their instrumented dogfights with "enemy" fighters -- were doing for fighter pilots. He wanted to give battle staffs an experience equally close to what would be their experience in war.

So General Dixon established "Blue Flag" at Hurlburt AFB, Florida, under the Tactical Air Warfare Center.

By 1978, Blue Flag was each quarter conducting a simulation of theater tactical air warfare. And, instead of fictitious countries like Eastlandia and Westlandia and their fictitious forces, Blue Flag exercises began to reflect actual operational situations and forces, both Blue and Red -- playing 4 ATAF in NATO's Center in one quarter, on the next occasion playing the Korea situation, and maybe the one after that playing NATO's Southern Command.

The Blue Flag exercises did not claim, nor did they aim, to do much more than train participants in techniques and procedures. But at the same time, those who ran Blue Flag recognized that the wargame rules should generate valid combat outcomes, or else the participants would gain incorrect insights; they would learn the wrong lessons.

Air/Land Warfare Simulation

A proper air/land warfare simulation seeks to represent as faithfully as possible the experience one would have if one were to be engaged in real warfare's actual command and control -- except that the experience is gained not in war

but in an exercise, through a carefully designed mix of computers and human controllers brought together in an exercise support system.

We are speaking of a level of fidelity in representing the experience of command and control in warfare comparable to the fidelity that a Boeing 747 flight simulator presents to the pilot, copilot, and flight engineer in their flight compartment. Just as the flight simulator that lacks fidelity will leave the crew member improperly trained and equipped for the control of the aircraft in flight, so will a simulation of warfare that lacks fidelity for its command and control participants leave them improperly prepared for war.

We are talking about creating for the commanders, and for the staffs who serve them, the experience that they would encounter in war -- in the war that they would wage with the means they now have at hand, under the conditions at hand, against the enemy at hand.

In that setting, we seek to represent to participants the uncertainties and frictions of warfare, the delays, the human interactions. We seek to represent the actual communications, with the losses and unreliabilities that will exist in the real world. Our effort is aimed not only at increasing the participants' understanding of these realities of war, but also toward their developing ways (to include fixes to their command and control systems) that will allow them to cope with these realities, or to create new realities which are less difficult to cope with.

Thus, the object of air/land warfare simulation is to represent to:

- o The land commanders (say, at the levels of brigade/ regiment, division, and corps, and at field army in the case of Korea)
 - and to their staffs (in their actual command posts, or realistic mock-ups),
- o And to the tactical air force commander(s) (which might eventually include wing and squadron level),
 - and to the people in their command and control centers (such as the TACC or CRC),
- o All of whom are part of an air/land battle force with a mission, a concept of operations, and a battle plan,
- o All of whom are connected by the actual communications they would have in war (or by realistic simulations of these communications),
- o Who, as a fighting team, working together, are faced by a realistically represented enemy with a mission and concept of operations and simulated forces and command and control means of his own,
- o A real-time experience in the command and control of air/land warfare that is as close to the experience of war as it is possible to achieve without actually fighting.

See Figure 10-1, next page.

The Objective:

The most *authentic* and *realistic* likeness of the air/land battle that it is possible to achieve without actually fighting.




Figure 10-1

Air/Land Warfare Simulation

Battle Simulation Reinforces Mission Orientation

The special contribution of realistic battle simulation is to make graphic, and vivid for all to see, the nature of the air/land battle in the specific situation being war-gamed. Battle simulation allows the participants and observers to visualize more clearly the conditions and requirements of warfare, to study, so to speak, the phenomenon in a working laboratory, and to critique their own performances and those of their troops and air units.

A realistic battle simulation reduces the need for a major exercise of the imagination as to what the battle will be like if it should come. No longer are we simply talking about "what would happen if?" -- we are experiencing it. But at the same time, a realistic battle simulation permits a more precise application of imagination and logical thought as to the specifics of the actual battle. Successive battle simulations of the same general situation and mission provide a common point of departure for discussion and development of tactical and logistical solutions.

Battle simulations are especially valuable in knitting together the tactical air and land force participants in the air/land battle -- forcing commanders, staffs, and all participants to examine the realities of the battlefield and to solve the real problems as they would be forced to do in combat.

Essentially, battle simulation permits fighting the war in advance, learning its lessons in advance, and improving the forces through adaptation in advance.

Realistic battle simulation can indeed be called "military history written in advance."

So employed, battle simulation becomes the most powerful of tools for assisting the commander, and especially the multiservice/multinational commander as in Korea, in focusing the attention of all concerned -- those he commands and those who support him -- on the mission and on how best to accomplish that mission.

The State of the Art in Battle Simulation

Three efforts at battle simulation show promise.

The most advanced of these is the Warrior Preparation Center at Ramstein Air Base in Germany. The Warrior Preparation Center is an initiative of U.S. Air Forces Europe with U.S. Army Europe as a full partner. The WPC has already conducted two computer-supported battle simulations in which the corps tactical operations centers and Allied Tactical Operations Centers (ATOC) have been exercised with encouraging success.

The U.S. Readiness Command has undertaken the development of a computer-supported battle simulation known as JESS (Joint Exercise Support System). The Jet Propulsion Laboratory is developing JESS, under REDCOM direction. The first computer suites of JESS were installed in the summer and fall of 1985 at Fort Lewis, Washington, where they will remain for two years as the JESS is developed in close touch with the kinds of Army and Air Force units who will be its users.

In Korea, battle simulation has advanced beyond the stage of rudimentary computer support. Progressing from stand-alone microcomputers like Wang and Altos, the CFC ROK/US Operational Analysis Group (OAG) has now installed a Digital Equipment Corporation VAX 11/780, with terminals, with which it will in due time be able to run the kinds of exercises visualized by the Warrior Preparation Center and JESS (both of which also are DEC equipment based).

The OAG has supported battle simulation efforts of the Combined Field Army and war games in TROKA and FROKA as well. It has conducted major corps and field army level ROK/US logistical simulation exercises called LOGEX.

However, neither the Warrior Preparation Center, nor JESS, nor the Korea command's effort has really scratched the surface of the simulation of command and control warfare, to include its command and control countermeasures.

Simulating "command and control warfare" is in fact the most difficult of all the problems of warfare simulation.

First, the database is enormous (transmitters, emitters, nets, locations, terrain masking, jammers, listeners, and so on. Then there is the complexity of the interactions; what happens when we jam, and to whom? Then, the phenomena (effects of range, power, terrain, and the like) are uncertain. The synergistic effects -- on fires, on air attack, on air defense, on movement, and the like -- are not well understood or measurable. There are hard-to-quantify intangibles -- the effect on decision making, on staff delays, and so on. The enemy's methods are not well known, and there are problems with compartmented information in

this field. Our side's capabilities and expertise are not well developed. And, finally, none of this simulation can be done without computers. But writing the code will be extraordinarily difficult.

The state of the art of this sort of simulation is thus in its infancy.

Conclusions

Therefore, measured against the requirement -- the realistic exercise as for war, of command and control systems -- it is evident that the Korea command's C² systems (like those elsewhere) "...are not being exercised realistically under the expected conditions of war."

What can the commander do about this?

Much is within his own control, given proper technical assistance and support.

But a great deal depends on recognition by the JCS and DoD that development of realistic battle simulations, especially of C² warfare, deserves priority and resources.

Fortunately, in 1985 the Modern Aids to Planning Program, managed by the Joint Analysis Directorate of the JCS, was headed in that direction.

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Chapter XI

ARE THEY NOW EXPLOITING TECHNOLOGY?

This chapter addresses the charge in Adequacy that theater forces' command and control systems "neither exploit the present capabilities of technology nor does the system for their development adequately provide that future systems will."

The Information Technology Advantage

We are in the "information age," the age of the "fourth industrial revolution," the age of "information technology."

Most certainly there are problems in coping with this new age. But each day it becomes more evident that the open and entrepreneurial nature of their societies confers upon the infrastructures of the industrial nations of the Free World an immense advantage in the exploitation of the possibilities of the information age.

Even as the nations of the Communist world strive to keep up with the rest of us, the widespread use of such technologies as distributed information processing with its shared data bases carries with it the seeds of their own societies' destruction. Useful shared data bases can operate only on the basis of truth. And truth is antithetical to these nations' internal structures.

Of the advantages which the nations of the West possess as they attempt to fashion the military forces they find necessary in their protracted struggle with Soviet and Soviet-bloc power, this towering advantage in information technology stands out.

It is of the utmost importance that the United States and its friends make the most of this advantage in its military forces.

Information technology is transforming American commerce. It is transforming American education. Reaching into American homes, it is transforming American life.

But -- although for decades their military possibilities have been briefed, and studied, and written about, and extolled -- information technology's advances have not yet affected in any comprehensive way how the operations of American, or allied, theater forces are actually conducted.

Using computers, American railroads have for years kept real-time track of each boxcar and its contents. The smallest of trucking companies can do the same with its truck fleet. But if war should come, American military logistics commands could today do no such thing with their moving or stationary supplies of ammunition. The military world is far behind the civilian world in using the computer.

The Evolutionary Approach

The solution lies in the evolutionary approach. Its key features are: close involvement of the user and technical expert; maximum use of off-the-shelf technology;

and a step-by-step process of building, then testing, then improving.

One of the prime movers in the U.S. Army's shift to the evolutionary approach has been Lieutenant General Emmett Paige, Jr., as of end 1985 Commanding General of the Army's new Information Systems Command, Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

In 1979, then a Brigadier General, Emmett Paige was confronted with the cancellation of the Tactical Operations System (TOS) by a Congress that correctly perceived it as going nowhere after more than \$100 million had been spent. General Paige brought about a complete recasting of the TOS project.

The project's new name was MCS, for Maneuver Control System. It has two microcomputer-based components -- the Tactical Commander's Terminal (TCT) and the even more powerful Tactical Commander's Station (TCS).

General Paige's new approach was evolutionary. There would be fielded first a baseline system with an absolute minimum of new functions. This baseline system would be placed in the hands of real users, units of the VII Corps in Europe, rather than surrogate users of the Army's school establishment, as had been the practice.

The real users, with General Paige's people from the Army's Communications-Electronics Command alongside them, would recommend improvements based on their practical experience with the system. Improvements would then be systematically made.

The TCT-TCS combination, under the project-management of Colonel (later Brigadier General) Alan Salisbury, soon became the Army's first success story in the use of evolutionary development.^[1]

Meanwhile, field commands throughout the Army were busy with their own "front-end evolution." Tired of the Army materiel establishment's interminable delays in delivering the fancy items it had long been promising, field commanders began buying off-the-shelf commercial gear -- everything from signal analyzers, to facsimile devices, to Apple computers -- and, right there in their own commands, were adapting these items to their operational uses.

The Army's top management encouraged this. Not only did they encourage it, they began to do some of it themselves. The Army's Forces Command (FORSCOM), using "training" funds, embarked on its own adaptation of the Apple II computer into what it called Microfix.

Microfix is simply a somewhat ruggedized Apple II, painted Army Green, shielded to prevent its electronic emanations from being picked up by the enemy, and equipped with simple software that permits its ready stand-alone use as an aid in the G2 section at division and corps.

Microfix in time was assigned an Army stock number; repair parts for it appear in the Army supply system; and by end-1984 Microfix was in use in substantial numbers in field commands.^[2]

CECOM's Center for System Engineering and Integration (CENSEI) was also practicing the spirit of front-end evolu-

tion. Using what was first called the High-Technology Light Division Test Bed (now known as ADEA, the Army Development and Employment Agency, working closely with the 9th Infantry Division) at Fort Lewis, Washington, CENSEI sponsored a division-level Distributed Command and Control System (DCCS).

The 9th Division's DCCS makes use of off-the-shelf WICAT and Grid Compass computers, put together under a distributed data base, distributed data management, concept. As of the summer of 1984 the DCCS was going through its third iteration, just completing its third operational use in a 9th Division field exercise.^[3]

The Army's corps in the field have their own programs of front-end evolution. Each has a different mix. That of the XVIII Airborne Corps is known as the TICS (Tactical Information Control System). The TICS, under the control of the Corps G3 (operations officer) is a network of some 20 work stations, each made up of an Apple II and peripherals, distributed throughout the corps tactical and logistics staffs and within the corps tactical operations center, and tied into the worldwide ARPA net. Whenever the XVIII Corps goes, or might go, to the field, TICS will go along.^[4]

The Air Force Moves to the Evolutionary Approach

By 1979 the USAF's Tactical Air Command had become disappointed with the results from the time and money the Air Force Systems Command had spent on the computer-based system for command and control of tactical air known as TACCAuto. TAC dropped TACCAuto and, using its own funds, undertook what it named CAFMS, the Computer Assisted Force Management System.

Building the CAFMS configuration around a commercial Perkin-Elmer 3230 microcomputer, and following a modular development concept which used off-the-shelf hardware and systems software, TAC within two and one half years delivered CAFMS sets to the 9th and 12th Air Forces in the U.S. and to the Tactical Air Warfare Center.^[5]

Recognizing that Korea and Central Europe each had its own special circumstances for the employment of tactical air, the Air Force also continued with the evolution in place of the command and control systems then being tailored for those situations.

The Korea system was called CONSTANT WATCH. It was a systematic, evolutionary, four-phase effort to improve the performance and survivability of the Korean Tactical Air Control System (KTACS). CONSTANT WATCH has for several years been developed incrementally on a cooperative, cost-shared basis by the ROK Air Force and the USAF.^[6]

The system in Germany was called EIFEL. This, with its follow-on program known as CONSTANT CONTROL, has been a bilateral U.S. and Federal Republic of Germany program to improve air tasking, the keeping of resource status, and interbase/wing coordination within NATO's Central Region.^[7]

In 1982 the Tactical Air Command went further. It awarded the first of three one-year contracts for 500 Cromemco microcomputers to be delivered directly to USAF tactical air wings, squadrons, and command and control centers worldwide. Software for these computers was to be developed home-grown (in each unit), in-house (by a new

"Small Computer Group" at Headquarters, TAC), and under contract to TAC, according to TAC requirements.^[8]

These small computers are in use now throughout USAF tactical air forces in Europe, the Pacific, Alaska, Panama, and the United States.

The Cromemcos have spread into the U.S. Central Command, as part of CENTCOM's planned user-dedicated suite of microcomputers, interconnected with a local area network and a transportable Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) mainframe. The Headquarters, CENTCOM computer support packages are to be flexibly tailored to each staff section's mission needs and to airlift availability. They can be introduced early into an area of operations and built up progressively.^[9]

Going one step further, the U.S. Air Force has chosen a standard personal computer for its people worldwide, has arranged for the computer to be made available at a reduced price to Air Force people through the Government Employees Association in Arlington, Virginia, is encouraging Air Force people to buy that computer, and is setting up the networking system so that Air Force officers and airmen can tie right into it from their homes or places of work for electronic mail and other official purposes.

The computer is the Zenith Z-100, with 128K byte random access memory (RAM), dual floppy disk storage expandable to a built-in hard disk drive, twin microprocessors which permit either 16-bit or 8-bit software to be run, and two serial ports and one parallel port, permitting the use of a printer and a communications modem.^[10]

The Navy's Experiment with USS Carl Vinson

One interesting project involving front-end evolution in the U.S. Navy has been taking place on board the nuclear-powered supercarrier, the USS Carl Vinson, since 1975 even before Vinson was launched.

The name of the project is ZOG. ZOG is a research and development effort of the Office of Naval Research and cooperatively developed by Carnegie Mellon University's Department of Computer Sciences and the crew of Vinson.

The object of ZOG has been to use Vinson as a test bed to develop for the Navy a prototype shipboard, rapid-response, state-of-the-art, automated information management system. Since pre-commissioning days, the ship's captain and key members of the crew (the real users) have been working closely with the Carnegie Mellon technical people in the operational environment of the ship itself.

The ZOG system is a distributed data base system consisting of 27 PERQ minicomputers and more than 3000 feet of Ethernet cable. Installed and running before the ship's commissioning, it has served Vinson at sea and in port since Vinson's first deployment in 1982.

Applications which were running in 1984 included electronic mail, the automation of the Ships Operations and Regulations Manual (SORM); the automated development and distribution of the ship's plan of the day (known as the Green Sheet); automatically generated "Leave Port" and "Enter Port" checklists for the Officer of the Deck (OOD); an on-line weapons elevator manual interfaced to a videodisk

player and TV monitor, and the rule-based, artificial intelligence program known as AirPlan, developed to provide real-time aircraft flight information for management of Carl Vinson's air operations.^[11]

Getting Control of Front-End Evolution

While a policy of "letting a hundred flowers bloom," to use a phrase of Mao Tse-Tung, has great potential benefits (increased computer literacy in operational units, opening up the system to new ideas, not to speak of improved operational performance), it carries with it obvious risks (problems of non-standardization, likely inability to interoperate, difficulties of maintaining multiple hardware and software packages).

Such fruits of an open, entrepreneurial approach might be tolerable in the business sphere. But they could be disastrous in military operations.

One aspect of the U.S. Army's method of gaining control of its mushrooming programs of front-end evolution in field units was to establish The Army C² Initiatives Program, or TACIP.

TACIP, managed by the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, set up mechanisms for keeping track of the many initiatives of field units, for exchanging information among units, for identifying and selecting the most promising, for terminating those which lacked promise, and for developing and enforcing workable standards which would lead to systems interoperability.

TACIP also has access to funds which it can use to foster deserving front-end evolution projects in Army field units. [12]

Finally, in 1984 the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Army Materiel Command (AMC) prepared a joint TRADOC-AMC pamphlet on "Non-Development Item (NDI) Acquisition." NDI is the term for rapid acquisition or adaptation of commercial off-the-shelf equipment which needs no lengthy R&D cycle. NDI is especially appropriate for the kinds of computer-based gear which are part of the front-end evolutionary process.

The Foreword to the NDI regulation reads in part:

Greater reliance on NDI types of acquisition is the wave of the future. No longer can we continue to use the traditional heel-to-toe developmental life cycle management approach to satisfy most of our materiel requirements. It takes too long and time is money....Certain technologies are advancing so rapidly that we can find ourselves fielding equipment several technological generations behind what is currently available. [13]

The Defense Science Board Task Force

The 1984 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Military Applications of New-Generation Computer Technologies says this about the best way to exploit the powerful new technologies now becoming available:

...Computers are decision-aids....Their effective utilization must be developed in concert with the judgment and experience of those responsible for military operations, namely, those in the actual using commands (in the field).

...[We should] encourage efforts at tactical applications like those aboard USS Carl Vinson and at 9th Infantry Division's High Technology Test Bed.

...[We should] continue to promote the use of micro-processors within military commands, as many have done with admirable personal initiative.[14]

One member of this task force, Dr. Frederick P. Brooks, Jr., Chairman of the Department of Computer Science, University of North Carolina, wrote a paper on the subject.

He asked: "What technological development in computers can have the most far-reaching and profound beneficial effect on U.S. defense posture in the 1990s?"

And he answered his own question: "Not a massive number-cruncher, 100 times a Cray I, not an AI Engine capable of 1000 logical inferences per second, but a simple super-micro, widely deployed both in embedded and free-standing environments."

By a "super-micro" Dr. Brooks means "an advanced-technology one-chip 32-bit microcomputer, similar in concept to the MOTOROLA 68000 but 10 to 100 times it in key technical parameters..." -- to wit, in his words:

- (1) 10-100 million instructions per second, fixed point,
- (2) floating-point hardware,
- (3) 2-16 megabytes of main memory,
- (4) one board of electronics, including processor, cache, memory management, memory management channels,

- (5) general-purpose von Neumann architecture, probably reduced-instruction-set,
- (6) 4-8 DMA input-output channels, at 4-10 MB/sec,
- (7) 100-1000 MB Winchester-type disk, substitute available for some applications,
- (8) bit-mapped color graphics, 1000 x 1000, 10-24 bits/pixel
- (9) networked,
- (10) multiplexable for reliability and load-sharing, and
- (11) distributed multiprocessing operating system.[15]

Dr. Brooks wrote that in the Task Force's review of today's military applications of computers, its members were strikingly impressed with several facts of life.

He cited, first, the long lead times for all military electronics, longer for "custom mil-spec stuff." He said that the Task Force saw "ancient hybrid digital-analog equipment in the fleet where even minicomputers would now be obsolete, and where microprocessors ought to be."

Second, he said that there is severe

...software inertia....It takes a long time to build an embedded-computer software system, and still longer to evolve it to maturity. Once in place, such a software system usually mandates several successive hardware generations with upward compatible architectures.

Third, he wrote that military hardware requirements and civilian hardware properties are converging, and that it is evident that:

Many military applications have no stiffer environmental hardness requirements than do standard commercial applications. More significantly, commercial-grade chips and packages now routinely operate in unpampered environments, so that moderate exterior ruggedizing makes them usable in military applications at a fraction of the cost of custom-produced electronics. This convergence is far from total, of course.

Fourth, Dr. Brooks called attention to the decreasing military dominance of the computer market. He noted that:

As millions of computers are now shipped each year into the U.S. civilian economy, the military hardware market becomes a smaller and smaller fraction of the whole. This implies substantial and growing cost advantages for the military to use off-the-shelf computer components, systems, and software wherever possible. It implies a decreased ability for DoD to set the directions of commercial development.

Dr. Brooks noted that:

Field-level commanders are scrounging money for personal computers and workstations. Ingenious and inventive people in each unit are harnessing these to solve what they perceive to be their biggest-payoff problems.

He asked:

How should DoD respond to these powerful trends? We recommend that DoD proliferate such systems radically and that it deregulate acquisition and programming, avoiding the standardization shackles on invention. This approach, we think, will best capitalize on the American genius for inventions, initiative, and accomplishment in chaos. In time, market forces will work, evaluations of excellence will become known, and there will be a shaking out.

In short, he said:

If the personal computer invasion has you concerned: do not try to stop it; do not try to standardize the technology; do not limit the user's innovation and initiative; instead, give your attention to the critical success factors; manage your data resources to assure the right people continue to have access to the right data; and educate the users so that they can recognize the opportunities and properly manage the technology along with the attendant risks.[16]*

Front-End Evolution in Korea

Front-end evolution is taking place in Korea.

The Apple II computer, modified to the Microfix, began to be introduced to the Korea scene in modest quantity in late 1983. About two dozen were in the first increment. By late 1984 each field army had a couple of Microfix machines in its command post.

Another innovation is the initiative known as MCATS (for microcomputer application for tactical support). This is a small intelligence processor (the Osborne machine) used by U.S. Marine Corps units occasionally deployed into Korea for work along the DMZ.

The USAF has fielded Cromenco microprocessors in its wings and squadrons for unit-level automation as part of the Tactical Air Forces Small Computer Program.

*For another approach to Dr. Brooks' ideas on the open, entrepreneurial approach, see beginning page 11-31.

In the mid-1980s there is talk of fostering front-end evolution in ROK Army tactical units, in a "pilot model" or "test bed" effort along the lines of that now being pursued by the U.S. Army in its 9th Infantry Division experiments at Fort Lewis, Washington, but on a far less ambitious scale.

One idea which has been circulated would have the pilot program include a selected corps headquarters and the units of a selected division down to regiment and artillery command. It would involve the use of off-the-shelf commercial equipment at first, and existing communications. After a program of orientation and training the using troops would, in the first phase, take up some simple applications -- developing the uses in close teamwork with their technical support. Then, later, more complex applications would follow.

An Architecture That Accommodates Change

We have a dilemma. On the one hand there is the pressing need to get on with a free, entrepreneurial, unfettered, experimental approach, in which the commands "do their own things."

Then there is cold reality. If we do this in an uncontrolled way, there will be no interoperability. Instead there will be chaos.

Is there any way to reconcile "free enterprise" and "necessary controls"?

The answer seems to lie in the development in commands, and to the extent necessary between commands, of what has been called an "architecture that accommodates change."

This term was used and its importance was addressed in 1981 and 1982 by a Study Team of the Armed Forces Communications-Electronics Association (AFCEA), which came out strongly for the evolutionary approach.

However, the Study Team said that:

There is a potential for chaos if C² system acquisition is allowed to proceed without a carefully-conceived and structured architectural framework that provides flexibility to facilitate orderly change and incremental growth without adverse effects on reliability, performance and cost.
(underlining in original)

The Study Team recommended the development of a hardware/software infrastructure that allows the interconnection and interoperability of a number of systems.

The Study Team said that:

A layered, open system interconnect model to enable establishment of interconnect and protocol standards is most critical to successful implementation of this second architecture. The compatibility of the C2 system interfaces can only be assured by developing a structure for interface standardization. At present, the ISO (International Standards Organization) open system interconnect (OSI) model, which has been implemented partially, is the most promising and most widely-accepted approach.[17] (underlining in original)

The ISO's OSI has seven "layers." It is an "open" system because it is intended to be made easy to enter at any "layer," and because it is not a proprietary system. And it visualizes, between layers, a system of "interconnects" through which electrical signals of increasing sophistication and information content can pass.

In 1985 the ISO-OSI standardized its first (bottom) three layers:

- o The physical layer is concerned with the flow of "bits" (0's and 1's) -- with their voltage levels, their speeds of transmission, and so on. The RS 232-C modem interface now widely used describes a physical layer.

- o The data link layer accumulates bits together into a "frame," which is the basic unit of information exchanged between any two nodes in a network. Frames include address bits, error detection bits, and other control bits grouped in a "header" at the start of the frame and a "trailer" at its end. Between the header and the trailer in the frame is a "packet." This is the "information content" of the frame, and is of interest in the next layer.

- o The network layer, which routes the packets' contents, sorts them out, combines them, and makes it possible to use the assembled information in the next layer, which the ISO-OSI calls the "transport" layer.

The ISO was proceeding in an orderly fashion to negotiate the characteristics of the "transport" layer, and above that the "session" layer, and the "presentation" layer above that, and finally, at the top, the seventh, or "application" layer. [18]

The importance of all this to the command and control of theater forces is that, if and when such standards are

finally described and widely used, military computer users can take advantage of them for interoperability -- thereby opening up the entire commercial marketplace for exploitation in military information processing.

We will then be in a position, in the military sphere, to bring to bear under the evolutionary approach the open, entrepreneurial way of making progress which has allowed Western societies to move so rapidly in applying information technology.

We will then possess "an architecture that accommodates change."*

A New Factor: Korea's Computer Industry

In 1967, the first computer was installed in Korea. Since then their number has grown 36 percent a year; by 1983 there were 60 superlarge, 84 large, 174 medium, 210 small, and 238 supersmall foreign-made units used in government and business.

Although the Republic of Korea's own electronics manufacturing capacity advanced from obscurity in the late 1960s to the world's tenth largest in 1984, it was not until 1982 that computer manufacturing began in Korea.

*The 9th Division's DCCS (see page 11-5) is applying in a practical way the full ISO OSI, just as those standards exist in their evolutionary development.

In April 1983, the Korean Ministry of Science and Technology placed orders with five major manufacturers for the supply of 5000 small educational computers. The purpose of this buy was to stimulate an appetite for Korean-made machines by encouraging their use in schools and among families with school-age children.

The small Korean-built computer quickly caught on, and in 1983 some 65,000 eight-bit, 16K to 64K memory, machines were manufactured and sold by a total of a dozen or more companies. These were built mostly from foreign-made components.

Then, in 1983 Samsung and Gold Star, two of Korea's largest conglomerates, brought Korea into a new age with the development, using reverse engineering and acquired American and Japanese technology, and then the production of 64K dynamic random access memory (DRAM) wafer chips. In a fashion reminiscent of Korean entry 15 years earlier into steel production and shipbuilding, both companies quickly began to build factories for producing the 256K DRAM wafer; at end-1984 Korea became the third country, after the United States and Japan, to begin manufacturing the 256K DRAM chip.

In 1983 and 1984, Samsung, Gold Star, and other companies as well formed joint ventures with American companies toward the manufacture in Korea of both microcomputers and mid-size machines. Gold Star, for example, is teamed with AT&T; Samsung has an arrangement with Hewlett-Packard; and IBM has built a plant in Korea for the assembly of its "5550" computer using parts built by four Korean vendors.

Use of computers in government and business is expected to increase eight-fold from 1983 to 1986, by which time domestic production is expected to meet about half of Korea's internal demand.

Korea is moving into the first-rank of telecommunications-computer-equipped nations. The number of telephone lines will grow from 2.7 million in 1980 to 8.3 million in 1986, increasing thereafter at a rate of one million-plus new subscribers a year. A fully digital long-lines telephone switching system was installed nation-wide at the end of 1984. In November 1984 cellular radio-telephone service for automobiles was inaugurated in Seoul (the same month such service began in New York and Los Angeles). Construction is under way to replace existing long lines with optical fiber cable.

Toward building what it calls a "telematic society" the ROK Ministry of Communications in 1982 brought together 28 Korean firms and five government agencies into the Data Communications Corporation of Korea (DACOM). DACOM now operates a domestic public packet-switched, 300 to 9,600 baud, data network connected to 52 countries. To its 200 or so subscribers it offers electronic mail, an on-line postal and banking computer system, and access to overseas and domestic database and information services. [19]

Can this business-oriented expansion of Korea's indigenous telecommunications and computer technology make a major contribution to a corresponding set of developments in military command and control in the ROK/US command? The answer would seem to depend on several factors:

- o Recognition of the opportunities.
- o Governmental stimulus.
- o ROK armed forces receptivity.
- o Willingness of ROK high-tech firms to seek such business.
- o U.S. and PACOM/CFC encouragement.
- o Obtaining necessary software know-how.
- o Obtaining necessary systems know-how.

Can Korea's own computer industry make a major contribution?

While the performance of the ROK armaments industry has been remarkable and certainly exceeds that of any other Free World nation on the Pacific rim, ROK military and civilian expertise in armaments manufacture is not yet what it should be. Although JUSMAG-K advises and arranges for schooling, military program managers have, in general, yet to acquire the level of skill which is taken for granted in the U.S. Further, ROK industry has much to learn in areas of marketing as well as those of production, and its research and development processes are still mostly those of reverse engineering and technology transfer from other countries.

The Korean computer industry had, to 1985, contributed little to equipping the ROK armed forces. No computer manufacturer had yet been listed among the 80 or so government-

designated "defense industries." For ROK computer companies to make much of a contribution, they will need considerable assistance in the development of software and techniques of systems management. And military program managers will require a good deal of help if they are to cope with the problems of "evolutionary development;" even after years of trial and error, many U.S. program managers have yet to master the required techniques.^[20]

Likewise, the level of understanding of computers within the user communities of the ROK armed forces is far from that of their U.S. counterparts. The video game and personal computer culture that mushroomed in the U.S. had no counterpart in Korea. While some may believe that the ROK military can quickly grasp the new technology, most advise a highly incremental approach of learning-as-you-go, and going slowly.

Institutional Mechanisms

The process of timely and enlightened evolution in Korea depends on putting together suitable institutional mechanisms. Creativity is required, and the roles of quite a few potential players must be taken into account. Some of these on the U.S. and Combined Forces Command sides are:

- o CFC itself.

- o The C³I section under the CFC/USFK C3/J3, the C³I Steering Committee and C³I Working Group, and the C³I Master Plan (see pages 9-19 and 9-20).

- o The small systems analysis capability (essentially the MITRE people) already installed and operating under USFK.
- o The USFK Information Systems Officer (formerly J6) who is at the same time Commander of the 1st Signal Brigade and the link to the U.S. Army Information Systems Command.
- o JUSMAG-K.
- o Other U.S. and CFC.

On the ROK side, in the military sphere, there are:

- o The Ministry of National Defense, especially the office of its Deputy Minister of Defense for Defense Industries.
- o The Agency for Defense Development.
- o The Defense Procurement Agency.
- o The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which the responsibility for command and control rests with the J3 (Operations) section.
- o The C³I Working Group within the ROK Ministry of Defense, established under the chairmanship of an assistant to the ROK J3.
- o The separate services: the ROK Army, the ROKAF, and the ROK Navy.

On the ROK governmental side, other than the Ministry of National Defense, there are:

- o The Ministry of Communications.
- o The Ministry of Science and Technology.
- o The Korea Electrotechnology and Telecommunications Research Institute.
- o The Korea Telecommunications Authority.
- o The Korea Advanced Institute for Science and Technology.
- o The Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.
- o And, no doubt, others.

The challenge of all this: how to put together suitable working mechanisms to get the job done.

Efforts by the Korea Command

Whatever mechanisms are put together, they will take into account some impressive recent undertakings by the Korea command, over and above those described in Chapter IX.

In early 1984, the MITRE team at Headquarters PACOM, with the support and encouragement of PACOM's command, control, and communications staff, undertook the task of determining the most suitable information processing system, using off-the-shelf components, which could be readily

installed at Command Post TANGO, CFC's underground static war headquarters.

The effort to put such a system in place soon became known as the "interim capability," or "FY 85," project. It was to be the first part of a two-part plan to bring CP TANGO fully into the information processing age.

The second part was to be a comprehensive and more deliberately planned and executed project which would build on the interim capability. This second part came to be known as TACCIMS, for TANGO Command and Control Information Management System. TACCIMS was sometimes called the "FY 87 project."

Toward the first project, providing TANGO quickly with an interim capability, the MITRE team at CINCPAC surveyed the field, including those off-the-shelf systems in use in XVIII Airborne Corps in the United States and in V and VII Corps in Europe. VII Corps was also serving as the test bed for evolutionary development of the Army's Maneuver Control System (MCS), with its Tactical Commander's System (TCS) and Tactical Commander's Terminal (TCT), a project under the jurisdiction of PM OPTADS (Program Manager, Operational and Tactical Data Systems). PM OPTADS is an agency of the Army's Communication-Electronics Command (CECOM).

MITRE selected, as the most suitable point of departure, the system known as DCCS (for Distributed Command and Control System), then under development in the 9th Infantry Division test bed at Fort Lewis, Washington, and briefly mentioned on page 11-5 above. The adaptation of the DCCS, using off-the-shelf components in an evolutionary approach,

was managed by CECOM also, but not by PM OPTADS. The DCCS had since its inception in 1981 been managed by the Center for Systems Engineering and Integration, or CENSEI.

The MITRE-CINCPAC study was well along in June 1984, when General Livsey succeeded General Sennewald as CINC CFC. In due time, in a visit to the TANGO command post, General Livsey received a briefing on the MITRE study and CENSEI's decision to go with the DCCS. He then said that he wanted the off-the-shelf system to be installed and operating in CP Tango by June 1985, in time to be used in the annual ROK/US command post exercise to take place two months later. (See description of this exercise at page 10-4.)

With the MITRE recommendation in hand, CENSEI then decided that the only way to achieve the DCCS in Korea in so short a time was, not through starting up a completely new DCCS-like project, but rather to transfer the DCCS hardware and software technology from Fort Lewis to TANGO through an extension of the contracts which were then in place for developing and installing the DCCS in the 9th Infantry Division test bed. The 9th Infantry Division DCCS was headed for an operational, or "flyaway," capability in 1985.

The TANGO interim capability would have to be an "unfunded requirement" in the Army's FY 85 budget. Its cost, about \$3.5 million, would have to come from other programs. But with CENSEI support, and eventually with the support of the newly created office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Information Management on the Army Staff, General Livsey was able by end-December 1984 to line up the necessary money.

By that time, his C³I staff had, with CENSEI's help and using the two-man MITRE team, established the technical specifications for adapting the 9th Division's DCCS to TANGO's situation. The contractor was ready to begin work as soon as the money was released.

What happened then makes a vivid vignette illustrating the sometimes Byzantine and, to the user, usually frustrating processes through which the provider of command and control systems meets, or fails to meet, the needs of the user. This blow-by-blow account is included to make two points. One, the commander, when aroused and technically prepared, can often have his way over the provider establishment. And, two, it helps if that commander is dealing with the provider establishment of his own Service.

Because the TANGO FY 85 DCCS project was no longer "developmental" but was actually being placed into the field, its management was in late December transferred to PM OPTADS. But the DCCS had for two or three years been seen by the PM OPTADS staff as a worrisome competitor to the more costly, but better established, MCS system already managed by his office.

Within days after gaining control of the the TANGO FY 85 project, and to the consternation of the CFC C³I staff, PM OPTADS stated his intent to cancel the yet-to-be-signed contract, and announced that PM OPTADS would begin its own non-development initiative (NDI), using the (different) contractor working on MCS, toward a new design for the TANGO interim capability.

The reaction of the Korea command was one of dismay. Achieving an interim capability by June 1985 was already a difficult undertaking; starting over with a new design would make it impossible. In their minds, internal CECOM politics, the product of DCCS-MCS competition, and not the command's needs were behind the move.

Although many concerned had visions of the FY 85 project's disappearing, as had so many others, into the CECOM bureaucracy, the outcome was really never in doubt. The Korea command made known its position in a variety of ways, including the personal and energetic intervention of the CINC himself to the Commanding General, CECOM, and others.

By its own chain of command, PM OPTADS was quickly directed to put the money back where it came from. The DCCS project resumed.

In mid-January 1985, PM OPTADS himself visited Korea, and user-provider confidence was restored. The final design for the TANGO upgrade was established. It would consist of an Ethernet within the TANGO facility, with communications links to the field army TOCs, to the HTACC of the Air Component Command, and to the command center of the Navy Component Command.

Nodes built around the WICAT computer would be placed at each of the five sites external to TANGO. Within TANGO itself, some eight or nine nodes would serve the various staff sections (Intelligence, Operations, Plans, Engineer, Logistics, and so on). Instead of the Grid Compass terminals used by the 9th Division's DCCS, the TANGO project

would use the new IBM Advanced Technology Personal Computer (IBM PC-AT).

The FY 1985 project then moved to completion. It was up and running in the June 1985 ROK/US exercise.

In the meantime, the Korea command proceeded with the design for its FY 1987 project, TACCIMS, mentioned on page 9-25. The Mission Element Needs Statement, or MENS, for TACCIMS was approved by the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Financial Management, in October 1984.

This project, to be incorporated into the Army's FY 1987 Program Objectives Memorandum, would be a multi-million dollar effort, considerably larger in scope than the interim upgrade of FY 1985.

For one thing, TACCIMS involved drilling into the rock at TANGO a new tunnel, not simply to house the computers, their power supply, and air conditioning, but also to provide more staff working spaces. It visualized a "battle cab" from which the commander and key staff officers could view the situation and direct operations. Closed circuit TV would be incorporated. There would be a Hangul-English database and display capability (the TANGO upgrade will be English language only). Language "conversion" and editorial intervention, rather than the far more difficult "translation" capability would be provided.

TACCIMS is being designed to have resident software to convert protocols and data from the wide variety of inter-connecting systems serving the Korea command -- among them AUTODINS (the Department of Defense Digital Information

System), WWMCCS (the Worldwide Military Command and Control System), KISS (see above), and ROK systems as well, so that the users will be able to overcome the "tyranny of the protocol," earlier described.

Above all, TACCIMS will be built as an evolutionary extension of the FY 85 TANGO upgrade, and will take advantage of all that is being learned and will be learned, as the FY 85 project is installed and placed into use.

It is expected that the RFP (request for proposals) for the TACCIMS project will be published in mid-1986.^[21]

Skepticism as to Front-End Evolution

There is in the U.S. technical community in Korea at least one skeptic as to the "open and entrepreneurial" approach to "front-end evolution" described so enthusiastically in earlier pages of this chapter. The chief of the MITRE team supporting the KISS program manager in Seoul, a computer scientist of some reputation, has had some colorfully frank words to say:

- o He said that ideas like Microfix, the TICS of XVIII Airborne Corps, and the encouragement of Cromemco computers in the Air Force (see pages 11-5 to 11-7) represent a "proliferation of diversity and incompatibility, hardly promoting or supporting interoperability."
- o As to the use of TACIP to manage front-end evolution (see page 11-9), he said, "I don't believe it."

- o As to the commercial off-the-shelf acquisitions encouraged by the TAC-TRADOC NDI regulation (see page 11-10), he remarked, "none of which, when acquired without due engineering analysis, can talk with one another."
- o As to the comments of the Defense Science Board Task Force, page 11-10 above, which said:

...Computers are decision-aids....[T]heir effective utilization must be developed in concert with the judgment and experience of those responsible for military operations, namely the actual "using commands in the field.

he said, "Agree," and he agreed that:

...(We should) encourage efforts at tactical applications like those aboard USS Carl Vinson and at 9th Infantry Division's High Technology Test Bed.

But he disagreed that:

...(We should) continue to promote the use of microprocessors within military commands, as many have done with admirable personal initiative.

- o As to the remarks of its member, Dr. Frederick P. Brooks, quoted on pages 11-12 to 11-14, and which said:

Field-level commanders are scrounging money for personal computers and workstations. Ingenious and inventive people in each unit are harnessing these to solve what they perceive to be their biggest-payoff problems.

and:

How should DoD respond to these powerful trends? We recommend that DoD proliferate such systems radically and that it deregulate acquisition and programming, avoiding the standardization shackles on invention. This approach, we think, will best capitalize on the American genius for inventions, initiative, and accomplishment in chaos. In time, market forces will work, evaluations of excellence will become known, and there will be a shaking out.

MITRE's KISS leader in Seoul said, "This is madness. It will take so much time for a standard to emerge. There is also inertia from previous hardware selections and software development efforts."

And finally, to Dr. Brooks' comment:

If the personal computer invasion has you concerned: do not try to stop it; do not try to standardize the technology; do not limit the user's innovation and initiative; instead, give your attention to the critical success factors; manage your data resources to assure the right people continue to have access to the right data; and educate the users so that they can recognize the opportunities and properly manage the technology along with the attendant risks.

He said, in effect, "No way!"^[22]

Such juxtaposing of extracts graphically illustrates the community's (actually not all that) divergent opinions as to how best to go about taking advantage of the computer in command and control.

The Situation in 1985

By 1985, the Korea command had accomplished a great deal toward taking advantage of the potential of technology in the evolution of its command and control systems.

- o The C³I Section in CFC/USFK's Assistant Chief of Staff C3/J3 had matured into an effective team with some technical support. Although small, this team had command backing and was on the right track.

- o With the four-phase Korea Intelligence Support System (KISS) which would make use of the air-forces-only KAIS and be extended to the CASICs at field army level, and with the "FY 85 Project" and TACCIMS initiatives for upgrading command post TANGO, the command had set into motion sensible evolutionary approaches to building key top level command and control systems for the CFC and its immediate subordinate echelons. These U.S.-funded projects were oriented toward the needs of the combined ROK/US command, and they were to be accompanied by ROK-funded construction and other efforts toward the common ROK/US goal.

- o In addition to its KAIS intelligence component and other automation at the Hardened TACC at Osan, the USAF effort known as CONSTANT WATCH was, in conjunction with the ROKAF, beginning to proliferate the Cromemco microcomputers at the wing level.

There was, however, much to be done.

- o At the field armies and below, there had been toward achieving automation to date only the thwarted effort in CFA and the emerging plans of the C2/J2 intelligence staff for a "Combined Tactical Intelligence Concept" at the echelons of corps and below.
- o The ROK armed forces had only begun to consider how to bring the computer into the command and control systems of its forces at the field army level and below.
- o The potential of the expanding ROK computer industry had yet to be studied in any comprehensive way, much less tapped.
- o Suitable institutional mechanisms for pulling together the multi-faceted and interdependent ROK and U.S. efforts had yet to be created.

In essence, the problem faced by the Korea command in 1985 was this: to organize, conceive, and provide the motive power for a ROK/US, command-wide, program of "front-end evolution" in Korea, toward putting into place in a timely way command and control systems which do indeed exploit the potential of technology.

A Managed Program of Front-End Evolution

Success stories in the adaptation of the computer to the processes of command and control are few. One success story is SAGE, the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment System, conceived and first fielded in the 1950s to assist in command and control of air defense of the United States.^[23]

And in mid-1984 an emerging success story in the application of today's computer technology to military command and control seemed to be the USS Carl Vinson.

The reasons for the success of SAGE were:

- o The actual operational user was engaged.
- o Technical personnel worked closely with the user.
- o The state-of-the-art was extended, but humans retained the functions that humans did better than computers.
- o An evolutionary approach was used.

The distributed command entities of the North American Air Defense Command (the users of SAGE) and the crew of the USS Carl Vinson (the users of its system) share common characteristics. Each is an operational command: Each is doing its task either continuously or very often under realistic operational conditions. And, in the development of its computer assistance, each has, or had, a responsive technical team working alongside it, or close by.

The British Broadcasting Company's four-hour television documentary of R. V. Jones' "The Secret War" vividly reminds us that this kind of close cooperation between the user and a technical establishment was responsible in 1940-1943 for perfecting the application of radar and of, until then, unheard-of electronic warfare techniques and equipment. This teamwork did so with a speed and effectiveness which seems incredible to us today.^[24]

If the Korea command is truly to "exploit the capabilities of technology" in command and control, it needs a far stronger handle than it now has on technology and on the evolutionary approach.

This must of course be a ROK/US effort. Let the subordinate commands start with modest objectives. Let them continue as they are, automating the simple things, learning as they go. When they get a few simple things done -- tasks now being done by sergeants -- they can move on to things that are more complex.

The key is to give the commander in Korea a small, technically qualified ROK/US system analysis capability (an "R. V. Jones" and crew) which he can use to study his command and control system and recommend ways to make it better, both with existing equipment and through the use of research and development. The genesis is there; it needs to be built further, and made ROK/US.

The Korea command's effort must be ROK/US. It should provide for enough top-down architecture and interoperability guidance so that its ROK and U.S. parts fit together as they evolve. It should be done in such a way that what is now in place, what evolves through front-end evolution, and all the big systems (KISS, CONSTANT WATCH, TACCIMS, and so on), now or to be programmed, somehow all come together.

To achieve the above, the Korea command needs a much stronger technical capability in its hands, more than anything on the horizon today.

In addition, there must be put into place a framework of funding and project development, supported by the "provider" establishments of both countries, through which ROK and U.S. funds can be obligated in a common framework, each party contributing its part toward the development and achievement of an integrated ROK/US command and control system which meets the needs of the coalition.

Conclusion

In brief, unless something along the lines of the above is done, the Korea command will "...neither exploit the present capabilities of technology nor will the system for (its C² system evolution) adequately provide that future systems will."

And the overwhelming technological advantage in information technology which is in the hands of the Free World will come to very little in Korea.

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Chapter XII

THE KOREA COMMAND: CONCLUSIONS, OPTIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS

Summary of Conclusions

Building on the background spelled out in Part I, Chapter VII described in detail the complex structure of the command in Korea and the written charters of the senior commander in all his several "hats." Chapter VIII discussed the many intangibles that affect the way in which these written charters are and can be used in peace and war.

Chapter IX then addressed, as to the Korea command, the charge presented in Adequacy that theater forces' command and control systems "...are not well tied together, top to bottom" and that, to the commander, they "...represent the largely unplanned splicing together of ill-fitting components which have been delivered to his forces by relatively independent parties far away who have coordinated adequately neither with him and his staff, or with each other."

As to this charge of Adequacy it is fair to say that, since 1983 and building on what was done before that beginning with the 1978 TPICK, the Korea command has to a large extent gotten a grip on the problem. Communications systems are increasingly tied together, and mechanisms are in place for monitoring and influencing U.S. Service-provided command and control systems such that so flagrant example as KAIS is unlikely to occur again.

Chapter X addressed, as to Korea, Adequacy's charge that theater forces' command and control systems "...are not being exercised adequately under the expected conditions of war."

The conclusion: Although a start has been made on realistic battle simulation in Korea, neither those rudimentary efforts nor the program of command post and field exercises of the Korea command sufficiently resemble the expected conditions of war. This remains a valid charge.

Chapter XI then dealt with the statement in Adequacy that theater forces' command and control systems "...neither exploit the present capabilities of technology nor does the system for their development adequately provide that future systems will."

In its final pages, just above, Chapter XI concluded that the Korea command still has a long way to go in this regard.

Countless options are available for dealing with these conclusions. We have assembled them into three.

Our first option is to continue essentially along the present path. The second is to undertake a major restructuring of the command in Korea. The third falls somewhere between these two.

Option One: Continue along the Present Path

In spite of its complexities, many of which are unavoidable in view of the nature of the two-nation coalition and the geographic and strategic situation within which the

coalition's forces must operate, the command and control system in Korea has worked in the past and is working today.

This option therefore visualizes little or no change in the structure and charters of command in Korea.

As to the mechanisms for placing into the field the ROK/US systems for command and control of the command's forces, this option visualizes that the efforts of the recent past would simply be continued. These methods have been productive; the situation has improved; continued improvement can be expected.

But what are the implications of this line of action?

For one thing, it accepts the following as the written authority of the senior commander in Korea (as summarized in Chapter VIII):

- o His opcon of U.S. Air Force forces day-to-day in peacetime is limited; he has no command or opcon whatever over U.S. Navy forces nearby; and over U.S. Marine Corps battalions on his territory near the DMZ he has not even the authority of an operation plan which assigns such units to his opcon in crisis or war. He has full command of only the U.S. Army forces on the scene.

- o Land, sea, and air forces of the Republic of Korea are, by decision of the President of that nation, placed under his opcon day-to-day in peacetime. But we have seen in our cases how tenuous is such opcon when national interests collide with the interests

of the multinational commander whose authority, in the final analysis, has little substance behind it.

- o His practical, solid, control of resources and therefore of programs which require resources extends only to the resources of the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea.

This would seem to place more burden than desirable on the commander's ability to use the intangibles of his position and situation. As Chapter VIII describes, even considering the commander's substantial moral authority, there are limits to how far these intangibles can be taken.

Thus, pursuing this option would seem to perpetuate an undesirable condition, namely that the commander's authorities are not commensurate with his responsibilities.

Another implication, deriving from the above but specifically addressing the machinery for placing command and control systems in the field, is that under this option the commander's capacity for effectively influencing the evolution of the full webs of command and control systems of his ROK/US command will remain inadequate.

It was not easy for Generals Wickham and Sennewald to gain the eventual deployment to Korea of a two-man MITRE team to assist the small C³I section in the CFC/USKF C3/J3 section in getting a handle on command and control evolution in the Korea command. If the process is simply to "continue to march," General Livsey will not have much to work with from the U.S. side, and little to offer the ROK side to gain

its participation in the coherent, integrated, systems-oriented look at the requirements of his ROK/US command.

Further, "continuing to march" at the present rate will not produce much in the kind of battle simulation effort which must exist if the command's command and control systems are to be exercised under the expected conditions of war. This kind of realistic testing is essential if the command and control systems are to evolve so that they will meet the command's needs should war come.

This option gives little promise of achieving the high standard of excellence in command and control systems described in pages 9-3 and 9-4.

Option Two: Restructure the Command and Rewrite its Charter

This option visualizes a major restructuring of the command in Korea, and the rewriting of its charters so as to make clear beyond question that the commander's authority and capacity match his responsibility and accountability for mission readiness and mission success.

Going this route opens up all sorts of possibilities, to include:

- o Establishing a Japan-based "Northeast Asia Command" as a unified command reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ROK and U.S. forces in Korea would come under that command. This would, in effect, turn the calendar back to 1957, when the Far East Command was

disestablished and Northeast Asia became CINCPAC's responsibility.

- o Short of so far-reaching a move, rewriting the charters of CINCUNC/CINCCFC/COMUSK to give him, under one hat or another: opcon day-to-day of more than the token USAF forces which he now controls; opcon of USMC forces when stationed in Korea and specifically of USMC battalions deployed near the DMZ; and opcon (as CINC CFC, so as to have rough equivalency with his ROK forces opcon) of both USAF and U.S. Army forces, including the Second Infantry Division.
- o Giving COMUSK some funds of his own in the field of command and control.
- o Providing CINC CFC greater influence on funding of both ROK and U.S. Service programs, especially those concerned with command and control. This would include setting up a substantial ROK/US technical capability responsive to the CINC CFC, with a charter sponsored and supported jointly by the U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK Minister of Defense.

Although, if accomplished, this would go a long way to solve the immediate problem, the implications of proceeding along this line of action would be major, to say the least.

First of all, it could call for the JCS to take up the Unified Command Plan. This is an always time-consuming, usually contentious, and often divisive, action. Any idea of creating a Northeast Asia Command as a full unified

command would be especially contentious, and would likely lead nowhere in any event.

Major rewriting of the charters of CINCUNC/CINCCFC/COMUSK would be less contentious, but divisive nonetheless. Many would argue, "If it ain't broke, don't try to fix it."

Any move along the lines of this option would encounter the temperament of the current Korea commander, which -- although highly mission-oriented -- is not to seek major overhaul of his charters but instead to seek modest, mutually agreeable, incremental change and to use effectively those authorities which exist.

Option Three: Substantial Improvement without Major Restructuring

Option One does not seem to do enough. Option Two seems to try to do too much, all of which may not be necessary in any event. This third option would undertake substantial initiatives, but without major restructuring of command lines or written charters.

Toward rewriting the Korea commander's authorities, this option would, for example:

- o Leave the USAF forces opcon situation much as it is, perhaps only placing the command and control apparatus of the 314th Air Division under Air Forces Korea, thus under COMUSK's opcon day-to-day. This addresses the anomaly described in pages 7-34 to 7-37.

- o Solve the problem of the USMC battalions running loose up near the DMZ by revising the CFC or USFK operations plan to say that these units would come under CFC or USFK opcon no later than declaration of DEFCON 3.

- o Address the ROK concerns as to CFC's status by placing U.S. forces which are opcon to USFK under equal opcon status to CFC. This would mean that no U.S. forces would be USFK-opcon-only.

Toward increasing the Korea commander's capacity to influence the timely and technology-exploiting evolution of the command and control systems of his ROK/US command, top to bottom, this option would include:

- o Putting into place creative institutional mechanisms which, recognizing that each nation's resources are to be under its own control, provides for a common approach to analysis of the integrated ROK/US command and control systems requirements and for the step-by-step processes through which these requirements are met in a coherent manner.

- o An agreement by the two Presidents and their Secretary/Ministers of Defense, made part of the proceedings of the annual ROK/US Security Consultative Meetings, that the two nations commit themselves to the achievement of an integrated system of command and control for their combined forces in Korea, responsive to the mutually agreed requirements of the CINC CFC.

- o Providing an adequate, co-located and cooperating, ROK and US capability for technical analysis and requirements determination, responsive to the guidance and judgments of CINC CFC as to what is required.
- o Accelerating the ability of Korea's own computer industry to meet the needs of its armed forces in advanced-technology command and control systems. This would involve the development of research and development capabilities, of military-oriented software, and of systems management expertise.
- o Encouraging, through the use of experimental test beds in ROK units, the growth of computer receptiveness within the ROK forces similar to that achieved in recent years in U.S. forces.
- o And, very important, pressing on vigorously with an enlightened and fully supported program of building and extending the reach into ROK and U.S. units of advanced computer-supported battle simulation techniques which would provide a proper test of the survivability and proper functioning of command and control systems under the realistic conditions of war.

This last would motivate the ROK, U.S., and ROK/US commands which make up CFC, to act both together and in their own interests in command and control improvement.


The Korea Command in the Larger Frame

Each of these three options, and indeed anything that is done in Korea, depends to a large extent on what is done in the larger, primarily U.S., frame within which the command in Korea must operate.

This is the framework of the unified command structure of the United States, which we refer to as "the operational commands," and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and its system of operating.

Chapters XIII, XIV, and XV, following, take up these matters.

PART THREE
OTHER OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS



Chapter XIII

THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDS: OTHER OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The Approach to Part Three

In Part Three we summarize what we have in Parts One and Two found to be the problems, we lay out the options for solutions to these problems, and we discuss the implications of these options.

Part Three is in three chapters, one on the operational commands, one on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and one a "matrix for decision."

While this work thus far has viewed theater forces and their chains of senior command as both multiservice and multinational, these final chapters will address only the options available in the multiservice sphere.*

*Some reasons for proceeding this way: In the multiservice sphere we can do something about the general conditions, influencing the specific conditions thereby. However, each multinational command has its own situation and mix of nations; there is no established overall multinational structure to address in the general case, and we have already dealt with Korea. Improving the conditions of multiservice command will, as in the Korea case, at the same time favorably affect the conditions of multinational command.

There is more to be done to correct problems of command and control of theater forces than simply to deal with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the operational commands. There is also the immense provider establishment: the three military departments; the military Services within the departments; offices and activities within the Office of the Secretary of Defense; and the defense agencies, such as the Defense Communications Agency (DCA). We do not address the provider establishment within this volume.

Within the first two chapters of Part Three, the sequence is the same:

- o An exposition of the findings arrived at up to this point and
- o A discussion of the "options" available and of the implications of each option. In each case three options are offered.

In each chapter, one option is, generally, "continue as we are going."

Another option generally says "make significant changes in the statutes governing the Department of Defense."

The third option says, essentially, "make major changes in DoD ways of operating and in the DoD power structure, but do this with little or no change in the law."

This is only the first step in solving the many problems described in this study. The real work of developing options and of making choices among them begins when and if

any given choice has been made and someone is deciding exactly how to go about it in detail.

Let's first go out into the field, with our first subject, "The Operational Commands."

The Responsible Operational Commanders Are Weak

Seeing these operational commanders in their surroundings, and seeing the deference and respect that is theirs wherever they go, one would think that they are men with both great responsibility and great power.

They are certainly men of great responsibility. But appearances are deceiving. What we have seen about them in the pages preceding this reveals the truth: They have in their terms of reference nothing like the power to match their responsibilities.

Of course, no field commander has absolute power. The tightest of command authority -- for example, the authority which I once possessed as the commanding general of the 101st Airborne Division and at the same time of Fort Campbell, Kentucky, its home installation -- operates within limits.

Ability to reward people, or to punish them, or to affect their careers adversely, is power. At Fort Campbell I had single-Service "full command" -- and with that came such an ability (to be used with care, to be sure). The usual multiservice commander has no ability comparable to that of a division commander to reward, or punish, or adversely to affect careers.

Ability to control the spending of money is power. At Fort Campbell, I had an annual budget of tens of millions of dollars and substantial control over how it was spent. But the typical multiservice commander controls very little money directly and has limited (although growing) influence on how the funds of the Service components opcon to him are spent.

He can request. He can negotiate. He can try to persuade. He can work with higher authority. But, even if the matter is of critical operational import to the mission of his command, he cannot direct.

The Power of the Services*

Why are the CINCs** so weak?

We have been through this in some detail in Chapter V. In essence, the CINCs are so weak because the Services are in comparison much stronger.

It is useful here to go back into history, to the events which led to the 1958 Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Before 1958, each unified command had an "executive agent" in Washington -- the Army for primarily

*This section is essentially repeated from Adequacy, pp. 213 to 215.

**I say "CINCs" here but really mean "major operational commanders." As we have said, General Livsey in Korea is not a "CINC" in the accepted U.S.-only sense generally implied by that term.

land commands, the Navy for primarily oceanic commands, and so on. Orders to the CINCs were prepared in the Service staffs (for example, those for LANTCOM were prepared in OPNAV, the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations). This tended to perpetuate the notion that the Service which provided the forces fought the forces in battle.

The 1958 legislation, however, placed into the statute the concept of the unified combatant command. As it did so, the statute set forth the functions of the military departments and through them their Services, in these words which we have already seen:

Under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense each military department shall be responsible for the administration of the forces assigned from its department to such combatant commands. The responsibility for the support of forces assigned to combatant commands shall be vested in one or more of the military departments as may be directed by the Secretary of Defense.
(underlining added)[1]

The role of the four Services, within the three military departments, was more clearly spelled out in the 1958 report of the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives on the proposed legislation to amend the National Security Act of 1947.^[2]

The Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee was Congressman Carl Vinson. Before unification, Congressman Vinson had been chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee. He was a spokesman for deep-seated Congressional concerns as to the dangers of going too far in unification, and for the strong interest the Congress had in maintaining pluralism in the defense organization.

In 1947, 1949, 1953 and again in 1958 Congressman Vinson and others of like mind sought legislative safeguards against any and all efforts to "merge the armed forces," or "to establish a single armed forces general staff," or "to establish a single Chief of Staff over the armed forces."

As the legislators, in 1958, broadened the powers of the Secretary of Defense, they took care to limit certain of those powers. They confirmed the established roles and missions of the Services and limited the authority of the Secretary of Defense to transfer combatant functions from one Service to another. And they carefully circumscribed, both in the law and in the legislative history which illuminated the law's intent, the concept of the unified command.

The Armed Services Committee's report aimed to preclude:

...any possible interpretation that the unified commands are to be developed into completely independent and wholly self-sufficient entities to assume the functions of and absorb the present Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps....The military Services are therefore to retain their function of preparing the forces to be assigned to the various unified commands.

It went on to say:

To take a specific example, the major activity of the Army is the development of forces organized, equipped, and trained primarily for land war....Army schools, developmental agencies, field forces, major commands, technical services, and intelligence activities, all contribute....

This undivided service responsibility for the preparation of forces for land combat -- for the

development of doctrine, for training, for research and development, and procurement....is the unifying factor which insures that the Nation will have one Army, rather than as many armies as there are unified commands....

...The operational commands (mainly overseas), unlike the military services, do not have the facilities, the schools, the technical services, the technical intelligence capacity, the development agencies, the test centers needed for combat development.... [They] could not be given this capability except at the cost of massive duplication of facilities of all types.[3]

This kind of language struck a responsive chord in the military departments and Services. It reinforced their deeply felt institutional needs not just to survive, but to develop and grow.

Twenty-seven years have done little to modify these imperatives. The military departments still do the research and development of new materiel; they state the requirements for weapons and equipment, produce them, and maintain them; they organize units and write their doctrines; they bring personnel into the service; they motivate them, school them, promote them, pay them, keep their records, and reassign them; and they have first call on their loyalties.

And their real power is far stronger than that of the combatant commands.

The Weakness is Pervasive and Endemic

The weakness we are talking about is the weakness of the "dotted line" which represents "opcon" in organization charts such as we have been reviewing all along.

Responsibility and accountability for mission accomplishment are in that dotted line. If the work of the Long Commission did nothing else, it made clear that such is the case.

But authority, and the capacity to make authority real through concrete action, are pervasively and endemically short in that dotted line. It is not just the lack of practical authority over how money is spent or how Service programs are managed that makes operational command weakness pervasive and endemic. The weakness encompasses many other matters of consequence.

And, as we have seen in the case of the Marine artillery and infantry battalions near the DMZ in Korea in 1977 to 1985 (pages 5-74 to 5-85), there may not even be a dotted line -- not even for planning in time of war.

Reinforced by the words of UNAAF, which we have described at length in Chapter V, and by the prevailing culture which brought about those words and sustains them, the Service component commander with full command is simply not inclined to grant to his opcon master, on his own volition, any important piece of that full command.

Here is an example from Europe in early 1976. In this case, both the four-stars -- General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., USCINCEUR (Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command), and the U.S. Army component commander, General George S. Blanchard, CINCUSAREUR (Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Europe) -- were officers of the U.S. Army.

At that time, in the U.S.-only chain of command, their command relationship was as shown in Figure 13-1.




Figure 13-1
U.S.-Only Chain of Command

In the NATO forces chain of command, their relationship looked like that of Figure 13-2.




Figure 13-2
NATO Forces Chain of Command

For reasons of his own, General Blanchard, CINCUSAREUR, decided to replace (actually, the practical effect was to relieve for cause) one of his corps commanders, a lieutenant general who had been in that command position for only a short time.

Readers should understand that the relief of a commander is not an inconsequential matter. Except in the most pressing circumstances of combat, a commander will take the matter up with his superior commander before relieving a subordinate.

Communicating his intent to do so to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, but not to the unified commander CINCUSEUCOM (General Haig), General Blanchard made the relief. A straightforward Army announcement to that effect appeared in the news media.

General Haig, most unhappy at being neither consulted on the matter nor informed until after the fact, made very clear his unhappiness to his fellow Army four-star, General Blanchard. General Blanchard's reply was that such a personnel action was within his jurisdiction as the USEUCOM Army component commander and not a matter for CINCUSEUCOM to be concerned with, nor consulted on, nor necessarily informed about before the fact.*

*General Haig has commented that, although this incident is correctly described, he did not consider that General Blanchard was practicing "turfdom," but that he was rather following "long standing practices in the European theater....I was determined to modify them and I believe ultimately did so. In subsequent months [General Blanchard] became one of our strongest advocates of the kind of operational integration your overall study describes." [4]

What makes this an interesting case is that the two commanders were both U.S. Army. The case would raise few if any eyebrows if the relief for cause had been a subordinate in U.S. Air Forces Europe or in NAVEUR, the other two component commanders to General Haig.

Is such an action an operationally significant matter, of concern either in the U.S.-only chain or in the NATO chain of operationa command?*

The answer is debatable. Many would say, "No;" many others would say, "Yes." Our view is that a commander responsible for operational mission accomplishment who is never cut into the picture when an operational subordinate relieves one of his major subordinates for cause is, de facto, in a situation of pervasive and endemic weakness.

That this is routinely the case in multiservice command chains, and is even more common in the multinational chains of operational command, only makes the case for "strengthening the operational chain of command."

Have We Made the Case?

I ask the reader, "Have we made the case that the operational commanders are weak, and that the weakness is pervasive and endemic?"

*General Haig could justly claim a right to be informed as SACEUR, as well. My impression is that his primary claim was as CINCUSEUCOM.

We have cited at length the words of the UNAAF, from which one can gain no other impression than that, while they purport to establish authorities for multiservice commanders, the operative motive behind the words is to protect the prerogatives of the Services and their Service components in joint commands.

We have seen example after example of the culture of command from which these words of UNAAF stem and which they reinforce -- Beirut, My Lai, KAIS, and many more. This, by now ingrained, culture of weak joint command discourages a multiservice commander's command supervision, producing a climate of weak opcon supervision which the Services would never permit in their own chains of command.

We have described how fundamental authorities of commanders -- for example, control over money which is to be spent for command and control systems -- have, through Service influence, long and systematically been denied to multiservice commanders.

Using for the most part the case of Korea, we have shown how difficult it is for the senior field commander to exercise the degree of influence he must exercise if his mission-essential multiservice/multinational command and control systems are to evolve systematically, exploiting technology's potentials.

For a final making of a reasonable case, if only as to command and control systems, we will repeat in this chapter the words, from Chapter IX, of the knowledgeable senior staff officer of the Korea command, who said that:

- o The theater commander will never be able to take advantage of his unique knowledge and perceptions of theater operations in developing a command and control system until he has some real way to impact the budget process.
- o By the time a theater commander has a chance to comment on any system development, that development has usually progressed to the point that its development path is predetermined and unalterable (especially for a single theater's needs).
- o There is no established mechanism by which a theater commander can make his needs known to the budget and development community. Each project is run on a unique basis, reporting to different authorities and operating under different rules.
- o The theater commander needs authority and ability to use discretionary funds to meet unique theater needs that are not being addressed through Service programs.
- o As long as the Services pursue independent development efforts, the results will be fragmented when employed in theater. The commander now has no way to articulate his interface requirements to developers of different Service systems.
- o Theater staff resources are presently inadequate to develop, acquire, and field those systems that are identified as "off-the-shelf opportunities." With proper staffing, his staff would only duplicate problems which are now imposed on us by Service development efforts.

Despite all that we have said, there may be those who will continue to say "What's the problem?"

If the reader is one of that group, he may be satisfied with Option One, which follows.

For other readers, less satisfied with the present path, our Options Two and Three are offered to solve the problems described.

Option One: Continue the Present Path

Since 1981, much has been done in the Department of Defense to increase the influence of the commanders-in-chief of the 10 U.S.-only "unified and specified commands" named on page 4-13.

Option One is to continue that present program and trend, adding further measures to increase the CINCs' influence.

The most significant of the measures already taken has been to involve the CINCs more actively in the processes of planning, programming, and budgeting within the Department of Defense. Shortly after the defense team of the Reagan Administration took office, it began to revise the directives and flow charts which described those processes.

The CINCs are now required to prepare annual situation reports which analyze their missions against their capabilities and to update these reports semiannually. In these reports they name their specific high-priority funding requirements. Each July, shortly before the sessions of the Defense Resources Board which take up the major funding programs of the Department of Defense, the CINCs meet collectively, and many of them individually, with the Chairman, JCS, to review their needs -- which as a DRB member the Chairman then represents.

General Vessey, JCS Chairman from mid-1982 to October 1985, guided and encouraged by the Secretary of Defense, made a determined effort to act as the spokesman and

representative of the CINCs in these matters of resource requirements and allocation, as well as in other matters.

In November 1984, in a memo, "Enhancement of the CINCs Role in the PPPS," the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed increased CINC participation in the POM (Program Objective Memorandum) process. The JCS then ordered implementation of the DepSecDef's directive and established procedures, beginning with the development of the 1987-91 POM, which would form the basis for the FY 1987 budget, to be sent to the Congress in early 1986.

The leverage for the unified command CINCs in these new procedures derives from their charge to establish "warfighting priorities" and to enforce these priorities through component command "feedback" and "dialog" and through discussion "directly with the Services" -- all of this in a system in which the CINCs inform the SecDef and DepSecDef of their priorities, the JCS use the CINCs priorities in the resource allocation process, and the CINCs are told that they "may independently raise issues and will be invited to participate in DRB (Defense Resources Board) deliberations...." [5]

The Joint Staff has been reorganized so as to facilitate the JCS' representing the interests of the CINCs. A Strategic Plans and Resource Allocation Agency (SPRAA) has been established reporting to the Director, Joint Staff, with the function of reviewing, planning, and recommending as to cross-Service resource allocations. The CINCs can provide inputs directly to the SPRAA.

At General Vessey's urging, the Director, Command, Control, and Communications Systems (C³S), of the Joint Staff reorganized his directorate to provide for a Deputy Director for Unified and Specified Command C³ Support. Under this deputy director there are divisions (such as EUCOM and NATO, PACOM) which focus on the requirements of specific CINCs.

Since 1981, each CINC has prepared a C² Master Plan for his command, in which the CINC presents his command and control requirements in the form of ROCs (Required Operational Capabilities) for review and validation by the JCS and to be incorporated into the programming and budget cycle.

The program known as the "CINC initiatives," begun in 1979, has grown from \$2-3 million annually to some \$10-15 million each year. This is a mechanism through which each CINC requests funds for command and control system needs which are short-term and can be quickly met outside the normal budgeting system. The funds so allocated are earmarked directly for that CINC and his purposes.

These and other programs are moving along. They are in the right direction. They are all to the good. And they will certainly grow.

Implications of Option One

We established early in this study the requirement for an extraordinary, yet achievable, high standard of excellence in the command and control systems of theater forces. This in turn places very high demands on the machinery through which theater forces' command and control systems are placed into the hands of field commands.

It appears that simply to extend the present path of increasing the influence of the CINCs would not meet such a requirement. Reasons:

- o There is no evidence of intent to provide substantial technical resources to major operational commanders.
- o Multinational operational commanders, and specifically the Korea command, do not seem to be receiving the attention they require.
- o The Services are giving no indication of willingness either to provide major operational commanders with funds of their own, or to permit them substantive influence in how they, the Services, spend their own funds in the commanders' areas of responsibility.
- o Further, it appears that neither the JCS nor the Secretary of Defense has addressed to any significant degree the UNAAF, or the Service-dominated culture of operational command which UNAAF reflects. It is this culture, symbolized by the pervasive language such as found in the UNAAF, which makes the components strong and the operational commanders weak in comparison.

In sum, it does not seem likely that simply continuing on the present path, laudable as have been the actions taken to date, will do what is really required.

Option Two: Make Changes in the Law

This option implies that the present law does not permit an adequate strengthening of the authority and capacity of operational commanders, and visualizes strengthening that authority and capacity through changes in the law.

The present law gives the Secretary of Defense full authority and direction over the Department of Defense. He already has considerable power.

The "Declaration of Policy" in Section 2 of the law says that:

It is the intent of Congress to provide...
for the establishment of unified or specified
combatant commands, and a clear and direct line
of command to such commands....

and,

...to provide for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, for their operation under unified command, and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces....[6]

The applicable section, Section 202 (j), of the present statute then says that the Secretary of Defense (actually, the President, through the Secretary of Defense) can:

- o Establish unified or specified combatant commands for the performance of military missions, and
- o Determine the force structure of such combat commands.

and that the forces assigned to the combatant commands are under the full operational command of its commander.^[7]

This, together with the policy statement in the law's Section 2 that it is the intent of Congress to provide for the "integration" of the "combatant forces" into "an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces" seems straightforward enough.^[8]

What new authority for himself or for the commanders of operational commands, or what new policy declaration, would the Secretary of Defense wish to seek through changes in the law?

Crafting a Legislative Package

Let us develop a package of legislation which the Secretary of Defense might send to the Congress, as further amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.

The Secretary of Defense might introduce the proposed legislation with a memorandum of transmittal, something like the following, which explains what has led him to submit it.

- o He would say that it has been more than 25 years since the last major change, the 1958 amendments, to the National Security Act of 1947.

- o He would say that, in those amendments, the Congress established by law that within the Department of Defense there would be unified and specified combatant commands for the performance of military missions, that the military departments would assign

forces to these commands according to the direction of the Secretary of Defense, that the commanders of these commands would have full operational command of the forces assigned to their commands, and that the military departments would administer and support their forces so assigned.

- o He would say that experience has shown that, while the commanders of these commands and their subordinate commanders down through their respective chains of operational command have responsibility for mission accomplishment and are accountable for mission failure, these commanders have neither commensurate authority nor the capacity to exercise such authority. This has resulted in a situation of pervasive and endemic weakness in the chain of operational command. Examples of the disastrous effect of such weaknesses are the Beirut Marine tragedy of 1983 and the atrocities of My Lai of 1968.

- o He would then say that the fundamental problem is that the military Services, through the control of funds and personnel which they exercise to administer and support the forces which they assign to the combatant commands, through the channel of the Service component command which goes directly to the Service chief and military department, and through the influence on the charters of operational command which their Service chiefs exercise within the Joint Chiefs of Staff system, have successfully vitiated the objective of full operational command both at the level of the major designated combatant command

commanders and, even more so, down through the chain of operational command force structure.

- o He could cite as one example of this the Korean Air Intelligence System, only now being corrected, describing it in sufficient detail.
- o He would cite the pervasive contrivances of language which restrict command authority; giving as an example the case in Korea in which the senior U.S. commander on the scene could not then, and does not today, have operational command of forces of the U.S. Marine Corps present in his front line areas for training.
- o He would say that one major problem has been that the operational commanders of multiservice forces neither have funds which they can control directly nor do they have adequate influence over the funds which the Services and their Service component commands spend in these operational commanders' areas of responsibility. Among other consequences, this deficiency has seriously affected the readiness of the command and control systems of operational forces and the ability of the commanders who use these command and control systems to exploit the many advantages of technology. The KAIS example above is a case in point.

To correct these shortcomings, the Secretary of defense would then recommend the following changes in the law:

- o In Section 2, Declaration of Policy (see page 13-20 above), add at an appropriate place the following as the intent of Congress: "...to provide commanders of operational forces, whether multiservice or not, authorities commensurate with their responsibilities."

- o In Section 202 (j), add at an appropriate place:
"The authorities contained in the full operational command exercised by the commanders of established combatant commands shall be commensurate with the responsibilities of those commanders. Authorities of full operational command commensurate with responsibilities shall be extended down through operational chains of command to all levels at which forces of more than one Service are present. At the level of the established combatant commands and below that level as directed the Secretary of Defense, the operational forces commander shall have meaningful authority as to the expenditure of funds, both through the control of funds made directly available to him and through his substantive influence on the expenditure of the funds of military departments in his assigned areas of responsibility."

The reader is invited to improve on the above. It will quickly become evident that it is no simple task to craft a piece of legislation that will "strengthen the operational commands." The above can only be illustrative of the kind of legislation that could be sought.

But, using the above as a straw man, let's take a look at the implications of following this particular option.

Implications of Option Two

The major implication of Option Two is that Congress would ask the Secretary of Defense why legislation is necessary, and the Secretary of Defense would have considerable difficulty answering that question.

For example, in a hearing, a Senator or a member of the House of Representatives might ask:

"Mr. Secretary, it does not seem to be the law that is at fault here, but your failure to use the very significant powers which the law confers upon your office.

"For example, you say that responsible commanders in the chain of operational command have responsibility for mission accomplishment, but that they do not have commensurate authority to achieve mission accomplishment.

"However, according to the law, the combatant commanders are to have 'full operational command' over their assigned forces. And in your own directives you define 'full operational command' to include among other things 'the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.'

"Now you are in charge of the Department of Defense and everyone in it. Either your own definition is at fault, or your enforcement of your definition is at fault.

"Will you please explain, sir, which is it? Why do we need to provide more than the words 'full operational command?' Why are you coming to us with words like these to put into the law?"

Another Congressman might ask, in view of the Secretary's present authority over the budget of his department and its mechanisms, why he needs these changes in the law to give major operational commanders what he wants to give them, from the viewpoint of influence over budgets.

The days and weeks of testimony answering questions like this would be neither necessary nor in any way profitable. Indeed, it would divert the senior civilian and military officials of the Department of Defense, and the members of Congress hearing their testimony, from more important matters and would open up all sorts of issues which are resolvable, and are far better resolved, within the Department of Defense.

Option Three: Make Major Reforms without Change in the Law

This option visualizes that the Secretary of Defense would use the very substantial powers of his office to strengthen in major ways, far beyond what is now visualized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, both the authorities of the major operational commanders and their capacities to use those authorities.

The objective of these reforms would be to bring the influence of the major operational commanders roughly into balance with that of the military departments and Services, and with respect to the command and control systems, broadly defined, of their commands to make theirs (the operational commanders') the predominant influence.

In using his existing powers, the Secretary of Defense would be careful to prepare the way well within the

Department of Defense, and especially among the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The idea would be to remove opposition through reasoning together ahead of time.

The Secretary of Defense would make his plans known to, and obtain the approval of, the President. He would be careful to inform the appropriate members of Congress of what he intends to do, and why, before he does it. He wants them to find out from him what he is up to, rather than from unhappy members of his own department.

The process the Secretary of Defense would follow would be similar to that used by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in 1961, when, with minimum strain on Congressional relationships and with little need for Congressional action, he successfully dealt with an organizational issue that was also politically highly charged and fraught with reefs and shoals -- namely, doing away with the technical services of the United States Army. [9]

Before embarking on any such program, the Secretary of Defense would have to understand thoroughly its transcendent importance to his own effectiveness as Secretary of Defense and to the national security. And he would have to be sure that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is with him on the issue all the way.

An Imaginary Speech by the Secretary of Defense

What follows in this section is the gist of a talk that the Secretary of Defense, with his Deputy SecDef present, might give to the membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, some pleasant morning in his office:

"Gentlemen, I have asked you to come together so that I can share with you my intentions and can ask your help in making these intentions come to pass.

"I have discussed this with the President. He has given his approval to what I am about to say and to what I intend to do.

"My basic intention is, within the statutory framework which now governs the Department of Defense, to strengthen in a major way -- and especially in the field of command and control -- the authorities of the commanders of our multi-service commands and of those multinational commands to which the United States has committed forces -- and to insure that those major operational commanders have the practical capacities to exercise their new authorities.

"I am satisfied, as is the President, that we must do this if I am to meet my responsibilities to him and to my office.

"By 'major operational commanders' I mean not simply the 10 whom we call the 'CINCs.' I mean the commanders of those multinational commands for which I as Secretary of Defense share responsibility with the defense ministers of other nations. Specifically, I mean SACEUR in Europe and the CINC CFC in Korea. I want these two gentlemen, wearing those 'combined' hats, to have their proper share of such increased influence as is in our present statutory power to make available.

"Now, you and I know that, in the world of business and industry, as in other walks of life and not only the military, the right things do not happen automatically.

"It takes drive, energy, and supervision, and management presence to make the right things happen and to keep the wrong things from happening.

"In the military this is called 'command,' and 'command supervision.'

"I have been doing a little reading and research on the subject of 'command' and 'command responsibility.'

"I realize that I am speaking with experts on this matter, but let me tell you what I have found.

"To put it very bluntly, I have found that over the years since the passage of the 1958 amendments to the National Security Act in 1947, the people who have been Secretary of Defense, those who have been members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I suppose even some members of the responsible Congressional committees, have -- however well intentioned they have been -- been parties to a pervasive, and by now endemic, weakening of the authorities which I am satisfied those who enacted those 1958 amendments intended be meant by the words 'full operational command.'

"In so doing, we and our predecessors have contributed to a situation in which commanders down through the operational chain of command have grave responsibility and accountability, but they have nothing like the commensurate authority and capacity. And the nation has suffered grievously.

"By what you and I and our predecessors have collectively done, and not done, over the past 25 years we have

not properly served either the President or the American people.

"Let me give you an example of what I mean by 'weakening the authorities of operational commanders.'

"The 1958 amendments to the National Security Act placed into law the concept of unified combatant commands. It said in Section 202 (j) that the forces which the military departments assign to those unified commands 'shall be under the full operational command of the commander of the unified combatant command....'

"That's what the law says, nothing more. No further definitions or qualifications. Full operational command.

"Now, Chairman Vinson's House Committee on Armed Services prepared a report to accompany the House of Representatives version of those 1958 amendments, which it sent to the House along with its proposed bill.

"I do not doubt that Chairman Vinson, affectionately known as 'the Admiral,' had some advice and assistance from various people in uniform as he and his committee wrote the section of the report which I am about to quote. Mind you, however, what I am about to read was not in the enacted legislation. It was in the Committee report, written 10 weeks before the passage of the bill itself.

"And now I quote:

The "full operational command" vested in the commanders of the unified or specified commands is the full operational control required for the

prompt and effective use of their assigned forces.[10]

"Note, in some way 'full operational command' has become 'full operational control.'

"The next sentence reads:

...The following definition...establishes the broad scope of the authority he possesses in the exercise of this operational control (full operational command)....[11]

"Note, it is now 'operational control,' not 'full operational control.' And 'full operational command' is in the parentheses, not vice versa. I now continue with the definition:

This operational control [note, gentlemen, no longer full operational command] is defined as those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. [Let me call this sentence 1 of the Vinson definition.] Operational control should be exercised by the use of the assigned normal organizational units through their responsible commanders or through the commanders of subordinate forces established by the commander exercising operational control. [And let this be sentence 2.] It does not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization and unit training, except when a subordinate commander requests assistance. [And this, sentence 3.][12]

"End of definition.

"Now, I realize that this Committee report is part of the legislative history of the 1958 amendments, and that

what it says should be taken into account as we in the Department of Defense give effect to the enacted statute.

"But let's go now to what I find in JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

"UNAAF defines operational command exactly as did the House Committee, in sentences (1), (2), and (3) which I just read to you. UNAAF adds a sentence in parentheses which says that 'operational command' is uniquely applied to the 'operational control' (note the shift again from 'command' to 'control') which the CINCs which we have established exercise over the forces assigned to them.^[13]

"I am puzzled at the reluctance of the drafters of these definitions to face up to the matter and call a spade a spade -- to call operational command, operational command. Whatever the level, all the way down to the task force.

"He is the 'commander' at every level, is he not? Not the 'controller.' The Navy calls him the 'officer in tactical command,' does it not? Not 'the officer in tactical control.'

"But the UNAAF goes beyond even what the Vinson committee wrote in its definition.

"The UNAAF goes on to limit commanders' authorities, not just symbolically, by changing 'command' into 'control' and the like, but by writing words of restriction for which I find no justification whatever in the legislative history. For example, the UNAAF says:

Within unified commands, operational command will be exercised through the Service component commanders....

"Operational command...through the Service component commanders!

"Where is the legislative justification for that? The law makes no mention of Service 'components,' nor should it.

"There may be the strongest of Service doctrinal justifications, but I for one question whether we should protect Service interests with so flat a statement of Department of Defense policy.

"The law does say that each military department is responsible for the administration of the forces which it assigns to unified commands, and that the responsibility for the support of these forces shall be vested in one or more of the military departments as may be directed by the Secretary of Defense. But why does the UNAAF spell out so unequivocally that operations will be the sphere of the Service 'component commander'?

"Why don't we let the commander with full operational command decide for himself whether or not he wants to give the Service component commander responsibility for operations of all the forces of that Service, as well as for their administration and support as implied by the law?

"Why not leave it to the senior multiservice field commander to determine if he wants to make one of his Service commanders a multiservice functional commander,

rather than, or in addition to, a single-Service component commander. Give him some flexibility!

"Why erode with such language the meaning of the word 'full' before 'operational command'?"

"I recognize that, as UNAAF says in a later paragraph, it is important to maintain the integrity of uni-Service units. But why should UNAAF say that 'organizational integrity of Service components should be maintained'?"

"Didn't President Eisenhower, when he sent his 1958 message to the Congress with his proposed amendments to the National Security Act, say that 'separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever.'?"

"Perhaps 40, or even 25, years ago it was necessary to write into the UNAAF that the commanders of the separate Service components of a unified command will have operational integrity. Perhaps we did not then have broadly qualified senior officers, able to integrate into their operations elements of two or more Services. But that was several generations of senior officers ago. I am confident we have such senior officers now, and that it is no longer necessary, if it ever was, to write strictures like these into our Departmental regulations.

"I like the way the Navy does it when naval forces operate alone. The Navy's equivalent of a 'Service component' is a 'type commander,' like COMNAVSURFPAC, who is essentially responsible in the Pacific for the administration and support of surface combatants -- cruisers, destroyers. Certainly the Navy does not contemplate that in

fleet operations COMNAVSURFPAC has operational responsibilities.

"No. The officers in tactical command according to the task organization of the fleet, as determined by its operational commanders, have the operational responsibilities.

"As far as I know, within, say, the Pacific Fleet, the only type commander who has 'tactical command' is the commander of all the submarines, COMNAVSUBPAC. Given the nature of submarine operations, this seems reasonable.

"Within the sphere of naval operations, the Navy is quite pragmatic, quite reasonable. Let's, all of us, use some of that Navy-type pragmatism in the sphere of multi-service operations.

"My point is this. I believe the UNAAF contains far too many such unwarranted restrictions on something that is very clearly stated in the law, in three simple words:

'full,' an adjective meaning complete;

'operational,' an adjective meaning having to do with operations; and

'command,' for which I use Chairman Vinson's phrase -- the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission!

"By going along with these restrictions, you and I and our predecessors have weakened what those who voted for that legislation enacted -- 'full operational command.'

"We have also diluted the declaration of policy of the National Security Act, which says that it is the intent of Congress to provide for the integration of U.S. combatant forces 'into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces....'

"The result has been a pervasive and endemic weakening of the authorities of the operational commanders in our forces.

"By pervasive, I mean that the weakening of command authority is widespread; it is throughout our forces.

"By endemic, I mean that it is by now a disease native to our U.S. military institutions.

"The disease is not as widespread in our multinational command arrangements. I note, for example, that the operational forces of Allied Forces Central Europe have no 'land component.' That headquarters was eliminated in the 1960s, for pragmatic reasons.

"And I note that, while there is a putative Ground Component Command within the ROK/US Combined Forces Command in Korea, there is no separate commander or headquarters staff for such a command; the CINC CFC and his multiservice, multinational staff are simply double-hatted.

"Now, gentlemen, you and I know that when you are in trouble you cannot get things done right without a strong chain of command.

"I am satisfied that it is time to roll back the deterioration of authorities in our U.S.-only operational chains of command.

"So here is what I would like you gentlemen to do:

"Rewrite the UNAAF.

"Use only the term 'operational command' to describe the authority of an operational commander. Do not use 'operational control' to define that authority. You can use 'operational control' in writing the task organization paragraphs of operations orders, but not to define the authority of an operational commander.

"I am not toying with words here. There is real substance in the word 'command.'

"For senior levels of command -- say down through one- or two-star rank -- use the term 'full operational command.' Do not confine that term simply to the unified and specified commander himself.

"For example, use the term for General Livsey's command authorities as commander of the U.S. Forces in Korea. I would have applied the same term to Vice Admiral Metcalf's command authorities in the 1983 Grenada operation.

"I do not want any doubt as to what such commanders, and their senior U.S. subordinates have. It is full operational command.

"Define both 'operational command' and 'full operational command' with one sentence: the first sentence of the Vinson definition which I just read to you, which reads:

...those functions of command involving the composition of forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the full (in the latter definition, so as to leave no doubt) authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.

"That's it. Nothing more.

"I particularly object to the statement in the third sentence of the Vinson definition to the effect that a commander with 'full operational command' has no authority in matters of 'discipline, internal organization, and unit training' unless a subordinate commander 'requests assistance.'

"I am satisfied that it was just that sort of restriction, both in the words of the UNAAF and pervading the culture of U.S. command authorities, that inhibited the exercise of proper command supervision by General Rogers as the CINC of the U.S. European Command in the case of the Beirut Marine tragedy in October 1983 and that led directly to the disastrous effect on U.S. national security of the lapses in command supervision described by the Long Commission.

"The Long Commission found that if General Rogers had gotten into the internal organization and unit training of that Marine unit, to the same extent that he did with respect to the EUCOM Office of Military Cooperation in Beirut, the likelihood of that tragedy, with its devastating effect

on our options for using troops in Lebanon, would have been considerably less.

"In the interests of the President and the American people, I want to expunge the kind of nonsense which contributed to the lack of proper command supervision by General Rogers in this case -- both from our military culture and from the words which we write in the Department of Defense.

"Now I want to move to the culture behind the words of limitation in UNAAF and other instructions.

"I want to change the culture so as to give each multiservice operational commander that which any legitimate commander must have: meaningful power to reward and to punish. Lacking such power, he is forced to rely as best he can on other motivating influences, such as his own personal leadership -- or his exhortations as to the command mission and the national purpose. The Service chain of commandless-opcon has its own strong personal leadership. And it has decisive power to punish and to reward. It is no wonder that the Service way of looking at things so often overwhelms that of the operational commander.

"Because it is through the operational chain of command that missions are accomplished, and because the operational chain of command is in a very real sense my chain of command, I aim to give the multiservice operational chain of command a power to reward and to punish equal to that of the Service chain of command.

"One motivating reward for officers, including senior officers, is an enhanced prospect for advancement to positions of greater responsibility. In the future, I want each officer in a senior command position in a multiservice operational chain to understand in no uncertain terms that his prospects for advancement to a more responsible position will be influenced in a major way by what his (other Service, if such is the case) seniors in that operational chain think of his abilities, and especially by what they think of his responsiveness to them as compared to his responsiveness to his Service chain.

"To achieve this, at least in part, I want a periodic (annual or semiannual) report from each unified command CINC, directly to me with a copy to the Chairman, JCS, on the 'strength and responsiveness of the operational chain of command' in his command. (We need no such report from the specified commands; each of their chains of operational command is essentially single-Service, and in most cases includes full command rather than operational command.)

"In that report, I want each CINC to tell me what he thinks, officer by officer by name, about at least the two- and three-star commanders, of whatever Service, who make up his subordinate command echelons. Are they professionally qualified? Are they responsive to his instructions? Do they perform strong command supervision in the operational chain, regardless of the Service makeup of their forces? Can they be counted on for effective multiservice results? Would he recommend them for a position of increased responsibility in his, or any other, multiservice or multinational command?

"I want this to be an objective, absolutely candid, report for my and the Chairman's benefit, and for the benefit of the Service Secretaries with whom I choose, and the Service Chiefs with whom the Chairman chooses, to share it. I expect that all nominations of general and flag rank officers for positions of increased responsibility which cross my desk will be considered in light of these CINC reports.

"Further, I want each CINC to tell me if there are any weaknesses, other than personnel, in his chain of command. Are there weaknesses in his authorities, or in his capacity to exercise those authorities?

"Because the CINC, Combined Forces Command, in Korea is responsible to the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Korea and to me, and because his responsibility to me is not through CINCPAC, but directly through the JCS, I want CINC CFC also to send me this periodic operational chain of command report -- on the same schedule as the six unified command CINCs, and also with a copy to the Chairman, JCS, who I expect will share it with CINCPAC.

"SACEUR can do likewise in his NATO capacity as well as in his capacity as CINCEUR.

"The ability which this gives the CINCs to influence the rewards of deserving commanders in their operational chains means, of course, an ability to influence their futures adversely as well. So be it.

"In addition, I would like the Chairman, JCS, to lead the JCS in the development of procedures through which a

CINC will be consulted by a Service component commander in the processes of replacing senior (two- and three-star) commanders in the CINC's opcon chain.

"I believe that there is one more way we can make unmistakably clear to each CINC and to his operational chain of command that he has all the authority he needs. That is this: to endow the CINCs, each one, with general court-martial convening authority.

"According to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, I have the power to so authorize the CINCs. I have used it already for certain joint task forces, and for CINC, CENT-COM. I intend to use that power for all CINCs.

"I am instructing the General Counsel of the Department of Defense to prepare the necessary documents for my signature.

"Now, I understand that the Service Chief members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have long objected to any such authority being placed in the hands of operational commanders. They, and their Judge Advocates General, have said that the Service and departmental structure is fully capable of dealing with matters of military justice in operational commands.

"This may well be true. But it misses the point. The point is that to deny a unified commander or joint task force commander any authority whatever for enforcing his orders in operational matters through the sanction of court-martial is to weaken his operational command authority in the most fundamental way.

"In the interest of effective operational direction of the military forces of the United States, I will have no more of it.

"Mind you, this takes nothing away from the Service chain of command's authority for court-martial. That Service-channel authority continues, and operates, as before. This simply makes equal in his own sphere the authority of the unified operational commander. Nor do I expect that this authority will be used often; it is enough to have it there as very real evidence that, as the Congress intended, unified commanders have full, and I do mean full, operational command.

"Because this authority will not likely be used often, we need not go overboard augmenting the legal staffs of our unified commanders.

"So much for that. Now, I specifically want to redress the balance of influence between a multiservice operational commander and his Service component commands in the area of command and control systems.

"I want procedures established through which no Service or military department spends money for command and control systems materiel or software which will go into an operational command, until after the responsible operational commander (or, for less-than-major systems or dollar amounts, the Joint Staff action on his behalf) has had a chance to review and comment on the program.

"We must give each of the major operational commanders a reasonable technical capability through which they can

have a positive influence on the evolution of the command and control systems of their commands, top to bottom -- through which they can get what they need and can influence what they get.

"The JCS and OSD have a role to play here representing the operational commands. I do not expect to staff these commands with enough people to do the OSD/JCS jobs. I expect those here in Washington to look at the problems through the eyes of the commanders.

"I want these major operational commanders to be able, with the support of our full provider establishment, to take advantage of the burgeoning advances in the art and science of information technology.

"Let me go through with you the logic that I have used in arriving at these intentions.

"First, I gave careful thought to my responsibilities. One of the most fundamental of these is to insure the complete readiness of the command and control systems through which the will and the guidance of the Commander-in-Chief is transformed into military action down through the echelons of operational command.

"By law, I am in that channel from the President to those operational levels of command. Like the President, I must insist that all the way down to the lowest levels the force's command and control systems are the finest that technology and human ingenuity can produce.

"In the kind of world we live in today, nothing could be more important.

"But strong command and control systems require, to begin with, a strong chain of operational command -- one in which the subordinate commanders of all Services, in peace and in crisis and in war, are fully responsive to the operational chain and through that chain to me and the President.

"Second, like you, I believe that command and control systems are much more than hardware, more than computers and their software. They include the human dimension. They can with good justification be so broadly defined as to include our very style of fighting, our teamwork, our quickness of maneuver.

"This is all the more reason why the human-technical composite must be of the highest quality it is within our power to provide.

"In its lead in information technology -- computers, and so on -- the Free World has an enormous potential advantage over the Communist bloc, if we can only realize that potential.

"But we are not realizing anything like that potential today.

"I am satisfied that the only way we will be able to take advantage of that technological lead is to decentralize the whole process of bringing command and control technology, or information technology if you will, into the hands of the real operational users in field commands --

with skilled technical people right there on the scene, working with them.

"I realize that we have taken many actions in recent years to increase the influence of the CINCs. But we have not done enough. What I am seeking will make it necessary to change the prevailing Service-dominated culture in the Department of Defense. This culture gets in the way of the operational commanders' making the best possible use of their forces, and bringing into their commands the finest of command and control systems.

"That is why I want you, gentlemen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to do some rethinking and some rewriting. It is why I want you to substantially revise the UNAAF, to remove the pervasive wording in that publication which reflects the culture I have just described."

So much for the JCS. Now let's see what the Secretary of Defense might say directly to his major operational commanders, taking as a case in point General Livsey.

An Imaginary Chat with General Livsey

I have seen a group picture taken at the end of the May 1984 annual Security Consultative Meeting between the ROK Minister of Defense and the U.S. Secretary of Defense and their respective people connected with the defense of Korea. These annual meetings are called for by the 1954 Mutual Security Treaty between the two countries.

There are in this photograph some dozen and a half senior officials -- ROK and U.S.

Just to let this little fantasy about the Secretary of Defense run on for a few more paragraphs, let's imagine that, at the end of such a picture-taking formation, the Secretary of Defense asked General Livsey, the senior commander in Korea, to come aside alone with him for a few minutes' chat.

Here is what the Secretary of Defense would say to General Livsey:

"General Livsey, there were a lot of important people at that picture-taking session. But as far as my responsibilities for proper command and control systems in the Korea command are concerned, the most important person there was you.

"I have discussed the matter with the ROK Minister of Defense. Each of us has discussed it with our respective Presidents.

"I want you to know that we, the two Presidents and the two defense ministers, are holding you personally responsible for the quality of the command and control systems, top to bottom, of your ROK/US command.

"We, and specifically I, expect you to take all the necessary action to get into place the best command and control systems that it is within the capability of technology and human ingenuity to provide.

"Other people will do the building of those systems -- including the materiel establishments of Korea and the U.S. But the driving force behind their requirements, their

excellence, and their adequacy in a crisis and in war is you, the responsible ROK/US commander.

"I promise you that I will do everything in my power to get you the technical capabilities you need to define what those systems should do for you -- to state requirements, and to run realistic simulations of their performance in exercises which are as close to war as it is possible to have without actually fighting.

"Now, I don't want any misunderstandings, General Livsey. I have been through the Pearl Harbor investigation, and the story of the abortive Iran Rescue Mission, and the Long Commission report on the Beirut Marine disaster. Each of those was a failure of command and control, and of the command and control system -- broadly defined.

"I want you to know that I do not intend that the command and control system in the Korea command be deficient in any way and that I am holding you responsible to me that it is not.

"Test it. Simulate its performance against an enemy with command and control means of his own, and who practices command and control warfare. Determine its deficiencies. Let those responsible for correcting the deficiencies know what they are. Make up a systematic program for their correction, whether the means to do so are under your control or not.

"I will work with the ROK Minister of Defense to see that he and I together get you what you need.

"If you are not satisfied with the practical responsiveness of the forces which are under your opcon, or if you consider that your terms of reference to forces you rely on should be improved, I want you to make that known to me also. I do not want you to have to put up with parochial nonsense from any of the Services or their Service chains of command in the Pacific.

"Remember, I hold you responsible for the complete readiness of your command and control systems, broadly defined -- and for telling me what you need to make them ready.

"I intend to set up institutions that will respond to your needs, and the like needs of all the major operational commanders, U.S.-only and multinational, for which I am responsible.

"Toward that end, I intend that at the next Security Consultative Meeting there will be an agenda item which states a declaration of policy for the development of a truly integrated bi-national command and control system and which focuses the attention of both the ROK and U.S. defense ministries and their Joint Chiefs of Staff on the concrete steps we must take to achieve such in the Combined Forces Command."

Implications of Option Three

The first implication of Option Three is a question: Could, or would, the Secretary of Defense ever say words like these to the JCS members and to a major operational commander?

The answer to that question depends on how the Secretary of Defense sees his job. We address this important subject at some length in Chapter XIV, following.

Another question is, would the Congress let him get away with it?

We can be sure that, if the Secretary of Defense should speak in this way, there would be much anguish in the Services as the Service chiefs began to carry out his instructions.

There may be problems in the Pacific as well, in other unified commands, and throughout the provider establishment, where there are all sorts of vested interests whose turf will be challenged by General Livsey and the other major operational commanders like him to whom the Secretary of Defense has given such a talk.

However, the Secretary's position is a powerful one -- command authority to match command responsibility, including his own personal equivalent of command responsibility, in the national interest.

The final implication is this: If the Secretary of Defense were to speak to his senior military people in terms like these, and were to follow up, the problems we have described would for the most part be solved.

But there is one thing more the Secretary of Defense must do.

Now, he addresses all his CINCs. Gathering them together, he says something like this:

"I want you to use the authorities I am placing in your hands. I want you to exercise operational command. I am holding you responsible for achieving the maximum in operational readiness of your commands that it is possible to achieve within the resources which you and your commands have been provided.

"In particular, I expect you to achieve the highest order of command and control readiness within those resources.

"You are all experienced commanders. You have come up through your Service chains of command. You know the meaning of mission responsibility.

"I intend that you have the full authority you require to meet the mission responsibility you bear for the forces under your operational command.

"You are no longer in the old culture, in which you were systematically denied authorities, in large part as a consequence of the Service Chiefs' influence through the Joint Chiefs of Staff system.

"You are in a new culture, one in which your authorities now match your responsibilities.

"I expect you to exercise your authorities as you must, to meet those responsibilities.


"And I hold each of you personally responsible for the day-to-day readiness, specifically including the full command and control readiness, of your command and for successful accomplishment of your command mission."

REFERENCES

<u>No.</u>	<u>Page</u>	<u>Citation</u>
1	13-5	<u>U.S. Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, P.L. 85-599, 72 Stat 514, August 6, 1958, Section 202(j).</u>
2	13-5	U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, <u>Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.</u> House of Representatives Report No. 1765, 85th Cong., 2d Session, May 22, 1958.
3	13-7	<u>Ibid.</u> , pp. 22-23.
4	13-11	Personal letter to Author from Alexander M. Haig, Jr., dated September 26, 1984.
5	13-16	Memorandum from Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: Enhancing Commander in Chief Participation in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) Development Process, November 1984.
6	13-19	<u>National Security Act of 1947, Section 2.</u> (See reference 4.15.)
7	13-20	Section 202(j) of the <u>National Security Act of 1947</u> states: "With the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the President, through the Secretary of Defense, shall establish unified or specified combatant commands for the performance of military missions, and shall determine the force structure of such combatant commands to be composed of forces of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, which shall then be assigned to such combatant commands by the departments concerned for the performance of such military missions. Such combatant commands are responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for such military missions as may be assigned to them by the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the

REFERENCES (Concluded)

<u>No.</u>	<u>Page</u>	<u>Citation</u>
7 (continued)		President. Forces assigned to such unified combatant commands or specified combatant commands shall be under the full operational command of the commander of the unified combatant command or the commander of the specified combatant command. All forces not so assigned remain for all purposes in their respective departments. Under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense each military department shall be responsible for the administration of the forces assigned from its department to such combatant commands. The responsibility for the support of forces assigned to combatant commands shall be vested in one or more of the military departments as may be directed by the Secretary of Defense."
8	13-20	<u>National Security Act of 1947, Section 2.</u> (See reference 4.15.)
9	13-26	During 1961-62, the Author was a member of the Office of the Department of Defense General Counsel where this action was managed.
10	13-30	U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Report No. 1765, p. 22. (See reference 13.2.)
11	13-30	<u>Ibid.</u>
12	13-30	<u>Ibid.</u>
13	13-31	UNAAF, Section 30225. (See reference 4.8.)



Chapter XIV

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND ITS CHAIRMAN: OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

To Review the Issues

This study and Adequacy, its predecessor, have been about command and control systems of theater forces, and about their adequacy.

As we described in Chapter IV and illustrated by cases in Chapters V and VI in some detail, "operational command" is very different from "full command," and is in inherent conflict with "full command less operational command."

We have also made it clear that:

- o It is through a strong, responsive, and well-exercised chain of command that the highest degree of command readiness and command performance is achieved.
- o It is a basic requirement that command responsibility and accountability on one hand, and command authority and capacity on the other, be in balance all the way down to the lowest levels of command.
- o With weak command authority or with weak capacity to make authority meaningful, even the most insightful and expert of operational commanders is forced to rely on substitutes for a practical ability to cause

things to happen -- on negotiation, on persuasion which calls to the attention of others what is in their various best interests, and ultimately on that moral authority which is bestowed on the commander by the commander's undeniable responsibility for mission accomplishment.

- o Command is inseparable from the command and control systems, broadly defined, through which command is exercised.

An extract from Adequacy is germane here. In that study, in a section titled "The Commander's Unavoidable Responsibility," we said:

If anything has been established in the chapters which precede this one, it is this fundamental proposition:

The responsibility for the condition of the command and control system of a field command rests jointly with the commander of that command and with the authorities who are responsible for providing his means of command and control. But, because command and control systems, broadly defined, are so essential a part of command's capability (indeed they are inseparable from the effective exercise of command), and because the commander bears the responsibility for failure, the commander himself bears the greatest responsibility for the condition of these systems -- both as to recommending their composition and as to making the best use of what is provided. This responsibility is even greater than that which he bears for other personnel and materiel resources of his command.[1]

And we have said that, in view of the strengths of the U.S. Services and of the component commands which are the

Service's extensions into the major operational commands, such substitutes for real authority and capacity as the major operational commanders are able to generate are inadequate. The practical authority and capacities of major operational commanders are far too weak compared to the responsibilities which they bear, and specifically their responsibility for the readiness of the command and control systems, broadly defined, of their commands.

In Parts One and Two of this study, we have developed how inadequate are the authority and capacities in the charters of the coalition commander in Korea and, by implication, those of other major operational commanders worldwide.

In Chapter XIII, just preceding, we have been through the options for providing the operational commanders in the field the practical authority and capacities necessary for them to meet their responsibilities.

In this chapter, we now consider the situation at the seat of government. We will describe our conclusions, the options, and the implications of those options.

The President*

Although Congress shares responsibility for the armed forces' resources and governance, the Executive Branch has

*Much of what follows, through page 14-9, is taken from Chapter VII of Adequacy.

question whether it is right and just to hold the President responsible for what some might judge to be a small detail in the scope of the President's responsibilities.

But that's the way it has to be. The Presidency is a big job.

Is the President accountable for the failure of theater forces' command and control systems?

Although the accountability of the President to the electorate (and through the impeachment process to the Congress) is a many-faceted proposition, the answer is probably "Yes." It can be argued that in November 1980 President Carter was relieved by the electorate in part because of the humiliating failure of the Iran rescue mission, a disaster due in large if not for the most part to deficiencies in the command and control, broadly defined, of the rescue force in its preparation and in its execution.

A more secure or astute President might not have been relieved by the electorate after the Iran debacle; witness President Roosevelt's reelection three years after Pearl Harbor.*

So while we say that a President is fully responsible, we also say that, the way things work, it is possible for him to avoid being relieved by the electorate for his having been accountable.

*President Reagan's opposition in the 1984 election made a major effort to discredit him for the October 1983 loss of life in Beirut, also a failure in command and control.

What about "authority" and "capacity?"

Scholars of the presidency have treated these matters at length. We simply conclude that while personal capacity varies with the individual it can be presumed to be adequate. And both authority and institutional capacity are ample.*

The Secretary of Defense

Let us consider the Secretary of Defense's responsibility and accountability for U.S. theater forces' command and control systems.

As with the President, the language of the statute leaves no doubt as to the Secretary of Defense's responsibility for the armed forces of the United States. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended particularly in 1958, makes him, in effect, "Deputy Commander-in-Chief" to the President.

Compared to the time of Pearl Harbor, the President's problem today is more simple. He can now delegate in full

*In Adequacy, we developed the idea that "Capacity is of two kinds. Personal capacity comes from such basic qualities as intelligence, energy, stoutness of character, political astuteness, ability to handle people -- some natural qualities, some acquired -- as well as from the ability to understand situations and events that one gets usually only from experience. Institutional capacity comes from the prevailing practices and relationships, often informal, which permit a person without formal authority to make things happen nonetheless." [2]

to a single Cabinet officer the responsibility for the readiness of the armed forces, to include that of theater forces, and of their command and control systems. That Cabinet officer is the Secretary of Defense.

There is no need to quote chapter and verse of statute and legislative history. The broad scope of the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense is unquestioned.

His implicit moral and personal responsibility is equally clear, and this certainly applies to command and control systems. If there were another Pearl Harbor today, there is no way the Secretary of Defense could argue that he was not responsible for the condition of the system that failed.

Accountable? We can define this as "actionable responsibility," which says, "Can I, or should I, be called to account by reasonable men for my failure (for example, to prevent something like Pearl Harbor)?"

There, the answer is not so clear. Under the British system a Cabinet officer would probably resign in such an event. Our system is less straightforward.

We can note that neither in the Pueblo incident, nor in the failure of the Iran rescue mission, nor in the Beirut Marine disaster, was the Secretary of Defense at the time held accountable by any significant sector of public opinion, nor did he come forward in public and accept responsibility -- statutory, personal, or moral.

Whatever accountability he has is to the President -- who has the right to hold him accountable and to discharge him if he fails.

What about the authority of the Secretary of Defense?

Certainly that authority, while carefully circumscribed in many aspects (such as Service roles and missions, and the duties he can assign to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) is broad indeed.

We conclude as follows: The Secretary of Defense has all the authority he needs to provide for U.S. theater forces' command and control systems' readiness, provided he has the capacity to do so.

Is the necessary personal and institutional capacity within reach of the typical Secretary of Defense?

Yes.

Responsibility for Multinational Force Readiness

So far we have been speaking of U.S. theater forces' command and control systems only. But U.S. theater forces will virtually always be part of a multinational force, and in almost every case under the overall command of a U.S. officer.

What is the responsibility of the President and his Secretary of Defense for multinational theater forces' command and control systems?

No statute fixes that responsibility, nor does any directive. Such responsibility and accountability as may rest with the President, hence with his Secretary of Defense, derives from their obligations to the American people, and from their obligations, freely undertaken, to multinational coalitions.

When multinational coalitions as in Europe and Korea are established, the defense ministers of the nations concerned work out the mechanisms through which forces are provided and through which the commanders report.

As the chief of state and the defense minister of the largest and leading member of each Free World coalition, the President and Secretary of Defense both bear special responsibility.

The Unique Responsibility of the Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Defense is like no individual below him in the chain of responsibility. His is the lowest level at which an individual is responsible for both classic structures of responsibility -- the "operators" and the "providers."

The "operators" are the major theater forces' multi-service/multinational commanders with their subordinate structures, who use the "webs of command and control systems" to perform their missions. When these are the "CINCs" of U.S.-only forces, they are responsible by statute to the Secretary of Defense. He is their boss.

Multinational forces of coalitions are similar. In practice the Secretary of Defense has a major role in supervising, with his counterpart defense ministers, those theater forces' command arrangements and readiness, and their "webs of C² systems."

The "providers" of multinational commands are the national and military departmental entities, and their subordinate structures, which make the means available. The U.S. military department Secretaries, supervising their respective Service chiefs, are directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense also has a strong handle on the U.S. resources that can be used to influence what is provided to multinational commands.

We see the unique position of the Secretary of Defense. But what about what is under the Secretary of Defense in the operational chain? Here we address the link between the Secretary of Defense and the President on one hand, and the major operational commanders on the other. That link consists of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, in a special sense, the JCS Chairman.

The 1958 Amendments

To 1958, operational direction of the forces was not written in law as a JCS function. After World War II the JCS continued their wartime practice of delegating operational direction of each unified or specified command to one of its members as the "executive agent" of the JCS. In 1953 President Eisenhower, in the name of civilian control, made the Service Secretaries these executive agents.^[3]

In 1958, at President Eisenhower's initiative, the Congress amended the National Security Act of 1947 to do away entirely with the "executive agent" system for operational direction of the unified and specified commands and made the commands responsible directly to the Secretary of Defense.

The Secretary of Defense's Armed Forces Policy Council, which included the military department Secretaries and the Service chiefs, then wrestled with the revision of Department of Defense Directive 5100.1. This directive, to be published December 31, 1958, would put into effect the changes which the Congress had just enacted.

The amended law made clear the authority of the Secretary of Defense. He would be "the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense." He would have "direction, authority, and control" over the full department. The unified and specified field commands would be "responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for such military missions as may be assigned to them by the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the President."^[4]

The amended law did not mention that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in the channel of operational command. But it can be inferred that the legislative intent of Congress was to so place them, inasmuch as President Eisenhower's message transmitting his reorganization plan told of his concept that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would "serve as a staff assisting the Secretary of Defense in his exercise of direction over the unified commands," and would issue orders to these commands "under the authority and in the name of the Secretary of Defense."^[5]

Further, because the law already gave the JCS responsibility for "strategic plans," for "strategic direction of the armed forces," and for "establish(ing) unified commands" (all this subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense), and because the JCS Organization was in place and working, and because the law had just raised the Joint Staffs' authorized officer strength from 210 to 400, it was entirely logical that the Secretary of Defense approve the wording proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staffs that:

The chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the commanders of unified and specified commands. Orders to such commanders will be issued by the President or the Secretary of Defense, or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense. These commanders...shall perform such functions as are prescribed in the Unified Command Plan and other directives issued by competent authority.[6]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and their organization thereby became the Secretary of Defense's military staff for purposes of command and control of operational forces as they had long been for other purposes as well.

The JCS thus bear the chief burden of responsibility to the Secretary of Defense for the adequacy of theater forces' command and control, and for the adequacy of theater forces command and control systems.

The Essential Nature of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The essential nature of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is that they are a committee.

Further, they are a committee of five, in which four members have major primary responsibilities and interests which conflict, often seriously, not only with each other's but also with the collective, or corporate, responsibilities and interests of the committee.

These four members are the Service Chiefs -- the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Moreover, the JCS are a working committee of four-star officers which meets for several hours regularly twice a week -- and on call often beyond that -- and which is served by a very large organization.

This organization includes directly under the Chiefs a mirror-image three-star-officer working committee (the "operations deputies") made up of the Chiefs' personal representatives. The organization also includes a several-hundred-member Joint Staff and appendages thereto with three-star directors of functional staff directorates. This massive organization prepares and serves up the subject matter for the top (Chiefs') committee's consideration.

The processes by which such subject matter is prepared are elaborate and detailed. They are known colloquially as the "flimsy/buff/green" procedures.*

*General David C. Jones, then JCS Chairman, made a point of these procedures in his April 1982 testimony to the House Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee. After testifying, he was asked to provide a written "description of the joint staffing process." His reply in full is at Appendix A to this chapter.

The processes are strongly (some would say decisively) influenced by the fact that the subject matter will eventually be presented, first to the committee of operations deputies and finally to the JCS in committee themselves. Thus the (often strongly held) views of the Service institutions which each Service Chief member represents must be taken into account from the outset, and if possible reconciled early in the process or at least later.

Likewise, the substantive views which the members of the Joint Staff -- from action officer to three-star rank level -- represent to officers within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and elsewhere are themselves influenced by the fact that these officers are to represent the committee's judgments. Their freedom of expression and open participation in problem solving is thus constrained.

As in other subject matter areas, the weaknesses of the JCS in providing for effective theater forces' command and control -- and in building the command and control systems of theater forces -- derive almost entirely from the JCS's structure as a committee, and from the JCS style of functioning and of guiding their Joint Staff, in part self-chosen and in part unavoidable because they are a committee.

The present state of the UNAAF, as dealt with extensively in Chapters V and XIII of this text, is but one result of the essentially-a-committee nature of the JCS.

Weakening the Authority of the CINC

There is a profound connection between the way the Joint Chiefs of Staff function as a committee and the usable

authority of the unified command CINCs. As practiced in the mid-1980s, the JCS's ways weaken the CINCs' authority.

By law, the unified commander is responsible to the President and Secretary of Defense for the employment of assigned forces in the performance of military missions.

Toward his mission accomplishment, the most important authority a unified commander needs is the authority to determine how his command is to be organized and employed in operations -- and, stemming from that, how the forces of his command are to be trained.

In practice, if the unified commander in preparing an operations plan should make known his intent to organize and employ the assigned forces of a Service in a way contrary to that Service's policy (known as Service doctrine), the Service component commander can and often does take the issue to his Service chief who then can and often does raise the matter in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Taking an issue to the JCS takes time. It raises the tension level both in the command and in the JCS, which neither the unified commander nor the Chairman, JCS, want to do. So the commander chooses not to raise the issue. This state of affairs substantially limits the practical flexibility of the unified commander in operations planning and preparation.

In an emergency, the unified commander can use his mission responsibility to override the objections of a Service component commander; however, last-minute changes

from accustomed ways of operating make for confusion in operations.

Putting the matter another way, we can say that the CINCs operate under an unspoken policy line: "Don't bring anything minor to the tank."

The "tank" is Pentagon lingo for the conference room in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff meet.

In light of the way the JCS are currently organized -- that is, as a committee -- such instructions make good sense. In their realm the opcon, for example, of an itinerant Marine unit up around the DMZ does not loom large (until, of course, disaster strikes because of a failure to insure that its orders were clear and that it was under positive local operational control). The JCS have better uses for their time.

However, when a unified commander hews to a policy line that says "don't bring anything minor to the tank," the Service component commander then has the upper hand. He has no such instruction from his Service chief, who makes those decisions himself in any event.

JCS Responsibility/Accountability vs. JCS Authority/Capacity

We will look at responsibility and accountability within the JCS system on one hand, and at authority and capacity on the other.

To add a little more excitement and adrenalin to the discussion, let us say that the situation is this: A given

theater forces' command and control system (broadly defined) has been found seriously deficient -- in a Pearl Harbor-like disaster, or something surpassing a Beirut Marine tragedy.

Fortunately this failure has not been irretrievably cataclysmic -- it has not precipitated an all-out nuclear exchange between the superpowers. But it has been so grave, so evident, and so shattering to the confidence of the American public that it has indeed raised the question of command and control system adequacy at the strategic nuclear level.

Congress and the American people are outraged. They want to know "Why?" They want to know "How did this failure happen?" They want to know "Whom do the American people hold responsible and accountable for this disaster?" And they want to know "How do we prevent any such disaster from happening again?"

So we now have a Congressional investigation. Not a "Long Commission," as established by the Secretary of Defense for Beirut; not a "Holloway Committee," as set up by the JCS for the Iran Rescue Mission. But a full-scale, staff-supported, Congressional investigation, as for Pearl Harbor.

And this Congressional committee means business!

We begin our story at the point when the Congressional committee has chosen its staff. Hearings will soon begin. The Secretary of Defense and his people, the Joint Chiefs of Staff individually and collectively, and field commanders will be called up and grilled. Former defense officials,

former members of the JCS, and defense experts and legal authorities of all stripes are lined up for questioning.

Before the testimony begins, the Chairman of the Congressional committee has directed the committee staff to prepare preliminary answers to some questions.

The first question:

Can we pin this disaster on the JCS? What is the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the gravely inadequate state of the operational forces' command and control systems which this disaster has revealed?*

In a few days, the committee staff returns its preliminary answers to that question, with a covering summary which says:

Although there is no likelihood that the members of the JCS would use the law to avoid accepting responsibility, the statute mentions no JCS responsibility for command and control systems. The most relevant language of Section 211 is that the JCS "shall...prepare strategic plans...provide for the strategic direction...review the major materiel and personnel requirements of the armed forces..."[7] The statute does not place the JCS in the chain of command to operational forces.

Therefore, by statute alone, their responsibility can be seen as zero.

*Here we imagine a situation in which a command and control disaster has occurred and Congress is investigating. We could just as well have said that the U.S. President had one day had a startling premonition of such a disaster and had been so shaken as to resolve to do everything within his power to prevent one from actually occurring.

Neither does the basic DoD directive explicitly mention command and control systems. Directive 5100.1 does say that "The chain of (operational) command runs from the President and the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the commanders of unified and specified commands." It has one key provision:

...It shall be the duty of the JCS....To review the plans and programs of unified and specified commands to determine their adequacy, feasibility, and suitability for the performance of assigned missions.... [and] to determine the headquarters support, such as facilities, personnel, and communications, required by commanders of unified and specified commands....[8]

Thus, by directive, responsibility for command and control systems is certainly implied.

However, it is undeniable that, whether their responsibility for command and control system readiness is explicit or not, the JCS have moral responsibility for the unsatisfactory conditions which permitted this disaster.

The JCS are the nation's military experts. Command and control is a sphere of essentially military expertise. The JCS uniquely occupy a position over the field commands and between the field commands and the Secretary of Defense and the President. Time and again, the JCS have asserted that command and control, and command and control systems, are their business.

There is no way the JCS can evade responsibility -- call it "moral" responsibility if you like, but it is full responsibility nonetheless -- for the failure of command and control, and command and control systems, which led to this disaster.

The next question posed by the Congressional committee then becomes:

Can we therefore hold the JCS accountable?

And the answer is:

We can and should hold the JCS accountable. Although not explicitly stated, theirs is the moral, and clear actual, responsibility for the inadequacy of the command and control systems which this disaster has revealed. The JCS failed to meet their responsibilities; it inexorably follows that they must be held accountable.

However, the JCS are a committee of five. It was through their committee-based ways of operating that these command and control systems were placed into the field. This committee-based system derives from and is clearly mandated by the statute. Its nature has been well known to the Congress for years. Under its system compromises and accommodations were inevitable as the JCS went about providing the command methods and command and control systems which failed. As in the Iran Rescue Mission and the Beirut Marine disaster, the deficiencies revealed here are built into the committee approach which the law establishes.

What does it mean to hold the full five-man committee "accountable" for the product of its members? How can we in practical terms "relieve for cause" or castigate as a group the "full committee?"

This answer is affected by the staff's answer to the next two questions, which are:

What was the authority, by statute and DoD directive, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to have taken measures to prevent the disaster? And,

What was their capacity to exercise such authority?

And, in brief, the staff's answers are:

When the members of the JCS can agree, their authority both collectively and as the Chiefs of the individual Services is great indeed. When they agree, they need no more authority.

Likewise, so is their collective capacity great, if they agree. They can obtain resources, they can allocate the resources they obtain, they can make clear what is expected of these resources.

In a crisis, they quickly agree and get the job done. In long-range planning, that is not always so. Especially, when the decisions are difficult (as they almost always are when Service roles and missions are involved, or basic Service doctrines are at stake, or Service-significant organizational issues are in the forefront, or when the amounts of resources, or their specific allocation when scarce, are up for JCS judgment) and the members of the JCS cannot agree (as is inevitable when decisions are difficult), then decisions are left unmade, or are reduced to the lowest common denominator (as is frequent in such cases). The authority of the JCS then becomes amorphous, or weak, or nil.

And, under such conditions, the capacity of the JCS to exercise authority is likewise severely limited or nonexistent. Despite the high competence and personal capacities of the JCS members as individuals, as a committee they become weak to powerless.

In its research, the committee staff sought to gain insights as to the military concept of "dereliction of duty." They reviewed the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

The applicable article of the UCMJ is Article 92, which reads in part:

...Any person subject to this chapter who --...is derelict in the performance of his duties; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.[9]

And the "model specification" for that part of the article:

Model specification: In that, , at (location) on or about (date), having knowledge of his/her duties, was derelict in the performance of those duties, in that he/she either negligently, willfully, or by culpable inefficiency, failed to , as it was his/her duty to do.[10]

The elements of proof thus seem to be:

- o An individual knew what his duties were, and
- o Failed to perform those duties, either negligently, willfully, or by culpable inefficiency.

The Manual for Courts Martial has this discussion on "dereliction in the performance of duty":

A duty may be imposed by treaty, statute, regulation, lawful order, standard operating procedure, or custom of the service....A person is derelict in the performance of duties when that person willfully or negligently fails to perform [them]...or when [he] performs them in a culpably inefficient manner. When the failure is with full knowledge of the duty and an intention not to perform it, the omission is willful. When the non-performance is the result of a lack of ordinary care, the omission is negligent. Culpable inefficiency is inefficiency for which there is no reasonable or just excuse. Thus, if it appears that the accused had the ability and opportunity to perform his duties efficiently, but performed them inefficiently nevertheless, he may be found guilty of this offense. However, an accused may not be charged under this article, or punished otherwise, if his failure in the performance of his duties is caused by ineptitude rather than by willfulness, negligence, or culpable inefficiency. For example, a recruit who has earnestly applied himself during rifle training and throughout record firing may not be punished because he fails to qualify with the weapon; nor may a sergeant who, however inefficient, has made an honest effort to maintain direction, be punished for becoming lost with his

squad on a maneuver; nor may an artillery battery commander who has zealously applied himself to the instruction of his battery in firing be punished because his battery fails to achieve a satisfactory score in a firing test. (underlining added)[11]

The Congressional committee staff saw that, while "ineptitude" was definitely present, there was no way under the circumstances in which a charge of "dereliction of duty" could conceivably be made against the JCS. As one staffer put it: "The UCMJ is for individuals, not committees. And in any event, their collective ineptitude was ordained by the way they are established by law as a committee."

The committee staff's summary of its preliminary memorandum concludes:

Thus we have, on one hand, a legislation-mandated condition under which grave responsibility (albeit for the most part moral responsibility, but no less real withal) for operational command and control of the forces, and for the readiness of the command and control systems through which command and control is exercised, has been given to a committee of senior military officers, and a situation in which their accountability as a committee is total. And on the other hand we have a condition in which, because of the nature of the committee, they are in a practical sense helpless.

Inasmuch as circumstances conspire to render their practical authority and capacity nil, their being held strictly to account is impossible.

In terms of "dereliction of duty" the JCS defense is "legislatively mandated ineptitude."

After weeks of searching questions of, and lengthy testimony by, a parade of witnesses, and after weeks of further research, the hearings end. The preliminary

analysis of the committee staff, as summarized above, still holds true.

The Congressional committee's conclusion:

The responsibility and accountability of the JCS for insuring the readiness of the command and control systems for operational forces are, because of the nature of the JCS as a committee, not matched by practical, usable authority and meaningful capacity.

Now for a Look at the Chairman

Let's assume that the Chairman of the Congressional investigating committee had also told the committee staff: "I want you to give me the answers to the same questions as to the responsibility and accountability, and the authority and the capacity, of the JCS Chairman as an individual."

Here is the summary of our imagined preliminary study by the committee staff:

The first question they posed was: "Given that a specific theater forces command and control system, broadly defined, has been found to be seriously deficient, what is the statutory responsibility of the Chairman, JCS?"

The staff summarized its answer as follows:

We can find nothing in the statute under which the Chairman, JCS -- in his own right and aside from the duties for which he is responsible as a member of the JCS -- has even an implied responsibility for command and control, or command and control systems. His only duties, as Chairman per se, are to preside over the

JCS, to set the agenda for their meetings, to assist their carrying on their business, and to inform the Secretary of Defense when they cannot agree.

The Chairman of the Congressional committee then asked, what about the Chairman's responsibility, per DoD directive?

The staff's answer, summarized:

The basic directive, DoD Directive 5100.1, contains no specific duties whatever for the Chairman, JCS. It is possible that the Secretary of Defense in another directive, or in a personal charge to the Chairman, JCS, has said that he holds the Chairman responsible for duties of one kind or another as to the command and control of operational forces, or as to the readiness of the forces' command and control systems. But we do not find it so.

The committee staff summary in this imaginary investigation went on to say that:

In light of the above, we are unable to say that the JCS Chairman can be held accountable in any court of law, or in all realism by this committee, for the deficiencies in command and control, and in the forces' command and control systems, which this disaster revealed. In view of what his directives state, it would be manifestly unfair to hold him so accountable.

Yet the staff continued as follows:

However, although there is no specific statement of responsibility in either the statute or DoD directive, we believe that in the natural order of things the JCS Chairman personally accepts responsibility and holds himself accountable. There is no one else, no single person beyond the Secretary of Defense in the Department of Defense, who can shoulder that responsibility -- unfair or not.

The Chairman of the Congressional committee noted the above, and in the hearings the following exchange occurred (Note: The reader should remember that, although true to life, this is fiction):

Committee Chairman. Admiral Crowe, I appreciate that by statute and by DoD directive you are charged with no specific responsibility for the readiness of the command and control systems which failed so disastrously on this occasion. And I accept that, for that reason, a court-martial or this committee would be unable to hold you personally accountable for the failure.

But I ask you, Admiral, if you accept any personal, or moral, responsibility for the inadequacies which this disaster revealed, and if you consider yourself accountable for the failure of these command and control systems.

Admiral Crowe. Mr. Chairman, I have no choice but to accept personal responsibility and to hold myself accountable. I am the senior military officer in the armed forces. I have an adult lifetime of military training and experience. I occupy the key individual military position between the Secretary of Defense and his operational commands. My oath of office has these words, "...and I shall well and faithfully perform the duties upon which I am about to enter." The conditions which led to this disaster were avoidable. I am responsible that they were not discovered and corrected. There is no other individual to whom the Secretary of Defense can turn.

The Chairman (in our true-to-life fiction) then said:

Committee Chairman. The Joint Pearl Harbor Investigation Committee of the 79th Congress had these words of wisdom to offer at the end of its report of investigation, and I quote, "In a well-balanced organization there is close correlation of responsibility and authority."

Admiral Crowe, do you have the authority -- and the resources (the capacity, as it were) to exercise that authority -- commensurate with the responsibility which you say you bear, and commensurate with your self-described accountability for failure, with respect to command and control systems?

And the answer:

Admiral Crowe. No, sir.

The Committee Staff's Findings in Tabular Form

Continuing our little fantasy for one more section of this work, in the two tables which follow are summaries of the committee staff's preliminary study, conducted before the hearings began, for the committee's consideration.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Given that a specific theater force's command and control system is seriously deficient, what is the statutory responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

None in statute either for U.S. or multinational forces.

By Department of Defense directive, what is the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for such a deficiency?

Substantial, for U.S. forces. Not as clear for multinational forces.

What is this group's moral responsibility for such a deficiency?

Complete, for U.S. forces; major for multinational forces.

To what extent can, or should, the Joint Chiefs of staff be held accountable if a specific theater force's command and control system fails in crisis or war?

They should be held accountable. In practical terms they cannot be so held even for U.S. forces. Why not? Because they are a committee.

How adequate is the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to insure the practical readiness of a specific command and control system?

If they can all agree, they can do just about what they choose to gain resources and to make the best use of resources provided. But they can rarely agree when the decisions are difficult, which they almost always are.

How adequate is their institutional and presumed personal capacity?

Because of the requirement to agree, their institutional capacity is severely limited, notwithstanding their individual personal capacities. There is a grave mismatch between what is expected of them and what they can do in the JCS system.

Table 1

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Given that a specific theater force's command and control system is seriously deficient, what is the statutory responsibility of the Chairman, JCS?

None, either for U.S. or for multinational forces.

What is his personal and moral responsibility?

Complete for U.S. forces; major for multinational forces. Why? Because he "sits in the chair" and if there is failure he should have done better.

To what extent can, or should, the Chairman, JCS, be held accountable if a specific theater force's command and control system fails in crisis or in war?

He cannot be held accountable by the "system;" only by the public and by his conscience. He can and should hold himself completely accountable because he "sits in the chair."

How adequate is the authority of the Chairman, JCS, to meet the above responsibility and accountability?

By statute, entirely inadequate. By what he can be given by the Secretary of Defense, considerably less so.

How adequate is his institutional and presumed personal capacity?

Institutional capacity at present is inadequate. Personal capacity is not in doubt.

Table 2

The staff's conclusion: We can do nothing about redressing the JCS' situation; they cannot in practice be held accountable as a group. But the great responsibility and accountability which rest on the Chairman, JCS, himself -- which, although personal and moral only, are undeniable in view of his position -- are entirely out of balance with both the authority and the institutional capacity in his possession. This situation can and should be corrected.

Generals Jones and Meyer Speak Out

So much for fantasy. Now back to the real world.

In February 1982, General David C. Jones, then Chairman of the JCS and due to retire in a few months, made public his dissatisfaction with the JCS system and his conviction that important changes were essential both in the way the JCS did its business and in the law that governed its makeup and responsibilities.

General Jones' criticisms, in brief, were:

- o The military advice given by the JCS is not timely, crisp, very useful, or very influential. National leadership therefore looks elsewhere.
- o The reason the advice is not very useful is that Service interests dominate JCS recommendations at the expense of broad national joint military interests. This results in little meaningful JCS advice on: resource allocation/budget levels, force structure, new weapons, joint doctrine, joint training, unified command plan.

- o The basic cause is the contradictory roles of the Chiefs -- as the chiefs of the Services, where they must uphold traditions, capabilities, esprit, morale; and as members of the JCS, where they are supposed to subordinate Service interests to broader considerations and this is not possible.
- o The conflict between Service and joint responsibilities is reflected in the Joint Staff, where officers come from the Services and go back to the Services -- and the Services retain close ties.
- o Responsibility and authority are diffused in the operational chain of command. The JCS are a committee, not suited for military command. The unified commanders are too weak. The Services determine the structure and readiness of their forces, and the commanders have little voice in determining the capability of the forces with which they would have to fight.
- o The JCS, the Joint Staff, and the CINCs thereby do not have the authority, the stature, the trained personnel, or the support necessary to plan and execute joint activities.^[12]

In essence, General Jones proposed to strengthen the role of the Chairman, to improve the quality of the Joint Staff, and to do away with what he called "the current system in which each Service has almost a de facto veto on every issue at every stage of the routine staffing process."^[13]

Although General Jones visualized some changes in the law (such as making the Chairman by statute the "principal military advisor" and making the Joint Staff responsible to the Chairman and creating a Deputy JCS Chairman), he proposed to retain dual hatting -- the four Service chiefs would continue to serve as members of the JCS.

In March 1982, General Edward C. Meyer, Army Chief of Staff, made public his own analysis of JCS deficiencies, and his more far-reaching recommendations. He proposed removing the "dual-hat" roles of the Service chiefs, setting up a senior military advisory council separate from the JCS, and making the JCS Chairman alone responsible for the Joint Staff. [14]

1982: Congress Takes Up the Issues of the JCS

Then, in April-August 1982, the Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee held hearings on the subject. [15]

Among other witnesses, the subcommittee heard two former Secretaries of Defense (Brown and Richardson); two former Deputy Secretaries of Defense (Packard and Gilpatric); five present and former Chairmen, JCS, (Vessey, Jones, Moorer, Lemnitzer, and Taylor); eleven present and former Service chiefs (Johnson, USA; Watkins, Hayward and Holloway, USN; Gabriel, Allen, LeMay, and Ryan, USAF; and Barrow, Wilson, and Greene, USMC), two unified commanders (Train and Starry), and one former Director of the Joint Staff (Hansen). (Admiral Train had also been Director, Joint Staff.)

The range of opinions was wide -- from General Taylor and Secretary Richardson who favored going beyond General Meyer's proposals, on one hand, to Admiral Moorer and General Lemnitzer, who found little fault with the existing organization and recommended only that it be better used, on the other.

Mid-1982: A New Joint Chiefs of Staff

In July 1982, during these hearings, there were installed three new members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (General John W. Vessey, Jr., Chairman; Admiral James D. Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations; and General Charles A. Gabriel, Air Force Chief of Staff).

On July 28, 1982, the new JCS Chairman, with General Gabriel and Admiral Watkins at his side, testified in hearings of the House Armed Services Investigations Subcommittee. General Vessey made known "what the current Joint Chiefs are doing about the Jones and Meyer recommendations." Clearly, he was determined to work with his colleagues to do the maximum possible within the system. [16]

General Vessey then made good his intentions. Two years later, the New York Times' Pentagon correspondent, Richard Halloran, was able to write that General Vessey "has made the present Joint Chiefs...more influential than any of their predecessors in 20 years." [17]

General Vessey's most impressive feat was that he brought the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff along with him as he went about his work.

On June 14, 1983, after his first year in office, the JCS Chairman appeared again before the Investigations Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services. The occasion was yet another set of hearings on legislation to change the JCS. General Vessey was accompanied by his fellow JCS members.

During those hearings, General Barrow, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, said:

...this particular JCS is an effective, good JCS. I will make the prediction that the one that is going to be in existence on July 1, with my successor and the successor to General Meyer, is going to be a good JCS.

The key to all that is that fellow sitting here.

At that point General Barrow actually put his arm around General Vessey's shoulder. He continued his complimentary remarks, saying "...this fellow has not given himself enough credit."^[18]

Conclusion: The Basic JCS Deficiencies Remain

In 1984, General Vessey was reappointed to his second two-year term as Chairman. In October 1985 he turned over his duties to his successor, Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., U.S. Navy.

In late 1985 it was not possible to say if the new Chairman would try to get the kind of mileage out of the JCS system that General Vessey had, or that he could succeed if he tried.

As General Barrow said in the sentences just before the testimony just quoted, "... the JCS is very personality sensitive."

What is the state of the JCS's performance, even today?

Here we must return to the idea of "the standard of excellence" by which the JCS are measured. The question is "what do the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Congress, and the American people have a right to expect?"

As we have said, command and control systems are the means through which the will and policy guidance of the highest national authorities are transformed into responsive and effective action by the operational military forces of the United States and of coalition commands in which the United States has joined.

Command and control systems are far more than simply the sensors, communications links, data processors, command centers and other such materiel of a command. Broadly defined, command and control systems include people -- commanders, staffs, and others -- and their ways of organizing and operating, their procedures, and their working relationships, both formal and informal.

In view of the benefits provided to the President and other national authorities by command and control systems of the highest quality in peace, crisis, and war, in view of the operational advantages in all levels of conflict conveyed by command and control systems superior to those of an enemy, and in view of the grave consequences if command and

control systems fail to function as they should, it is in the highest interest of the elected leaders and representatives of the American people, and it should be a policy objective of the greatest urgency and importance, that the command and control systems of theater forces be of the highest quality that technology, military foresight, and human ingenuity can provide.

We say that, in the field of command and control with which this study is concerned, and with due regard to all that has been done in recent years, the JCS is not measuring up.

We say that the charters of multiservice operational commanders and the Service-dominated culture which underlies and accompanies those charters have led to a situation in which the responsibility and accountability which these commanders bear is not matched by the authority and capacity which they possess.

We say that the "wall of the Service component" which is at the root of these weak charters and prevailing culture always inhibits and often prevents multiservice commanders from exercising proper command supervision over their commands' mission readiness. As to the subject of this work, the combination of weak charters and Service-dominated culture has kept these multiservice commanders from the exercise of proper influence over the evolution of command and control systems essential to these commanders' mission performance.

Although the Korea command has to some degree overcome these obstacles, we conclude that the assessment carried in

Adequacy probably remains essentially true for theater forces' command and control systems in general. That assessment was, and is:

Theater forces' command and control systems are not well tied together, top to bottom. They are not being exercised adequately under the expected conditions of war. Great sections of them will probably not survive the attack against them which is sure to come in war. For the typical senior commander, allied or U.S., whose forces must use these systems, they represent the largely unplanned splicing together of ill-fitting components which have been delivered to his forces by relatively independent parties far away who have coordinated adequately neither with him and his staffs nor with each other. And they neither exploit the present capabilities of technology nor does the system for their development adequately provide that future systems will.[19]

Our judgment: Measured against that high standard of excellence which can and must be achieved, the JCS remain wanting.

Pervasive and Endemic Weaknesses in Command and Control

As laid out in Chapter XIII, preceding, and summarized beginning page 13-8, we say that there are pervasive and endemic weaknesses in the chain of operational command, dangerous to the interests of the United States.

We say that these weaknesses stem in a fundamental way from the strengths of the individual Services in the institutional mechanisms of the Department of Defense and in the Service-oriented culture which runs throughout the armed forces. These Service strengths are themselves exercised

through the Service chiefs as they sit as members of the essentially-a-committee Joint Chiefs of Staff.

We say that over the years since 1947, and especially since 1958 when the concept of operational commands responsible to the Secretary of Defense was written into law, those who have been Secretary of Defense and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been, however unwitting or well-intentioned, parties to a weakening of the operational chain of command which has by now become taken for granted. This condition of weakened chains of command is pervasive, endemic, and unacceptable.

We say that further action is needed if the command and control systems, broadly defined, in the hands of theater forces are to approach the standard of excellence which is achievable and which must be reached in the national interest.

As to command and control, and the systems for exercising command and control, of theater forces, we say that the deficiencies in effectiveness listed in the paragraph quoted on page 14-36, has, at the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, been a matter not of the lack of individual authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but of their lack of capacity. When they can agree, they have by virtue of their positions (four of them) as chiefs of Service ample authority to bring about the agreed action.

But they all too often have been unable to agree.

The problem in essence is this: In difficult matters such as resource allocation, Service doctrines, and Service

prerogatives, the natural loyalty of the Service chiefs to their Service interests usually makes agreement virtually impossible. When this translates into decisions on theater forces' command and control systems, the JCS and their Staff too often have become ineffective, either defaulting in their responsibility for objective, useful military advice to the Secretary of Defense or arriving through their processes of negotiation at a poor substitute.

Their failures in theater forces' command and control have thus derived from their structure as a committee -- and from their style of functioning and of guiding their Joint Staff, in part self-chosen and in part unavoidable because they are a committee.

Command and Control: Inappropriate for a Committee

In addressing how the JCS and their Chairman meet their responsibilities for theater forces' command and control we must of necessity raise a larger issue -- how the JCS system performs in the full range of its responsibilities and functions.

This raises the basic question: What is properly expected at the seat of government of the nation's senior military officers? What is their role? How do they best fulfill that role?

It may be debatable whether the Secretary of Defense would wish to have a very strong military staff for every purpose. He may find it desirable in many fields (defense policy, broad force requirements, national strategy priorities, arms control, military assistance, broad resource

allocation, for example) not to create at his level a highly influential purely military staff -- simply because the independent and well-articulated views of such a body might in important cases be contrary to his own.

But we are speaking here of command and control. Although exercised at the highest level by the President, a civilian Commander-in-Chief, and by the Secretary of Defense, his civilian "deputy commander-in-chief," command and control is at its roots a military process.

Command and control broadly defined is a composite of many military processes -- staff coordination procedures, doctrine development and application, intelligence collection and evaluation, tactics, force employment, weapons use, logistics, organization, training, and so on, not to speak of such military intangibles as motivation and discipline -- as well as of the military communications and the military operations centers with their people, their hardware, and their software which provide the means of command and control.

If there is any field in which the Secretary of Defense requires competent military advice and assistance and in which military men and institutions should be responsible to see to it that effective means exist for the will of the President and Secretary of Defense to be worked all the way down through the chain of command, it is in this field of command and control of the forces for which the Secretary of Defense is responsible.

But the hard truth is that to plan and exercise military operational command and control is singularly inappropriate for a committee.

We will now lay out options for bringing the authority and capacity of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or of their Chairman, into line with the responsibility and accountability which these men collectively and individually bear for the readiness of theater forces' command and control systems.

Our first option is to change the law in fundamental ways.

Option One: Substantial Changes in the Law

We can address this option by reviewing the path of legislation that followed the 1982 hearings of the House Armed Services Committee Investigations Subcommittee.

The path of this legislation was essentially a search for language that would take care of the criticisms leveled by General Jones, without fundamentally changing the "dual-hatted" nature of the JCS.

These legislators and their staffs were not seeking major structural change. They were not seeking to do away with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nor with the roles that four of them have as Service Chiefs.

Although Congressman Ike Skelton in April 1983 introduced a bill "to abolish the Joint Chiefs of Staff and establish a single Chief of Staff for the National Command Authorities, to establish a National Military Council, and for other purposes," and although the House Armed Services Committee held hearings on that bill -- the Skelton bill never got off the ground in committee.

One may wonder why.

Here we have, on one hand, a parade of experts who conclude that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are ineffective, largely because they are a committee in which four members have outside loyalties inconsistent with the committee's purposes.

And, on the other hand, we have a profound unwillingness by the Congress to change in any fundamental way that system.

Why?

The answer is simple. Not everyone believes that the JCS are all that ineffective. Not every respected military man agrees with General Jones or General Meyer. Many believe that the committee features of the JCS were purposely built into the American military institution by representatives of the people, for good reason. They would have it no other way.

Listen to the testimony of a former JCS Chairman, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer:

...Mr. Chairman, you asked in your letter if I had any recommendations concerning the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization. My recommendation is a very simple one: Leave the organization alone.

Our organization is the best organization that can be put together when one stops to think that the United States is a great democracy, whose government is based upon checks and balances.[20]

Or General Barrow:

The current Joint Chiefs of Staff system with its built-in checks and balances is compatible with our form of government....Under the Jones proposal, civilian authority, deprived of all but one source of advice, and in all likelihood one philosophy of war, will be weakened.

My considered military advice to this committee is to reject the Jones or any other proposal to reorganize or change the current Joint Chiefs of Staff system.[21]

Or General Lew Allen, Jr., then Air Force Chief of Staff:

...I believe very strongly it is important that the service chiefs continue to play a dual role of the head of service and a member of the JCS....[22]

Or General Harold K. Johnson, former Army Chief of Staff:

I believe that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has all of the power that he needs....I disagree with that proposal (that dual-hatting be eliminated)....[23]

Or General Louis H. Wilson, Former Marine Corps Commandant:

...it is helpful to refer to the intent of Congress concerning this legislation...as reconfirmed in 1958....The establishment of a single Chief of Staff over the Armed Forces is prohibited....The creation of an overall Armed Forces general staff is prohibited. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is denied command authority....The Joint Staff is prohibited from operating or being organized as an overall Armed Forces general staff....

Let me tell you the chairman has the authority that the chairman is willing to exercise....The present organization is undeniably subject to improvement, but there is ample authority and opportunity to effect improvement under present law....Now General Jones proposes a deputy chairman....The creation of such a billet...is objectionable...because the deputy would be a de facto senior to the chiefs of service without the responsibility associated with authority.[24]

Or, finally, General Lyman Lemnitzer, U.S. Army, former Chairman of the JCS:

Our current system...provides a source of collective wisdom which served us well in the past and will, I am confident, in the future....[It] provides the checks and balances which moderate extreme views. While some may criticize this system as unwieldy, I do not. After all, this country of ours is based upon a system of checks and balances....[25]

There were indeed many, both civilian and military, who testified convincingly that the JCS needed major structural reform. But will a Congressional committee report out such legislation, or will the two houses of the Congress enact it, as long as testimony such as the above is given in hearings?

Problems of Crafting and Passing Legislation

Here is what happened in 1982-85.

In August 1982, after its hearings, the House Armed Services Committee reported out a bill of fairly modest change which:

- o Created a Deputy Chairman of the JCS;

- o Placed the selection of the members of the Joint Staff under the authority of the Chairman, JCS (rather than by the JCS with the approval of the Chairman as does present law);
- o Said that the Chairman, JCS, would manage the Joint Staff himself (instead of "on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" as per current law);
- o Said that the Joint Staff would support the Chairman (as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as per current law).

The bill also established a Senior Strategy Advisory Board, to consist of 10 retired former JCS members or former CINCs, which would "provide such advice and recommendations on matters of military strategy and tactics as it considers appropriate to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff." This provision took a feature of General Meyers' proposals, which had visualized eliminating the dual-hat nature of the JCS, and spliced that feature onto General Jones' proposal which retained dual-hatting, combining both into one bill. [26]

The committee's recommended bill was passed by the House of Representatives and sent to the Senate.

In December 1982, in the "lame duck" session of Congress held after the Congressional elections, the Senate Armed Services Committee went through one day of hearings on the House bill. Generals Jones, Meyer, and Taylor and Admiral Holloway, along with Chairman White, who was in his last weeks as a member of Congress, all testified.

However, the Senate Armed Services Committee took no action that year, simply remarking in its published report of hearings that the issue should be a matter for the next session of Congress.

In 1983, two new bills were offered in the House. They became the subject of new hearings by the Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, under its new Chairman, Congressman Nichols of Alabama.

One of these was the Skelton bill, which would abolish the JCS entirely.^[27]

The other was the Department of Defense's own proposal.

Aside from the five members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who appeared before the subcommittee as a group in support of the bill proposed by the Department of Defense, only two other witnesses testified at these hearings.

Admiral Moorer, former JCS Chairman, not unexpectedly entered his unalterable objection to the Skelton bill.

Although he recognized that it had no chance of being passed, General Maxwell D. Taylor, U.S. Army (Retired), former JCS Chairman, supported the Skelton bill.

But the Skelton bill never came to a vote in the subcommittee. It was simply too radical a measure. All discussion focused on the DoD-sponsored bill, which provided that:

- o The law would be changed to place the Chairman, JCS, as an individual, in the chain of command. The law would now read, "The chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary and through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the combatant commands. Orders to combatant commands shall be issued by the President or the Secretary through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff."

- o Restrictions on the size of the Joint Staff and on the tenure of its members would, in effect, be removed. [28]

That was all. Nothing more.

Secretary Weinberger and his General Counsel wrote the subcommittee in support of the bill.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also testified in its support, each member giving his own rationale.

Admiral Moorer testified that he supported the DoD bill.

On the Skelton bill, General Taylor remarked that "unhappily its time may not have come." He then commented on the DoD-sponsored bill. Among other recommendations was this:

...a new paragraph, to make the Chairman, Joint Chiefs a regular member of the National Security Council. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by law, have long been responsible for advising the NSC, they have never had a representative of their own at the meetings. The Chairman has normally attended, but that has been at the invitation of the Secretary of Defense. [29]

The House Bill in 1983-1984

In September 1983, the House Armed Services Committee reported out a new bill, H.R. 3718, which:

- o In the language recommended by the DoD, placed the Chairman, JCS, in the chain of command;
- o As to the providing of military advice:
 - Made the Chairman, JCS, a full member of the National Security Council;
 - Made the JCS Chairman responsible for providing advice in his own right, retaining the JCS as "principal military advisors;"
 - Made the JCS Chairman responsible for determining when issues being considered by the JCS shall be decided;
- o And as to the Joint Staff:
 - Removed the 400-officer limit, and provided for nominations from among the "most outstanding officers" of each Service and selection by the JCS Chairman;
 - Gave the JCS Chairman greater management authority over the Joint Staff, in essentially the same language as the 1982 bill. [30]

The House of Representatives passed H.R. 3718 and sent it to the Senate.

The Senate Armed Services Committee held hearings on the House bill in the 1983 legislative year.

Speaking for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in these hearings, General Vessey said:

- o As to its provisions which placed the Chairman, JCS, in the chain of command, he and the other members of the JCS fully supported the language and intent of the House bill.
- o As to the provision which made the Chairman, JCS, a member of the National Security Council in his own right, while neither he nor the JCS had recommended such a step to begin with, they believed it to be desirable as written in the bill. General Vessey said that in this respect they disagreed with the Secretary of Defense, who was not in favor of that provision.
- o As to certain provisions of the bill which prescribed in detail how the views of the CINCs were to be taken into account in the processes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he and the JCS believed such language to be unworkable.^[31]

Neither in 1983 nor in 1984 did the Senate Armed Services Committee report out the House bill, nor its own version of such legislation.

In May 1984 Chairman Nichols of the House Armed Services Committee Investigations Subcommittee, who was by that time impatient with the failure of the Senate Armed

Services Committee to do anything at all with the House bill, succeeded in having the House bill added as an amendment to the annual Department of Defense authorization bill as passed by the House. He let be known his determination to see that bill, or something like it, become law in 1984, one way or another.

But in strenghtening the Chairman (see the two "bullets" on page 14-47), Chairman Nichols and the House of Representatives had set themselves up for a counterattack.

Especially, by adopting General Taylor's recommendation that the JCS Chairman be made a member of the National Security Council, the House had created a fundamental and unnecessary split between the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and had raised the sensitive issue of "civilian control."

The practical effect of the proposed NSC provision had been achievable without legislation; the President can invite the JCS Chairman to meet with him and anyone else whenever the President so chooses. President Reagan's methods with the JCS Chairman are exemplary in this regard; General Vessey was the practical equivalent of a member of the NSC. [32]

And, even if in law, the NSC provision would be readily circumventable if the President so desired. Thus the NSC membership stands well enough as it is.

But once the NSC provision was raised, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense wrote the House Armed Services Committee that the DoD did not concur. When

questioned in hearings, General Vessey said that he and the other JCS members agreed with the provision.

The counterattack on Chairman Nichols' proposed bill was not long in coming.

"Let's Stop Trying to Be Prussians"

On June 10, 1984, John Lehman, Secretary of the Navy, writing under the above title in the Washington Post, said that:

The bad idea, recently attached to the House defense bill, creating a Prussian-style general staff reporting to a strengthened chairman is, like most bad ideas, an old one. In its modern form, first put forward by Gen. Joseph L. Collins in 1945, and overwhelmingly rejected in the 1947 consolidation, it has reappeared in essentially its present form about every five to 10 years. It is usually pushed by a coalition of civilian arm-chair strategists, who don't really understand the Pentagon bureaucracy, and by uniformed military staff officers, who understand it all too well.

Always the diagnosis is the same: interservice rivalry supposedly results in poor strategy and poor military performance. Accomplishments like the 35 years of NATO deterrence and the 215 successful applications of U.S. military power in crisis management are ignored, while the isolated instances of failure such as the tragic Iranian rescue mission are highlighted with the JCS organization chart provided as the scapegoat.

It is an easily understood phenomenon that all post-war permutations of this bad old idea called for more power to Washington staff officers and for severely diminished authority for field commanders and civilian leaders alike. Hardly surprising, since nearly all have been drafted by officers whose principal career progressions have been as staff officers, an unbroken line from World War II to the present.

The current version, like its predecessors, would create a very powerful, uniformed chairman out from under the secretary of defense by putting him in his own right as an equal member of the National Security Council. The 700-man uniformed joint staff is to be detached from JCS control and assigned directly to the person of the newly powerful chairman. Finally, this all-powerful chairman and his general staff is to be placed directly over the field commanders in the chain of command, interposing a new layer between the secretary of defense and the field commanders.

Thus, in the name of reform, this bad idea subverts two of the most important principles of American military institutions: civilian control, wherein authority to decide whether to conduct military operations is reserved to civilian authority advised by service chiefs, and command responsibility, wherein authority to plan operations once decided, including tactics and timing, is vested primarily in those who have to carry them out, the operational and joint commanders, not the unaccountable military staffs.

The principle of civilian control is as old as the American republic. It runs to the heart of government by the consent of the governed and no one proposes to abolish it. But civilian control depends on civilian knowledge and in this case knowledge also means access to a variety of opinions. To interpose the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff between the president and the secretary of defense and service chiefs, or between the defense secretary and the field commands, would in practice restrict that advice to the opinion and decision of one man, the chairman himself, and his general staff bureaucracy. The history of such arrangements is not a happy one.

Hubert Humphrey's strong opposition to this bad idea when it was put forward in 1956 is worth considering:

"Many of those who are proposing a change in our Joint Chiefs of Staff system apparently do not realize that such a change would do violence to the basic concepts on which this nation is founded. I seriously doubt that those who so willingly condemn our JCS system have analyzed the philosophy on which it is founded and the mechanism of its functioning. I doubt also if those who would so willingly desecrate the JCS have ever contemplated the dangers of the supreme general

staff concept which they advocate as a substitute. There is no middle ground between our American way -- the JCS system -- and the Prussian way -- a form of supreme general staff. It is my firm conviction that there has never been a greater example of the inherent genius of our governmental institutions than the American developed JCS concept. By this method the United States has solved the great dilemma of how to keep a democratic nation militarily strong without injecting into that nation's body politic the fatal germs of militarism. Through the device of the JCS, our nation possesses a means for strong, wise and effective military planning at the seat of government without having to utilize the form of highly centralized supreme general staff system which is anathema to every concept of democracy....The unique and fundamental feature of the JCS is that it combines authority and responsibility."

....The bad idea -- that a Prussian-style organization chart will solve our military problems -- threatens to drive out the very good idea espoused by President Reagan and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger -- that a more accountable, responsible defense establishment cleansed of 35 years of uniformed bureaucratic growth will help good men do their best, in the context of a supportive nation.

Much progress has been made to that end. The functioning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff today is far better than four years ago. The tasks remaining to complete the reforms now begun are not just in the JCS. The Office of the Secretary of Defense staff is too large and bureaucratic, the service staffs are too large and bureaucratic, the chain of command has too many layers with too many uniformed bureaucrats. Some functions need shifting from OSD to JCS and the services. The critical integrating and cross-service functions of OSD need strengthening. The issues are complex, but the path of reform has been mapped clearly. Congress must reject the old bad idea and begin the more difficult task of acting on the good idea in partnership with Secretary Weinberger.[33]

By July 1984, the Senate had passed its version of the defense authorization bill. It contained no language at all

on the JCS system. The House and Senate versions then went to the joint conference committee.

The story around Washington in August 1984 was that Secretary Lehman had the support of former Secretary of the Navy, now Senator, John Warner, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, in his campaign to defeat the House bill. Chairman Nichols' outlook for passage was bleak.

From July through September 1984, when the jointly agreed bill was finally passed by both houses, the struggle between the Senate and House continued.

The Senate members of the Senate-House conference committee had little interest in Chairman Nichols' proposals. But Mr. Nichols held fast to the position that something constructive should be written into law which would reflect the concerns of the House of Representatives, gained from two years of hearings, as to the weaknesses of the JCS system.

House members of the joint conference committee sought to change the law to place the Chairman, JCS, in the channel of command to the combatant commands. But in the face of Senate opposition (including that of Senator John Tower, outgoing Chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee), their effort did not succeed. Neither did they succeed in having the JCS Chairman made a member by statute of the National Security Council.

They succeeded only in having the JCS Chairman designated by law as the "spokesman" for the unified and specified commanders.

The JCS Chairman was also given authority to "select" members of the Joint Staff (as "nominated" by the Services).

The allowable tour length of Joint Staff members was extended from two years, extendable to three, to three years, extendable to four.

And finally, the Secretary of Defense was required to insure that Joint Staff performance was given appropriate consideration in military promotion, retention, and re-assignment policies.^[34]

That was all. It was very little, in the eyes of those who believed strongly that the JCS system should be fundamentally reformed. Indeed, what was achieved by end-1984 was a good deal less than the JCS themselves wished and not even as much as so outspoken an opponent of change in the present system as Admiral Moorer had favored.

Events in 1985

But the battle in the Congress was not over. With Senator Tower's departure from the Senate, Senator Barry Goldwater became Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. He and Senator Sam Nunn, the senior minority member, were determined to do something about the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Their committee staff had since 1983 been working on a comprehensive study of the organization and decision-making procedures of the Department of Defense. In January 1985, the two senators instructed the staff to get busy on a report.

Then, in the spring of 1985, the President established a Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management under former Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard. The Commission's membership included experienced civilian authorities on defense management as well as one retired officer from each of the military Services. While the original impetus of this Commission came from public and Congressional concern over the Department of Defense's business practices, such as extravagantly costly tools and aircraft parts, the Commission's charter also required it to look into the Joint Chiefs of Staff and unified commands.^[35]

In October, accompanied by a series of press releases from Senators Goldwater and Nunn, the Senate Armed Services Committee made public its staff's report. Titled "Defense Organization: The Need for Change" and 645 pages long, the report made a powerful case for reform of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the unified command structure. Among other charges, it said that there is an "imbalance of emphasis on functions versus missions... imbalance of Service versus joint interests... [and] inter-Service logrolling...." It said that the Secretary of Defense had insufficient power and influence. And it said that changes in the law were required.^[36]

In November and December 1985 the Armed Services Committee held 10 days of hearings on defense organization. The usual series of witnesses spanned the typical spectrum of opinion. But the tide of opinion had begun to turn. The stand-patters began to be outweighed by those who said that fundamental change was necessary in the Joint Chiefs of Staff system and in the unified command system. In December, the Secretary of Defense wrote the committee that

he no longer objected to a four-star Deputy Chairman of the JCS provided that the deputy (whom he would also have be director of the Joint Staff) would be junior in rank to the Service chief members of the JCS.

Meanwhile the House of Representatives was not idle. By November, the House Armed Services Committee had reported out a new bill, the "Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1985." That bill, amended slightly on the House floor, quickly passed and went to the Senate.

As passed, the House bill made the JCS Chairman the principal military advisor to the President. It said that the duties assigned to the JCS by current law would now be the responsibility of the Chairman himself. It gave the Chairman the new function of submitting program and budget proposals to the Secretary of Defense. It authorized the Secretary of Defense to direct that the chain of command to combatant commands run through the Chairman. It made the Joint Staff responsible to the Chairman. It said that the Chairman would supervise the commanders of the combatant commands, in addition to acting as their spokesman. It established a Deputy Chairman, to outrank all other serving officers except the Chairman, who would also be director of the Joint Staff and who would act for the Chairman in the latter's absence.

The House bill also provided that any Service chief member of the JCS, if he disagreed with the military advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "shall submit to the Secretary of Defense" such opinion in disagreement -- and provided a like process for military advice to the President.^[37]

With the President's Commission due to make a preliminary report in late February 1986 and with the Senate Armed Services Committee planning to develop its own legislation responding to the House bill early in the 1986 session of Congress, the stage was set at end-1985 for both legislative and executive decisions of perhaps considerable moment with respect to Option One, substantial changes in the law.

Option Two: Continue along Present Path

But at end-1985 "do nothing with the law" remained an option.

Secretary Lehman's remarks of 1984 take us to that option. It is to continue along the present path -- which Secretary Lehman characterized as seeking, within present law, "a more accountable, responsible defense establishment cleansed of 35 years of bureaucratic growth."

By his performance in almost four years as Chairman, General Vessey, in the eyes of many, made the enactment of new legislation less necessary. He in effect confirmed what General Barrow said in the 1982 hearings:

[The Joint Chiefs of Staff system] needs the discipline that comes from leadership that is positive and persuasive, and gets that institution to work in harmony, together, on the problem.[38]

But is it enough to continue "along the present path?"

Experienced military officers like Admiral Moorer and General Lemnitzer, and civilian officials like Secretary Lehman, have said that it is.

Other experienced military officers, like General Taylor and Admiral Harry D. Train, Retired, and many former high officials of the Department of Defense like Harold Brown and Robert McNamara, have said that considerably more is necessary.

Most observers agree that these are not simple issues and that civilian control, diversity of military advice on policy decisions, and the like are matters of fundamental and entirely legitimate concern. Nor are all present and former defense officials and all the officers from any given Service, including the Navy, of like mind.

Admiral Train's is an interesting case. As a three-star officer, he had served as Director of the Joint Staff. He was a unified commander -- Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command -- when he testified in 1982 in the House subcommittee hearings: "I personally support former Chairman Jones' proposals as he submitted them."

Admiral Train further testified:

I believe that all line military activity can be divided into essentially two basic functions. The first of these functions is programming, budgeting, and procurement of weapon systems, weapons, people, and support....The second function is the deployment and employment of these weapon systems, weapons and people in support of our Nation's political objectives....

...You cannot write your active plans with the objective of supporting a procurement strategy.... Service secretaries and service chiefs, over the decades, have intuitively, unconsciously, and innocently attempted to impose their procurement strategy on accountable operational commanders.... Their constituencies have demanded it....

...What I would recommend and what General Jones' proposals would accomplish is to take the operational function and separate it from the existing programmatic function and make a completely separate audit trail of operational command and authority....

The place where these two audit trails coincide would be at the Secretary of Defense level.[39]

Implications of the Present Path

The major implication of continuing along the present path for command and control matters is that the present path fails to take into account adequately the "audit trail of operational command and authority" so ably described by Admiral Train, and that command and control is inseparable from this audit trail.

Recall the (page 14-23 above) conclusion of our fictitious Congressional committee after investigating our postulated catastrophe in command and control:

The responsibility and accountability of the JCS for insuring the readiness of the command and control systems for operational forces are, because of the nature of the JCS as a committee, not matched by practical, usable authority and meaningful capacity.

And recall that, in the same "true-to-life fiction" the Committee Chairman asked the JCS Chairman:

"Do you have the authority -- and the resources (the capacity, as it were) to exercise that authority -- commensurate with the responsibility which you say you bear,

and commensurate with your self-described accountability for failure, with respect to command and control systems?"

And that the JCS Chairman had answered: "No, sir."

Admiral Train's "audit trail" must of necessity include the means of command and control.

We can get an idea of the difficulties involved in solving problems of these means of command and control, working along the present path, by reviewing the story of the creation of the Joint Tactical Command, Control, and Communications Agency (JTC³A).

In June 1983, the Deputy Secretary of Defense sent a memorandum to officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The memorandum said in effect: Establish a joint agency for managing tactical command and control.

By September 1983, the draft charter of such an agency, to be known as JTC³A, was developed. Then came nine months of negotiations leading to DoD Directive 5154.28 establishing the JTC³A.

One issue: To whom should the JTC³A report? OSD was adamant; the JTC³A must report to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C³I; cross-Service program control could be effectively achieved no other way. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted that the JTC³A report to the JCS; to the JCS nothing is more clearly a military matter or more fundamental to military operations than command and control and its systems.

OSD then suggested that the JTC^{3A} report not to the JCS but to the JCS Chairman.

The Service Chief members of the JCS would not agree; there was no way the Services would give up their cherished flimsy/buff/green method of deciding even the most technical and detailed issues of command and control.

The solution: The JTC^{3A} reports both to the ASD (C^{3I}) and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a body.

Another issue: What would be the JTC^{3A} jurisdiction?

The negotiated answer was consistent with the strongly held Service-provider views. The JTC^{3A} would deal only with interoperability of Service-provided systems, through interfaces -- i.e., interface standards and interface definitions. After some intensive debate, toward interoperability the JTC^{3A} would be allowed to develop a "joint architecture," but in 1985 this was not a door anyone could drive a truck through.

Immediately after its activation in September 1983, the JTC^{3A} then faced another issue: Who would "task" (i.e., give orders to) the new organization?

The answer: As negotiated with the Service Chiefs in the JCS, neither the ASD (C^{3I}) nor the JCS can task the JTC^{3A} without the other's signature on the tasking instruction.

As the JTC^{3A} at end-1984 and in 1985 began to gather and organize its resources, it was still confronting the

opposition of the Services and their provider establishments at every step of its young life -- in its fight for people, and for money, and for jurisdiction.^[40]

In testimony March 2, 1985, to the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Wallace H. Nutting, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Readiness Command, said that the U.S. Army will spend \$30 million in FY 1986 to change its new long-range combat communication system because these radios (a super-high-frequency multichannel satellite system) could not communicate with similar Air Force radios. Senator John W. Warner said, "It's incredible, it's almost atrocious, that it got that far."^[41]

We say that, as long as the Services continue to exercise the kind of independence in matters of command and control that they now exercise, problems like that cited by General Nutting and Senator Warner will continue to come up.

Our assessment, therefore, is that this option of "the present path" -- notwithstanding such initiatives as the JTC³A and no matter how expertly the JCS and others are guided by any Chairman -- will not lead to the kinds of changes that are required if theater forces' command and control systems are to reach the standard of excellence which they can and, in the national interest, must achieve.

Note that we are seeking not merely to "get by," not simply to "avoid disaster," but to achieve that fully attainable standard of excellence which the challenges to theater forces' command and control systems demand be reached for the good of our country.

The present path will not take us there.

Option Three: Major Change within the Law

Our third option is to make the maximum possible, including major, changes in the JCS system with no (or possibly very little) change in the law.

In this option the Secretary of Defense would undertake to do by his own authority that for which he unsuccessfully sought authority from Congress in 1983 and 1984, and more.

This option requires the Secretary of Defense to say to the Congress that his proposals to change the law were unnecessary and that, although they had raised controversies within his own department, he could have handled, and now will handle, those controversies himself.

The present law gives him substantial authority, should he so decide.

The Role of the Secretary of Defense

This brings us to a fundamental question. Why hasn't the Secretary of Defense done more?

Or, relating to the final remarks of Chapter XIII, what is the likelihood that the Secretary of Defense would ever say with strength and conviction what I have him say in pages 13-26 through 13-48 to the JCS and to senior commanders?

Even though to do so, and of course to follow up, would largely solve his and the President's problems of command and control, is it conceivable that the Secretary of Defense would speak in that way?

My answer is that I believe no Secretary of Defense since the 1958 amendments has really understood his problem. None has appreciated the full meaning of those amendments. None has fully realized the significance of his operational responsibilities.

So the broader question is, "How should the Secretary of Defense look at his job?"

In his 1983 testimony, General Taylor addressed this question:

In closing, a final word about the Skelton bill, H.R. 2560. Although unhappily its time may not have come, it contains many features worthy of continuing study and further development.

One of the most important is the proper role of the Secretary of Defense in the chain of command in contrast to his role as Secretary of the Department of Defense. In the latter he is unquestionably -- by law -- "the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense." Let me remind you that in the channel of command is not a part of the Department of Defense where the Secretary generates armed forces for use in war.

The chain of command is the channel whereby the President as Commander in Chief issues orders to the combatant forces which are outside the Department of Defense. So, what is the Secretary in the chain of command, where he wears another hat?

Conceivably, he could be a number of things. For example, he could be "the principal assistant to the Commander in Chief in all matters relating to the chain

of command," parallel language to that describing his role in the Department of Defense. Or he might be a Deputy to the Commander in Chief with such duties as the latter might assign. The third possibility is for him to be an independent command authority in the chain of command just below the President, responsible to him for the combatant commands and all they do in peace and war. There are undoubtedly other options.

Today, no one can give an authoritative answer to these uncertainties I raise. Until an official decision is reached as to what is expected of the Secretary in the chain of command, particularly in time of war, we shall not be able to decide many of the issues arising in the course of a thorough reorganization of the JCS. Anything this committee can do in the future to eliminate the present uncertainties regarding the role of the Secretary in the chain of command will be a major contribution to national security.[42]

Even General Taylor raises unnecessary questions. These matters are already decided in the law. The Secretary of Defense already has operational responsibilities.

To drive home this point, we must go back to the questions of responsibility and accountability, raised earlier in this chapter. See our discussion of the Secretary of Defense, pages 14-5 to 14-7.

Here, we simply say that it does not seem possible, or just, that the Secretary of Defense would be neither responsible nor accountable for a failure in command and control or in the command and control systems through which command is exercised.

That being the case, he would be well advised to "think of the investigation" which the disaster, sure to come if he does not act, will bring, and to do now all that is in his power to make that chain of command better.

Separating Out Command and Control

First, the Secretary of Defense and his people need to sort out a conceptual problem. They need to separate what Admiral Train called "the audit trail of operational command and authority" with its implied content of command and control, from other matters such as defense policy and what Admiral Train called the "programmatic function."

The former, operational employment and details of command and control, are not fit matters for committee-style resolution.

The latter, which relate to civilian control, assuredly are.

Indeed, civilian control must extend to military operational matters as well. Secretary Lehman said it well:

In American military institutions...authority to decide whether to conduct military operations is reserved to civilian authority advised by service chiefs....

More than that, policy guidance as to how to conduct military operations, along with establishing the fundamental objectives of those operations, is also clearly the province of civilian control.

But the Secretary of Defense needs to say something like the following to his military experts: "It doesn't do me much good to establish policy and basic objectives if your radios can't talk to each other. Because I am responsible for the 'operational audit trail' cited by Admiral

Train, I now intend to use the authorities of my office to take many of the practical issues of command and control out of the Service-negotiating, committee-style, framework of the JCS."

Further Imaginary Remarks by the Secretary to the JCS

The power of the Secretary of Defense is substantial. If he uses it intelligently and articulately, he can get a great deal done with no change whatever in the law.

To illustrate that power and its appropriate use, here is what the Secretary of Defense could say, in private, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- after he had well-prepared the ground:

"Gentlemen, as I see it, I am responsible to the President for achieving excellence in all the functions of the Department of Defense.

"I do this in part by making fundamental policy decisions which set the course and establish the pattern by which we do our business in accordance with the statutes that govern us.

"After considerable study, I have concluded that, while I see no evidence of major change to come in the law, within the law I must bring about some fundamental changes in the ways in which you, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, do your business in the field of command and control of military forces.

"As with my remarks the other day on strengthening the authorities of our major operational commanders (see page 13-26), I have discussed this matter with the President. He has approved what I am about to say.

"I have also informed the appropriate people in the Congress of my intention to take these actions with regard to my responsibilities in the field of command and control of operational forces.

"I define 'command and control' broadly, to include the procedures, organizational arrangements, command relationships, concepts of operation, and so on, related to the disposing of military forces and to their employment under our operational commanders, both multiservice and multinational.

"We do essentially two things in the Department of Defense. Within the resources provided to us, we generate military forces and see to their readiness. This is done, at my direction, essentially by the military departments.

"And we dispose and employ the military forces thus generated. According to statute, this is done, at my direction, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the operational commands.

"Although a number of charges have been made that the Joint Chiefs of Staff can and should do a much better, more resource-efficient, more strategy-responsive, job as we in the Department of Defense go about generating the forces, what I have to say today addresses only the latter function -- employing the forces.

"It is this latter field which involves 'command and control.'

"I consider myself equally responsible for both the employment and generating functions. I am not satisfied with the ways in which my responsibilities for the command and control aspects of the employment function have been met.

"In addressing command and control, however, I will also address the ways in which we generate the systems of command and control through which is achieved that standard of excellence in employment which we seek.

"I have decided that I must, within the authorities which I possess, direct you gentlemen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to change your ways of operating, very substantially, in the field of command and control.

"The law says that the combatant commands 'are responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for such military missions as may be assigned to them by the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the President.'

"Since 1958, DoD directives have said that 'the chain of command... runs through the Joint Chiefs of Staff...' to these commanders.

"In 1983, the JCS proposed, and I so recommended to the Congress, that the law be changed to add the words 'The chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary and through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the combatant commands.' We also proposed these words: 'Orders

to combatant commands shall be issued by the President or the Secretary through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.'

"We had broad support from past Chairmen and Chiefs, to include Admiral Moorer among others, for those proposed amendments to the law.

"The Congress has not seen fit to enact those sentences into law. They said only that the Chairman, JCS, would be the 'spokesman' for the unified and specified commanders; but I had already so designated him within my own authority.

"I therefore propose to gain the practical effect of my proposals, without legislation.

"Let me call to your attention one of the authorities which I now possess. It is in this provision of law, enacted in 1949, in the first amendments which the Congress made to the National Security Act of 1947:

The Secretary of Defense may, without being relieved of his responsibility therefor, and unless prohibited by some specific provision of this act or other specific provision of law, perform any function vested in him through or with the aid of such officials or organizational entities of the Department of Defense as he may designate.[43]

"Under that authority and specifically the phrase 'through, or with the aid of, such persons...', I have chosen the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a body as my channel to the unified and specified commands. Using that same authority, I now intend to use the Chairman, JCS, rather than the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a group, as my means for assuring effective operational command and control of the unified and specified commands.

"I do not intend that the Chairman, or in his absence the acting Chairman, be a part of the 'chain of command.' The law clearly states that the operational commanders are responsible to the President and to me. It also states that the Chairman '...may not exercise military command over... any of the armed forces.'

"However, I am satisfied that the law does not prohibit my granting the Chairman as an individual, instead of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a group, authority to issue instructions to the commands, on my behalf and in my name.

"And, in the interest of reasonable checks and balances and toward retaining the considerable advantages of the pluralistic approach which is built into the Joint Chiefs of Staff system, I want it understood that, if any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should take exception to an instruction which the Chairman has issued in my name, he should so inform me without delay, giving his reasons.

"Now, for the Joint Staff.

"I want it understood that, with respect to all matters of operational command and control, to include the command and control systems through which operational command and control is exercised to and within those commands, the Joint Staff, under its Director, is my staff.

"I say again: I am responsible by law for the employment of the armed forces of the United States as well as for their generation. The employment of military forces is an art and science which requires military professional experts. There is no point to my establishing a separate

staff of professional military experts to assist me in my employment functions when there already is such a body in the Department of Defense -- the Joint Staff.

"So, under the same authority granted to the Secretary of Defense in 1949 which I cited earlier (Note to reader: see page 14-70), I now charge the Joint Staff, under its Director, with assisting me, through the JCS Chairman, in my responsibilities for employing the armed forces of the United States.

"And I want it understood that, in so assisting me in matters of command and control, the Joint Staff will not engage in the system of staff work known as the 'flimsy/buff/green' which it now routinely uses. These staff processes are singularly inappropriate to matters of command and control.

"And in accordance with my authorities earlier cited, I am instructing the Chairman, JCS, to manage the Joint Staff (in matters of command and control) on my behalf, as well as (for other matters) on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and me. I do not consider that using these cited authorities to so instruct the Chairman is prohibited by law.

"My only other recourse would be to take the Joint Staff (and possibly the JCS also) completely out of the field of command and control and to give that staff function to another staff or DoD agency.

"Let me say a few words here about the need for the Secretary of Defense and the President to have available to

them on important issues a variety of positions and opinions.

"I would call this 'diversity.' It is not unlike the political notion of 'pluralism.'

"Diversity is not anathema to a military organization. Indeed, armies have a pluralistic bent, with their infantry (and different kinds of infantry), and their cavalrymen (likewise), and the heterogeneous mix of other branches that make up the amalgam of armies. Likewise, the U.S. Navy, so monolithic in appearance to an outsider, is a diverse mix.

"The Services together form a diverse mix (each one itself being more or less pluralistic). The nation needs the Services' diversity. It adds competition and vitality, and personality and esprit.

"Even though diversity at the high levels of defense decision-making is messy, I am in favor of it. I am satisfied that it helps keep us from making mistakes. It insures that other lines of thought are added to the debate.

"The Congress has taken pains to foster diversity in the defense organization, and rightly so. I, too, seek diversity with all its advantages.

"But diversity carried too far is anarchy. Or it leads to an inability to decide rationally and to act decisively.

"As the 'flimsy/buff/green' processes described by General Jones reveal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their Joint Staff today are, in the field of command and control, victims of one of their virtues -- diversity, or pluralism.

"I do not prohibit the use of such processes in major issues of resource allocation, or in broad strategic planning, or in matters of political-military policy. Within reason, they are perhaps justified there.

"But they have no business in a proper military staff for the assistance I need in carrying out my employment, my command and control, responsibilities.

"So my solution is this.

"I ask that the Chairman, JCS, with the advice of the Director if he so chooses, decide when a matter comes under the category 'command and control' or 'employment,' and thereby requires other than the flimsy/buff/green procedure.

"Again, in the interest of checks and balances, if any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagrees with the Chairman's call on a specific occasion, he should so inform me.

"Likewise, should a member of the JCS disagree with the product of the Joint Staff, as submitted to me through the Chairman, on a matter of command and control he should so inform me. The Chairman should establish simple procedures through which this can be done at the level of the Chiefs themselves, without the use of the 'flimsy/buff/green' system of staff process which allows a Service chief or his agents, as General Jones said, to 'exercise a veto over the substance of papers at every stage of the process.'

"Now, gentlemen, only you and your people know how your system works. And only you and your people can write the procedures for your new system which I am directing.

"I would like the Chairman to see that such procedures are quickly written and placed into effect, and to report to me in two or three months that such has been done and how it has been done.

"And I do not want any of you to doubt that I mean business. I want this done."

One Modest Change in the Law

We can extend Option Three with one modest change in the law.

Having said the above to his Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense would turn to his General Counsel and say something like this:

"I would like to make it possible to nominate the Director of the Joint Staff to four-star rank.

"As you know, since the earliest days of the Joint Staff, from 1947 when its numbers were limited to 100 officers, that has been a three-star position.

"In those days, and even into the 1960s, there were no other three-star positions on the Joint Staff. Now there are five, not including the Directors of the DIA, DCA, and DNA (all of whom work with the Joint Staff). The Joint Staff and its appendages are well over the 400-officer limit set up in the law. It is a very big operation.

"It seems to me that -- as for the Chief of Staff, Allied Command Europe -- the responsibilities of the Director fully justify his holding four-star rank.

"The law, since 1947, has said that the Director 'must be an officer junior in grade -- I say again, grade -- to each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.'^[44]

"Although the Joint Dictionary does not define 'grade,' I presume that it means that, say, a lieutenant general or vice admiral is junior in grade to a general or an admiral, and that, while four-star generals or admirals are in the same grade, within grades there is relative rank.

"Rank seems to depend on the date of promotion to a grade, but not entirely on that. For example, a lieutenant general appointed to be Army Chief of Staff immediately becomes senior in rank to all other Army generals (unless the Chairman, JCS, is from the Army) but not senior in precedence to those members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff already appointed whom he then joins.

"And, I note that, regardless of their dates of appointment, within the Department of the Navy (but, according to the Marine Corps, not in joint matters) the Chief of Naval Operations is always senior in rank to the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

"I would like you to work it out that we can have a four-star Director of the Joint Staff who is, however, regardless of his date of appointment, always junior in rank, that is, precedence, to each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"I have never thought we needed a 'deputy JCS Chairman.' But I would very much like to have a four-star Director of the Joint Staff.

"I expect that this means a change of a single word, namely 'grade,' in the law. If so, let us seek it, explaining why we believe it is necessary."

Implications of Option Three

So much for what is meant by Option Three: substantial change within the law.

The first implication of Option Three is "Would the Secretary of Defense ever take it upon himself to look at his command and control problem in this way, or, if he did, to make remarks such as these?"

It is indeed to be doubted. Not many, if any, of our Secretaries of Defense have in the past thought in terms of their "operational" as well as their "provider" responsibilities.

Not many Secretaries of Defense have been blessed, or afflicted, with a "sense of the tragic," with a sense of their personal responsibility if or when something goes wrong in the operational chain.

It may well be too much to ask that sort of outlook of a Secretary of Defense -- especially when he has enough to do already in the "provider" half of his job, and when he is being told by experienced officers of impressive credentials and achievement that "these are military matters, and our military institutions are doing a good job taking care of these military matters."

It would take a certain mixture -- an Elihu Root-like strong sense of responsibility, insight, trust in his own judgments, and iron determination to see the matter through -- for a Secretary of Defense to proceed along the lines laid out in our scenario above in Option Three.

For one thing, he would have to say to the military men something that is true but that would be hard for them to take. He would have to say, "Yes, these are military matters, but, no, you are not doing them well. So I am stepping in, before the investigation, not after. Because, you see, I am responsible."

For another thing, he would have to be ready to deal with a Service Secretary or other figure who might object in public to the Secretary of Defense's setting up "a Prussian-style organization chart."

His answer there is to remind such objectors that, unlike a Service Secretary, the Secretary of Defense has statutory operational responsibilities, that he must organize his available means effectively to meet those responsibilities, and that what he is doing is in no way like the behavior of Kaiser Wilhelm, Count Bismarck, and the von Moltkes.

Such a stance may not be easy to carry off. But the position of the Secretary of Defense is unassailable. He is simply carrying out the duties mandated to him by the law, using the means the law in its wisdom provides.

And the Secretary of Defense, who would take such action, would be worthy of the gratitude of his fellow countrymen, whether his countrymen realized it fully or not.

But there is one very real question raised in Option Three: Can the Secretary of Defense do this sort of thing without change in the law?

Chairman White of the House Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee raised this issue himself in the Congressional Record in 1982. He said, in effect, that he was not clear in his own mind whether the Secretary of Defense could place the Chairman in the chain of command, in his own right, without a change in the law.^[45]

Evidently, the Secretary of Defense, in submitting his proposed legislation in 1983, had arrived at the conclusion, either that he could not, or that he should not, so place the Chairman without a change in the law.

Should he attempt to do so now, without a change in the law, he would no doubt incite that number who claim to fear an "all-powerful Chairman and his ('Prussian') general staff." These people might even generate enough of a fuss to cause the Secretary of Defense problems in the Congress. The evidence is, however, that the problems would not be in the House of Representatives and that the Secretary of Defense would in due course have his way in the Senate.

Indeed, it is likely that the House Armed Services Committee, having been frustrated in 1984 by its sister committee in the Senate, would come to the aid of the Secretary saying that he did it in the national interest, that he did it on his own only because the Congress would not, and that in any event the authority can be construed to be his to begin with.

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APPENDIX A

The "Flimsy/Buff/Green" Process

After his April 1982 testimony to the House Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee, General Jones was asked to provide written answers to this question:

Question: The Subcommittee has heard a great deal about the joint staffing process. Some have criticized the intricate procedures by which the Joint Staff develops formal position papers. These procedures, they claim, in effect give each of the Services a veto over the substance of the papers. As a result, the process is slow and cumbersome. More important, critics suggest that the quality of military advice suffers from being watered down to satisfy all of the Services....

Please provide a brief description of the joint staffing process....

General Jones's reply is reproduced here in its entirety. It deserves careful reading.

Answer: A typical joint staffing action can be illustrated by outlining how a request from the Secretary of Defense for JCS' views on an important defense issue would be handled.

Such a request would be received by the Chairman. In turn, it would be forwarded to the Director, Joint Staff and to the appropriate staff office in the Joint Staff. An action officer (O-4/O-5) [major/lieutenant colonel, or Navy equivalent] would be assigned the task of putting together a draft response. At the same time, each of the Services would receive a copy of the request and designate an action officer to work with the Joint Staff action officer in preparing a draft response.

At this point, the staffing process may take a number of courses -- depending on such variables as time

allowed to develop a response, magnitude of the task, and relationship of the current request to other recent or ongoing JCS efforts. In order to illustrate all aspects of the process, we should assume that ample time has been allowed and that no recent or ongoing JCS effort is applicable. (There are procedures for shortening the staffing process in order to provide rapid assessments or advice. Also, if the JCS had recently completed such a relevant assessment as part of the Joint Strategic Planning System process -- the formal administrative mechanism for providing JCS advice pertaining to the planning, programming and budgeting process -- the Chiefs might simply forward this product in response to the SECDEF's request.)

The Flimsy, Buff, Green process begins with the Joint Staff action officer convening a meeting with the Service Staff action officers. At this meeting, he or she would establish a schedule for preparing the response and discuss the substance of the paper to be prepared. The Joint Staff action officer would have general guidance from his Director on the content of the paper. Similarly, the Service action officers would have received guidance on the paper's content from their Service Operations Deputies. If time allowed, the Joint Staff might request the views of the appropriate CINCs. Otherwise, the Joint Staff would attempt to represent their views.

The Joint Staff action officer is under institutional pressure to find a position with which each of the Services can agree. To do so means far fewer hours spent preparing subsequent drafts, generating issue papers, and managing additional staff procedures. And, to the extent that the paper for which he is responsible is issue-free, it is seen as a signal to his superiors that he is a skillful and successful staff officer. Likewise, the Service action officers are under institutional pressure to insure that Service roles and missions are not abridged, that major Service weapons systems are emphasized, and that a proposed strategy does not imply more than a fair share of emphasis for another Service.

The Joint Staff action officer must prepare the initial draft of the response -- called the Flimsy. In doing so, he or she is bound to consider the views of the Service action officers and the appropriate CINCs. In creating the Flimsy, each Service representative might write a portion of the paper, a portion of the paper

might be provided by a CINC or his staff, or the Joint Staff A/O [action officer] might assume the entire task. Generally, because the Service staffs are larger and have Service-unique data and analysis not available to the Joint Staff, the Joint Staff action officer is very dependent on Service Staff inputs.

Once the Flimsy is prepared, the Joint and Service action officers meet to discuss its content. Each presents his or her Service's position on the content of the paper. Suggestions to change the Flimsy are discussed, with the consensus view usually prevailing. To do otherwise would increase the administrative workload of preparing issue papers on divergent views. For a substantive paper of some length, each Service action officer may have as many as 100 recommended changes. They quickly learn the art of compromise -- each agreeing to support the balance of the changes proposed by the other in return for equal support. The Joint Staff action officer then publishes a Buff paper -- reflecting the consensus of the meeting. Minority views which are not reflected in the Buff can be re-argued in the next step of the process.

Each of the action officers who worked on the Flimsy takes the Buff paper to his Service or Joint Staff planner (O-6) [colonel or Navy captain]. The Planners, who work directly for the Service Operations Deputy, are carefully chosen officers who usually have some previous experience in JCS matters and have demonstrated an ability to articulate and support Service interests. Their full-time job is to interface with the Joint Staff process and insure that their Service views are reflected in JCS products. The Planners repeat the review process, making recommendations and seeking support for their views. At this point, there may be as many as 20 issues left to be resolved. The Planners generally are able to resolve all but two or three of them. The Joint Staff Planner then amends the Buff to reflect the consensus of the planners and publishes a final draft on Green paper. Minority or divergent views not reflected in the Green paper may be readdressed at the next level of reviews.

The Service action officer and Planner present the Green to their Service Operations Deputy (on some occasions an additional review layer -- the Deputy Operations Deputy -- is added). The background, issues, and divergent views expressed in the earlier drafts (Flimsy and Buff) are presented along with

recommended changes. The likely views of the other Services are discussed and arguments to counter them are developed.

The Operations Deputies meet with the Director of the Joint Staff to discuss the Green. On many topics of lesser importance, the Operations Deputies, if in full agreement, will approve the paper and the Director can sign and transmit it to the Secretary of Defense on behalf of the JCS.

The Operations Deputies represent the first level of review at which a truly joint perspective is brought to bear on the issue. However, the Operations Deputies are dual-hatted, as are the Chiefs, and they are under great institutional pressure to represent Service as well as national interests. Each is prepared for meetings by his Service action officers, recommended courses of action must be coordinated through the Service Staff, and he arrives at the meeting with a long list of Service-oriented recommendations. Institutional resilience is most evident here, for the success or failure of the Operations Deputy in arguing in behalf of Service views is highly visible throughout the staff.

The Operations Deputies are also under pressure to resolve as many of the remaining differences as possible before asking the Chiefs to address the issues. Hence, significant compromise may occur at this level of review. Yet to be resolved issues and divergent views, if any, are highlighted, and the Green is placed on the agenda for the Chiefs to consider.

The Chiefs then consider the Green, make adjustments as necessary, and send the paper to the SECDEF. Over the years, the Chiefs have been in full agreement on 99% of the papers addressed. In instances where disagreement exists, the dissenting Chief(s) may add divergent views to the memo sent to SECDEF.

In sum, the current Joint Staff process encourages compromise, relies too heavily on Service participation, and depends on staff officers who are well versed in Service interests but are ill prepared to address issues from a joint perspective.

Chapter XV

A MATRIX FOR DECISION

Our options in Chapters XIII and XIV were sharply defined: proceed along the present path; make major change in the law; and make major change, with little or no change in the law.

In making major change with little change in the law, our imaginary Secretary of Defense, especially in Chapter XIV, stretched to its limit or beyond what the current law and expressed intent of the Congress permits him to do. While this was an interesting way to look at problems and solutions, it was in practical terms a questionable option.

What is to be done? As 1985 ended, this was being addressed in the two houses of Congress, in the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, and in the Pentagon. In these circles there seemed to be no doubt that in 1986 something would be done. Few considered "proceed along the present path" a likely outcome.

Whatever is done in 1986 will be a combination of legislative and executive action. In the Congress the key players are the two committees on the armed services. In the executive the key players are the President, his Blue Ribbon Commission, and the Secretary of Defense.

In this new chapter, we change our approach to "options." We look at what might be done as a combination of action by Congress and action by the Executive, and we offer a different

way for participants and observers to look at the issues involved.

A Framework for Analysis

Some basic propositions can form a framework for this analysis.

- o There is no need to change the basic bi-functional structure of the Department of Defense. The Service Secretaries with their Service Chiefs remain responsible to the Secretary of Defense for providing the forces, and the combatant commanders remain responsible to the Secretary of Defense for employing the forces in the performance of military missions. What is needed is to improve the way in which the two parties go about meeting their responsibilities.
- o Although our study is about theater forces' command and control, we must take into account the broader scope of the theater commander's responsibilities.
- o The matter is one of responsibility and authority: Do the unified command CINCs have the practical authority to match their responsibilities?
- o Restructuring the Joint Chiefs of Staff to give the Chairman more authority (to include making him the supervisor of the unified command CINCs) will increase the usable authority and influence of those CINCs. We therefore must address the way the Joint Chiefs of Staff are organized and operate.

- o Whatever new authority and influence is given to the unified command CINCs or to the Chairman of the JCS will likely be taken from the Service Secretaries and their Service Chiefs. The redistribution of influence is of major public import.

- o We will address the authorities of only the unified commanders. Since the forces of each specified command are only from the U.S. Air Force, the specified commanders can be assigned full command through the Service channel and the problems are minimal.

In presenting this analysis, we tend to take as having been established certain conclusions developed in this study on the present authority of unified commanders and on the adequacy of the present Joint Chiefs of Staff organization. Not all who reviewed the draft of this study as circulated in May-July 1985 agree with those conclusions. One of the more articulate statements of another viewpoint was that of Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Toward insuring that this view is made known and considered, we reproduce the USMC memorandum in full at Appendix A to this chapter.

The Structure of Unified Command Authority and Influence

Let us look again at Figure 4-1, with its types of "lines of command." The meanings of these terms are developed in Chapter IV.




Figure 15-1
Types of Lines of Command

Because for the forces of a unified command neither the CINC nor the Service exercises full command, the diagram looks like this:




Figure 15-2

Lines of Command to the CINCs and Their Forces

The authority of the unified commander is exercised through the dotted (opcon) line, and that of the Service Secretary and Service Chief is exercised through the dashed (command less

opcon) line. For other Service forces, not assigned to unified command, full command rests in Service channels.

For command and control as well as other matters, more than the CINC's operational authority is involved. Also involved is the degree to which a unified commander can influence the actions of the Service Secretary and Service Chief in such matters as the resources to be provided his command and how his assigned forces are to be organized, trained, and equipped.

We will look at this representation:




Figure 15-3
Lines of CINC Influence

The asterisk line represents various channels through which the unified commander influences, to whatever degree, the resources (including forces) to be provided to his command -- and how the forces are to be organized, trained, and equipped, and how they are to be employed in operations. Most of these asterisk channels are now through the JCS.

Another way for the CINC's influence to be exercised is through the commanders of the forces assigned to his operational command. (In this light, the dotted and dashed lines are equivalent to asterisks.)

The asterisk line also represents the channels, other than the dotted line of operational command, through which the CINC influences the responsiveness of his subordinate commanders to his operational command.

Figure 15-3 is an idealized picture. The specific units of the forces under unified operational command are always changing; ships and Marine Corps units of the fleets and squadrons of tactical air forces come and go. There is also in the United States a pool of Service forces many units of which, although not assigned to a unified command day-to-day, are earmarked for one, two, or more of them. This complicates the relationships between the unified commands on one hand and the Services on the other. As Carl Vinson pointed out in 1958 (see page 13-7) we cannot have several armies, several navies, several air forces, and several Marine Corps.

The Areas of Unified Command Authority and Influence

Toward his effective mission accomplishment, the unified commander wants to have either authority or influence in these areas:

- (1) How his command is to be organized and employed in operations.
- (2) How the forces of his command are to be trained.
- (3) How the forces of his command are to be equipped.
- (4) What resources are to be provided to his command.
- (5) How administrative and logistical support is to be provided to the forces of his command.
- (6) Personnel actions as to key members of his command.

Down the left column on the next page are the areas of authority or influence. Across the top are columns for entering judgments as to the present system and as to what is necessary and reasonable. Some may judge that the present system is all that is necessary and reasonable.

The Practical Authority or Influence of a Unified Command CINC
In View of His Mission Responsibility

<u>Aspect of Command</u>	<u>According to Present System</u>	<u>Necessary & Reasonable</u>
(1) How his command is to be organized and employed in operations		
(2) How forces of his command are to be trained		
(3) How forces of his command are to be equipped		
(4) The resources to be provided to forces of his command		
(5) How admin/log support is to be provided to the forces of his command		
(6) Personnel actions as to key members of his command		

Authority to Decide How to Organize and Employ

Now, let's develop the matrix for Item (1), how the CINC's command is to be organized and employed.

By law the unified commander is responsible to the President and Secretary of Defense for the employment of assigned forces in the performance of military missions. One might assume that it

is for the unified commander to decide how forces assigned are to be employed.

However, in practice, if the unified commander in preparing an operations plan should make known his intent to organize and employ the assigned forces of a Service in a way contrary to that Service's policy (known as Service doctrine),* the Service component commander can and does take the issue to his Service Chief who then can and does raise the matter in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (See Case 1, page 5-5.)

Taking an issue to the JCS takes time; the conflict raises tensions both in the command and in the JCS, which neither the unified commander nor the Chairman, JCS, want to do. So the commander often chooses not to raise the issue. (See Case 4, page 5-74.)

In an emergency, the unified commander can use his mission responsibility to override the objections of a Service component commander. However, last-minute changes from accustomed ways of operating make for confusion in operations.

Undue influence of the component commander and Service Chief thus substantially limits the practical flexibility of the unified commander in operations planning and preparation. We have called this state of affairs "the wall of the component."

*Issues of Service roles and missions may also be raised.

One might argue that a unified commander now has all the authority he needs, that it is a matter of the "will of the commander." Another might say that the examples in this study of a CINC's reluctance to exercise authority now vested were, not to use too strong a word but to convey the idea, indicators not of reluctance but of timidity.

Our view is, however, that in many issues of how their forces are to be organized and employed, the CINCs simply do not have the time or the stomach to raise again and again what should be minor matters to the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The time of the JCS should be spent on matters of major consequence. In their realm the opcon of a transient unit in a CINC's area (as in Case 4) does not loom large (until, of course, disaster strikes because of a failure to insure that the unit's orders were clear and that it was under positive local operational control).

And when -- as does happen -- a unified commander is told not to bring small matters to the JCS, the Service component commander has the upper hand. He has no instructions not to bring those matters to his Service Chief.

We can now fill in our matrix with what we will call "judgment options." Because the matter is so critical to mission performance, we write our question: "What is the practical authority of a CINC to decide how his command is to be organized and employed in operations?"

The Practical Authority of a Unified Command CINC
In View of His Mission Responsibility

<u>Aspect of Command</u>	<u>According to Present System</u>	<u>Necessary & Reasonable</u>
Judgment Option I		
(1) Decide how his command is to be organized and employed in operations.	Authority is ample.	<u>No change</u> needed.
Judgment Option II		
(1) Decide how his command is to be organized and employed in operations.	Authority is weak. Service component commander and Service Chief can and do take any issue to the JCS.	<u>Limit</u> ability of Service component commander and Service Chief to take any issue to the JCS.
Judgment Option III		
(1) Decide how his command is to be organized and employed in operations.	Authority is weak. Service component commander and Service Chief can and do take any issue to the JCS.	<u>Deny</u> ability of Service component commander and Service Chief to take any issue to the JCS.

Can Options II and III be accomplished without legislation?

No, for Option III. To deny a Service Chief an opportunity to object to the employment of forces of his Service would be so great a departure from what the Congress had in mind when it wrote the original legislation in 1947 that, regardless of whether the Secretary of Defense believed he had authority to do such a thing, action by the Congress would be required to allow it to happen.

Even Option II has far-reaching implications. A Service Chief might have good reason to object to a unified commander's plan. He may believe that the plan does not use his Service's forces properly in accordance with their capabilities. He may question the competence of the CINC to decide how to use that Service's forces.

Moreover, he may believe that the plan involves an issue of his Services' roles and missions; these are stated in law and are spelled out further in DoD directives and JCS publications.

Former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James L. Holloway III, has said that roles and missions, "...dealing in some cases with the virtual existence of the Services, [have] always been a highly emotional [issue].... Congress regards this areas as its preserve."^[1]

Roles and missions are assigned Service functions; they are the functions for which the Services prepare forces for employment. They were not written in the law, however, to limit the purposes for which the President and Secretary of Defense, through operational commanders, can organize and employ forces.

As to Option II, legislative action may not be "required" to limit the ability of a Service Chief to take an issue to the JCS. The Secretary of Defense has enough authority to put a stop to objections based merely on a Service Chief's view that a unified commander is violating his Service's chosen policy or doctrine.

However, Option II may impinge on Service roles and missions and in any event involves a basic shift in relative influence between the CINCs and the Service Chiefs. It appears that,

regardless of whether legislation is technically necessary, it is, practically, required.

The legislative action necessary for Judgment Option II ("limit") seems to be threefold:

- (1) As to the authority of the CINCs, state in simple language in the law that, subject to the review and direction of the Secretary of Defense and the President, the unified commander may organize and employ assigned forces in any way he chooses toward the accomplishment of his assigned mission.
- (2) Toward permitting the practical use of this command authority, strengthen the position of the Chairman, JCS.*
- (3) Provide each Service Chief the right to appeal a unified command or JCS decision to the Secretary of Defense and the President.

The legislative action necessary for Judgment Option III ("deny") is about the same, omitting (3) just above -- i.e., no Service Chief right of appeal.

However, it seems desirable for either option to enact a further proviso into law, along these lines:

*This issue, strengthening the authority of the Chairman, JCS, is covered in detail under Item (4), beginning page 15-31.

"Nothing in this section shall affect the responsibilities of the military departments or the functions of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps as described in (cite the passages of current law which define 'roles and missions,' although that term is not used in the law). This section applies only to the authority of the unified commander to organize and employ forces which the military departments assign or may assign to his operational command."

These are judgment options. Use them, or write your own, and take your pick.

Authority to Decide How to Train

Now, let's move to Item (2). What should be the authority of a unified command CINC to decide how the forces of his command are to be trained?

As for Item (1), we will first describe the practical authority of the CINC according to the present system. Then we will develop some judgment options about what is necessary and reasonable in view of the CINC's responsibility for the performance of military missions.

Neither the law, nor DoD directive, nor the UNAAF, assigns explicit authority to the unified commander to decide how the forces of his command are to be trained. By UNAAF, training is a

Service responsibility. Even joint training is not in the standard charter of a CINC.*

Of course, all unified commanders organize and conduct joint training exercises. These can be command post exercises in which commanders and their staffs participate but the troops do not, or they can be field exercises in which troops also participate. Each year, working with the CINCs, the JCS prepare a list of unified command exercises and arrange their funding.

The authority for a CINC to prescribe the training of his assigned forces stems also implicitly from his statutory authority for "the performance of military missions." If he is to perform missions in war, obviously he must see to it that his forces are trained for the performance of those missions in peacetime. Readiness for war is a responsibility of operational command at every level.

Decisions on how to train forces of the Services in joint operations are, however, to the Services even more sensitive matters than are decisions on force employment in operations. The training of its own forces is a cherished Service responsibility; it is intimately linked to a Service's "doctrine;" and a Service's operational doctrines are related in the Service's mind to its roles and missions, and these are its family jewels.

*Not through UNAAF but through a mission stated in the Unified Command Plan, the U.S. Readiness Command (headquarters at McDill Air Force Base, Florida) has responsibility for joint training of its assigned Army and Air Force forces. REDCOM has no assigned Navy or Marine Corps forces.

It was a long time ago and unified command authority was not involved, but the 1955 joint Army-Air Force maneuver known as Exercise Sagebrush illustrates the point.*

The 1950s were the early days of army aviation. The helicopter seemed to be opening up new possibilities for land warfare. In Exercise Sagebrush, the Army sought to test its embryonic "Sky Cavalry" concept, espoused by Lieutenant General James M. Gavin in his article "Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses," in which both helicopters and ground reconnaissance vehicles in one company-sized unit would together perform the screening and reconnaissance function of cavalry.^[2] Thirteen two-man Army helicopters were involved. Their number was small; the issue was very large.

General O. P. Weyland, Commander, Tactical Air Command, was Maneuver Director. General Weyland held that doctrinal differences not covered by joint instructions were involved in the proposed employment of Army aircraft. As Maneuver Director he would not concur in the employment of Army aircraft to airlift and land personnel within hostile territory.

The Commander of the Army's Continental Army Command went to Maneuver Headquarters and insisted that the Army be able to use the organic helicopters. The Deputy Maneuver Director (Army) issued instructions accordingly. General Weyland considered

*This case is taken from Chapter III of Adequacy. Titled "The Sometimes Conflicting Influences of "Doctrine" and "Mission," that chapter treats at length issues only touched on in this section.

these to be an abrogation of tactical air command and the issue went to the Pentagon.

The Air Force position was that the proposed tests involving landing of army troops of whatever numbers in hostile territory by Army aircraft came under the assault role and would duplicate the Air Force's mission and responsibility to provide such aircraft.

The Army position was that adherence to the Air Force interpretation would place intolerable restrictions upon Army commanders and that the concept for conduct of ground operations in future wars visualized close integration of organic Army aviation and ground troops within the combat zone.

Secretary of the Army Wilbur Brucker appealed to Air Force Secretary Donald Quarles, who then sent General Weyland a message directing him to permit the Army to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by Exercise Sagebrush to carry out its Sky Cavalry tests. This was ordered, according to Quarles, without prejudice to the joint doctrine question involved.^[3]

Exercise Sagebrush vividly illustrates how fixed in their view military men (who are like other men when it comes to matters of "turf") can be when it comes to Service doctrine. These Army and Air Force commanders had just a few years earlier been in the same Service; a dispute like this in 1946 would have been decided by the Army Chief of Staff.

In Exercise Sagebrush, matters of "Service doctrine" were involved. But "Service doctrine" is more than "how to fight." A Service's basic doctrine charts the Service's future, as both the

Army and Air Force could clearly see in this case. The unspoken issue was, "In the future who is going to have the helicopter?" This was more than a matter of doctrine; it was one of roles and missions.*

Thus Service doctrine often takes on the character of a religion; its true Service believers will go to almost any lengths to have their way.

In this chapter we are talking not about what Service Secretaries can decide but about the authorities of a unified commander over his subordinate Service commanders as to the employment of forces in training exercises.

Today, the CINC's ability to have his way in matters of joint training is even weaker than is his ability to decide matters of operational employment. If the CINC should make known his intent to train the assigned forces of a Service in an exercise in a way contrary to that Service's doctrine, the Service component commander can tell the unified commander he does not wish to participate.

*In 1961, Secretary of Defense McNamara decided the issue of Army aviation; he told the Army to figure out how to exploit the possibilities of the helicopter. In Vietnam, the Army's helicopters came into their own. The 101st Airborne Division, which I commanded in 1972-73, was equipped with 415 helicopters, of every size. However, even today, who controls helicopters in "special operations" remains a sensitive point in Army-Air Force relationships.

He can tell the CINC that the CINC has no authority to decide issues of training. As we have stated, neither the law, nor DoD directives, nor the UNAAF mention any such authority.

Further, should the CINC cite his responsibility for mission performance as authority, the Service component commander can still refuse to participate in a training exercise contrary to his Service's doctrine. He can do this without the stigma of outright insubordination, as might be the case should he refuse to comply with the orders of a unified commander in an emergency when he holds those orders to be contrary to his Service's doctrine.

There is no provision in the UNAAF for emergency authority to decide training. Nor can there be, because when an emergency comes it is too late to train.

If the employment of forces in an operation plan were the issue, the Service component commander can and does take the issue to his Service Chief, who takes it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If training is the issue, the Service component commander need do nothing. It is the unified commander who must take the matter to the JCS for resolution.

Knowing the way the system works, the CINC decides not to make an issue of it, and the Service component commander has his way. That's the way the system works today.

In Chapter V, at page 5-28, we discussed the Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission. As any experienced military man can see from reading Admiral Holloway's report to the Secretary of Defense, that mission failed in large part because of inadequate joint

training. As is equally clear, a fundamental obstacle to proper joint training was the "wall of the component." Yes, the need for the tightest of security in the preparation of that rescue mission played a part in limiting training opportunities. But, within that restriction, the "wall of the component" made matters worse.

In preparing his forces for operations, the unified commander today confronts, in his far larger frame, the same problems with his Service component commanders as the commander of the 1980 Iran Rescue Mission had with his. The consequences if operations of grave consequence are required will all too likely be similar.

So, let's go to our "matrix for analysis" and consider Item (2). As in Item (1), we write the question: "What should be the practical authority of a CINC to decide how forces of his command are to be trained for operations?"

Here is Judgment Option I.

The Practical Authority of a Unified Command CINC
In View of His Mission Responsibility

<u>Aspect of Command</u>	<u>According to Present System</u>	<u>Necessary & Reasonable</u>
Judgment Option I		
(2) Decide how forces of his command are to be trained for operations.	Authority is ample.	No change needed.

There is a school of thought that is satisfied with the present system.

Let's look at Judgment Options II and III.

The Practical Authority of a Unified Command CINC
In View of His Mission Responsibility

<u>Aspect of Command</u>	<u>According to Present System</u>	<u>Necessary & Reasonable</u>
Judgment Option II		
(2) Decide how forces of his command are to be trained for operations.	Authority is weak. Consent of Service component commander is required. Service component commander can invoke Service doctrine and refuse to participate.	<u>Limit</u> ability of Service component commander and Service Chief to invoke Service doctrine. Permit CINC to invoke his mission responsibility and override. Provide a Service right of appeal.
Judgment Option III		
(2) Decide how forces of his command are to be trained for operations.	Authority is weak. Consent of Service component commander is required. Service component commander can invoke Service doctrine and refuse to participate.	<u>Deny</u> ability of Service component commander and Service Chief to invoke Service doctrine. Give the CINC authority to train his forces in any way he sees fit.

Can options II and III be accomplished without legislation?

As for Item (1) "organize and employ," legislative action is not technically required to limit the ability of a Service

component commanders to refuse to train when such training violates a Service's doctrine. The Secretary of Defense has enough authority to end such practices when the Service objection is based only on a Service commander's view that the unified commander's training plan violates a Service's chosen policy or doctrine.

But this item goes directly to one of the Services' most cherished rights -- its jurisdiction over its basic operational doctrine -- and may involve matters of Service roles and missions. It also brings about a basic shift in influence between the CINCs and the Service Chiefs. Legislation would seem to be essential from the viewpoint of establishing Congressional intent.

Building on the legislation considered in Item (1), the legislative action necessary for Judgment Option II ("limit") again seems to be threefold:

- (1) As to the authority of the CINCs, state in simple language in the law that, subject to the review and direction of the Secretary of Defense and the President, the unified commander may organize, employ, and train assigned forces in any way he chooses toward the accomplishment of his assigned mission.
- (2) Toward permitting the practical use of this command authority, strengthen the position of the Chairman.
- (3) Provide each Service Chief the right to appeal a unified command or JCS decision to the Secretary of Defense and the President.

The legislative action necessary for Judgment Option III ("deny") would seem to be about the same, omitting (3) above -- i.e., no Service Chief right of appeal.

However, it seems desirable for either option to enact a proviso into law like that for Item (1):

"Nothing in this section shall affect the responsibilities of the military departments or the functions of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps as described in (cite the passages of current law which define 'roles and missions,' although that term is not used in the law). This section applies only to the authority of the unified commander to organize and employ, and train for employment, forces which the military departments assign or may assign to his operational command."

Again, take these options or make your own. And take your pick.

Influence on How Forces are Equipped

The law assigns each military department responsibility to "organize, train, and equip" its particular type of forces. But the commanders of combatant commands are responsible for using these forces for "the performance of military missions." What possibilities are there for the influence of a unified command CINC on how the military departments and Services equip the forces which are, or are to be, assigned to the CINC's operational command?

We can consider the matter in general terms, then in the specific case of the equipment components of the forces' command and control systems.

The equipment of military forces consist of hundreds of thousands of line items -- from major weapons such as artillery pieces, aircraft, and materiel handling equipment to kitchen gear and combat boots. Desirably, no item in the hands of troops will be unimportant.

These items get into the hands of troops through a process of materiel acquisition. DoD and Service instructions tell how the need for each item is established; how the detailed requirement specification is developed and approved; how the operational concept is articulated; how the initial prototype is built; when production begins; and so on until the item is delivered to the troops in quantity. The Service structures for doing this are large and complex.

Each Service has a system for involving the "user" in this process. The user can be a "surrogate user;" in the Army, the schools and centers of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) fill this role. Or the Service can involve a "real user" -- as the Army has been doing with the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) at Fort Lewis for the last five years.

In recent years, the Services have increasingly been involving the "real user" in the development and fielding of command and control systems and their components. This derives from the great importance of the human dimension in command and control systems and from the consequent need for close user participation in their evolutionary development.

Command and control systems make up the web of means through which the unified commander and his operational chain of command direct and control the forces of the command. Their fully

effective performance, their full exploitation of all the possibilities of technology, fundamentally affect whether the unified commander will meet his basic responsibility -- the performance of his military mission.

From the treatment of unified commands in general in Adequacy and of the Korea command in particular in this work, our conclusion: The unified commander needs greater influence in the processes by which command and control systems are provided to the forces of his command.

An example may further illustrate the point.

During the 1960s, the U.S. Army began the development of a new combat net radio for use by the battalions and brigades of Army forces. Called SINCGARS, this radio would use "frequency hopping" to prevent the enemy from jamming its transmissions. In 1985 SINCGARS was in production; issue to the troops would soon begin.

Over the years, the "user" for this development has been TRADOC, and specifically the Army Signal Center and School, first at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and then at Fort Gordon, Georgia. From time to time, what the Army believed to be "real users" -- commanders of Army units in the U.S., or Korea, or Europe -- entered into the process of determining requirements.

But the ultimate real user, the unified commander (who in war usually operates in another "hat" as multinational commander), never entered into the process of establishing the requirements for SINCGARS.

Specifically, CINCEUR was not asked what he believed should be the characteristics of a combat net radio. If he had been asked, he would no doubt have told the Army that the combat net radio of U.S. forces should be able to talk to the combat net radio of German and other allied forces of his multinational command. This would be valuable in coordinating operations when, say, U.S. and German forces work closely together in battle.

As fielded, SINCGARS in its anti-jamming mode will not be able to talk to the combat net radio being developed by the Germans. This results among other causes from failing to get the views of CINCEUR.

In recent years the Department of Defense has put into place new mechanisms through which the unified command CINCs take part in the processes through which the forces and other resources of their commands are provided.

Among these initiatives are: the establishment of a mechanism for the CINCs to state formally their requirements to the JCS and DoD, and to interface with the Services or Services having responsibility for the satisfaction of those requirements; the forwarding of a semiannual situation report to the Chairman, JCS, highlighting operational needs of the unified command and its Service component forces; the quarterly reporting to the Secretary of Defense of key operational requirements; the annual submittal, directly to the Secretary of Defense and Chairman, JCS, of prioritized CINC operational requirements; and the CINCs' personal participation in the Defense Resources Board process conducted at the highest levels of the DoD.

These initiatives, however, do not fully address the matter of "how the forces of his command are equipped." There is no process through which the unified command CINC is routinely asked for his view as a Service is establishing the specifications for an item of materiel.

Of course, a CINC's interest in these specifications will differ depending on the item. A CINC may have little interest in the specifications for a truck, one being much like another in his opinion. He may have more interest in the specifications for an antitank missile. And he will have a strong interest in command and control items.

It is not possible for the Service to judge a CINC's interest, item by item. The specifications for an item as common as a combat boot, or field ration, may be very important to one or more CINCs.

Moreover, common sense dictates that each CINC cannot establish a huge staff for writing or commenting on specifications for all the materiel items with which the troops of his command are equipped. Nor, of course, can a Service always satisfy each and every CINC.

With that background, we can now develop our judgment options for reasonable and necessary answers on Item (3).

Here is Judgment Option I.

The Practical Authority of a Unified Command CINC
In View of His Mission Responsibility

<u>Aspect of Command</u>	<u>According to Present System</u>	<u>Necessary & Reasonable</u>
Judgment Option I		
(3) Influence how forces of his command are to be equipped	The CINC has appropriate and sufficient influence in today's system	<u>No change needed</u>

Those who think this way will cite the processes through which the Services now involve the CINC's component commanders in determining requirements and will state that the CINC's component commanders can adequately reflect the CINC's views.

Judgment Options II and III add to the CINC's influence.

The Practical Authority of a Unified Command CINC
In View of His Mission Responsibility

<u>Aspect of Command</u>	<u>According to Present System</u>	<u>Necessary & Reasonable</u>
Judgment Option II		
(3) Influence how forces of his command are to be equipped	The CINC's influence is generally adequate, except that he is insufficiently involved in the processes for establishing requirements for command and control systems.	<u>Require each Service to give each CINC an opportunity to comment on the requirements of each command and control system or end item.</u> Improve coordination with the CINC on other types of materiel.

Judgment Option III

(3) Influence how forces of his command are to be equipped	The CINC's influence is insufficient. He is inadequately involved in the processes of establishing materiel requirements.	<u>Require each Service to give each CINC an opportunity to comment on materiel requirements of each item, at some point in the requirements development process.</u>
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Is legislation required for Options II and III?

Apparently not. These are simply extensions of mechanisms which have been put into place for involving the CINCs in resource matters, over the past several years. No new authority was required for the Secretary of Defense to establish the current mechanisms; none seems required for those described in Options II and III above.

However, the Congress may consider it desirable to confirm in statute that the CINC has a strong position in the determination of resources to be provided to his command. The law as written makes scant mention of the CINCs. In a sentence or two, the law describes their basic responsibility for the performance of military missions, but it does not spell out their authorities or the influence which the Congress intends that the CINCs have.

In this light, and if there is to be a new section in the statute which deals with the combatant commands, it may be desirable to include some language which describes the increased authorities and influence in principle at least.

This would enact into law the distribution of power as to the CINCs which has been taking place over the last several years.

On balance, even though the detailed processes for involving the CINCs in either Option II or Option III would be described in DoD and JCS instructions, we say that the status of the CINCs conferred by those options probably needs the authority of law.

Influence on Resources

The "resources" of a unified command CINC include not only his assigned forces (battalions, squadrons, ships, and so on) but also the funded level of activity of those forces, such as the number of flying hours per month that are to be funded for tactical air and aviation units under his operational command. Resources also include the command's infrastructure, such as base and port facilities, roads, airfields, supply depots, and pipelines. They include stocks of war reserve ammunition, fuel, and other consumables as well as pre-stocked major items such as

trucks and artillery pieces. They include intelligence collection capabilities both airborne and ground based. And much more.

The money which pays for all these resources -- which pays the people, buys the units' equipment, buys the repair parts and fuel to sustain the flying hours, buys the ammunition and transports it to the storage depots, builds the igloos in those storage depots, and so on -- is requested in the military department budgets and is appropriated to the military departments by the Congress line item by line item. Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs justify their budget requests before committees of the Congress. The military departments and the Services manage the process of spending that money. The CINCs have only small staffs for managing money; they rely on the Services to do that.

From reading the testimony of witnesses from military departments and Services, one might get the impression that the Services actually do the operating. A witness might say: "These resources are required to make the (name of Service) capable of performing its (operational) mission." But it is not the Service that has the operational mission; it is rather formations of the Service under unified command.

From World War II to 1953, the chain of operational command to a unified command went through a Service as the "executive agent" for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In 1953-58 it went through one of the military departments. In those days it was relatively simple to harmonize the unified commander's plans and the Service's resources.

Still, resources management could get out of phase with the command mission and concept of operations. When Secretary of Defense McNamara took office in 1961, his comptroller's office

found to its surprise that the Army was providing resources to its forces in Europe based on a "long war" concept and the Air Force was providing resources to its units in Europe based on a "short war" concept.

One function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is be sure that what the unified command CINCs are planning to do is in harmony with what the Services are providing, and vice versa.

We listed at page 15-27 some of the new DoD mechanisms through which the unified command CINCs take part in resource decisions in the Department of Defense and the Services.

These mechanisms include ways for the CINCs to state formally their requirements to the JCS and DoD and to interface with the Services or Services having responsibility for meeting those requirements, and a way for the JCS Chairman as their spokesman and themselves to participate in the Defense Resources Board process.

The issue is, however, not about the various mechanisms as mechanisms. The issue is: Within these mechanisms, what should be the relative influence of the two parties -- "providers" on one hand, and "users" or "employers" or "mission responsible commanders" on the other?

Although far from identical, the relationship between the Services as "providers" and the unified commands as (we'll call them) "users" in the present bi-functional structure of the Department of Defense is analogous to the relationship between the "producer" establishment and the "consumer" establishment in the Department of the Navy in the 1940s and 1950s.

In 1959, Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, U.S. Navy, Retired, who was a fleet logistician in World War II and then for many years an instructor in logistics at the Naval War College, described this "producer-consumer" relationship within the Navy in his book, Logistics in the National Defense.^[4]

As the chart on the next page illustrates, Admiral Eccles described wartime logistics as having, over time, a producer phase and a consumer phase. In the producer phase, control is civilian and the objective is harmony with the economic system. In the consumer phase, control is military and the objective is harmony with the combat environment.

Time>

<u>Phase:</u>	Producer		Consumer
<u>Objective:</u>	Harmony with the economic system	Area of Tension and Debate	Harmony with the combat environment
<u>Criteria:</u>	Stability of programs Predictability Dollar Value Speed Sociological and Political Factors		Combat effectiveness Military Essentiality Functional Responsiveness Reliability Speed

Source: Michael G. Sovereign and Michael Melich, "Requirements in DoD Acquisition," Naval Postgraduate School, December 6, 1985. Adapted from Henry E. Eccles, Logistics in the National Defense. Reprinted by permission.

Figure 15-4

Producer-Consumer Relationships in the Navy

Eccles listed criteria for performance in the producer phase and in the consumer phase. The "area of tension and debate" is where the two sets of criteria, as well as the two objectives, are in conflict.

The admiral then wrote this principle: "The objective of a logistics effort is the creation and sustained support of combat forces." (italics in original)^[5]

About that principle he went on to say:

[it]...does not deny the civilian foundation for logistics nor does it belittle the civilian overall authority in national defense. It does, however, place the emphasis on the military side of logistics, and it represents the viewpoint of military command.[6]

Although the idea is appealing, we will make no effort to develop a similar chart for "control," "objectives," and "criteria" for the military departments/Services as providers and the unified commands as users in the bi-functional Department of Defense. However, here is how Admiral Eccles' principle reads when we substitute "providers'" for "logistics."

The principle thus paraphrased: The objective of a providers' effort is the creation and sustained support of combat forces.

This appears a worthy principle.

Although both are bi-functional, the working structure of the Department of Defense differs in many ways from that of the Navy Department of the 1940s and 1950s. For one thing, there is no equivalent to a Chief of Naval Operations in command of the fleet.

Another difference is that in the Department of Defense, the Service "provider" side provides far more than did the old Navy's "producer" side. The Services provide forces -- fighting and supporting units organized, trained, and equipped for fighting and supporting. The units they provide are made up of people whom the Services bring into uniform, train, motivate, and

administer. The fighting effectiveness of these units derives from the training, morale, and discipline imparted through Service channels. Within the Services themselves, there is a "producer-consumer" relationship.

Nonetheless, the bi-functional structure of responsibility is there. And it would seem that, within this structure, Admiral Eccles' basic principle still prevails: the unified command "user" and not the Service "provider" should represent the driving interest in the relationship.

Application of this principle in practical relationships calls for balance. Where the balance should be is a matter of subjective judgment.*

Look again at our earlier Figure 15-3, next page.

*Eccles says that the shaping of requirements is the responsibility of the combat commander. But he cautions that when commands are not in combat their future needs are a lot less clear, and they must plan so that they will be able to adapt over a wider spectrum of possibilities. So it is not proper in peacetime to put the entire responsibility for forecasting requirements on the frontline commander. He might guess wrong.




Figure 15-5
Lines of CINC Influence

The asterisk lines represent the channels through which the unified commander influences the resources to be provided to his command. Note the key position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Here the respective influences and interests of the unified command users and the Service provider meet. Here a great part of the reconciling and harmonizing between the two parties takes place. Here the two parties work out allocations, priorities, and program details.

Today the JCS operate as a committee. Four members represent the Services. Only one member, the Chairman, has no

Service constituency. In addition to his other duties, he is the spokesman of the unified commanders.

A consensus seems to be growing within the Congress and in other circles that the existing relationships and balance in the work of this committee do not give enough influence to the unified commanders nor do they permit an objective weighing of their needs.

Most recommendations to correct that imbalance call for increasing the authority of the Chairman. Two approaches are being advanced for doing this.

- o One is to make the Joint Staff responsible directly to the Chairman rather than to the JCS as a body; the Chairman would then manage the Joint Staff for the Secretary of Defense, on his own behalf instead of "for the Joint Chiefs of Staff."
- o The other is to give the Chairman a four-star Deputy Chairman. Within this, various solutions are offered as to the rank of the Deputy JCS Chairman with respect to the four Service Chiefs.
 - The House of Representatives bill, passed in November 1985, would make the Deputy Chairman senior in rank to the four Service Chiefs. In the Chairman's absence, he would preside over the JCS. In addition, the four-star Deputy Chairman would be the Director of the Joint Staff (now a three-star position).

- The Secretary of Defense's proposal would make the Deputy Chairman junior in rank to the Service Chiefs. In the Chairman's absence, one of the four Service Chiefs would preside over the JCS. Here too the Deputy Chairman would be the Director of the Joint Staff.

- Another approach would do as the House bill does, but would retain the three-star Director of the Joint Staff as a separate position. The intent here is that the Deputy Chairman -- senior in rank to the Service Chiefs -- would be primarily in the business of resources, representing the views of the unified commands.

Whether the Deputy Chairman is Number 2, as the House bill would have it, or Number 6, as the Secretary of Defense would have it, is a crucial matter. That question is certain to generate heated debate before it is finally resolved. And at the root of all the impassioned language will be the single issue: the distribution of influence. What the Chairman and his deputy gain, the Service Chiefs lose. What the Service Chiefs retain, the JCS Chairman, his deputy, and the unified commanders do not gain.

With these thoughts in mind, let's look at the Judgment Options for Item (4).

The Practical Authority of a Unified Command CINC
In View of His Mission Responsibility

<u>Aspect of Command</u>	<u>According to Present System</u>	<u>Necessary & Reasonable</u>
Judgment Option I		
(4) Influence the resources to be provided to his command.	Mechanisms are adequate and relative influence is appropriate.	No change needed.
Judgment Option II		
(4) Influence the resources to be provided to his command.	Mechanisms are reasonably adequate but influence of the CINC is somewhat less than it should be.	Modify the relationships to increase the influence of the CINCs somewhat relative to that of the Services.
Judgment Option III		
(4) Influence the resources to be provided to his command.	Mechanisms are reasonably adequate but influence of the CINC is very much less than it should be.	Modify the relationships to increase the influence of the CINCs substantially, to make them in balance with the Services.

Words like "reasonably adequate...", "somewhat less...", "substantially..." and so on in the above are loaded with subjective judgments. Converting these descriptors into concrete measures which will redistribute influence where it needs to be for those judgment calls is going to be an interesting exercise in the houses of Congress and the executive office.

Let's set up our own matrix for decision.

We all know that it is not possible to "meter" influence. To go beyond adjectives like "modest" and "considerable" is difficult indeed.

But we will use a device to put the matter in quantitative terms.

Let's say that today there are "100 units" of influence below the level of the Secretary of Defense and his Deputy Secretary, his two Under Secretaries, and his several Assistant Secretaries. (The Secretary of Defense has more than ample authority at his level; we are talking about the distribution of influence beneath that level.)

We will put into the balance pans of a scale various options for the distribution of these "100 units" of influence. For each option, in one pan we will put the influence of the Chairman, JCS, and the unified commanders; in the other pan we will put the influence of the Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs.

Let us first weigh the two "influence pans" against one another, as they exist today. (Remember, these numbers are only substitutes for words like "weak" or "strong" or "too little.")

Considering the makeup and practices of the JCS, and considering the clout that the Service Secretaries and their Chiefs can bring to bear inside the Pentagon and in the Congress, compared to the clout of the CINCs, our scale says that the balance of influence in the asterisk lines of Figure 15-5 is 20 to 80, in favor of the Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs ("strong") versus unified commanders ("weak").

Let's say that our objective is to make the ratio 50 to 50. This may not be what Admiral Eccles' principle, as paraphrased, would suggest -- he might advocate 55 to 45, or a little stronger in the CINCs' favor.

But we will make the objective "50-50," or roughly even, and let the Secretary of Defense and his civilian deputy and other civilian assistants take it from there.

Now, what can we do with Judgment Option I?

The Practical Authority of a Unified Command CINC
In View of His Mission Responsibility

<u>Aspect of Command</u>	<u>According to Present System</u>	<u>Necessary & Reasonable</u>
Judgment Option I		
(4) Influence the resources to be provided to his command.	Mechanisms are adequate and relative influence is appropriate.	No change needed.

We cannot do much. The only way that this is a viable option is to revise our judgment and call the present relative influence, not 20 to 80 in favor of the Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs, but more like 35 to 65 -- and use "improved mechanisms" to go the rest of the way, to around 50-50.

Now, how about Judgment Option II?

The Practical Authority of a Unified Command CINC
In View of His Mission Responsibility

<u>Aspect of Command</u>	<u>According to Present System</u>	<u>Necessary & Reasonable</u>
Judgment Option II		
(4) Influence the resources to be provided to his command.	Mechanisms are reasonably adequate but influence of the CINC is <u>some-what less than</u> it should be.	Modify the power relationships to increase the influence of the CINCs <u>somewhat</u> relative to that of the military departments and Services.

Here we want to move the influence relationship from 80 to 20, in favor of the Service Secretaries and their Service Chiefs, to something more appropriate. So we take the following actions:

- o Create a Deputy Chairman, using the Secretary of Defense's formulation -- namely make him junior to the other Service Chiefs and also make him Director of the Joint Staff.
- o Make the Joint Staff responsible to the Chairman in his own right, on behalf of the JCS as a body.

What does that do to the 80 to 20 imbalance? The first action does very little. This "deputy" Chairman is not a real deputy. All we have done is to increase the rank of the Director of the Joint Staff. As the junior four-star in the JCS meetings, he cannot preside over the JCS in the absence of the Chairman.

However, making him and the Joint Staff responsible to the Chairman, not to the JCS as a body with the Chairman managing the

Joint Staff on behalf of his colleagues, does bring about a significant shift in influence.

So (understanding that this is a highly subjective judgment) let's call this arrangement a 65 to 35 distribution of influence, in favor of the Service Secretaries and their Service Chiefs.

Now, lets look at Judgment Option III.

The Practical Authority of a Unified Command CINC
In View of His Mission Responsibility

<u>Aspect of Command</u>	<u>According to Present System</u>	<u>Necessary & Reasonable</u>
Judgment Option III		
(4) Influence the resources to be provided to his command.	Mechanisms are reasonably adequate but influence of the CINC is <u>very much less than</u> it should be.	Modify the relationships to increase the influence of the CINCs <u>substantially</u> , to roughly balance that of the military departments and Services.

Here, we do with the Joint Staff and the Deputy Chairman what was done in the House bill of November 1985. That bill made the JCS Chairman the principal military advisor to the President; said that the duties assigned to the JCS by current law would now be the responsibility of the Chairman himself; gave the Chairman the new function of submitting program and budget proposals to the Secretary of Defense; authorized the Secretary of Defense to direct that the chain of command to combatant commands run through the Chairman, made the Joint Staff responsible to the Chairman, said that the Chairman would supervise the commanders of the combatant commands, in addition to acting as their

spokesman; and established a Deputy Chairman, to outrank all other serving officers except the Chairman, who would act for the Chairman in the latter's absence.

In our approach for Option III we do not make the Deputy Chairman the director of the Joint Staff. We keep that position on the books, and keep it at three stars.

The House bill also provided that any Service chief member of the JCS, if he disagreed with the military advice of the Chairman or of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "shall submit to the Secretary of Defense" such opinion in disagreement -- and provided a like process for military advice to the President.^[7]

And, with these actions, we say that the balance is now even.

We say "even," unless your subjective judgment says that we have made it as much as 80 to 20 in favor of military influence and have created a Prussian-style all-powerful single Chief of Staff, and a threat to the civilian control of the Department of Defense.

Influence on Administrative and Logistical Support

Administration and logistics includes all those supporting and sustaining activities through which operating forces are supplied, maintained, moved, based, sheltered, and serviced, and through which their personnel strengths and fitness are maintained and the personal needs of their people are taken care of. The history of war is clear: There can be no effective operations unless these activities are done well.

There is resupply of everything from food and medicine, to tank engines and radiator hose, to diesel and aviation fuel, to rifle and artillery ammunition, and on and on in endless number and detail.

There is repair and maintenance in equal detail and equal complexity. There is transportation -- by truck, rail, boat, and air. There is housing and troop assembly, storage and transfer, hospitalization and medical evacuation. There is the pay, and discipline, and welfare, and personnel administration of each soldier and airman, and the providing of replacement personnel and crews for those who are killed or wounded.

Management of this extraordinarily complex and dynamic array of logistics activity so that it satisfies the requirements of the fighting forces in war is an art and science of its own.

By law, administration and logistics of forces assigned to unified commands is the responsibility of the military departments.

The things which operational forces need to sustain their operations are described in large part in terms of items, and of tonnage. For example, fuel and ammunition are of relatively few items, but of large tonnage. Repair parts are of relatively small tonnage, but many items.

At its root, logistics is a matter of movement, information, and stock control of both items and tonnage.

Movement is a matter of directing and coordinating the means of loading, transport, and unloading. Information is a matter of knowing where movement means are and what they carry, and where

the stocks not in movement but in position are -- in detail and in real time.

Such equations -- of movement and stock levels, of items and tonnages, of information and management -- are the basic stuff of the art and science of logistics. Mastery of such equations is to be sought by logisticians. And logisticians who have mastered not only the equations but how to make them work superlatively in practice are to be sought by commanders.

Administration and logistics goes all the way back to a nation's farms and forests, to its mines and factories, to its offices for recruiting and conscripting, to its transportation systems, its Services' depots and medical establishments, and so on.

For this reason "logistic support is a Service responsibility."

However, the unified command cannot live with the unalterable dictum that "logistic support is entirely a Service responsibility." Logistics, which is essential to mission accomplishment, must in major ways be not only the senior theater commander's personal responsibility but also that of his subordinates.

This is so because mission accomplishment depends on logistics and mission accomplishment is the unified commander's responsibility.

Further, in battle, and in the planning for expected battle, somewhere toward the forward end where the forces are deployed and where they will fight, many of the operating forces'

supporting and sustaining resources must of necessity lose their Service identities. They must be pooled.

Some resources (e.g., fuel and ammunition) lose their identities forward more readily than do others (e.g., repair parts). Some resources (e.g., personnel replacements) never lose their Service identities.

The fundamental challenge of unified command logistics is to resolve the conflict between Service responsibility for logistic support on one hand, and the theater commander's responsibility for mission accomplishment on the other. This is something like what Admiral Eccles was pointing out, as represented in the chart on page 15-35.

Administration and logistics operates at essentially three levels. There is the producer level, essentially in the national homeland. There is the consumer level, essentially with the operating forces themselves. And there is an intermediate level that links the two, which goes by such terms as "theater-level logistics" or "lines of communications," or "the communications zone."

The structures and processes of each of the various aspects of administration and logistics run rearward to forward, and back, through these three levels.

There is a detailed system linkage, for example, that connects the medical aid station of a battalion in contact back to military hospitals in the United States. This system is separate from that which links the ammunition in that battalion's combat trains all the way to an ammunition plant in Illinois. And both of these are separate from the system which links the

aviation fuel supply at a forward operating air base through a tanker route to a refinery in Venezuela.

It is too much to expect that the theater commander will manage systems like these even in his own territory. He simply cannot do so. He depends on Service and other authorities to see that they function.

But at the intermediate and the consumer levels, the CINC must have effective mechanisms for integration and coordination of the logistics effort.

This is where the Service responsibilities and the commander's interests come together and must be reconciled, recognizing that operational responsibility demands a degree of logistics authority.

Senior commanders must have authority in certain functions if they are to achieve that integration of forward area logistics effort which is essential for mission performance.

One function is the establishing of requirements. What is needed? How much is needed? Where is it to be positioned? What is the operational and conceptual basis for these needs? What consumption rate factors are to be used in its calculations? What are the risks if these needs are not provided?

This function involves the commander's setting of standards, and his policing of these standards. In base development, for example, what is the standard for troop housing? (In a bare base situation with little host nation support, lumber and plumbing supplies take up shipping space which ammunition should perhaps have.) In food service, for example, what is the standard for

refrigeration? (Frozen meat and fresh vegetables take up transportation which spare parts should perhaps have.)

Another function is the control of priorities.

Assets will be short. The responsible operational commander must make the necessary tough decisions which may well determine whether or not operations succeed.

Control of priorities means more than simply establishing those priorities. It means having control over distribution.

It means having a system so that, once established, priorities are adjusted as the tactical situation dictates. It means authority to direct "cross leveling" of assets (i.e., taking from one element and giving to another as the situation requires.) It means establishing controls on ammunition expenditures, and making them stick.

Another function is the control of movement resources.

The basic tool of the theater-level logistician is movement. Movement means will always be short. They must be shared; they must be allocated to where the most urgent needs exist. They must be responsive.

Responsiveness of Service logistics systems to the unified commander's needs is essential. But more than willingness is required in such a system. Command and control and the ability to audit, in place at the start of operations, is also required. This means monitoring logistics performance, in real time and with accurate data, and giving guidance -- with the assurance that the guidance will be followed.

The most powerful mechanism that a commander can have to meet these functions is command authority over the full logistics system. This was essentially what General Dwight D. Eisenhower had in 1944-45 in allied operations in France, the Low Countries, and Germany.

Eisenhower's case was unusual -- the United States was the allies' main logistics source, the United States Army command in Europe (ETOUSA, or European Theater of Operations, United States Army) was commanded by General Eisenhower himself, with an immediate subordinate in command of his Communications Zone. Wearing his operational hat, as Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, General Eisenhower in effect had himself as his own logistician.

Even then, making logistics decisions, and making them stick in times of strain, was not an easy matter.

The least powerful mechanism which a responsible commander can use is no command authority whatever, not much of a system, and little influence. In such a situation, where the commander has a purported authority to direct operations but not to control logistics performance, he becomes powerless to do the former.

Each theater forces situation will be different. National and Service composition of forces will differ. The geography will differ, as will the distances and nature of the lines of communications. It is for each commander, in his situation, to decide what he must have as a coordinating and integrating mechanism, for that situation, and to fight to get it.

If the theater commander is to exercise influence on theater level logistics performance, he and his logistics operator must

have information that is timely, accurate, complete, and germane to the problem, and which permits the issuing of instructions quickly to the right places.

This means a command and control system that exists in peacetime, with a database that is current, with procedures that are practiced, and which is able to make the transition to and survive and function in time of war.

Unlike command and control systems for operations and intelligence, the widely spread agencies and activities of the various Services (and nations in multinational forces) which provide this system with data will for the most part not be related to the logistics system operator through command channels.

Design and installation of such a distributed, cooperative system is a matter of high priority.

Extraordinarily difficult and complex logistics support operations will occur in a contingency force operation, where the logistics situation is "bare base" or nearly so.

Typical characteristics of such a situation:

- o The U.S. dominates the logistics picture; the U.S. logistic structure largely supports whatever other national forces there are or may be.
- o Careful and coordinated planning is an absolute must.
- o There is little or no base structure or logistics infrastructure already on the ground; real estate acquisition starts from essentially zero.

- o An intermediate staging area may or may not be available.
- o Such ports, airfields, and highways and railroads as exist in the area are limited; their early and rapid improvement is required.
- o The buildup of logistics stocks begins with the entry of the first operational forces. Typically, these are both U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, the latter being deployed from a naval amphibious task force which carries a logistics train, and the former being air-dropped or air-landed with its own follow-on air-landed and seaborne logistics stream.
- o Follow-on stocks and service facilities immediately begin coming ashore.
- o The fighting forces immediately begin moving out, stretching and soon outrunning their self-supported lines of communication.
- o It quickly becomes necessary to share stocks (e.g., fuel and ammunition) services (e.g., evacuation and hospitalization), and transportation, and to coordinate access to the local labor supply.
- o Fighter and transport aircraft, if and when based in the lodgement area, begin to consume large quantities of fuel and munitions.
- o Part, or all, of the initial lodgement has been made under naval (albeit "joint") task force command, and in

due time there ensues a transfer of command ashore which does not include command of fleet units offshore nor of offshore logistics.

- o The local government and populace, which may vary in attitude from somewhat hostile to very cooperative, is overwhelmed by all that is happening, as are local resources of all kinds. Civil affairs, and civil military operations, take on increasing importance.

With faulty coordination and control, this is a situation ready-made for confusion. If it is compounded by enemy air or long range missile attack and by hostile guerrilla or other operations in the developing base area, the logistic and base situation can quickly get out of control and operations will soon begin to suffer.

Here the urgent requirement is that, from the outset of the planning, the commander who is responsible for the success of the operation must have available to him a central logistic support authority who can influence the planning of the logistic support and who can from the operation's inception coordinate, control, and when required direct that logistic support.

The senior multiservice commander who does not insist on there being such an authority responsible to him from the planning phases of an operation through its execution will regret it when his logistic support operations quickly become unmanageable, inefficient, even chaotic -- and his operations suffer accordingly.

When he attempts to insist on such, however, the multi-service commander encounters the doctrines of the U.S. Services

and, frequently, the ingrained cussedness of the Service commanders reporting to him.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff will have difficulty agreeing to the responsible senior commander's insistence on a high order of control over forward area Service logistics machinery. This is because they operate as a committee, in which the Service chief members' natural bent is toward not relinquishing Service control. However, the JCS Chairman and the logisticians in the Joint Staff will tend to support the field commander.

With that background, we can develop Judgment Option I for Item (5).

The Practical Authority of a Unified Command CINC
In View of His Mission Responsibility

<u>Aspect of Command</u>	<u>According to Present System</u>	<u>Necessary & Reasonable</u>
Judgment Option I		
(5) Influence how admin/log support is to be provided to the forces of his command	The CINC has appropriate and sufficient influence in today's system	<u>No change needed</u>

This does not look like a viable option. In his area of operations, in the intermediate and consumer levels, the CINC needs more authority in the areas of requirements, priorities, distribution, and movement.

We have covered requirements in the section on resources just above (page 15-31).

Judgment Options II and III address priorities, distribution, and movement, and the mechanisms for influence on these aspects of administration and logistics support.

The Practical Authority of a Unified Command CINC
In View of His Mission Responsibility

<u>Aspect of Command</u>	<u>According to Present System</u>	<u>Necessary & Reasonable</u>
Judgment Option II		
(5) Influence how admin/log support is to be provided to the forces of his command.	The CINC's influence is <u>substantially insufficient</u> . He has inadequate authority to plan and direct priorities, distribution, and movement.	Give the CINC and his admin/log staff authority to plan and direct matters of admin/log <u>priorities, distribution, and movement</u> in his assigned area of operations.
Judgment Option III		
(5) Influence how admin/log support is to be provided to the forces of his command.	The CINC's authority to plan and direct is <u>gravely inadequate</u> . Further, he has no suitable organization for directing the performance of admin/log support in his area in time of war.	In addition to the authority in Option II above, give the CINC authority to establish a command responsible to him for directing all-Service admin/log support in his area of operations in time of war.

Option II gives the CINC practical authority to decide the most important matters of consumer logistics. Option III gives him a practical capability to put his decisions into effect in time of war.

Is legislation required for Options II and III?

Yes. These measures involve a real redistribution of influence from the Services to the commanders of unified commands. The law assigns the military departments and their Services responsibility for administration and support of the forces assigned to combatant commands. If there is to be a new section in the statute which deals with the combatant commands, for either Option II or Option III it should include language which describes the increased authorities and influence in principle at least. The detailed processes for carrying out either Option II or Option III would be described in DoD and JCS instructions.

Influence on Personnel Actions

In the previous section we discussed the influence which it may be necessary or desirable for a CINC to exercise in the personnel administration support which the Services provide to his forces -- medical support, personnel replacement, morale activities, and the like. Much of this support is provided by the sizable establishment which each Service maintains for managing its personnel. These establishments take care of everything from bringing the service member in to mustering him out.

For the unified command CINC to seek influence in the details of Service performance of the greatest part of this personnel management responsibility is out of the question. Relying on the Services to do the job right, he concentrates on what is important to operations.

The CINC is, however, highly interested in personnel management matters with respect to key personnel of the forces under

his operational command. Specifically, he wants to have an influence on personnel matters pertaining to his key commanders.

We can define "key commanders" as those all-Service commanders through whom the CINC must work to accomplish his mission. These might be the two- and three-star officers in command of combat formations. For the Army and Marine Corps, this might go to the level of division, possibly separate brigade, commander.

For the Air Force, key personnel might include the tactical air force and air division commanders, or even wing commanders. For the Navy, they would include three- and two-star commanders of fleet task organizations.

The definition of "key personnel" is itself a policy matter. Should the CINC stop at the top-level commander of the formations, or might he go down into the Service formation structure -- to the division commanders in a corps, for example?

Commanders of smaller unified commands will be interested in commanders at the level of brigadier general and colonel.

For each of these key personnel, once defined, the CINC is interested in two aspects of personnel management: (1) their selection, and (2) their motivation.

Today the CINC has little to do with the selection or replacement of his key Service formation commanders. The Services, usually without any participation by the CINC, decide who will be the senior formation commanders in their Service commands. The CINC is "notified" but is usually not consulted in advance. The CINC may have some voice in an officer in his headquarters, but

rarely in an officer of another Service in operational chain of command. In the rare case of the relief for cause of an officer in his operational chain of command, he often learns after the fact.

The Services consider themselves fully capable of assigning officers of high quality to key positions. Each Service has its carefully monitored system for general or flag officer assignment. They are not interested in checking out with a CINC the acceptability of, say, one of his new air division or air wing commanders. We are here into a jealously guarded Service prerogative.

As to motivation, the CINC is interested in two simple things. One of these is the ability to reward; the other is the reverse, the ability to adversely affect the key subordinate's future, or punish.

To a senior officer, reward is of course wrapped up in his sense that his commander thinks that he is doing good work and that his work is appreciated. A more tangible reward is an improved chance for higher rank or a more responsible assignment.

The senior commander's periodic performance report -- differently labeled in each of the Services -- is one way in which the commander can reward, or adversely affect, his subordinates. Informal or formal comments on the subordinate's effectiveness, to his Service superiors, can be even more meaningful.

The ultimate sanction, relief from command, is simply not available today to a CINC on his own authority.

With that background, we can now develop our judgment options for reasonable and necessary answers on Item (6).

Here is Judgment Option I.

The Practical Authority of a Unified Command CINC
In View of His Mission Responsibility

<u>Aspect of Command</u>	<u>According to Present System</u>	<u>Necessary & Reasonable</u>
Judgment Option I		
(6) Influence personnel actions as to key members of his command	The CINC has appropriate and sufficient influence in today's system	No change needed

This option is for those who are satisfied with the current system. Judgment Options II and III add to the CINC's influence.

The Practical Authority of a Unified Command CINC
In View of His Mission Responsibility

<u>Aspect of Command</u>	<u>According to Present System</u>	<u>Necessary & Reasonable</u>
Judgment Option II		
(6) Influence personnel actions as to key members of his command	The CINC's influence is insufficient. His means for influencing the selection and performance of key personnel of his command are too few and weak in their effect.	Give the CINC additional means to influence the selection and performance of key personnel of his command.
Judgment Option III		
(6) Influence personnel actions as to key members of his command	The CINC's influence is insufficient. His means for influencing the selection and performance of key personnel of his command are too few and weak in their effect.	Give the CINC additional means to influence the selection and performance of key personnel of his command, sufficient to raise his influence on key members of his operational chain of command to be at least equal to that of the Service.

Note the action specified in the last seven lines of Option III.

We can approach the development of actions for these two options by making a list of those actions which would accomplish the purpose of Option III -- namely, making the influence of the CINC equal to that of an officer's Service -- and then scaling back from that list for Option II.

In our imaginary talk by the Secretary of Defense at page 13-40 in Chapter XIII, the Secretary discussed this subject at some length. He listed a number of actions he intended to take. His aim was to "give the multiservice operational chain of command a power to reward and punish equal to that of the Service chain of command."

(We should recognize that to do this in peacetime will put many senior officers in the operational chain of command in a considerable bind. At present, their Service command chain is paramount; it is also the chain through which they obtain their resources and receive their performance ratings. Under this new policy they may have some agonizing choices as to whom to listen to.)

The Secretary of Defense went on to say, "I want each officer in a senior command position in a multiservice operational chain of command to understand in no uncertain terms that his prospects for advancement to a more responsible position will be influenced in a major way by what his (other Service, if such is the case) seniors in that operational chain think of his abilities, and especially by what they think of his responsiveness to them as compared to his responsiveness to his Service chain."

Let's make a list of "the Secretary's" actions, and possibly some others, and check them off as "yes" under the column, Option III, below. In the next column, we can check off those which can go into Option II. This will be our Item (6) "matrix for decision."

Our first two entries are to establish the statements of the Secretary of Defense as quoted above as basic policy. We go on from there.

<u>Action</u>	<u>Option III</u>	<u>Option II</u>
Policy statement: Give the CINC and his operational chain of command a power to reward and punish equal to that of the Service chain of command.	Yes	?
Policy statement: Each officer in a senior command position in a joint operational chain of command must understand that his prospects for advancement will be influenced what his seniors in that operational chain think of his responsiveness to them as compared to his responsiveness to his Service chain of command.	Yes	?
CINCs will report periodically to the Secretary of Defense on the strength and responsiveness of the operational chain of command. They will list at least the two- and three- star officers in the operational chain and rate their performance according to their responsiveness to the operational chain.	Yes	?
The CINC will be consulted by the Service in the process of routine replacement or relief for cause of key personnel commanders in the opcon chain. The definition of who are "key personnel" is up to the CINC to decide.	Yes	?
SecDef to give general court martial convening authority to the CINC, over the members of his operational chain of command.	Yes	?
The CINC, after consulting with the Service Chief, is authorized to relieve for cause a key member in his operational chain of command.	Yes	?
Each Service selection board for general and flag rank will have one or more members on it (the number depending on the size of the board) selected by the Chairman, JCS.	Yes	?
The Secretary of Defense, with the recommendation of the Chairman, JCS, will convene an annual selection board for the grade of major general/rear admiral upper half, which will select a total of 10 percent of the number of brigadier generals/rear admiral lower half to be promoted by within each Service in the coming year.	Yes	?

The reader can add to Option III, and then in his own way complete Option II, which is somewhere between I and III.

Technically, legislation is not required for Options II and III. The Secretary of Defense could take all the actions under Option III on his own authority.

But because actions like these for Options II and III change the basic relationships and influence structure within the Department of Defense, it would seem proper to spell out in general terms in the law the intent of Congress as to the increased authorities of the CINCs and the Chairman.

A Final Worksheet for Decision

To summarize the basic findings of this study:

- o Over the years, a pervasive and by now endemic weakening of the chain of U.S. operational command has had grave deleterious effect on the readiness and performance of U.S. multiservice forces, and has contributed to recent disasters such as the October 1983 Beirut Marine tragedy.
- o "The wall of the Service component" has always inhibited and often prevented command supervision of mission performance and mission readiness by multiservice commanders and has kept them from the exercise of proper influence over the evolution of the command and control systems of their commands.
- o The fundamental problem is that the authority, and the capacity to exercise that authority, which is possessed by senior officers in the chain of operational command

does not match the responsibility and accountability which these officers bear. This mismatch is both structurally unsound and manifestly unfair.

- o The underlying cause of this mismatch and of the consequent deficiencies in command and control is the prevailing Service-dominated culture of U.S. multiservice operational command. Within this culture the senior multiservice commanders lack the full operational command which the Congress in 1958 specified that they will possess.*

In Chapters XIII and XIV we sought ways to break down the "wall of the Service component," to improve the functioning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to strengthen the operational chain of command. Basic choices were to (1) continue generally along the present path, (2) change the governing statutes, and (3) make major change with little or no revision of statutes.

In this chapter, we have taken the viewpoint that any significant movement beyond the present condition will require a combination of legislative and executive action.

The chart on the following page tells that story for Items (1) through (6). Judgment Option I is, in general, "continue along the present path." (Discussion is at the page numbers.)

*See Appendix A to this chapter for another point of view about these findings.

Is Legislation Required to Put the Option into Effect?

<u>Unified Commander's Aspect of Command</u>	<u>Judgment Option I</u>	<u>Judgment Option II</u>	<u>Judgment Option III</u>
(1) Decide how his command is to be organized and employed in operations	No (15-12)	Yes (15-12)	Yes (15-12)
(2) Decide how forces of his command are to be trained	No (15-21)	Yes (15-22)	Yes (15-22)
(3) Influence how forces of his command are to be equipped	No (15-29)	Yes (15-30)	Yes (15-30)
(4) Influence the resources to be provided to his command	No (15-43)	Yes (15-44)	Yes (15-45)
(5) Influence how admin/log support is to be provided to the forces of his command	No (15-56)	Yes (15-57)	Yes (15-57)
(6) Influence personnel actions as to key members of his command	No (15-61)	Yes (15-62)	Yes (15-62)

For Options II and III, Congress can give its intent and write some basic authorities but, just as with the 1958 amendments, to convert the new authorities and the resulting fundamental shift in relative influence into practice will require action on DoD directives and JCS publications within the Department of Defense.

We conclude this study with a final worksheet for decision. It will list various proposals which have been made, in the Congress and elsewhere. For each proposal some sort of legislation, either specific or more generally worded, is either surely or probably required.

Using this format...

* * * * *

<u>Proposed Measure</u>	<u>Necessary & Reasonable?</u>	<u>Modest Shift In Influence</u>	<u>Major Shift In Influence</u>
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* * * * *

...each reader can decide for himself, in light of our discussion and his own reasoning and judgment:

- o Is the action necessary and reasonable in view of the need to increase the authority and influence of unified commanders to a level commensurate with their responsibilities for mission performance?
- o Does the action represent a modest shift in influence within the Department of Defense, or a major shift in influence?

And, although no space is provided for the entry, the reader can make his judgment as to whether it is appropriate to make the action a matter of law.

Upon completing the worksheet, answer the question: Is the sum of what you believe should be decided by law an appropriate package for the Congress to enact?

Your worksheet for decision:

<u>Proposed Measure</u>	<u>Necessary & Reasonable?</u>	<u>Shift In Influence</u>	
		<u>Modest</u>	<u>Major</u>
(1) The JCS Chairman will be the principal military advisor to the President.			
(2) The duties assigned to the JCS by current law will be the responsibility of the Chairman himself.			
(3) The Chairman will have the function of submitting program and budget proposals to the Secretary of Defense.			
(4) The Secretary of Defense can direct that the chain of command to combatant commands run through the Chairman.			
(5) The Joint Staff will be responsible to the Chairman.			
(6) The Chairman will supervise the commanders of the combatant commands, in addition to acting as their spokesman.			
(7) There will be a Deputy Chairman, to outrank all other serving officers except the Chairman, who will act for the Chairman in the latter's absence, and who will also function as Director of the Joint Staff.			

(Note: Measures (1) through (7) above are all provisions of the House bill, passed in November 1985. That bill also provided that any Service Chief member of the JCS, if he disagreed with the military advice of the Chairman or of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "shall submit to the Secretary of Defense such opinion in disagreement" -- and provided a like process for military advice to the President.)[8]

(The ideas listed below, although not all of them call for legislation, are subject to the same proviso as to Service Chief appeal written into the House bill just quoted above.)

To continue:

<u>Proposed Measure</u>	<u>Necessary & Reasonable?</u>	<u>Shift in Influence</u>	
		<u>Modest</u>	<u>Major</u>

(8) In addition to the present Director of the Joint Staff, there will be a Deputy Chairman, to outrank all other serving officers except the Chairman, who will act for the Chairman in the latter's absence.

(9) There will be a four-star Deputy Chairman, to rank below the Service Chiefs, who will also function as Director of the Joint Staff but will not act for the Chairman in his absence.

[Select only one of (7), (8), or (9), if any.]

(10) Toward the performance of assigned military missions, and subject to the review and direction of the President and Secretary of Defense, the unified commander will have authority to organize and employ, and train for employment, the forces of his command as he chooses.

(Here another legislative proviso seems necessary: "Nothing in this section shall affect the responsibilities of the military departments or the functions of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps as described in [cite the passages of current law which define 'roles and missions,' although that term is not used in the law]. This section applies only to the authority of the unified commander to organize, employ, and train for employment forces which the military departments assign or may assign to his operational command.")

To continue:

<u>Proposed Measure</u>	<u>Necessary & Reasonable?</u>	<u>Shift in Influence</u>	
		<u>Modest</u>	<u>Major</u>
<p>(11) The full operational command which a unified commander has over forces assigned to his command is defined as "the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission." When a unified commander deems that his authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission requires that he issue orders as to matters of discipline, internal organization, unit training, and other standards of performance to forces under his operational command, his judgment prevails over that of the Service chain of command.</p>			
<p>(12) Authorities of full operational command commensurate with responsibilities shall be extended down through operational chains of command to all levels at which forces of more than one Service are present.</p>			

Proposed Measure

Necessary &
Reasonable?

Shift In Influence
Modest Major

(13) At the level of the established combatant commands and below that level as directed by the Secretary of Defense, the operational forces commander shall have meaningful authority as to the expenditure of funds, both through the control of funds made directly available to him and through his substantive influence on the expenditure of the funds of military departments in his assigned areas of responsibility.

(14) In their process of materiel acquisition, the military departments will give unified commanders an opportunity to comment on the requirements of those items with which forces assigned to their commands may be equipped.

(15) With respect to the administrative and logistical support which the military departments provide to the forces assigned to unified commands, the unified commander will, in exercising his responsibility for the employment of those forces, have authority to plan and direct matters of priorities, distribution, and movement in his assigned area of operations.

<u>Proposed Measure</u>	<u>Necessary & Reasonable?</u>	<u>Shift In Influence Modest</u>	<u>Influence Major</u>
<p>(16) In addition to the above, in time of war or emergency the commander of a unified command will have authority to designate a single commander responsible to him for directing all administration and logistic support in his area of operations.</p>			
<p>(17) The Secretary of Defense will establish policies and procedures for officer personnel management which will make the influence of the unified commander on the key personnel in his operational chain of command equal to that of those who are in those key officers' Service chains of command.</p>			
<p>(18) The Secretary of Defense will give the unified commander general court-martial convening authority over the members of his operational chain of command.</p>			
<p>(19) The Service Chief will consult with the unified commander in the process of replacing key personnel in the operational chain of command.</p>			
<p>(20) After consultation, when possible, with the Service Chief of the officer concerned, the commander of a unified command may relieve for cause any officer in his operational chain of command.</p>			

<u>Proposed Measure</u>	<u>Necessary & Reasonable?</u>	<u>Shift In Influence</u>	
		<u>Modest</u>	<u>Major</u>

(21) Each Service selection board for general and flag rank will have one or more members on it selected by the Chairman, JCS.

(22) The Secretary of Defense, on the recommendation of the Chairman, JCS, will convene an annual selection board for the grade of major general/rear admiral upper half which will select 10 percent of the officers of each Service to be promoted to that grade in the following year.

Others?

You can record your judgments by listing below the numbers which would be in your "legislative (or executive) package."


Legislative Action

Executive Action

There is your matrix for decision.

REFERENCES

<u>No.</u>	<u>Page</u>	<u>Citation</u>
1	15-13	<u>A Report by a Committee on Civilian-Military Relationships.</u> Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, Inc., 1984, p. 26.
2	15-17	James M. Gavin, "Cavalry, and I don't Mean Horses," <u>Harper's</u> 208 (April 1954): pp. 54-60.
3	15-18	For a history of Exercise Sagebrush, see Richard P. Wienert, <u>History of Army Aviation 1950-1962, Phase II: 1955-1962</u> (Ft. Monroe, VA: Historical Office, Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, November 1976) or John D. Stevenson, "Exercise Sagebrush," <u>Air University Quarterly Review</u> , Fall 1956, pp. 15-38.
4	15-34	Henry E. Eccles, <u>Logistics in the National Defense.</u> Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, Inc., 1959.
5	15-35	<u>Ibid.</u> , p. 42.
6	15-36	<u>Ibid.</u>
7	15-46	U.S. Congress. Senate. <u>Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1985.</u> (See reference 14.37.)
8	15-70	<u>Ibid.</u>



MEMORANDUM

Subj: MARINE CORPS COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT OF JOHN H. CUSHMAN'S
**COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THEATER FORCES; THE KOREA
COMMAND AND OTHER CASES**

1. The study written by General CUSHMAN provides a useful review of issues and opinions related to the unified direction of the Armed Forces. While extensive, the discussion is by no means exhaustive; however, it contains one point of view (of many) which should be studied by those charged with improving responsibilities, relationships, and processes necessary for unified direction. His orientation (and use of terms such as "theater forces" which he defines as those employed largely for land mass operations) is basically continental, and he tends to view all combat operations as they relate to that exclusive category. Nevertheless, his comprehension of basic naval organization and operational practice is good.

2. General CUSHMAN's basic premise is that senior officers in the chain of operational command, both in field commands and at the seat of government, bear responsibility and accountability which is not matched by authority and the capacity to exercise that authority; that the underlying cause is Service-domination of U.S. multi-Service operational direction which deprives unified commanders of full operational command; and that JCS committee action for command and control provides substandard results.

3. Throughout the study, General CUSHMAN finds fault with the provisions of **Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF, JCS Pub 2)** relative to the authority of a joint force commander (primarily at unified/sub-unified command level).

a. He takes issue with the UNAAF definition of operational command/control, but recognizes that the proviso therein for "the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission" is fundamental to the issue. In fact, other than changing the title (OPCON to OPCOM), his only change to the definition is to add "full" before authoritative direction and delete the proviso that such authority should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate forces (joint or uniService, as the case may be). As this latter provision establishes the chain of command and direct responsibility between superiors and subordinates, its removal creates far more problems than it solves.

(1) The difference between "authoritative direction necessary" and "full authoritative direction" is questionable. In any event, no authority, military or otherwise, is absolute; it is constrained by the terms of delegation and limitations imposed by higher authority. And, within the basic division of work accepted in the Defense Establishment for Services to develop and support forces and for unified commanders to employ them, full command, as the author points out, aggregates only in the national Service forces which inevitably are the building blocks for any joint or combined organization. That may create problems from time to time, but nothing like the problems associated with six unified commanders each being responsible for wholesale and retail logistic support of their forces. Nevertheless, UNAAF provides the unified commander with authority to coordinate that logistic effort in support of their combatant operations. The examples stated tend to reflect a reluctance (timidity, to echo the author's qualification of his use of Service "cussedness", may be too strong word but it conveys the idea) to exercise authority now vested. The one example cited (H. M. SMITH at Saipan) of a joint commander relieving a subordinate is just that -- the one example. Change of subordinate commanders is faster and more effective than court-martial.

Encl (1)

Subj: MARINE CORPS COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT OF JOHN H. CUSHMAN'S
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(2) The author's definition of OPCON/OPCOM ostensibly (his claim) would give the unified commanders freedom to form "functional" components or to operate Service forces outside the Service component. In fact, a review of UNAAF will show that he has that authority now. He may organize his force on either a functional or area basis, or some combination thereof. In that context, he may employ uniService forces or joint forces as subordinate commands. On the single Service side, he may employ his Service components, and he may choose to organize an element thereof as a uniService force (functional or area) under his direct OPCON. Examples (both functional) are 1st ANGLICO and 5th Special Forces in RVN. When the requirement goes beyond the capability of any one Service component, he may organize a subordinate joint force under his direct OPCON. Again, MACV provides examples: 3d Marine Division (Marine and Army); XXIV Corps (Army and Marine); III MAF (Marine and Army); and Studies and Observation Group (all Services). SOG was a joint functional command; the other examples were joint area commands.

b. The author refers continuously to the problem of an itinerant force (e.g., Marine battalion training in Korea) and lack of operational authority over such forces. UNAAF (par 30229) stipulates that, in the event of a major emergency in his area of responsibility which necessitates the use of all available forces, the commander of a unified command (and by extension, subordinate unified command; see par 30234) is authorized to assume temporary operational control of all such forces, except those forces scheduled for or actually engaged in the execution, under war plans approved by the JCS, of specific operational missions which would be interfered with by the contemplated use of forces. The determination of the existence of such an emergency is the responsibility of the commander concerned. Again, no change is required to implement this -- only comprehension of existing doctrine. As a practical note, it is hard to believe that any battalion commander -- Army or Marine -- deployed for training who found himself on a battlefield would back out of the fight.

c. Taken as a whole, the discussion of the inadequacies of UNAAF reflects the DoD-wide lack of understanding of its provisions. The dialogue over functional components in recent years is illustrative. The argument for recapturing OPCON/OPCOM is not persuasive. The elements of operational authority -- and that is what counts -- are the same for both. Exercise of that authority will not be improved by a change of name. While UNAAF can be improved, we ought not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Perhaps what is required is better instruction regarding UNAAF in the Staff and War Colleges to teach its provisions and options for their use.

d. There is another point to be made here and that is the national need for centrally deployable forces to be able to reinforce any theater commander, according to the requirements of the developing situation. Creation of these general purpose forces is the responsibility of the Services, and the doctrine and team skills which bind them into employable combat power cannot be tailored exclusively to the perceived needs of any one theater commander. Accordingly, during peacetime, the Services do have a major role in development and coordination of Service and joint doctrine. Otherwise, we end up with six armies, six air forces, six navies and six Marine Corps -- with little hope of mutual supportability within or among theaters. The current effort to get theater commanders to develop universal joint doctrine is demonstrating the impracticality of that approach. Inevitably, the Services must learn to work together in the U. S. if we

Subj: MARINE CORPS COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT OF JOHN H. CUSHMAN'S
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expect them to do so in overseas theaters. The greater the distance we can maintain between these operational employment matters and resource apportionment matters, the greater the chances of cooperation.

4. The author states (pg. 14-16) that the essential nature of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is that they are a committee. In fact, they are a staff. See the Functions Paper, par D which stipulates that the JCS constitute the immediate military staff of SecDef. Like all staffs, they use committee action to coordinate; unlike conventional committees, each staff member has functional responsibilities directly to the command authority, who is the NCA. In dealing with responsibilities and relationships between a commander and his staff, we must keep in mind where final authority and accountability lie -- in the commander, not his staff -- nor that staff's chief. That conventional principle of military authority is as true at the seat of government as it is at the infantry battalion level. The only difference is that the U.S. Constitution provides (as in every other nation State) that the civilian head of government has the ultimate military authority and responsibility. In his dual capacity as JCS military staff member and Chief of Service (or Chief of Staff/CJCS), each member of the JCS can be held accountable for his collective performance and his individual functional performance. The Secretary of Defense may hire and fire, and has done so. When collectively the staff disagree, a commander -- not a staff officer -- must resolve the issue. One move which would focus their efforts (as JCS) on the operational and strategic issues is to keep them out of resources management; that is the function of the Military Departments, OSD, and the SecDef.

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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS*

AADCP	Army Air Defense Command Post
AAFCE	Allied Air Forces Central Europe
ADC	Assistant Division Commander
ADEA	Army Development and Employment Agency
AEF	American Expeditionary Force
AF	Air Force
AFB	Air Force Base
AFCEA	Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association
AFCENT	Allied Forces Central Europe (NATO)
AF/IN	Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence, USAF
AFK	Air Forces Korea
AFM	Air Forces Manual
AFNORTH	Allied Forces Northern Europe (NATO)
AFSOUTH	Allied Forces Southern Europe (NATO)
AIB	Airborne Infantry Battalion
ALO	Air Liaison Officer
ARPA	Advanced Research Project Agency
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASOC	Air Support Operations Center

*We do not seek to list all those acronyms and abbreviations which are used only once and which are explained where they are used.

ATAF	Allied Tactical Air Force (NATO)
ATOC	Allied Tactical Operations Center (NATO)
AUTODIN	Automated Digital Network
AWOL	Absent Without Leave
Bde	Brigade
BETA	Battlefield Exploitation and Target Acquisition
BLT	Battalion Landing Team
C ²	Command and Control
C ³	Command, Control, and Communications
C3	Operations Chief on Combined (Multinational) Staff (Korea)
C ³ CM	Command, Control, and Communications Counter-measures
C ³ I	Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
C ³ S	Command, Control, and Communications Systems
C ⁴ S	Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems
C6	Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications-Electronics, on Combined (Multinational) Staff (Korea)
CAFMS	Computer Assisted Force Management System
CASIC	Combined All-Source Intelligence Center
CATTS	Combined Arms Tactical Training Simulator
CAV	Cavalry

CDIP	Combined Defense Improvement Program
C-E	communications-electronics
CECOM	U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command
CENSEI	Center for System Engineering and Integration (CECOM)
CENTAG	Central Army Group (NATO)
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CFA	Combined Field Army (Korea)
CFC	Combined Forces Command (Korea)
CG	Commanding General
CGFMFPac	Commanding General, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CINCCFC	Commander-in-Chief, Combined Forces Command
CINCENT	Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command
CINCEUR	Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command
CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command
CINCPACFLT	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCREC	Commander-in-Chief, Readiness Command
CINCSOUTH	Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe
CINCUNC	Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command
CINCUSAREUR	Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Europe
CINCUSEUCOM	Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command
CINCUSNAVEUR	Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Europe

CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COMNAVAIRPAC	Commander, Naval Air, Pacific
COMNAVFORK	Commander, Naval Surface Forces, Korea
COMNAVSUBPAC	Commander, Naval Submarines, Pacific
COMNAVSURFPAC	Commander, Naval Surface Forces, Pacific
COMUSK	Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea
COMUSMACV	Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam
CP	Command Post
CP TANGO	Command Post TANGO (Korea)
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CRC	Control and Reporting Center
CRP	Control and Reporting Post
CRT	Cathode Ray Tube
C/S	Chief of Staff
C SCT	Combat Support Coordination Team
CTIC	Combined Tactical Intelligence Concept
CTF	Commander, Task Force
DARCOM	Department of the Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command
DARPA	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DCA	Defense Communications Agency
DCCS	Distributed Command and Control System
DCS	Defense Communications System
DEC	Digital Equipment Corporation

DEFCON	Defense Condition
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DMA	Defense Mapping Agency
DMZ	demilitarized zone (e.g., Korea's DMZ)
DNA	Defense Nuclear Agency
DOD DOD	} Department of Defense
DR	
DRAM	Dynamic Random Access Memory
DRB	Defense Resources Board
DSB	Defense Science Board
ECB	Echelons Corps and Below
ERADCOM	Electronics Research and Development Command
ETOUSA	European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army
EUCOM	U.S. European Command
EUSA	Eighth U.S. Army
FDC	Fire Direction Center
FIP	(Five-Year) Force Improvement Plan
FIPS	Federal Information Processing System Standards
FM	Field Manual
FMFLANT	Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
FMFPAC	Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FORSCOM	U.S. Army Forces Command

FROKA	First Republic of Korea Army
FY	Fiscal Year
G2	intelligence officer (on an Army force staff)
G3	operations officer (on an Army force staff)
GCM	General Court-Martial
HTACC	Hardened Tactical Air Control Center (Korea)
IADB	Inter-American Defense Board
ICTZ	I Corps Tactical Zone (Vietnam War)
IDHS	Intelligence Data Handling System
IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
ISO	International Standards Organization
J2	Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (Joint Staff)
J3	Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations (Joint Staff)
J5	Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans (Joint Staff)
J6	Assistant Chief of Staff, Communications- Electronics (Joint Staff)
JAAF	Joint Action Armed Forces
JAAN	Joint Action of the Army and Navy
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JESS	Joint Exercise Support System

JINTACCS	Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems
J-SAK	Joint Attack of the Second Echelon
JTC ³ A	Joint Tactical Command, Control, and Communications Agency
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTIDS	Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
JUSMAG-K	Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group-Korea
KAIS	Korean Air Intelligence System
KISS	Korean Intelligence Support System
KMA	Korea Military Academy
KTA	Korean Telecommunication Authority
KTACS	Korean Tactical Air Control System
LANTCOM	Atlantic Command
LIB	Light Infantry Brigade
MACV	U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAF	Marine Amphibious Force
MAGTF	Marine Air Ground Task Force
MAU	Marine Amphibious Unit
MCATS	Microcomputer Application for Tactical Support
MCS	Maneuver Control System
MENS	Mission Element Needs Statement
MOC	Ministry of Communications

MR 1	Military Region 1 (Vietnam War)
MSE	Mobile Subscriber Equipment
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVEUR	U.S. Naval Forces, Europe
NCA	National Command Authorities
NCC	Navy Component Command
NDI	non-development item
NORTHAG	Northern Army Group (NATO)
NSC	National Security Council
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
OAG	Operational Analysis Group
OJCS	Organization of Joint Chiefs of Staff
OMC	Office of Military Cooperation
OOD	Officer of the Deck
OPCON	Operational Command/Operational Control
OPLAN	operations plan
OPNAV	Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OPTADS	Operational and Tactical Data Systems
OSD	Office of Secretary of Defense
OSI	open system interconnect
OTC	officer in tactical command
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces

PACFLT	Pacific Fleet
PACOM	Pacific Command
POM	Program Objective Memo
RAF	Royal Air Force
RAM	Random Access Memory
RDJTF	Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
REC	radio-electronic combat
REDCOM	U.S. Readiness Command
RFP	Request for Proposal
ROC	Required Operational Capability
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROKA	Republic of Korea Army
ROKAF	Republic of Korea Air Force
ROK/US	Republic of Korea/United States
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO)
SAGE	Semi-Automated Ground Environment
SASM	Special Assistant for Security Matters
SCI	Sensitive Compartmented Information
SIAMS	Sensor Information Automation Management System
SINCGARS	Single channel ground-air radio system
SORM	Ships Operations and Regulations Manual
SOP	Standing Operating Procedure

SOPA	Senior Officer Present Afloat
SPRAA	Strategic Plans and Resource Allocation Agency
SROKA	Second ROK Army
SSO	Special Security Officer
STANAG	Standardization Agreements (NATO)
STEP-K	Satellite Telecommunications Employment Plan - Korea
TAC	Tactical Air Command
TACC	Tactical Air Control Center
TACCAuto	U.S. Air Force automated tactical air command and control system
TACCIMS	TANGO Automated Command and Control Information Management System
TACSIM	Tactical Simulation (for intelligence)
TACP	tactical air control party
TACIP	The Army C ² Initiatives Program
TAF	Tactical Air Force
TCCOC	TANGO Combined Communication Operations Center
TCS	Tactical Commander's Station
TCT	Tactical Commander's Terminal
TF	Task Force
TICS	Tactical Information Central System
TOC	Tactical Operations Center
TOS	Tactical Operations System
TPICK	Telecommunications Plan for the Improvement of Communications in Korea

TR-1	USAF reconnaissance aircraft
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
TROKA	Third Republic of Korea Army
U&S	Unified and Specified
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
UN	United Nations
UNAAF	Unified Action Armed Forces (JCS Pub 2)
UNC	United Nations Command
US	United States
USA	United States Army
USACC	United States Army Communications Center
USAF	United States Air Force
USAREUR	United States Army, Europe
USARPAC	United States Army, Pacific
USARV	United States Army, Vietnam
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USCINCEUR	United States Commander-in-Chief, Europe (NATO)
USCINCPAC	United States Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USFK	United States Forces, Korea
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
USNAVEUR	United States Navy, Europe

USNFK	United States Naval Forces, Korea
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSR	Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics
WESTCOM	Western Command (U.S. Army in Pacific)
WOC	Wing Operations Center (NATO)
WPC	Warrior Preparation Center
WWMCCS	Worldwide Military Command and Control System