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**The Role of Army Intelligence in the
National Foreign Intelligence Program
James D. Davis**

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The Role of Army Intelligence in the National Foreign Intelligence Program

James D. Davis

Since January 1986, James D. Davis has been Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (Management) for the U.S. Army. Mr. Davis has served the Army throughout his professional life. Entering in 1960, he spent seven years on active duty, and then received a Civil Service appointment in the Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, at Headquarters, U.S. Army Security Agency. In 1972 he was appointed Deputy Director of the National Maintenance Point of the Agency's Material Support Command, and in 1974 became the Chief of the Agency's Management, Cost, and Economy Analysis Division. He was detailed from that position to the Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Security Agency/U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command in 1975, where he served as the Chief of the MACOM Planning and Implementation Group. In 1980 Mr. Davis was appointed to the Mission Analysis Office, and in 1981-1982 became the Study Director for the U.S. Army Echelon Above Corps Intelligence Security and Electronic Warfare Architecture Study. In late 1982 Mr. Davis was appointed the Chief of the Mission Analysis Office and in 1983 became the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans, Programs and Modernization, HQ, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command.

Oettinger: It's a pleasure to welcome Jim Davis. He prefers dialogue over monologue, so have at him as soon as the spirit moves you. With that, I give you Jim Davis.

Davis: Thank you very much. It's my pleasure to be here. Even though, as you know if you've looked at the biography, I'm a civilian, and this is my legitimate uniform, I want you to pretend that I'm very green, and that I'm wearing a very green Army uniform. I celebrated my 34th anniversary in Army intelligence this week, and I think I'm about as green as you can get, given that.

I'm going to talk about intelligence from the perspective of where I work as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence in the Pentagon, on the Army staff. I work for Deputy Chief Chuck Owens, Vice Chief Peay, and Gordon Sullivan.* There is no intelligence officer on the Secretariat staff, so we also provide intelligence support to the Secretariat from our office. We

have a dual responsibility in the departmental headquarters: that of providing current and estimative intelligence for the Army policy and decision-making processes, as well as being the Army's functional intelligence manager. Understand that in Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Secretary's mission is to assess, organize, equip, and train the United States Army. We don't fight it; we don't employ it, but we provide that capable, trained, and ready ground component capability to Joint Task Force (JTF) commanders, unified commanders, and coalition commanders. In our estimation, in an intelligence officer's estimation, it is the most capable ground force in the world. It's not the largest, but it's certainly the most diverse and assuredly the best. It's equipped and it's trained. The thing that makes it the best, by the way, is the quality of the soldiers as well as the quality of the technology that they have to work with. That's part of the concern that I'll talk about in terms of being able to sustain this force into the 21st century.

Force XXI isn't a cute little acronym. Force XXI is an analytic initiative started two weeks ago by Gordon Sullivan, the Chief of Staff of the Army. He challenged each of the four-star commanders in the Army, and each of his staff principals, to


* Lt. Gen. Ira C. Owens, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence; Gen. J. H. Binford Peay, III, Vice Chief of Staff for Intelligence; Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

develop a vision of what the Army is going to have to be in the 21st century to respond to the world as we see it evolving over time, and to the role of military force in that world, especially as military force is a component of U.S. power projection—political, economic, and military power projection—to protect U.S. interests, and to establish U.S. interests in the international realm.

Oettinger: Will you suffer an impertinent question from the floor? The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was Colin Powell at the time the Navy produced *From the Sea*, and the Air Force was coming up with some vision things. How come the Army is so late?

Davis: The Army's present vision piece, companion to *From the Sea*, is a doctrinal piece that's called *FM 100-5 Operations*. It's brand new. It's of the same genre, and from the same timeframe, as *From the Sea*,

and it talks about the way the Army will operate from now on. I've got excerpts of that pertinent to the intelligence function in this presentation, so I'll talk to that notion. This vision is different. Those were responsive to the bottom-up review. That was the Aspin view of the world. This is what defense planning guidance gave us for the last budget cycle, and this is how we were designing our downsized military forces to accommodate the four dangers facing the nation that actually drove the Aspin bottom-up review (figure 1). Given this new world—no monolithic Soviet threat, these world conditions—what kind of forces does the United States need? So Aspin drove that decision analysis and that's where *From the Sea* and the Air Force *Global Reach, Global Power*, and the Army's brand new *FM 100-5* came from. I don't apologize for this, but you'll find sometimes that the Army is criticized as being doctrinaire because we write books about how we think and how we



Source: Defense Planning Guidance, Fiscal Years 1995–1999.

Figure 1
The Four Dangers

fight and how we train and what we do. We proliferate them broadly, and we train our people broadly, and we're sometimes criticized as being too wedded to doctrine. I'll tell you, our doctrine is very dynamic and responsive to the situation, and I think that some of the things you'll see that I've pulled out of 100-5 will illustrate that.

So we think that this change of administration that brought this focus out on whither the threat, and this kind of focus has fundamentally changed the way we do business. Now, lest we think that this is a nonlethal world as far as military force is concerned since the Wall has come down, the Army has awarded 650 Purple Hearts, there are four combat streamers on the Army flag that haven't been there before, and we've awarded the Combat Infantryman's Badge four times since the Wall came down. So the message is that even in the new roles, and even with this new world order and this perception of danger, rather than the monolithic Soviet threat, our force is involved internationally and faces threats day in and day out.

Student: Sir, you mentioned a couple of times no longer having the monolithic Soviet threat. We've had at least one speaker who talked to some of the changing conditions in Russia. I'd be interested in your thoughts on when this came out, it was based on what we thought at that time was the absence of a monolithic Soviet threat, and now we're seeing changes in Russia in which the complications are maybe changing again.

Davis: The fact that Russia is a significant, global power with military interest in the near-abroad, their phraseology now for the former Soviet Union, doesn't in my mind bring them back up on par with either the capability or the intent to threaten the national survival of the United States. That's where I draw the demarcation line. We're not talking about a threat that was capable and could develop an intent to threaten U.S. existence as we were five or eight or ten years ago.

So, yes, they're still a very potent military force, and we're reminded of that every time we negotiate and work with the

Russians. It's an interesting phenomenon. It's not just that they want to be treated as a significant world power, it is that by comparison with any of their neighbors, they have the best military in Eastern Europe.

Not the best military on the continent, but certainly the best in Eastern Europe.

They're better than any of the forces of the near-abroad. They still have significant capabilities. They have a lot of problems, but still a part of this relational aspect here is the relationships that can exist on a professional military-to-military basis with other armies, with other navies, with other air forces, where we can develop and continue and improve international dialogue. The Russian army is still there.

In this setting I want to make a couple of points. One is: regional powers come up here as a crisis challenging regional peace and stability. Regional powers are really getting to be kind of in-your-face. They want a significant role in their regions of the world. Within that notion of regional conflict, the idea of ethnicity as a root of conflict is dominant. There are 40 ethnic conflicts going on today. Terrorist incidents, interestingly, in this modern world, in the last year, are down 35 percent in terms of numbers of incidents. However, casualties are up about 170 percent; there are not as many incidents, but they're a lot more lethal when there have been terrorist attacks.

There are other pathologic indicators that say to us that we have to have a force that's prepared to operate in very strange and unusual conditions. Our estimates say that HIV cases are going to go from 10 to 40 million cases in the world over about the next five years. What does that say about the economic underpinnings and the cultural framework of those countries that are dominantly affected by the HIV virus, especially in sub-Saharan Africa? It affects the control mechanisms of that whole part of the world, because AIDS particularly attacks the upper middle class and upper class in sub-Saharan African nations, and the whole cultural underpinning of those nations in the next five to ten years is going to be racked. The potential for conflict as regional powers try to dominate or take over a weakened nation, and the temptation

to do that, are going to be awesome. How much are we going to intervene as a part of this U.N. peacekeeping, or peacemaking, or a U.N. "world order" kind of force? Some of the missions that we're going to take on as a part of that in the next generation I'm going to lay out here in about a slide or two.

Lay that against the more conventional ideas that there will be more than 25 nations in this world by the year 2000, by the end of this decade, that will possess weapons of mass destruction: nuclear, chemical, biological. And, oh, by the way, they're interesting nations in why they have those weapons. They're not into deterrence. They're into regional dominance. So that's a different reason to acquire a weapon of mass destruction than we have used to nationalize this large nuclear arsenal that we still have. We did that for deterrence. Well, these folks don't do it for those reasons.

Against that backdrop, some of our cultural proclivities and lenience relevant to the employment of military forces—especially ground forces, especially sons and daughters on the ground in the face of hostile fire, with the CNN camera at 10 degrees off the line of fire watching the taking of casualties and the taking of prisoners are changing. This brings a different dimension to the decision to employ forces on the part of the United States. It's not distant, it's not surgical. It's in our living rooms. That part of the information age is changing our national will.

That's a little backdrop of things that we think are going to change, and have changed, and continue to change.

Student: Are you suggesting that's driving your strategy or is it just a factor?

Davis: It's fact. It doesn't drive strategy at all. It will be a factor weighed differently than it's ever been weighed before in the decision to deploy and employ forces. We've seen that handled two distinctly different ways in the last two deployments. The press was very tightly contained in the Gulf War, and we read a lot about the fact that they didn't have free rein, as opposed to the press being on the beach in

Mogadishu before the amphibians came in with the Marines.

Student: That's apples and oranges.

Davis: Was it?

Student: Yes. One was humanitarian and one was combat. I don't want to debate you; I just think they were different.

Davis: I understand. The decision to employ forces was based on totally different factors and it's great the Americans are going to feed people, but I bet that in their guts the Marines and the amphibians that were running the feint during the Gulf War and the Marines and the amphibians going ashore in Mogadishu felt about the same way. It wasn't a whole lot different in either situation because they're going to an unknown place with no infrastructure support and it's a hostile environment.

I know the decision to employ was different. But I also know that when we put our soldiers and our sailors and airmen (the Air Force has got to get a non-sexist term—maybe "aviators"), and Marines into hostile environments, for whatever reason, that's when it really comes true: what they're trained for, how well they're commanded, how well their commanders' decisions are communicated and implemented, and how much information those decisions are based on. These environments are not friendly environments.

Student: I'm just a little concerned that we may be suboptimizing these objectives here. When we went into the Gulf War, we were publicly talking about thousands of casualties and everybody knew that going in. The objective and the mission are well stated up front; casualties can be addressed up front. I'm concerned as a military officer that sometimes we can be suboptimizing that too much.

Oettinger: Let me echo that in a way because you're not the first speaker to mention that as if it were an absolute truth. I'm reminded that we got into the Spanish-American War courtesy of William Randolph Hearst, who in that day

employed what got called yellow journalism. When I see the agitation about Bosnia that is being carried on by the electronic journalists of the day, what you're describing could be flipped. Either that, or it is not as much of a factor as somehow I hear folks in Washington seem to believe.

Davis: I accept that. It's a distinct possibility that the people who come and talk to you from Washington are reacting to the Washington reality of Washington press—that part of the press that hangs on every word and every action that every public official takes. Maybe that's a part of what you are getting at. I've thought about that because I think when you get outside the Beltway that the whole attitude toward what goes on, and the reaction to what goes on publicly and in the public debate and in the military, is significantly different than it is inside the Beltway. So maybe what you're hearing is a particular or peculiar Washington reaction to the press.

Oettinger: Perhaps it's out of phase, because it seems to me that now what has happened is that the press has gone jingoistic to a degree I haven't seen in years.

Davis: Yes. And that's okay. By the way, that's a Boston perception. In Washington it's not taken as jingo. It's taken as abusive in other ways. People take it seriously anyway. I think that I agree with you. Maybe that's a good point and it's worth repeating to other people who talk to you because it occurs to me that you might be getting an inside the Beltway reaction or hypersensitivity to the media.

What does it mean to us as we assess, organize, equip, train and prepare forces and are a part of the national intelligence community and are a part of this notion about warning and about decisions and about where conditions might exist where we'll have to employ forces? There's no one that can threaten our existence, but we're going to be involved for a number of different reasons. Further, we don't have a Soviet force to design our forces to defeat, with the old assumption that if you can defeat the Soviet force, you can defeat any other force. We have to come up with

another underpinning. We're not ready to say capabilities-based forces are the way to go because there is some risk in there, so we try to build threat scenarios now.

The reason that capabilities-based forces might have a little a bit of risk in them is because of the world arms bazaar. Anybody who wants to buy a very capable force can go out and buy one. They can buy the best technology in the world from Sweden, from the United States—the largest sellers by the way—or from anyone who makes the best world class technology. There's no problem. COCOM (the West's Coordinating Committee on export controls) went away last week and a lot of people say "So what? Did it ever work?" But still and all, that to me just reflects an international attitude. Even though it went away all the members of COCOM have pledged not to sell sensitive military technology. "Just because we don't have COCOM doesn't mean that we won't sell our best technology. Ha, ha."

Student: They'd get it anyway?

Davis: Yes. There's money, balance of payments, offsetting development of new technology.

Student: Can I just pick on some terminology? You created the best weapons with the most capable force and I would argue that command and control, human resource management, and those kinds of structures—the soft structures, if you will, of a military force—are what really would make the difference. Obviously the weapons enhance capability, extend range, improve intelligence collection or whatever, and I'm not saying that you should just go ahead and let arms be sold anywhere and that kind of thing, but the terminology that you used worries me. There's a people element that I think makes the difference.

Davis: Training and doctrine. How you use the weapon and how you train your soldiers to use the weapon are also very, very important. But the point in fact is that high-tech weapons are available to anybody who wants to buy them. You assume that the people who are interested in owning the

weapons are interested in learning how to operate them effectively, and if they are buying RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades), and if they're buying ATGMs (antitank guided missiles) that can penetrate M1-A2, block 2 armor, you've got to be concerned about that. Even if they're not trained as well as an American crew might be trained, if they've got enough ATGMs that can defeat M-1 tanks, they're going to get lucky. Even if they're not good, if they've got enough of them, they're going to defeat M-1 tanks.

Student: But surely, isn't she right? I agree with you that weaponry is an important part of the story, but presumably later you'll come onto U.N.-type coalition operations and that seems to me to require a whole different philosophy of approach in ... well, fighting is emphatically the wrong verb to use.

Davis: Certainly.

Student: In the U.K., speaking as a civilian and one of those pesky diplomats who is always committing the Defense Ministry to do these things (and they didn't like it), there was initially a tremendous resistance among the armed forces to getting involved in this sort of thing. Now they've more than happily come to grips with it, so that going into Bosnia is almost as natural to a British soldier as getting onto a German plane. So isn't there a psychological change in this?

Davis: Absolutely. A psychological and training change. You're right in terms of lexicon, because one of the things that we admittedly cling to is the mission of the United States Army to fight and win the nation's wars. Now given that that is the stated purpose, we have taken the Combat Training Center at Hohenfels and built training scenarios there for peacekeeping operations. That's the only infrastructure that we have to hang the training and preparation for these new roles on right now. I guess it's nonsensical to say that the Combat Training Center is going to train a force for peacekeeping operations, and oh, by the way, we train forces from the Netherlands

and from Germany and from the United States at that Combat Training Center about how to conduct peacekeeping operations, not combat. So yes, there's a whole lexicon set here and we're moving in that direction in the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and at the Combat Training Center in Hohenfels. The one place where we haven't done that, in terms of really training our forces to engage other forces, is at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. That is still a brigade force rotation through a simulated force-on-force engagement in combat.

Student: Excuse me. You said the Joint Readiness Training Center is doing nothing but peacekeeping?

Davis: No, there are two scenarios that are employed there and two that are employed at Hohenfels. That's not the exclusive use, but we have the capability to use those centers in that mode as well as in low-intensity conflict at the JRTC, which is where it started.

Student: Has that switch involved a switch in attitude in things like the rules of engagement?

Davis: Chapter Six and Chapter Seven of the U.N. charter really prescribe for us the rules of engagement, the dimension of what we will be allowed to do as a part of a coalition force in these kinds of operations. We're clearly teaching that. We're training to that, we're very sensitive to that in the American Army, as we try to train and prepare our soldiers. That doesn't really get applied until there is an indication that you might be a part of a force to do something. We're training a new kind of force to go up to the Sinai right now. It's a combined, active reserve component force. We're bringing some reserve component soldiers on active duty for a period of time to be a part of the multilateral force and observers in the Sinai. Part of that training package is the specific rules of engagement pertinent to that Sinai peacekeeping, so before the force goes, all the conditions that we know about will come to play in terms of how they will

behave and how they will interact in that situation.

Student: I have a question concerning the different environment between, let us say, full-out war between two major forces where there's no consideration about civilians and everyone's moving at the target, and peacekeeping operations or, for instance, Bosnia or those kind of low-level wars. It's more like a police war. Do you have a connection or scientist or trainer from police forces, let's say from New York, who has more knowledge about how to fight in, let's say, the Gaza Strip or where there are lots of civilians or where you can't distinguish who is an enemy and who is friendly or neutral? You could bomb Mogadishu, but that wouldn't make sense.

Davis: No, it wouldn't. These charts (figures 2a and 2b) may respond to both of your points. Figure 2b is not an exhaustive list by any stretch of the imagination, but

these are kind of representative of what we think our army is going to be involved in as part of U.N. coalition forces. These kinds of things are nontraditional missions for the United States Army, or as a part of anybody's force.

Now, are we moving toward that direction? Is this the exclusive *raison d'être* for the United States Army? No. This is a very complex organization, but this is very high up in our consciousness now in terms of what we have to do, what we're going to be called on by the political leaders in the nation to do. So we're not there yet.

Oettinger: It sure is odd. I look at that list and every one of those sounds like something that we had to do at the end of World War II in Germany and Japan, including the interim civil administration.

Davis: It's not that we're not experienced institutionally. We've done these before.




Figure 2a
U.S. Army Commitments Worldwide

- **Truce Imposition/reimposition**
- **Cantonment and disarmament operations**
- **Mine clearance operations**
- **Election support**
- **Police force monitoring**
- **Interim civil administration**
- **Infrastructure recovery**
- **Negotiations support**

Figure 2b

Second Generation Peace Operations Missions

Student: How does this differ from General Joulwan's* peacetime engagement?

Davis: Not at all, and the Partnership for Peace embraces all of this. As I said, it's not an exhaustive list, but General Joulwan's notion and the move toward the Partnership for Peace on the European continent is all a part of the same thing. You see it from Finland on south in terms of people who are now engaging in that dialogue and using that lexicon not to rationalize, but as kind of a way to approach the issues. "Okay, now that the world order has changed or is changing (whatever that means—I don't know what that means, but it's different than it was before), what are the challenges, what are the stresses that are going to be placed on nations where militarily trained organizations, units, capacities and capabilities would have some utility and application to these kinds of tasks?"

Student: Obviously, we're seeing this type of redefinition of missions throughout the services. Are these so different from the typical Army role that it's going to require

such a proliferation of training, et cetera, that there will have to be specialization within the Army? Will there be certain troops that are designated to do this type of thing as opposed to whole forces training?

Davis: No. I think the training for any of these scenarios will be situational and mission-specific. The *raison*, the backbone of training, for the Army will be to fight and win the nation's wars. I don't think we are going to drift away from that. But in doing that there's a lot of infrastructure that goes around the combat force—combat support, combat service support functions that are already in there that are easily adapted to many of these tasks. Some of the combat forces themselves can be situationally qualified and trained to go to a place and do a thing. I don't think we're going to see Army training go away from making war to these missions.

Student: I didn't mean that. I just pointed out there's going to be division of responsibilities.

Davis: I don't think you'll see an MOS (military occupational specialty) for peace-keeping either.

Student: Isn't the difference likely to be in command structures?

Davis: Absolutely.

Student: Because you must now, as we all must now, contemplate any one of those operations working for a U.N. general.

Davis: I would say so. Or, in some of them, domestic disaster relief, working for the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Oettinger: That's a fate worse than death.

Davis: God forbid! FEMA, by the way, did a pretty good job in the LA earthquake—the first time in my experience.

Oettinger: That's remarkable.


* Gen. George Joulwan, USA, CINC USEUCOM/SACEUR.

Davis: It's honest to God truth. I know some of your exposure, or I infer it, anyway, because of earlier work and consultation that you were engaged in. I had the exact same experience. It was a disaster. It wasn't a disaster waiting to happen. It was awful. But they really came together and did a great job in the LA earthquakes last year. They got beaten to death in Hurricane Andrew because they couldn't do their basic fundamental mission. The President had to call in the United States Army and the Director of Military Support, which is headed in the Army but is a joint staff—Army, Navy, Air Force—to do the disaster relief in Florida for Hurricane Andrew simply because FEMA couldn't do it. To President Clinton's great credit, he really shook that place up, rolled it out and got

them focused, and they did a good job in the LA earthquakes.

So, yes, we'll be working for all kinds of different people down a continuum and they provide the backbone of a set of modeling and simulation and gaming scenarios that we use to design and test and train our forces now. Our doctrine, to which we're wedded, freely talks to operations other than warfare. That's a quote out of it and you'll see that in a minute.

In the Bosnia-Desert Storm realms, talking about coalition forces, particularly internationally, think for a minute about what has been going on in the U.N., and I've intimated that a minute ago. There are some interesting statistics about that. As an example, there are the numbers of missions between 1948 and 1978 (figure 3). In 30



UNEF: U.N. Emergency Force
 UNMOGIP: U.N. Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
 UNOSOM: U.N. Operations in Somalia

UNPROFOR: U.N. Protection Force (Bosnia)
 UNTAC: U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia

Figure 3
U.N. Peacekeeping

years there were 13 U.N. peacekeeping, peacemaking missions established, and since 1978 we've had 16. In 1980 the U.N. was paying about \$360 million a year for peacekeeping operations and in 1993 it was \$4 billion. So there's an explosion in an international consortium called the United Nations in terms of what they do, and the numbers of people are on the chart. The vertical axis is the number of operations. This is total U.N. It's the number of operations, the number of people, and the years.

Now, this point has been made before, but let me make it slightly differently. In the Cold War, in the 1950s and in the 1960s and up into the 1970s, for a U.N. peacekeeping force to go into place, one of the driving conditions was the mutual consent of the belligerents that the force was put between to maintain the peace. That's not necessarily true anymore. You don't need consent to put a peacemaking or peacekeeping force in place: the international acceptance of, or demand for, or ability of the U.N. to intercede where they might not even necessarily be wanted is there.

Student: You do need the consent of the participants to put peacekeeping forces in place. You don't need the consent for peacemaking forces.

Davis: Chapter six and chapter seven are different. I stand corrected. Thank you. That's a good discriminant. But still and all we didn't do that very much, as the United Nations, until about five years ago.

Student: While we accept this as a growth industry and I think several commentators may have said that, to what extent, based on what you see inside the Beltway now, does this reflect the first six months to a year of the Clinton Administration's agenda, compared with what you're seeing now? Aren't we seeing a backing off from this U.N. support? Hasn't there been a change?

Student: I don't know if you're going to it, but in September there was a series of four speeches that were given by President Clinton at the U.N., by Madeleine Albright

at the National War College, by Anthony Lake at Johns Hopkins, and by Warren Christopher. They set down all the criteria, and they're going to be saying a lot more "no's" to doing that kind of stuff with U.N. operations. Is that pointed out in your briefing?

Davis: No, it's not.

Student: If I can be rude and interject again, when looked at from a nasty political perspective of this, in my estimation, it's extremely difficult to say no.

Davis: You're absolutely right.

Student: That's part of the problem. If you're sitting on the Security Council ...

Davis: That's not a nasty political perspective. That's the other political perspective. What you hear in those four speeches is the U.S. policy. Now track how many times U.S. actions perfectly mirror U.S. policy. Whether we like it or not, whether we agree to it or think it's a good idea or not, we're going to continue to be dragged into these coalition relationships. That's the bottom line of this chart for me. That's where I was going to stop. Your point is well taken. Yes, this administration has said and professed. Now why were they doing that? Because the United Nations wanted 100,000 U.S. soldiers to go into Bosnia and stop the war at that time, and that's why those speeches were made saying "under no conditions will we do that." Now you ask me how much of the First Armored Division is going to wind up in Bosnia in a peacekeeping role. My estimate, within the next six months, is: some of it.

Student: In Latin America, before we sent any Army troops down there (and 50,000 troops would run down there every year), there were several conditions that to be met. One is the host nation wanted them; two is the host nation's responsibility for their security; and three is that we would also have a way to extract them when things got tough. I think we need to start to ask those questions of ourselves before we

get into this growth industry. I think General Joulwan thinks that way.

Davis: I know he does, and thank God he does. He's in exactly the right place because of that right now. I'm not advocating that this is the correct model for U.S. force engagement as a part of the United Nations in the future. But I think it's a part of the international political reality that we're going to continue to be involved in unexpected ways, in unexpected places. That brings a complexity to the world that I live in in terms of what we are preparing forces to do and what kinds of information we provide them before they go, and what kinds of instrumentality we have to keep them alive with information once they're there.

In Macedonia we have a company-sized element that's manning three checkpoints along the Serb-Macedonian border as a part of the U.N. force there. That element has a warrant officer and two NCOs, a lap-top computer, and a COMSAT terminal that's bringing the national intelligence database pertinent to that part of the world in to them all the time. We have the technology to do that. We've talked about the wisdom of providing that much and that kind of information, that far forward, that unsecure. I don't care. They need it, they're using it, it's valuable.

The U.N. operations in intelligence in Bosnia are absolutely disorganized. I guess that's the kindest thing that I can say. But on the other hand, as disorganized as they might be, information can move out of Bosnia on a NATO intelligence system from ground forces, from people who are in contact with things and have information about infrastructure, bridge-loading, which tunnels are blown, and what roads are trafficable. The only way you can get that is by people walking around and kicking rocks and falling down and seeing stuff, and moving the information back out of the country. It's seminal. It's stuff that you can't get any other way. So the two-way flow of information across international boundaries into the international and into the national exclusion zones, to round out other national holdings, is going on today,

and it's pretty good. I think that's real progress.

We have 150 U.S. people at the U.N. intelligence support element at U.N. headquarters in New York City, who are providing U.S. intelligence to these decision makers who are trying to figure out where to intervene and what would be appropriate and what's there when they get there.

Student: This is a really fascinating kind of complex of issues because I think that you have to make differentiations two ways. The first is between *peacekeeping* operations, which are the old style stuff—the UNMOGIPs and the UNFICYPs (U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) and all that sort of stuff, which are proper, fully U.N. command and control frameworks, and *peacemaking* operations, into which Bosnia currently fits. I'd like to consider us as subcontracted. One of the reasons Bosnia works is that you have a NATO headquarters there, with NATO standard operating procedures. You're absolutely right, but something has to be done about U.N. and coalition intelligence activities. In classic peacekeeping operations, intelligence has been a dirty word. In peacemaking operations, I think, it's becoming accepted because at last people have realized that you have to do it. But I think also there is a need to walk a rather careful tightrope because the thing that the U.N. hates more than anything else is to have one country or another country providing input as intelligence.

Davis: That's not peculiar to the United Nations. That problem has existed in NATO for years. NATO is a very close military alliance, and this international sharing of information, even within NATO, has always been a contentious issue. For instance, what was the source of the information that the ACOS-I (Assistant Chief of Staff—Intelligence), who is a Canadian Brigadier General at SHAPE, was providing to the SACEUR? It's funny that it never got surfaced inside NATO to the extent that it's being surfaced internationally within the U.N. peacemaking structures as it is today.

We're learning about that. One of the enablers in that learning really is a piece of

technology called LOCE (limited operational capability, Europe) that has an automatic data processing/communication link terminal that moves intelligence information and operational information around NATO. We're now providing it to some of the U.N. coalition in Bosnia. The ability to move that international intelligence information, which everybody's kind of agreed is going to be shared internationally, is illustrating these problems and it's helping us move forward and survive through that.

Among the things I worry about (figure 4) are various factors that affect the intelligence business today: the global environment, which involves dueling with shadows; increased jointness; the bottom-up review and national military strategy; our revised roles and missions; national and DOD intelligence restructuring; doctrine and

leadership; budget reductions; and force and personnel reductions. They are the gremlins that live in your closet that come out at night because it's no longer a nice simple algorithm, one-on-one, kind of a force-on-force. The job was a lot easier when we had the monolithic Soviet threat and the global threat. It's harder now, and these are a lot of the reasons why it's hard, and I've talked about them. I'm Army green and I'm in the middle of this, and I'm trying to react and to project into the future, into this Force XXI domain that our Chief would bring us into, and respond in some ways that will be meaningful to the ground component of U.S. forces or to the U.S. Army ground component of coalition forces in the future in all these uncertain situations, and I live in an environment that is a bureaucracy of no mean dimension.




Figure 4
Many Factors Affect Intelligence Business

The Big "I" is national intelligence (figure 5). That's my shorthand for our part in the interagency intelligence structure. Wednesdays I sit on the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) with the Director of Central Intelligence as part of the estimative process of the nation within the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) (figure 6). I could have yesterday, except that I was trying to get cleaned up so I could come up here for a day. Some days I work on readying the pointy end of the spear about what kind of targeting information the MLRS (multiple launch rocket system) battalion is going to need in a particular scenario of engagement (figure 7), and that gives you an interesting perspective: having a foot in the tactical intelligence and in the national intelligence, because you're going from where you know what a target looks like to puzzling about what a

national capability might be ten years from now. That goes from the imprecise, way up in the strategic area, and the ambiguous to the fairly finite. You have the whole range of analytic processes where the standards and the process are about the same, but the information that you have to work with you have less confidence or more confidence in, et cetera.

The Director of Central Intelligence is a real player in Washington. I'm talking inside the Beltway now. He writes and focuses national intelligence priorities and the national intelligence interests from his Community Management Staff and from the old headquarters building at Langley now, and we are all part of that.

I'll tell you why it's important for the Army to be a part of this interagency intelligence process. We have two additional congressional oversight staffs that watch




Figure 5
Managing the Big "I"





Figure 6
Behind the NFIP Fence

over the intelligence business of our nation. Everybody who wears a uniform, everybody who's in the services, has four staffs that look over the whole military domain: the House Armed Services Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the House Appropriations Committee, and the Senate Appropriations Committee. If you're in the intelligence business, you get to have two more: the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. They were put into place post Church Commission, post Pike Commission, post Chicago Seven Trial to ensure that we nasty guys in military intelligence stop spying on Americans. We did that, and that is part of an American citizen's right to privacy. We don't do that anymore, and that is a fact. It was the policy rule of the leaders, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, that established

those two committees to watch over the intelligence domain in the United States. I'll talk to you about how they decided to make the rules stick. Two years after that came into place there was another decision made.

Now in OSD, there is an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. Why that linkage? I go back to Tom Weinstein again. Intelligence not communicated is nothing. It's just not useful to people who don't have it, so you have to move it. So there's that linkage.

You'll also see C⁴I very much in the vernacular used today. The manipulation of information and the focusing of information into a decision-making process, using information technology, has to happen. We know so much today that a human can't assimilate all the data bits. We're running out of people, too, because the military domain is getting smaller. So when you



FIC = Foreign Intelligence Command
 FSTC = U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center
 HUMINT = Human Intelligence

ITAC = U.S. Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center
 S&IA = Security and Investigative Activities
 SIGINT = Signal Intelligence

Figure 7
National Intelligence Support to Title X

couple the fact that you have fewer people and a lot more bits of information to process and focus on the decision-making process, everybody that you have left would be working in the information systems world unless you had machines. So that's why we use machines to process data and to correlate information and correlate data bits and bring similarities together so that you can ignore them and point out anomalies. That's how we use machines. We map the world with a lot of very sensitive technology that will tell you where all kinds of information and where all kinds of signals are radiated. If it's

something that's been happening for the last five months, you ignore it. If it's something new that pops up, you look at it, and that's what machines allow you to do. That's my little description of why this comes together—C³I and C⁴I.

C² is command and control. What's command and control? I'd like some views. I think I know what it is. What is command and control as a process?

Oettinger: Come on, folks, you've been reading about it! You've complained about it!

Student: Which interpretation do you want?

Davis: I'm in a room full of people who have been studying this; I only have opinions, too. Because I'll tell you, every commander will tell you that it's something different. So it's okay to have different opinions about what it is, but what's important about it?

Student: Leadership.

Davis: Sure it is. That's right. That's a military view. What's the process? We put a bureaucratic structure around command, control, communications, and intelligence. It's the process. How is leadership affected? Through communications, I think.

Student: The structure is getting the desires of the leadership made known to people who are going to carry it out in such a way that they can effectively do it and it's clear to them.

Davis: Great! So the desires of the leadership are very, very important, and the desires of the leadership are based not on desire, but on some course of action that they want to pursue.

Student: National interest.

Davis: Yes, and that's at the very high level, so you want to do something. What do you want to do? How do you reduce uncertainty? What courses of action are available to you? All of a sudden you need some information. Part of it's readily available. The only difference between information and intelligence is that intelligence information is essentially from a relatively denied source. Command and control information is readily available. You've got to do something extraordinary to get intelligence information. Intelligence is information in the aspect that it is used in the decision-making process in choosing options and making decisions about what the leadership wants to do that they then communicate and inspire their followers to follow their directions.

The Director of Military Intelligence was invented in 1991. It was started by Duane Andrews, who was ASD C³I under Cheney. His reorganization made the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency a "big dog" in defense intelligence, where before he'd run kind of a Sleepy Hollow analytic agency. I'll show you how big he is in a minute. Cheney and the Director of DIA and Duane Andrews said, "Unified commanders have to have their own intelligence mechanisms," and this is how they did that.

Oettinger: Excuse me, you made a remark that I let go by while you were talking. The Security Act of 1947 hadn't changed. What is it about the current circumstances that make this DCI stronger than his predecessors? Was it a personal relationship with SECDEF? It was certainly not a change in statute, so was it reduced budget, better control of the budgets, or what?

Davis: Let me answer the question before I go back to the Director of Military Intelligence—formerly the Director of DIA. That's an excellent question and it's a point that we need to understand very clearly. I told you that in addition to this policy decision that there were going to be two congressional committees. There is a bureaucracy in place called the Community Management Staff. They gave all the money to pay for peacetime intelligence collection, analysis, storage, and manipulation of intelligence data—all that's done in non-wartime settings and non-warfighting settings—to the DCI.

Oettinger: That's Rich Haver's staff?

Davis: No. Rich Haver is the Director of the Community Management Staff, but the DCI personally retains that responsibility. Haver's staff does the budget work. This is called the National Foreign Intelligence Program (see figure 6). The reason that the DCI is a big dog is because 75 percent of this budget that he has is executed by Defense organizations, so he's writ large in DOD intelligence business. All the stuff that we collect and analyze and store in peace-

time is paid for by the National Foreign Intelligence Program (see figure 6). There are three pieces of it that affect us. The three pieces are the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), whose program manager is the Director of NSA; the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), run by the Director of DIA; and the Foreign Counterintelligence Program (FCIP), which is run by a part of the ASD C³I staff. So there are three subprogram managers in DOD who run his program. In addition, there's the CIA program, which pays for all the operations and activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, and there are other small pieces in federal agencies—Energy, FBI, Treasury, and State—to do peacetime intelligence work there.

There is a separate intelligence authorization bill written by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and a joint committee conference that comes up with an authorization bill. Remarkable in this event is that when the appropriations bills are written, the moneys are appropriated for this 75 percent of the NFIP in the Defense Appropriations bill and suballocated to Combat Support Agency one, Combat Support Agency two: Army, Navy, Air Force. So the appropriations come directly to us. We have fiduciary accountability and responsibility for the spending of that money and the conduct of the operations, under the policy authority and coordination (approval) of the DCI with money that he has defended on the Hill; he presents the budget to the Hill.

So this is really a collegium. This is why we play in the national intelligence community in part, plus the fact that the military intelligence analysis is done by the military services. Most of that is done at the strategic and national level inside DIA because it's a joint agency and we send uniformed military people there to do part of that work.

Student: A kind of off-the-wall question. Did you see Congressmen lately, from time to time, saying, "Let's do away with the CIA since the Soviet Union is gone?" Is that just an inner-Beltway type thing or is that seriously being considered?

Davis: I don't think it's seriously considered. I don't think any thinking people believe that.

Oettinger: One of the most vocal is Senator Moynihan, and Pat knows better. I imagine this is a shillelagh he uses to beat DOD incumbents over the head with. It's a game he plays.

Davis: It's fun, first of all, and it evokes really interesting responses sometimes, but I think that people would understand the international political dimensions, as well as the potential lethality at the international level, if we were to do away with CIA.

Student: These frontal attacks have not affected your funding or your task?

Davis: The frontal attacks have not. The downturn in defense has affected intelligence, and there has been a deleterious effect on our capacity.

Oettinger: Moynihan has for years been one of the staunchest defenders of intelligence and its integrity, and he uses these rhetorical devices essentially in order to kick butt and prod. It may not be a hostile maneuver.

Davis: Peacetime operations are joint. This is a very, very purple world (figure 7). We all play as a collegium, as I said. Why does the Army spend a light division's worth of soldiers when we're getting so small in the national peacetime intelligence business? We've got about 7,000 people who do this, who are budgeted for by the DCI, and whom we send to the signals intelligence, human intelligence, general military intelligence, and scientific and technical intelligence analysis business. These kinds of organizations, in the CCP and the FCIP and the GDIP of the NFIP, consume about a light division because in many, many cases intelligence is from a denied source of information, as I said. These operations give us the only access that we might get on foreign ground force doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and technology that our army might have to face on the battlefield. We have to populate

the scenarios that we're training against and modeling with and designing against with a foreign ground force that is truly representative. When that icon moves on the screen, it's moving at the right speed, and when that weapon-on-weapon engagement occurs, the relative force effects of the foreign weapon and the domestic armor are correct in the model, and the source of that technical data is a National Foreign Intelligence Program-funded collection, analysis, and intelligence storage mechanism.

Student: Is the percentage of Army personnel that are engaged out of proportion to the amount the other services use?

Davis: No, but it's smaller than it used to be, by about 30 percent.

Student: Is that principally active duty or are there reserves in the mix?

Davis: I'm speaking principally of active duty. There are 15,000 Army reservists with military intelligence MOSs, and some of them are engaged in peacetime activities in their training cycles. We have strategic military intelligence detachments that do analysis and produce information on their weekend training drills, and we're more and more going to a condition where we're going to have more individual mobilization augmentees drilling and on their weekend drills they're going to be in real live intelligence watch centers and analytic agencies.

Student: The only reason I brought that up is because in SOUTHCOM we couldn't beef up the JIC (Joint Intelligence Center) without reservists because of the mandated ceiling of personnel.

Davis: That's right. That is common just about every place. So we do it because it gives us information, and data, that we need to design our force against.


Oettinger: It's a puzzlement though: you seem to be stressing the peacetime, both now and in what you said earlier about the NFIP, and raising, training, and so forth, but the NFIP also ...

Davis: ... does not go away when you go to war.

Oettinger: It changes color because it feeds the tactical needs.

Davis: This is a green, unidimensional view of the NFIP, by the way. It's not just a military intelligence program. It's military, political, and economic intelligence. But, first, we play principally and primarily in the military intelligence component of it. The other reason I emphasize peacetime is because this is the only way that we have any authority to conduct intelligence operations during peacetime when we're not engaged. The only way we can do it in peacetime is through this mechanism. It doesn't mean that this goes away when you go to war, and it doesn't mean that there aren't national systems that are fully capable of supporting military operations, because there are, and we use them a lot. We design our own systems to exploit the military intelligence capabilities in the national intelligence system. We have a whole suite of hardware and units called tactical exploitation of national capabilities, the TENCAP programs, that do that. They bring national-level data into the tactical force.

At the DOD level again, the Director of DIA is now being called the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) (figure 8). He's still the Director of DIA, and this is his Defense Intelligence Agency. He owns this collection, he does production, and he has infrastructure support—ADP and telecommunications essentially—that networks the Joint Intelligence Centers with every regional, unified CINC and functional CINC also. Every CINC has a Joint Intelligence Center. His intelligence center is networked with these functions in DIA. The Deputy DMI, Ground, is my boss, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence in the Army, and he has operational control over the National Ground Intelligence Center, which is in Charlottesville, Virginia. That is scientific and technical intelligence and general military intelligence analysis combined. Major General Ervin Rokke runs the National Aerospace Intel Center at Wright-Patterson AFB. General Rokke is



DDMI = Deputy Director of Military Intelligence
 DMI = Director of Military Intelligence
 MIB = Military Intelligence Board

Figure 8
DMI Functional Organization

the Air Force AC of SI (Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence). Rear Admiral Ted Shaefer is the Director of Naval Intelligence, and he runs the Maritime Intelligence Center in Suitland. So there's symmetry here.

This is new: the Marine Corps, interestingly, participates. There's a cell in the Ground Intel Center and there's a cell in the Maritime Intel Center that are run by the Director of C⁴I in the Marine Corps, the Deputy Director for Intelligence. He owns those two cells, about 30 people deep and

about 60 people deep, respectively. So the Marines are beginning to play at a level that they never played before, and I think that's great.

This brings a management loop around service analysis and production that's never been there before. As I said before, DIA's becoming a very credible organization, and this is one of the reasons. The Military Intelligence Board (MIB), which General Owens, my boss, sits on, comprises all the service intel agencies. The Director of NSA sits on the Military Intelligence Board

although there's no NSA operation or policy here, but he's still a part of the interagency group in defense intelligence. The Director of DMA, the Director of the Central Imagery Office, and the ASDI—the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Keith Hall—are members of the Military Intelligence Board also.

So all of those agencies come together weekly. We talk about substantive intelligence, because that's where DOD vets its position on the national intelligence estimates. We talk about intelligence policy and resourcing issues pertinent to the world situation—what's going on today. We talk about instrumenting the joint intelligence system, this infrastructure world. How do we extend these databases resident in these military intelligence centers to the forward deployed forces? How do we network the databases from these JICs with all of this? How do we bring all of this information together? How do we focus I don't know how many thousands of gigabits of databases on the decision-making processes of a CINC, a Chairman?

The J-2 on the JCS works for the Director of DIA.

Oettinger: If I may, let me try to say a couple of things and see if they ring true to you because otherwise I'm afraid that the class may not appreciate the import of what you're saying.

Davis: This (figure 8) is not an organizational line-and-block chart.

Oettinger: No, but it is a functional, and control, and who's getting organized how in controlling the budgets kind of a chart. And what's remarkable about it to me is the fact that it is really a major departure from the past, when all of these pieces were fragmented and autonomous and had to be beaten over the head. He's talking about sharing of databases and so on as if that were the most natural thing in the world.

Davis: We wear Kevlar. It doesn't hurt if you hit us on the head anyway. That is very fair. We learned this, by the way, in the Gulf War, and I'll operationalize this for you later. We learned because the intelli-

gence support to the Gulf was really broken. Thank God we had time to build it and put it together in a way that I'll show you. This is a part of what we learned, and we learned it because Jim Clapper* has had the stature in the defense intelligence community to call these MIB meetings and say, "We've got to get together and figure out what the hell we're going to do for Schwarzkopf and Jack Leide in the desert."

Oettinger: My impression was that that thing had no statutory existence but came with a directive. He created it kind of as a personal initiative.

Davis: Yes, he and Chuck Owens are two of the military three-stars in defense intelligence right now. Those two guys said we've got to do this, and they just sort of, by force of personality, pulled it together and it worked, so we have kept it.

Student: How do the J-2s in the various unified commands fit in this? If you read the WWMCCS (Worldwide Military Command and Control System) traffic during the Gulf War, and the intel section from each command, it was like they were fighting different wars.

Davis: They don't do that anymore. We have stopped them disseminating their daily intel summaries outside their own theaters. There is one, and it comes from the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC). That's the only one that's broadcast. Now you can take that and amplify it and focus it and use it in your own AO (area of operations), that's fine, but you keep your own dissemination inside your own AO. Everybody here is working off the same sheet of music, at this level and at the unified command level. That's an interactive process.

Part of the technology that's in place, allowing that to happen, is called the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System—JWICS, not WWMCCS. JWICS is a data rate, T-3 capacity, interactive

* Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper, Jr., Director, DIA, and Director, Military Intelligence.

communications circuit between most mature CINCs and the NMJIC. So we can move a hell of a lot of data and information, and everybody gets a common picture of the world every day. It also has video teleconferencing, which we found out is absolutely invaluable in the desert, where you can sit four or five people around a table in one place who know some stuff each, and four or five people around a table in Washington who know some stuff each, and work problems and come to a common view of what the hell's going on in a place. That's what we were not able to do very well during the Gulf War.

Student: Do you also limit the services from putting out their own view of the world?

Davis: Oh, thank God, yes. I'll tell you this frankly: the Army was the last to give up the ghost, but we don't do our own black book anymore. We use DIA's black book.

Oettinger: Before you just go on, you mentioned the NFIP, but you did not mention TIARA (tactical intelligence and related activities). Are you getting there or has that disappeared?

Davis: I'll talk about TIARA. TIARA's alive and well. That's the tactical forces, so let's talk about that now. TIARA's a part of all three services, and it's a part of your nation's army. It's getting really small. Don't ask me where it's going to end up. Some people talk about 495,000. The Congress is right now saying, "Don't come down too fast! Now we're not going to give you any money, but don't come down too fast! We're not going to fund your whole force, but don't come down too fast." You can't have it both ways. The Chief is absolutely committed to not hollowing the force. What he's got on active duty he will have trained and ready, I promise. He is so committed to that, and he has so committed all of us to that, that it's going to happen. What that's going to mean is that these numbers are all weird, because he's only going to buy as much manpower as he can afford without stripping training and readiness money

away from the active forces that he's got. So even though he might be authorized 540,000 in FY95, because the Congress might hold him at that level, he might not buy 540,000 soldiers.

Student: Doesn't Congress, when they're looking at those in-straight figures, mandate a small margin of error on that—2 or 3 percent or something—that you have to stay within? Didn't they just come back two or three years ago and put a minimum number so that the services didn't do that?

Davis: It was not in the act. It was in the report language.

Student: But aren't the committees enforcing that language?

Davis: No, that's report language. It's not enforceable. It's not law. They look at it, and they'll yell at you about it, but the options are slim and none. You either have to use that MPA (military personnel account) to train soldiers or you buy soldiers whom you can't train.

Student: I understand the problem. I'm of the opinion that the Air Force is having to report this number to Congress on a recurring basis.

Davis: We report the numbers to Congress all the time in terms of what our actual strength is, against authorized strength, and it's always less. The Congress doesn't like it, but the point in fact is that the appropriation doesn't match the demand, and you have to balance somewhere.

Student: The same joint agency reporting the SORTs (system operational readiness tests) data for all the commands? The readiness?

Davis: This doesn't do SORTs.

Student: Is there a single voice that's talking to that as well? Because you talked about the hollow force where the high commander said, "I'm C-1, C-2, or whatever ..."

Davis: I know SORTs, but the answer to your question is no. There have been two high-level OSD commissions—one convened and deconvened in about three months last year, and another one on line right now—looking at joint readiness reporting so the unified commander can get involved in readiness reporting from a joint command standpoint, and can have a joint readiness reporting system. The work on how to do that is being carried out by several retired four-stars under OSD leadership right now.

Student: But do you see that shared database being a part of that system?

Davis: Not a part of this system. This is the intelligence system. It's not the operational and readiness system. Where do those come together? I've got a chart that talks about that. Unfortunately it does not come together at the unified command level. It comes together in the Army component, in the ground component, in a distinctive way. It comes together in the Air Force component in yet another distinctive way, and it comes together in a maritime component in yet another distinctive way. That's what this panel or board is looking at: "You've got three readiness systems out here, and how do you bring those together so I understand what the readiness of my joint force components are?"

I said "components." Does that constitute the readiness of the joint force? Hardly. How do you measure the readiness of the joint staff and the state of training? That, by the way, is why ACOM (Atlantic Command) was stood up: to train joint staffs, and form habitual relationships so you've got them shelved, they know one another, they've worked together before, they know what their task is. You've got a JTF put together to go do a thing. You've got people who are already conversant with and know one another, and understand joint process, to be that JTF headquarters. That's what ACOM's new mission is to be. They have been in the field with the components that would be assigned to them. They've had JTXs (joint training exercises).

Oettinger: If I may just interject, this is a remarkable thing in terms of why it takes so long to pass the Goldwater-Nichols Act and then to have it become reality. It's one after another of this kind of detail, where all these things have to be put in place in order to make something that in spirit was agreed to a functioning reality. You have dozens of places where this matter like a joint staff having a way of getting those who have been trained together and really be effective has to be settled, and it takes time.

Student: Is ACOM just services in Europe?

Davis: No. The U.S. Atlantic Command has the mission of training all CONUS-based forces in joint operations. It's no longer U.S. Atlantic Command that chases Soviet submarines around the North Atlantic. There aren't any to chase in the first place, but that's beside the point. They now have this huge functionally expanded mission. They've got all those Navy guys down in Norfolk who are now being inundated by Air Force people and by Army people to be a part of this joint, unified command, whose mission it is to teach joint staff process, procedures, and joint command and control. We don't train people in joint command and control in the Army.

Student: So if the 18th Airborne Corps is given a task to be the Joint Task Force commander, it's going to get its staff from ACOM?

Davis: No. It's a JTF. ACOM will have trained them in their joint mission. The J-2, depending on the mission, could be a Marine.

Student: The standing 18th Airborne command is going to be purple?

Davis: It is purple by definition. It is operationally purple to date. It cannot operate independently. It is either going to be a JTF headquarters, or it's going to be the ground component of a JTF or unified command.

Student: So the First Marine Division ...

Davis: The First Marine Division is joint by definition. It cannot operate autonomously. If it operates as a JTF independently, it's going to be under the command and control of a unified CINC. So it's joint.

Student: That must be deployment. The First Marine Division is clearly not purple.

Davis: It's not a purple organization. There is no component organization that is purple. That is my point. The only place you can be purple is on staff.

Student: But in reality, if a unified commander wants to do something, he's going to turn to the one that has the most forces. He says, "You're my Joint Task Force commander, you can turn this component ... "

Davis: He's not going to do that anymore. He's going to have designated JTF headquarters and commanders. CINCPAC has designated I-Corps as a JTF headquarters. He could pull that JTF headquarters forward and not have an Army division or a Marine division assigned to him.

Student: But we're triple counting again.

Davis: I didn't say we weren't triple counting.

Student: You pull that staff off and then I-Corps is going to have a hollow force. Talk about a hollow force; now you have a leaderless force.

Student: That's what we saw at Shaw during Desert Storm.

Davis: You took your command element out?

Student: Basically what you're doing is filling Joint Task Forces. You're triple counting people and saying, "Okay, this is your MOS and, oh, by the way, you're going to be doing this, this, and this."

Davis: That's only important to the component. That's only important to the service

that assesses, organizes, equips, and trains that unit. It's not important to the operational commanders.

Student: But if you talk to the folks in the 10th Mountain Division, it's important to them because they got stripped off for Mogadishu to do lots of different things, and still weren't able to keep their wartime readiness to support other war plans.

Davis: That goes back to an earlier point. Let me be bold enough to say that that's old think. Do you think we honestly plan to send the 10th Mountain Division to war?

Student: No.

Davis: All right. So is that really important? Are we measuring the right factors in readiness?

Student: Just like policy doesn't follow reality, our regulations aren't following reality either, because we're grading that two-star commander on his readiness for war.

Davis: That's right. Let me tell you the reason they deconvolved the first DOD Joint Readiness Commission that they put together. They pulled a bunch of retired four-stars together who couldn't get over that point. They were measuring the readiness of the component forces to go to war, not the readiness of component forces to execute their assigned missions. We're at the cusp of huge change here.

Student: When you first started, you talked about how your mission was to organize, train, equip, and assess. I didn't hear you talk about the war plans that each of the unified commanders have developed.

Davis: It's not my mission.

Oettinger: Let's be very, very clear. The reason he keeps repeating that, in case it's not crystal clear to everybody, is because that's engraved in statute.

Davis: It's where I live.

Oettinger: The fundamental law makes it a mission of the services to train, equip, and whatever—that lip service that he keeps reciting. He said earlier that they don't fight: they provide the components. By law, reinforced by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, it is a CINC of a specified and unified command that does the fighting. As he pointed out, the law is hollow, and you're quite right in that respect: that giving the CINC that responsibility has done nothing to instill this formation of how the hell do you do this effectively with people whose only experience is in components? What is remarkable about this is that in the intelligence field ...

Davis: ... we're ahead of everybody.

Oettinger: It's the first organization structure that is more than a paper structure, which, by the way, may not outlive its current incumbents ...

Davis: Yes, it will.

Oettinger: ... because much of that is done by force of his personality.

Davis: But the title is now codified and the charter is being codified in a DOD directive as we speak.

Oettinger: But it's a major departure because it says that instead of just purple words, there are purple dollars, purple procedures, and above all, as I keep stressing, training—getting to know one another. Before that, guys arrived at DIA and by the time they left, they didn't even know what somebody from another service was like.

Student: But that's a real rub. There are no purple dollars.

Davis: Yes, there are. That is the power of this National Foreign Intelligence Program, because the General Defense Intelligence Program, which resources this whole thing, is purple. The MIB runs it. I compete for dollars with Navy and Air Force components in the GDIP. I'm the Army's GDIP program manager, and I sit with the director of the DMI staff, Ms. Joan

Dempsey, and my counterparts from the Navy and the Air Force, and we arm-wrestle who's going to get which dollars to do what missions in this structure. It's an inter-agency structure.

Student: So as I understand it, the sea service speaks in steaming days, is that correct? Do you throw one in?

Davis: And we speak in miles, OPTEMPO. We speak in tank miles per year and aviation hours per year (figure 9).

Student: So how are you sorting all that out?

Davis: That's TIARA. That is component business. That's how we train our tactical force. This is a joint intelligence force. If it goes to the field, it doesn't go below the Joint Task Force headquarters level.

Student: So the JCS is allocated the money?

Davis: No. The DMI is (figure 8).

Student: That's new, then.

Davis: No, it's not.

Student: You mean he gets it from DCI?

Davis: Yes, he presents the GDIP budget to the Community Management Staff, who integrate it with CCP, FCIP, CIP, rank it, interleave it there, and the DCI presents the budget for this whole shmeat to the President and the Congress.

Student: When you say it's new, how new?

Davis: It's not that new. About 1979.

Student: We have been working this since then?

Davis: Yes, but let me tell you what's new. The GDIP's not new, but what's new is that this is done in an integrated fashion under the leadership of an individual who is




Figure 9
ARFOR Intelligence System

not just the Director of DIA, but has policy authority over the activities through the functional manager for production of all the analysis and production, and through the two other functional managers over collection (figure 8).

Oettinger: It's a conscious aping in one respect of the duality of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Davis: Exactly.

Oettinger: ... both of whom, by having both the effective leadership of an actual operational intelligence unit (in this case, DIA; in the other case, CIA) have some reality and some staff and so on. But by virtue of also having the authority and the title of the concomitant thing, they have at least in theory—and this until recently has been totally in theory—had across-the-board responsibility. This is the first time that there's a glimmer of evidence that the Director of Central Intelligence, as mentioned earlier, has some influence over the collective, and not just over CIA, and the chart (figure 8) indicates that this Director of Military Intelligence, who is also the Director of DIA, in fact has some influence through that Military Intelligence Board on a whole bunch of other folks who hitherto were operating entirely independently. I still remain somewhat skeptical, because to my mind this is so recent and still so personality dependent that I figure one good shakeup and it could all evaporate because the centrifugal forces are enormously powerful. But it is the first time that, whether it's personality or events, there is a glimmer of a genuine purpleness that has not been seen before.

Student: Where does SOCOM fit in here? They're kind of in between a service and a command.

Davis: That is a rice bowl and a fiefdom that is unparalleled in my experience in DOD. It's another service is what it is. Major Force Program 11 is under an Assistant Secretary of Defense's sole control. It's not under any service control. I

guess it's only under the SECDEF's control. Where are they (figure 8)? They're a consumer of intelligence but they're resourced independently. They buy their own stuff. They operate their own stuff. They get as many soldiers, sailors, and air persons as they want. The services have limited influence over the amount of force structure that they have. They're an autonomous fiefdom. There is a JIC at U.S. Central Command, which happens to be collocated with the headquarters of USSOCOM.

Student: Aren't they moving SOCOM, though? Isn't that on the books to move?

Davis: No. SOUTHCOM is, and they've talked about collocating SOUTHCOM and integrating SOUTHCOM and SOCOM headquarters, but that's just gum-flapping right now. I don't think there's any plan to do that, and certainly no money. But the J-2's analytic element in USSOCOM is integrating itself with the JIC at MacDill Air Force Base, so that we have one JIC supporting two unified commands. They have two totally different kinds of missions, but one set of hardware, ADP telecommunications, and two sets of analysts—one focused on Southwest Asia, the other on SOCOM's interests.

Student: Do you see them coming into this fold eventually?

Davis: Quickly, not eventually. Probably this year.

Student: Before you leave this issue, which certainly speaks well to the evolution of the Goldwater-Nichols—the unified CINCs and the roles and missions and all that—there is residual that I think you're talking about. I feel compelled to point out that when we went in the middle of Desert Storm, we took air wings (I could be wrong on this), and we redesignated them provisional air wings. While they were over there, their host wings were back in the States. The vice wing commanders were acting wing commanders back in the States and they were reporting C status. We were dropping bombs on Baghdad when

the host wing commanders, the acting wing commanders back in the States, were reporting something less than C-1, which is what they're graded on because they didn't have two of their three squadrons on board because two squadrons were over dropping bombs on Baghdad. They fixed that somewhere in the middle of Desert Storm while we were actually in the middle of the war.

What they never fixed throughout the entire war was that we were still doing training reports and all that on people while people were deployed and you never even saw them for the entire reporting period. We had management indicators where all people were supposed to have a 95 percent on-time rate for these indicators, and they had a 20 percent on-time rate. We did that for the whole time. So we're not there. This speaks well to an initial effort. We're supporting the joint mission, but we're not there.

Davis: Let me point something out. Let me quickly bifurcate the U.S. Army intelligence community. Let me cut it right in two. What's above the line is the base force (figure 10). To the right is the pointy end of the spear; the military intelligence battalion in every division in the United States Army, the brigade in every corps, and the new force projection brigade. We now have five theater brigades out with the theater CINCs. They're not going to survive through the end of the century so we're taking them down. We're going to have a Pacific Rim force projection brigade and an Atlantic force projection brigade. We're going to have hemispheric echelon above corps support where we today have a brigade invested in every theater. We're taking five down, we're standing up two. They're pretty capable. These battalions and brigades are what report readiness in Army military intelligence. They are the largest part of our force.


National mission operations and departmental production and collection were on the other chart (figure 8). That is what Jim Clapper's got his string drawn around. This was a part of the interagency setup and this doesn't report readiness. This is not a TOE (table of organization and equipment) warfighting organization. This

is TDA (table of distribution allowance), and the distinction there, for non-Army people, is that the Army counts its force structure in three pots. TOE is the classical, tactical, operational, warfighting unit, with all of the Kevlar and web gear and weapons and tanks and guns and combat support stuff that goes with it.

TDA is the tail. That's the schools and the depots and the logisticians, the training base, the installations, and the garrisons. Then there is another account called TTHS (transient, training, holding and student account). That's the overhead for the Army—the parts that are not available for duty anywhere else: people who are in basic training, people who are in the advanced courses, people who are off at school here. They're not available for duty, so they're in this holding account.

Interestingly, 23 percent of the Army is in the tail. Twelve percent is in TTHS. Sixty-five percent is in the warfighting forces. That's how we allocate these 540,000 spaces in the Army, and that part—65 percent—that's in TOE units, that's at Fort Carson, that's at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, that's in the 82nd Airborne Division, and the 1st Armored Division in Germany, that's the part that reports readiness. That's where the problems that you're talking about come up, because when a reinforced brigade out of a division is attached to a brigade task force in a JTF, how is he going to report readiness? What does it do to his readiness? What does it do to his preparation to go to war, even though he detached his reinforced brigade to go to a peacekeeping mission—not a wartime mission.

I'm telling you that this high-level commission in DOD right now is looking at the whole construct of what is readiness, and the first group was dismissed because they couldn't get beyond the kind of problems that our written policy today creates. If you ain't there, you can't be ready; you're not there, you're off dropping bombs somewhere, so we're not ready, so I can't check that block. My operational readiness rate has gone down the tubes because half of my tanks are off fighting in the desert. That's what our policy says we have to do. You're absolutely right.



Joint activities = [dotted box] Army = [solid box] Deployed = [hatched box] Marines = [vertical lines box] Air Force = [diagonal lines box] Navy = [checkered box] Special Operations = [stippled box]
 HQDA = Headquarters, Dept. of the Army ODCSINT = Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence INSCOM = U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
 TUSA = Third U.S. Army LAM = Louisiana Maneuvers

Figure 10 Intelligence Support to Ground Component Force Projection—Tomorrow

Oettinger: To a humble civilian mind this is analytical bullshit.

Davis: Of course it is.

Student: Is it cow or is it bull?

Davis: It's crazy. It is illogical. Now, you may wonder how much of that is ingrained and how much can be changed.

Student: You're right to a point. Let's not overstate it either, because if they're deployed they have to go back to that home unit for logistic support, and that's where the real rub comes.

Davis: It does. For a lot of things we're in, part of our force projection notion is that they come back there for a lot of their intelligence, too, and we are designing the concepts now and putting them into place for split-based operations (figure 11). We're beginning to look at Army garrisons and installations not as Army posts and camps and stations but as power projection platforms. That's where you send a battalion from for a battalion task force. That's where you send a division out from. It's a power projection platform, but you're still tethered to the combat support and combat service support capabilities at home station, so it's split-based.

Student: So you do it like Air Mobility Command?

Davis: Exactly. We have intelligence communication systems in place where we can SATCOM link forward. We don't have to take a lot of databases forward. We can push forward. We've been engaged in CONUS in training and preparation for deployment, so post deployment we can continue to support. We understand the unit. We understand the people we're working with, and we understand the mission environments we're going into and what their intelligence requirements are. We can move it forward without moving all that hardware and those databases forward. We can send product forward.

Student: Who does the frequency management? The home base?

Davis: Frankly, we use COMSATs. We have a system called Trojan. There are views, and I am an advocate of those, that we should do COMSATs just as we've done airplanes for years, and when we have a national emergency you just commandeer them. Intelligence not communicated is not intelligence. We've been very successful with the Trojan system and it uses any kind of a COMSAT we can buy bandwidth on. It works great all the time.

Student: It seems like that's something worth pursuing because that's one of the problems that we had early on in the Gulf War, as I recall, in the leasing of satellite time. We could have found ourselves in a real situation in the early days if ABC and CBS and all those people had lost interest or whatever. But what you're saying is that we don't have a system in force where we can do much as we do in the CRAF (civil reserve air fleet)

Davis: No, we don't, and we should.

Student: Doesn't that make very expensive, internationally owned commercial assets military targets?

Davis: Yes, but they are absolutely beautifully redundant, and there are so damn many of them that how would you shoot them down? There are proposals now that we blanket the whole solar spectrum with COMSATs. Isn't Milstar a target? And how many of them are there?

Oettinger: Yes, but turn it around a little bit. Think again about older technology processes. Beginning in World War I we said the same thing about postal and telegraph services, and yet by and large they were kept reasonably inviolate because of the fact that sufficient combatants of different size had an interest in keeping the bloody thing going. So you could look at it the other way: that it provides the incentive to keep the things going because everybody




Figure 11
 Force Projection: Five MI Doctrinal Concepts

depends on them. So it's a funny kind of a problem. It's an important issue, but it isn't black and white.

Student: The argument is made, too, that if you cannot have satellites or whatever, sure, you are going to have difficulty with one side getting its orders out, but when it comes down to the time to start talking about peace or you've got to call your troops back, you're not going to be able to do that either. It may just complicate the problem.

Oettinger: Exactly, because warfighting and peacemaking capabilities are two sides of the same coin. So it becomes very complicated.

Student: I think that eventually the level of safety becomes less when you have an asymmetric conflict, because if you have some kind of tin-pot little group, they're not going to care very much, but you then conceivably have the capability to do something else.

Oettinger: Yes, but they also command fewer resources. They can induce terrible damage on the spot, but it's very hard for them to disrupt the whole damn system.

Davis: I want to make about four more points, and I want to do that quickly. U.S. Army operations doctrine, not intelligence doctrine, says five new, very important things about intelligence (figure 11). This is a counterpart to *From the Sea* and *Global Reach, Global Power*.

First and foremost is that intelligence is the commander's responsibility. It's not the G-2's or the J-2's responsibility. What this does is drive the way we train and acculturate our commanders and operators in our whole force. That's an important concept.

Oettinger: Is there an operator alive in the Army today, who really believes that, or are they having that sort of rubbed in front of their eyes?

Davis: General Maddox, who is CINC-USAREUR right now, had a two-day conference at Augsburg, Germany, in one

of our intelligence complexes. He brought all of his general officers, assigned to U.S. Army Europe, regardless of what they did, to Augsburg and spent two days teaching them about intelligence. He used our intelligence staff—General Chuck Thomas is his intelligence officer—and several U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command colonels and his own colonels from the 205th and MI Brigade in Fifth Corps to teach his generals about how U.S. Army intelligence works. His point is that he understands the system and he, in the past, would have relieved any of his subordinates who did not understand fire and maneuver. He added intelligence last summer.

So, yes, he made believers of them really quickly. So we've become a generation of flag rank and colonel-level leadership that understands and uses intelligence. They grow up with it in their branch schools. It's part of them and now it's enshrined in doctrine, as the Army is wont to do for ever and a day, that this is the way it works. This is the notion that I talked about earlier about broadcasting information that's readily available and user pull. It's there on the net for everybody. You pull what you need; it's dialed up.

The other notion that we were just talking about is split-based operations. You keep your heavy concentrations of analysts and whatever back in safe haven and you move information forward. That notion of operating out of safe havens is very important because you don't have to move heavy stuff so far. A lot of it can be done from CONUS.

We've built, in the Army, intelligence doctrine that has three very, very important parts. The first is intelligence preparation of the battlefield, which is a commander's assessment of the scenario, the operation, and the activity that he is going to be engaged in. I don't care what it is—fighting somebody or introducing forces between two opposing forces in a peacekeeping sort of a notion—he is conditioned to prepare to do an IPB, an intelligence preparation of the battlefield, which teaches him and his staff and his subordinate commanders where they're going. It also keys his intelligence collection mechanisms about what to look

out for: what can change the situation as they understand it.

Right against that is the decision support template. That's the G-3's tool that says, "Knowing what I know about the battlefield, here's how I'm going to write my op order. Here are the decisions that I have to make and they are time-phased." That allows us to write a synchronization matrix that says: given that if this is the timeline for my operation and if I am going to have to make decisions A, B, and C at this point, this point, and this point along the timeline of the operation, I must have intelligence about this factor, this factor, and this factor at these points so we can cue our collection. That's the system. That's a doctrinal process that we use. Those things are very, very important because what they do is empower commanders to control intelligence. We have broken the green door: the intelligence system in the operational level, and the tactical level, belongs to the Army. It belongs to the commanders that are going to use it.

This chart (figure 9) is very busy, but you've got these charts and this is the final exam in the MI officer advanced course—almost. There are two very important points, because it talks to how quickly intelligence can respond and must respond. When I'm targeting a divisional level MLRS (multiple launch rocket system) battalion, I need to turn a target to the lanyard pullers in less than a minute because it's a fleeting target. It's moving. It will move out of the CEP (circular error probable) of the round that's going to be fired quickly. So I've got to turn it quickly. I have to have 50 meters CEP accuracy on that target and I know what it looks like and I know where it is so I can shoot it.

Student: I wonder whether one of those bolts is going to hit it?

Davis: Another point that's very important is that we do not design our organic intelligence organizations to be autonomous. A divisional in an MI battalion cannot support his commander's intelligence requirement in his area of interest and area of responsibility. He is dependent on the corps MI brigade for coverage of part of that area.

We can't afford to give every division everything and they wouldn't use it all the time anyway. So we surge from the corps level, and in a corps' area of interest, we surge from the theater level. These are these force projection brigades.

Notice that minutes to hours is the division-level operational loop. Hours is: "He's operating tomorrow. What's he going to do tomorrow? What's he going to do two days from now, 48 to 96 hours here at the theater level?"

Now the kind of systems you use and the processes that you use go from the pointy end of the stick, very specific, to when you get up to the national focus, days to weeks. You're looking at a lot of different kinds of capabilities and what you're looking for are national, political, economic and military objectives. "Oh gosh, it doesn't look like a tank and I can't shoot it with an MLRS," and that's what I was talking about earlier. The specificity of the information that you have to work with at the policy level is much less than you have back at the division level, but you use the same kinds of collection management and steerage processes to get this kind of data. You use different hardware.

Oettinger: This is fascinating. I would urge you all to read that chart really carefully because it's the first thing we've had all semester where there is a good layout of that spectrum from the specific to the nebulous, and very different criteria about what is truth and what is useful, depending on where you are in there. You've done us a great service by laying this one before us.

Davis: Now let me be a little specific. Let me just tell you a couple of things. What's laid out here are the tasks that the intelligence community does to satisfy these kinds of requirements: task, requirement. What's going on here? What are the strategic objectives? What are the joint command and allied coalition support? What is that?

Here's how we develop that. You'll notice that some of the tasks are the same. But at the corps level you get intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and you get battle damage assessment and targeting and situation assessment. This goes from situa-

tion assessment to situation development. That goes away at the upper left of the chart and the tasks that we do are offensive counterintelligence operations—that's spy catching—and production of general military intelligence and scientific and technical intelligence.

Think about the production cycle and how long it takes to do that to satisfy the objectives of "What am I supposed to do? How am I going to target my strategic collection?" So you've got this spectrum. I've told you I had a little bit on that.

I'll finish up by going back to the previous chart (figure 10). I'm only going to make two points on this chart because it's a very simple chart. How far down does the joint intelligence system come from the National Military Joint Intelligence Center, the J-2, who works for the director of DIA, the DMI? This communications pipe, JWICS, Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System, comes to every CINC in his JIC, comes into the components, and comes to the J-2 of the JTF, who has something called the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System, the JDISS, that goes down into the components.

What do we do in the Army? This is an Army chart again. There are other components here and they have their own kinds of component organizations under the JTF. We have a force projection brigade forward, remember, the force projection brigade that we're going to send out here with the JTF. We're training and preparing and exercising and modeling and simulating—Louisiana maneuvers (LAM) is an acronym used in the Army for modeling and simulation—and we're training for operations other than war and for combat operations. We're preparing forces in CONUS, active and reserve components, for force projection missions where they'll be assigned to a JTF. It's a fairly simple chart.

What do we use to prepare them to deploy to this AO, to this JTF? We use intelligence, by the way, which is drawn from that DIA/J-2 center, through the National Ground Intelligence Center and the production complex that's run by the DMI, using the same databases. The same databases are

hosted and resident throughout the JTF. They pull what they need.

Student: Are you pushing down approval authority to the young S-2, so that if, say, he's doing the Andean Ridge ops and a Peruvian wants to look at the photograph that was just taken, he can give it to the Peruvian? Is he given that authority?

Davis: Yes. We learned that in Mogadishu. We learned how to do that. We broke a lot of classification rules. All the rules around what we can now say out loud is the NRO have changed in terms of sharing that information. You can't let people keep it, but you can show it to them. We did that with the U.N. forces in Mogadishu and we do it in New York now; "we" meaning not the Army, but we the collective intelligence community. So we're moving forward in that aspect of more fully sharing information.

I'm going to leave a handout here (figure 12). This is not even a paid commercial. I happen to believe all this stuff. What it talks about are what we're facing in your nation's Army today, and where we are on a lot of issues: what our focus is and what our direction is across a whole range of things beyond intelligence. I've got another handout here, which I'm just going to leave with you, that has all these points expanded in terms of what we think, where we think we're going, and what's beginning to shape our vision of Force XXI in a holistic view, not just from the intelligence standpoint. Intelligence is ahead of the rest of Army in jointness, because we're still hooked up to the system. Unlike DLA (the Defense Logistics Agency), which takes Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel, and does its defense logistics mission almost autonomously, we stay involved and we're very much involved in the joint defense intelligence mission.

I've enjoyed this.

Oettinger: Sir, so have we. We are enormously grateful to you. Before we let you go, we have a token of our appreciation.

Davis: Thank you.




Figure 12
Key Army Issues



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