

***INCIDENTAL PAPER***

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**Seminar on Command, Control,  
Communications, and Intelligence**

**Teaching Intelligence**  
**Robert L. DeGross**

**Guest Presentations, Spring 1987**

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# Teaching Intelligence

Robert L. DeGross

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*Dr. DeGross is Provost of the Defense Intelligence College. Over the past 10 years he has overseen the development of the nation's only degree program in intelligence, the degree's authorization by the U.S. Congress, and the College's accreditation by the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools. Dr. DeGross has served on the Advisory Board to the Department of Education on International Education and on the DOD University Forum on Languages and Area Studies. Previously, he held academic appointments in the History Department at the University of Maryland and at Miami University. He has published on the military-academic relationship and on the relationships between education and work, and has traveled and lectured extensively both in the United States and abroad.*

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**Oettinger:** Robert DeGross is the Provost of the Defense Intelligence College. I invited him to talk on the problems of teaching about intelligence as the eyes and ears of command and control, including the use of intelligence in joint operations, in the context of the passage, in 1986, of the Defense Reorganization Act, the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

**DeGross:** I brought along two things for you. One was this handout — the first part is some basic information, and I will refer to this as we go along. The second thing is a prop. All good instructors need props. I just happened to pick up at the airport this morning *The Wall Street Journal*, which some of you have had time to look at. What struck me, and is kind of basic to what I'm going to say today, is that under the World Wide part of "What's News," the first article deals with hostages — which deals with intelligence. The second part deals with weapons — which deals with intelligence. The third part is a story on Pollard and the Israelis — which obviously deals with intelligence. The fourth article is on the Italian Socialist Party which will be of interest to national decisionmakers, and intelligence people need to be aware of it. The fifth article deals with books being banned in Mobile, Alabama. (I will stay away from that one.) The sixth, Turkish war planes, bombing — intelligence interests. The seventh, Carlucci expresses concern about

oil dependence — intelligence. The eighth major story is Soviet literary officials talking about the release of books — of interest to intelligence people in a rather broader sense about trying to understand what is going on in the Soviet Union.

Then there's an article on AIDS and salmonella, and I think I will stay away from those, except that an important part of intelligence today is biomedical intelligence. Just having used *The Wall Street Journal* talks about the problem that I see facing an intelligence professional today. It is, what *doesn't* he need to know? It is a very interesting problem, and it's a very severe problem to someone like myself who is trying to prepare a professional. I use the term professional because I believe intelligence is a profession.

We have a limited amount of time to develop this professional. At my institution, the Defense Intelligence College, I have a maximum time of one year with the student. Many masters programs go to two years. We have been accused at the Defense Intelligence College of cramming a Ph.D. program into nine months to a year. I don't believe we do. But there is an incredible amount of information that must be learned.

Then the other problem that one has is the diversity of background that people have who come into intelligence. The demands which are being placed on an intelligence professional today are more tech-

nical than they used to be. I'm speaking in a very general sense now and I'll be a bit more specific. There are concerns about technology transfer and, therefore, one has to be a bit of a technologist. There are concerns about just sheer quantities of information we are looking at in the future. Whereas in the past we found more people with social science backgrounds coming into the field of intelligence — one reads some of the books of who were members of the early OSS (Office of Strategic Services), and you found out that they came from Harvard and Yale history departments, and other liberal arts departments — a new breed of cat is being recruited into intelligence. Many have engineering backgrounds, information science backgrounds. They need to assimilate information in a different way, and we need their skills in a different way. The type of individual we are preparing and what he is called upon to do make it hard for us to try to come up with a set sort of curriculum because the demands are very different.

The first handout which I provided you just kind of runs through the national intelligence community (appendix A). It essentially outlines who does what. Many of you may be familiar with this. I just brought it up because it is something that we use as

a handout in our institution. I'm not particularly a "structure" person but I sometimes think that structures reveal interesting things. The point I would have you understand here is that there are many agencies that are involved in intelligence: the Commerce Department, the FBI, the Defense Department, the CIA, National Security Agency (NSA), the military services. We have students, for example, attending our college from the Drug Enforcement Agency, and from the General Accounting Office (GAO).

Intelligence is a skill, or subject, or profession which is different than what we are led to believe by the novelists. I did wear a trench coat up here, but I think our notion of what intelligence does is still very much of a novelist's creation.

The demands on an intelligence person are to understand the political system that he works with and the need for information, to collect information, to analyze that information, to get some sort of product which is readable by a decisionmaker, and then to disseminate that information. That is what is called the intelligence cycle, and there is a little handout on that (figure 1). The intelligence cycle is the collection, production, and dissemination of information.

### **DIA Definition:**

**"The intelligence process is the method by which information is assembled, converted into intelligence, and the resulting product made available to the user."**

- **Collection**
- **Production**
- **Dissemination**

### **CIA Definition:**

**"The intelligence cycle is the process by which information is acquired, converted into intelligence, and made available to policymakers."**

- **Planning and direction**
- **Collection**
- **Processing**
- **Production and analysis**
- **Dissemination**

**Figure 1. Intelligence Process or Cycle**

At our college, for example, we prepare military attaches. Military attaches are collectors of military information. They are legal representatives of this country in foreign countries who are there to collect information. This is a recognized diplomatic activity.

**Oettinger:** Let's take for granted that for purposes of this discussion we're not dealing with covert operations, but with the analytical information acquisition. Is that what your intention was?

**DeGross:** In fact, one of the great disagreements within the community — I guess those people who are intelligence professionals — is whether covert action is actually part of intelligence. There are those people who say that covert actions are implementation of policy decisions and, therefore, while they are done sometimes by intelligence agencies, they in fact are not part of the intelligence process.

**Oettinger:** Bob Inman once suggested moving covert activities from CIA to DOD.\* We asked him about that the following year after he left NSA to become Deputy Director of Central Intelligence: Do you leave it together, or do you maybe take it apart? My recollection was that on balance he thought it was one of these things that could go either way and, at this particular juncture, why not leave it alone because we have other problems.\*\* The next time he came around — he was out of office by then — he said, "Well, maybe we'll separate them," but that was from a different vantage point.\*\*\* The reason I wanted to see if you'd stipulate to leaving that argument aside is that the problem is defining what *not* to deal with.

**DeGross:** Okay. I guess I would say that if we only took the narrow definition that you used of clandestine collection, then we would only need the Central Intelligence Agency. That is the agency which essentially has the charter for clandestine collection. Every government needs information to make decisions: military decisions, diplomatic de-

cisions, commercial decisions. It's spelled out in the Executive Order that this is the type of information that the government feels it needs. I would say a very small part of it is clandestinely collected, although some of it is.

**Student:** I would lay the demarcation out in a different way. Intelligence deals with the collection of that information which, one, is foreign somehow, not domestic, and two, normally which other governments do not want us to get. In other words, it's somewhat protected. That doesn't cover the whole spectrum, because it lets out open source information, which is a major component of any good intelligence estimate, but still it tends to focus it on the types of information you're interested in.

**DeGross:** It also doesn't include the FBI.

**Student:** Well, no.

**Oettinger:** It may not help here to define this thing as turf, rather than as a profession, or a process. Maybe the turf and the professional substance question should be separated.

**DeGross:** I would say that when one is dealing with collection which is a part of the business, one would talk about human sources, or communications sources, or imaging sources, and one would get a certain methodology for collection and find out what it does. But the actual uses or how it's gotten could vary. When one talks about analysis, one is talking about a very generic sort of issue. The political arm has essentially decided that drugs or a war against drugs is a national security issue. So we are taking our analytical course down to the centers that are trying to fight the war against drugs, and teaching them basic analytical skills. The applications are a bit different, the information they're using is different, but the skills that one has, and how one collects the information, and what the sources are, and how one goes to the agencies, are pretty basic. Then there are statistical methodologies. They differ by intent, but they're far more generic than one would think.

**Student:** I've heard some criticism to the point where people would say that what you're in fact teaching people to do is really academic. What an academic does when he's researching a problem or an issue is very much the same thing. He has to collect facts and information. He has to know how to assimilate and then do analysis to eventually come up with a product. How do you at your school do something different than what an academic would do, and how do you teach it differently, if in fact you do?

\*"Managing Intelligence for Effective Use," *Seminar on Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence: Guest Presentations, Spring 1980*. Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1980, p. 159.

\*\*\*"Issues in Intelligence," *Seminar on Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence: Guest Presentations, Spring 1981*. Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1980, p. 214.

\*\*\*\*"Technological Innovation and the Cost of Change," *Seminar on Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence: Guest Presentations, Spring 1986*. Program on Information Policy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1986, pp. 66-7.

**DeGross:** I think there's a strong similarity between what we do and what an academic does. In fact, the intelligence world is full of academics who study a subject and then write a book on it, except, perhaps, the book is classified or the product is classified. The sources of information are different. The purpose of the product tends to be a bit narrower, and it tends to be much more immediate.

I hope you don't mind me giving examples as I go along. We, for example, run a series of seminars for intelligence analysts. Last year we had about 2,500 analysts come in from around Washington. These seminars are put on by college professors whom we invite in, experts on a particular world region or a particular topic. Then we invite in all the analysts from the various intelligence agencies that I've mentioned to sit down with that college professor who has been doing current research on a particular issue. One of the things that becomes evident is that they are interested in the same topic, but they approach it very differently. An academic has a very long-term perspective versus an intelligence person, who has a very short-term perspective. They both grow by the experience. At least, that's been our experience on it.

Unfortunately, there are reinforcing stereotypes within intelligence sometimes. One talks about the threat so often that sometimes one sees it everywhere, and it's important to bring in outside viewpoints. We had a college professor from the University of Texas who was an observer in the Nicaraguan elections who was very pro-Sandinista. We got him together with the Nicaraguan analysts, and they went at it and it was a very growing experience. I think that's important. But there is a strong similarity. Bob Gates,\* who is an academic, is a Soviet specialist. He made his reputation at CIA as a Soviet scholar. I would say that that's good. Probably, that's the way it should be. That is the origin of intelligence and it's unfortunate that there's not more dialogue. It's why a person like myself who has a university background feels relatively comfortable in intelligence. It's also, I think, why there is a growing dialogue between the college community and intelligence. It's certainly in rather specific areas, though. There are a couple of things that I wanted to move into.

**McLaughlin:** I think you have two adjectives in the institution's name. If we take the general view of "college," we all would like to think that we're teaching people to collect information, and analyze

it, allow them to write, distribute, be decision-makers or something, and what's unique about yours is "defense" and "intelligence." Isn't that what makes DIC a different part of the world than just teaching people to do research and write papers? Is that fair?

**DeGross:** Yes, and that's a good point. I wasn't speaking specifically about defense intelligence, I was speaking more about teaching intelligence.

**McLaughlin:** Is it a problem for you that you have that additional adjective?

**DeGross:** No. It is a problem for the institution because the institution is getting asked to do more and more which is less and less defense related. We work for the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI (Director of Central Intelligence), so we have many bosses. There is an intelligence community and our institution has been asked to do things by the community which are not traditionally defense related, but then I guess I should say also that defense is getting asked to do things which are not traditionally defense related, for example, narcotics.

Some would say that the Defense Department is being dragged screaming all the way, for instance, on the issue of using AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) planes along the border, and where the military is going to use its resources and assets, which are limited.

**Student:** Wasn't that same type of screaming going on when terrorism became an issue?

**DeGross:** That's another area. The traditional role, if you will, of the Defense Department I think has certainly changed under this administration. I think the definition of national security and the defense of the nation has broadened and, therefore, as the Defense Department's role broadens, an institution which is preparing people for the Defense Department is broadening.

Also, you have the other factor of competing analysis which mucks the water up a bit, because the prevalent notion is that you have agencies which together perhaps arrive at the truth, but through different sources and methods, or at least through different paths and analytical approaches. Then they get together and there is competing analysis, so I'm told. To a certain extent, CIA does military analysis. DIA does military analysis. We do economic analysis. State does economic analysis. CIA does economic analysis. You can't do one without doing the other, if you really want to try to get an accurate picture.

\*Robert Gates is Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

I think the old lions are — was it the Tower Commission Report or someone on the news talking about the Tower Commission Report which advocated one intelligence agency? I forget whether that's actually in the report.

**Oettinger:** Shades of 1947. I thought we had that settled. Right?

**McLaughlin:** We created all that "joint" in 1947.

**Student:** It wasn't a significant comment, but I thought you might find it interesting to know that the Navy in and of itself since about 1975 has been helping DIA and others in drug enforcement as surveillance at sea on the East and West Coasts and in the Caribbean as a spotter for a long time now.

**DeGross:** Very much so, and I guess they finally made it legal. We, for example, have a lot of Coast Guard students coming through our classes. There will, I believe, be the first Coast Guard attache, a military attache, going to one of the Latin American countries.

**Student:** Just now you talked about the overlap of intelligence analysis. What and how much economic analysis is done in the defense intelligence assessment? What percentage and how much you require — of a military attache, for example?

**DeGross:** There's a problem. That's a very good question. Obviously, we at our institution, for example, teach a course on economic intelligence, how to do economic analysis. But, by and large, the Defense Intelligence Agency and community tend to look at economic analysis as the ability of a country to sustain or to fight a war. That tends to be a bit more of the focus rather than the Commerce Department, which looks at how we're competing in the world and those sorts of issues.

A military attache is most of the time (probably the exception being the Army) not an intelligence professional. He is a member of the combat arms who comes in to perform an intelligence function for one tour or perhaps two tours. A military attache is only with us for 12 weeks. We certainly don't have enough time to prepare them in a variety of skills, which one might if in fact we had a diplomatic profession of an attache within the field of intelligence. The training is really very limited and we do very little. It's probably less than one percent of their time. It is what sort of backgrounds do they come with? What has been their preparation up until the time they come? What sort of schools? I don't know if that answers your question. I don't

think of an attache as a military intelligence professional.

**Student:** Forget about attaches. In the assessment done inside the DIA, the processing part of the intelligence, how much do they weigh the economic analysis? In our Indian intelligence organization, in the past we had no economic analysis at all, but later we came to realize that without economic analysis we cannot produce good quality intelligence. Now we are beginning to act to put more emphasis on that part of the issue.

**DeGross:** There is an element within DIA which focuses on economic intelligence, but again the main agency responsible for it is the CIA.

Coming back to the issue that I started with, what an intelligence officer needs to know or doesn't need to know. When I first came to the Defense Intelligence College almost 10 years ago, I found what I perceived to be — and this probably says a lot more about me than about the college or school — an over-preoccupation with the Soviet Union, "the threat" as it was perceived at that time. Since I've been there we have rather carefully and considerably expanded and narrowed. We've expanded the scope of the curriculum to reflect the responsibilities of the United States to the entire world, our military responsibilities, and narrowed the emphasis on the Soviet Union in terms of requirements. Yet, and this sounds like a contradiction, we've also expanded the rather specific knowledge that is available on the Soviet Union.

What I mean is we offer a graduate program at the Defense Intelligence College. When I first came to the school, students were locked in a lecture hall from eight in the morning to three o'clock in the afternoon and we poured in knowledge. We poured in something — I'm not exactly sure what. Then we stepped away from that and we started a seminar process. Since that time we have kind of approached it from what a person can really remember. What do they need to know and what can they remember? Just obtaining information on something while going through school is not going to pay good benefits for an intelligence officer.

For example, we're dealing with the Soviet Union. We went from a very heavy emphasis on what the Soviets were doing to a look at what was going on in the rest of the world. The problem with that is, again, what can students remember when they leave — two, three, four years later — ten years later, about the world. Have they merely gotten some impressions? So we have backed away from that a bit and now we've decided what students re-

ally need are skills on how to make a regional assessment. They need to be familiar with perceptions of threat, but they also need to know how to analyze a world region so that if, in the course of a military career, they are assigned to an analytical desk dealing with the Soviet Union, they have some of the skills necessary. If they then are moved from that Soviet desk to deal with Afghanistan, they know how to get the information, and how to apply it. Then, if they move from Afghanistan to deal with Nicaragua, which happens, unfortunately....

**Oettinger:** There are mountains in both places.

**DeGross:** Yes. We cannot afford with the manpower limitations, which will always be there, to have foreign area officers as analysts for all regions. It just doesn't work. The foreign area officers, meaning people trained specifically for that region, or area, or country. So, you have a group of generalists who must have certain skills, and the skills are economic analysis, military analysis, political analysis, and sociological analysis, those sorts of things. How does one approach a country, a region, to be able to make a valid assessment?

**Student:** Would one of those capabilities also be the language indigenous to the place?

**DeGross:** Big debate, big debate. I have a particular interest in this. I serve on a Department of Defense task force called the DOD University Forum Working Group on Language and Area Studies. It's a group of people within the Department of Defense like myself and college presidents and chancellors, etc., outside and we're desperately concerned about the status of languages, primarily Third World. The government cannot and should not maintain enough resources to provide everyone with language capability, and yet we know we're going to need it. We see the reservoir of language capability drying up on the outside, especially during the 1970s and 1980s, because of lack of funding. Language departments are closing.

The Secretary of Defense has expressed active concern about language training for two or three budget years in a row. The President's budget has zeroed out funding for the Department of Education for foreign language and area study centers, and each year the Secretary of Defense sends out a letter saying this is in the national security interest, please restore the funding. That letter makes its way to Congress, and Congress restores the money. To a certain extent it's a game that's being played, nevertheless, the Department of Defense does recognize

that language capability is an intelligence-related skill. That's the phrase that's used.

Now, however, that's one level. The other level is: Can we really afford to maintain the language capabilities, develop and maintain them? How much is available in translation? Given the nature of the military, the rotation of assignments, even the foreign area officers have difficulty maintaining language and the fact that many of the foreign area officers were going into positions where in fact they didn't even use the language and they lose it. Maybe Harvard might be one of those assignments.

It is very costly, obviously, to develop and maintain a language. It's something that everyone at the top gives a great deal of lip service to, about the need to have it. Whether it's actually doable and affordable, I'm not sure. One of the more promising things that has come out, though, is that someone using their head figured out that if the military can't maintain a language capability, the reserves can maintain a language capability. There are several language reserve battalions which have been established in the United States, so that if, in a time of emergency, like an emergency in the Philippines, we find out that there are no Tagalog speakers, the reserves are used.

**Oettinger:** This is one of those questions of whether the accent is on defense, or on intelligence, or on college, or on U.S.? Where do you put it? You can get it outside the military. Sometimes it's a national capability whether you have it in the military or elsewhere.

The question of where the skills should reside and how necessary it is for them to reside there ...

**DeGross:** It's necessary that they be there somewhere.

**Oettinger:** Somewhere, but not necessarily in the head of the military.

**DeGross:** There is, I think, an obvious recognition and an obvious commitment that an attache who goes to a country has to have the language. If that is an intelligence function then I think that's understood. I think there's a genuine recognition that an analyst who has a language capability for the country he's dealing with is probably a better analyst, because he understands the cultural milieu and is able to read journals and pick up the nuances. Whether that is attainable, maintainable and cost effective in the government today is debatable. Obviously, it's critical for a National Security Agency to have the language capabilities.

Language therefore is very important. It's one which I and many other people spend a lot of time



thinking about, because we're concerned about the future. But intelligence managers, managers of analysts, tend to think about their daily problems, not about their future problems, and they don't want to build, necessarily, a capability that they might need for 5, or 10, or 15 years from now. To tell people that they really ought to have one Swahili speaker is very hard when they know their budget comes for certain types of intelligence. They know that their immediate problems are this and that, and it's very difficult to get them to send someone out for a long-term study of Swahili or some other language.

The analytical techniques that we teach could in many cases be taught, and are taught, at colleges and universities. What makes it different — we teach statistics and probability, baysean analysis. We teach computer courses, but ours, of course, are on a classified computer. So one has to know the language that we use in order to get the information up for oneself. What makes all our analytical courses different or methodological courses different is the case studies that we use. It's just like Harvard Business School, I suppose.

In addition, we provide people with area assessment training or education. This is, how to assess a world region and give them familiarity with major world regions' area studies. What makes our courses kind of different than the traditional area studies courses is the focus. We provide students

with an overview course which deals with economics: What's the basic political structure? What's the composition of the people, the ethnic backgrounds, language, and things like that? But we get into considerably more military detail. In that packet I handed out, you will find a listing of the Soviet concentration (figure 2). I brought that because I think you would find some of these courses on a college campus, but you would probably not find all of them. You would also not find these courses allowing the students to use classified information. I always like to say our students have more academic freedom than exists on any college campus because they have access to classified and unclassified information, whereas someone who attends a civilian college or university has to be content with open-source information. So our students can pursue their ideas in both categories.

Then you would have the sort of operations courses. I've talked about the analytical courses, what kind of probability statistics to use. The operations courses, what we call operations courses, talk about collection. At a national-level school we don't really teach people how to collect. That's done in rather specialized schools. What we do is teach them about it. How reliable is the information and how to get it. For example, we don't teach a person how to get a satellite up to take photography, but

**SA642** – East Europe: Current Appraisal

**\*SA661** – An Appraisal of the Soviet Union

**SA662** – The Soviet Armed Forces

**SA663** – Soviet Foreign Policy Schedule

**SA664** – Soviet Military Doctrine

**SA665** – Soviet Intelligence and Security Services

**SA666** – Soviet Naval Operations

**SA667** – Soviet Air and Strategic Rocket Forces

**SA652** – Scientific and Technical Intelligence I

**SS690** – Analysis of Strategic Nuclear Warfare Issues

\*Required for concentration

**Figure 2. Soviet Union Concentration**



we teach a person how to ask the system to get the photography that you need to resolve the problem that you're trying to deal with, and in what cases one should use the photography, and in what cases one shouldn't use the photography. We're teaching what I like to think is a bit of a higher level than how to tighten the screw; we're teaching you about the whole concept of screwdrivers. That's kind of our operations courses in a rather general sense.

There is one other area which I think also mirrors where a lot of work has been done at colleges and universities. There are courses at many colleges and universities today that deal with intelligence in the national security structure, or the role intelligence plays in the government. This is growing. It's found in government departments, or political science departments, or history departments.

We feel that it's important for an intelligence professional to understand the milieu in which he's operating. An intelligence analyst who doesn't understand the political realities of the world he lives in will probably produce intelligence that is not used. In order for intelligence to be used, it must be concise, unfortunately, because a decisionmaker won't read a book. He doesn't have time to read a book. It has to be sensitive to what the current policies are, because that's the first question the decisionmaker is going to ask: "How does this deviate from where we stand right now?" And so we do have courses which focus on the national intelligence structure, and how to get the information to where it's supposed to go, to the national decisionmakers.

I think it's also important for morale, because an analyst needs to know why people don't listen to his analysis. At times it can be because of the structure, it didn't get there in time, or at times it can be because it's so far out of line with what the current political thinking is that it's going to be rejected. That's not a failure of analysis, that's the failure of the policy maker to see something with a different perspective.

Then there are other sorts of considerations which we feel that a military intelligence officer needs to know. A military intelligence officer is part of a military intelligence bureaucracy, therefore, he also needs to know how to get a budget through, and how to get personnel. We teach him little things about management, and those are rather important things too, because while it's important to have a mind which is willing to be unstructured, it's important also to understand that you survive in a bureaucracy which is very structured. You can be the

most brilliant person and do the most marvelous analysis, but if the structure keeps it from getting to the person who needs it because you are so unorthodox, then you will not succeed.

Those are substantive sorts of things. There are other sorts of things which we also think an intelligence officer needs to have. He needs to be aware of the image that he projects. This sounds trite, but it's true. One of the main ways that intelligence information is disseminated is through briefings. Every morning the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff gets a briefing. Every morning the President gets a briefing. Unfortunately, how you present what you have to say is important. It has to be clear. It has to be concise.

**Student:** In other words, you work on the rudiments of presentation.

**DeGross:** Presentation, briefing techniques.

**Student:** Increasingly, I have found that at higher level staffs officers are selected to be briefers based strictly on their media capability. They brief a script. They do not look like they're briefing a script, but they brief a script. The analyst is among that great group of strap hangers behind the admiral or the general out there, and as soon as a question is asked which the "dog and pony show" guy can't answer, the analyst pops up and answers the question.

**Oettinger:** The Air Force is particularly good at that, or particularly bad, depending on which way you want to look at it.

**DeGross:** We increasingly at DIA are finding that Congress is requesting that the analysts come over, which we do not necessarily feel is the best way to have things done. I'm not disagreeing with you. I'm also saying that even the guy who's in the back needs to be able to speak and present himself coherently.

**Student:** Absolutely. I think it's incumbent on any military officer, whether he's in intelligence or operations, or supply, or logistics, to be able to stand up in front of a group of people and get his ideas across. What you're teaching is particularly important for an intelligence officer.

**McLaughlin:** Going back to the Richard Beal comment of two years ago in this seminar about

briefing\* — his observation that having two and a half minutes a day to brief the President on what may come unhinged in the world — that they had found that it was time for a different technology — in his words “high-burst video” — to communicate more in two and a half minutes than the traditional briefing.

**Oettinger:** Like, “Where is Nicaragua anyway?”

**McLaughlin:** Are you teaching your analysts new media?

**DeGross:** No. I do not believe that’s an appropriate thing for an analyst to know. What you’re talking about is a standardized briefing. That standardized briefing is carefully controlled. DIA has increased its whole presentation division because it is aware that the medium is the message. In fact, it takes a great deal of time to orchestrate. *Soviet Military Power*, which some of you may be aware of, will this year for the first time come out in a film. Okay? They have taken a document and now they are producing a film on it which can be distributed to your local high schools for an appropriate cost.

**Student:** I’d seen it translated into slide shows, but I didn’t think that they had gone that far.

**DeGross:** This will be out for the first time this April.

**McLaughlin:** Fascinating! Taking photos and converting them into drawings and making photos of the drawings.

**DeGross:** Artist’s conceptions. I’m looking forward to seeing the first ones.

**Oettinger:** Animated artists’ conceptions are now well within the state of the art. I know a guy who will sell you a machine to do that for about \$30,000, and it will take any two or three still images and provide the animation in between. You can now have anything animated to the nth degree.

**DeGross:** This is a very good point because certainly the thrust of the Reagan Administration has been to get more information out — this may not be true of Mr. Casey — so that the public is more aware of why they are making some decisions or more aware of “the threat” as it’s perceived by the Reagan Administration.

That’s not the analysts, but there are people who are associated with intelligence within broader agencies who, in fact, have that as their entire focus.

**Student:** I see a potential problem there. I know a lot of the critics have pointed to this sort of thing and said that what you get now is intelligence officers who are supporting policy by twisting potential evidence.

**DeGross:** It’s the politicization of intelligence.

**Student:** Do you address that at all with your students: How you can avoid that or what to do if you’re faced with that?

**DeGross:** I wish I could say yes. I’m not sure that we do.

**Oettinger:** I’ve been waiting for an opening to get into that sort of area. There are several handles. One has to do with perceptions, the other with assessment. This is a problem that we wrestle with a great deal here in our own research program: the question of presenting a situation from the point of view of multiple perceptions, that is, looking at it through the eyes of various protagonists. The Ayatollah, say. The moderate opposition to the Ayatollah, such as it might be, if there were such a thing. The perceptions of whether there is such a thing from different parts of the United States government. To take a contemporary example, it seems to me that there are ways of approaching this question of politicization that have to do with skills and with technique and with analytical integrity one way or another that are not arcane arts and would lend themselves to clear exposition in a briefing modality by whatever technology is available.

What do you think personally? What does the institution think when they worry about this, outside of the pressure of media hype over whether things are or are not politicized? Why is it so hard, or isn’t it, or is it a red herring?

**DeGross:** I think students of intelligence and intelligence analysts provide the information, and some is utilized and some is not. The politicization of the information is the selection that is taken by the various policy makers which they then decide is going to go here and there. It’s probably a little easier to have divergent viewpoints in non-Soviet areas. There have been divergent viewpoints within a Soviet area, and there’s been a lot of political flack about that because CIA has a different view of the Soviet threat than DIA has of the Soviet threat. Who’s right? What does that mean? But both viewpoints come out. Now it tends to be tied up

\*Richard S. Beal, “Decision Making, Crisis Management, Information and Technology,” in *Seminar on Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence: Guest Presentations, Spring 1984*. Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA: February 1985, pp. 5-19.

with defense budgets and many other things. I don't have an answer for you, Tony.

**Student:** I was wondering if you wouldn't mind commenting on something that I found rather disturbing. I was in the Indian Ocean at the time that the war between Iran and Iraq broke out. We were with a flagship and battle group. I was at the Midway battle group at the time. We got a briefing from the staff intelligence officer that I thought was rather bizarre. It was totally unexpected that the war was going to break out from everything that he received in terms of military intelligence at the time. In fact, we were doing a port visit in Mombasa, Kenya, at the time, and there was a big scurry by the battle group commander to get us back to sea and under way and up there. The USCOM 7th Fleet got on the telephone to the battle commander and said, "No, you wait until we've got an assessment of the situation." There seemed to have been a big vacuum of information about what was going on at the time. I was wondering if you had any intimations, in the first place, why, it might be, and in the second place, what we might be doing about it now.

**DeGross:** There are a couple of feasible or conceivable explanations. I don't know why. So, therefore, let me just throw these out as possibilities. This maybe leads farther ahead to where we're going to end up. One of the problems I think which was recognized by the Goldwater-Nichols legislation or the DOD reorganization was that an awful lot of intelligence was being provided to the national decision-makers, but it wasn't getting out to the field. That to a certain extent was not enhanced by the former DCI, Mr. Casey, who wanted a close hold on a lot of intelligence products, to the effect that they could not be distributed even to the U.S. commands.

**Oettinger:** Let alone to the Israelis. To put a gloss on yesterday's headline.

**DeGross:** There was such close hold that, in fact, the information didn't get out. That's one of the fights, if you will, that has been going on in Washington, maybe for generations, but certainly more recently between Defense, which realizes that information has to get out to the battlefield commander, and the CIA, or at least the DCI, which says, no, I want this close hold because I don't want leaks.

**Oettinger:** One of my favorite prejudices, and I might as well put it on the table, is that polarized arguments on this score are the most dangerous thing there is. They mask what I perceive as the reality which is a continuing and unavoidable ad-

justment of a set of balances along dimensions which may or may not be compatible and that come out of some basic ways of running organizations.

The more people know, the more you let out, the more damage you can do to operational security, to sources and methods, etc., etc. It is not being paranoid, per se, to want to hold things close. It's very difficult to judge abstractly whether Casey was an extremist on this score, or a reasonable man, or what. There's always a bug about counterintelligence. Not unreasonable in and of itself, except there's the other element of balance, which is that the more people know, the more they are able to help themselves, the more they are able to make sound decisions under varying circumstances which the front office cannot necessarily predict. The more something breaks down, and they get cut off, the better they'll act independently. There's a whole bunch of very good reasons. The more everybody knows, in fact, the more your adversary knows — commercial, military, or whatever — the better off you are, because the risk or the probability of irrational miscalculation is reduced and, therefore, you're all better off if everybody knows the same thing. That's the other extreme.

That's also nonsense. There are people who go whole hog at that extreme, and say you're giving away the family jewels. It's not a matter of one or the other view being right. It is a matter that can never be resolved. The thing I find worrisome is when there is a period of belief that the right answer had been found, or a period of assertion that the right answer must be found. As opposed to language that says, hey, under these circumstances, for this period, how do you set this balance? Recognizing that under certain circumstances you may have an advantage in tightening up or letting out, but at least considering these factors in a reasonably rational fashion. To me the dangerous folks are the ones who don't do that. Casey was a bit extreme in holding things close and not all that amenable to the advantages of broader dissemination.

**DeGross:** I would agree that security can become counterproductive. You had the case in Vietnam where intelligence people picked up information that didn't get through to the guy who was dropping the bombs because it was going to reveal sources and methods.

**Oettinger:** Anything getting around causes delays sometimes, and they may lose confidence, and so on. That's another dimension of a perennial argument between how much you need to discuss

sources in order to lend credibility versus "let the bastards take it on faith." Again I don't think there is any set answer.

**Student:** I happened to be at IPAC (Intelligence Center, Pacific) in 1980, and I'm familiar with the politics of the Pacific Command at that time. I would suggest that your battle group intelligence officer's problem lay more with the lack of a sound relationship between CINCPAC (Commander in Chief, Pacific), IPAC (from whom he got his intelligence), and CINCPACFLT (Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet). IPAC was briefing the CINCPAC everything known about the tension building up and the probability of war breaking out. CINCPACFLT never attended these briefings, however, relying instead on his own Fleet Intelligence Center. They never coordinated with IPAC, but put out their own estimates of the situation.

**Student:** That seems to be almost a fixture of our system. That story's told again and again. The other fixture, as far as I can see, going back to my days many years ago when I sat in the Pentagon and I'd see the top secret digest every morning, is that there seemed to be a tremendous motivation for all intelligence estimates to be made as bland as possible. It's very hard for people to take a strong position in any direction. It's always "Yes, but..., and if..."

**DeGross:** That's true. On the other hand, to Mr. Casey's credit, he has allowed much more in the way of footnoting. So that, in fact, you do have differences being acknowledged in estimates rather than trying to come up with something that is mutually acceptable to everyone and satisfies no one.

**Student:** With so much consensus required before you get anything out you have to reduce things to that.

**Oettinger:** Forgive me for being single-minded and extremist in defense of moderation. That's another perennial. You footnote too damn much and have too much dissension and at some point, unless the President, or the task force commander, or the CINC has personally looked at all of this stuff and netted it out for himself, somebody is going to say, "Enough of this multiarmed ifs, ands, buts, etc., what the hell does it net out to?" If it is not done by the principal, the decisionmaker, or the commander, then it's got to be somebody on the staff. Whether that is somebody in the intelligence area or on the guy's personal staff, or several layers in between, somewhere that is going to happen, and somebody's going to be unhappy because it got digested and

netted before the right level had all of the various pieces for its consideration.

Again, it's unresolvable because, given the fact that after a certain amount of fanning out all the facts, all the options, etc., it's too damn much for any one human being to digest. You will never resolve that tension between the inability to digest, on the one hand, and the necessity to have all the pieces for the decisionmaker to consider. So the compromise there is always going to be an uneasy one. After many, many years of watching this field, I'm convinced that there are certain perennials which keep coming up and they keep being a surprise to everybody. Not just to journalists but to practicing analysts, commanders in chief, local lieutenants, and whatever. I wonder whether there isn't something in an intelligence curriculum that could catalogue these perennial cats and dogs, and say, "Folks, these are the things you have to live with; the adjustments may differ at different points in your career under a different administration or with this SOB or that jerk, or genius, but here are a bunch of perennial adjustments." I have yet to run into any practitioner anywhere for whom that thought is a comfortable one.

**Student:** A lot of intelligence estimates remind me very much of forecasts, economic forecasts. There's one fundamental rule there. You never lose your job by being in the middle of the pack. The risk-return situation's bad. There wasn't an economist who made an estimate of how high interest rates would go five or six years ago. He would have been laughed out of court. He would have lost his job if it hadn't turned out that way. Stay with the pack. I hate to say such things to an intelligence professional.

**DeGross:** This is kind of an ant's view because I'm not involved in the estimative process, nor am I getting briefed on the estimates. I haven't reached that exalted position yet. What I am aware of is that I perceive there is less emphasis placed on estimates today. Within the Defense Department there is a thing called the Military Intelligence Board that's composed of all the intelligence general officers, the head of Air Force intelligence, Army intelligence. They meet and they usually hash out intelligence estimates. That's one of the things that they do. When the meetings have been called lately dealing with estimates, the people representing the intelligence chiefs are lieutenant colonels. Before, the generals themselves used to attend. So one percep-

tion is that there is much de-emphasis on the value of estimates. I don't know if that's true.

**Student:** I think that varies entirely by the nature of the occupant of the office, and that could change tomorrow if you get a new Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence in either the Army or the Air Force.

**Student:** I think it's also been reflected at the national level. Under this particular administration — I think this even occurred a little bit under Carter — there's been a melding of the old NIE (National Intelligence Estimate) process and policy-making process so you now have documents that incorporate both intelligence and policy potential decisions. That was one of the major functions of the NSC (National Security Council) to combine that, so you don't have a separate policy reaction to a potential intelligence problem. You have it brought together before you even get to the President. That's where I think it may be reflected now at lower levels. I've been told that's been occurring now regularly. One of the reasons for it was, for example, the time it took the NIE on Iran to appear. Actually it never did appear in 1978. They spent a whole year trying to get a consensus which never occurred. This is prior to Casey and prior to the footnoting thing. That was one of the things that sort of drove people away from relying on an NIE which takes too long to come together, and when it does come together it may be watered down to something that really doesn't say much. Is that necessarily accurate?

**Oettinger:** The NIE was a great innovation in its day, and again it's my obsession with balances, because without something like that the fragments are unintelligible. And as Sherman Kent\* advocated, this was in reaction to a perception that all these bits and pieces — whether it's a bit of intelligence or a bit of policy and so on — when delivered out of context make no sense. Kent got the machinery going and then his successors eventually lost track of why they were in the swamp. The NIE process became a ponderous, encyclopedic and, therefore, hopeless aberration and had to be pruned back again. I will say that usually these things are cyclical. Argue with me if you think I'm crazy. We used to insist on people grasping that one of the essentials — aside from tools and techniques and how to hornswoggle budgets and so on, which one has to do in any activity which are very specific to the particular institution, and which you need to be taught

in the local context — is this matter of how the hell to understand what the elements of a balance are, and which way they've gotten out of hand in a very sort of specific and focused way. This strikes me as a total gap.

In this discussion, each of you is presenting a snippet from one piece of experience at either some extreme or at the local setting. I think there ought to be a way of revealing and inculcating the notion that informing oneself about balances before charging off to make things ready might smooth things out a bit and get better results.

**DeGross:** There are a couple of things I want to say about that. One, we do study intelligence failures. So hopefully by looking at failures (this is in warning in particular, that we study failures) one gets a perspective. The second thing is: It's not only what you teach but who teaches it. You have a class in which you interject ideas and experiences that you've had. We have, for example, a number of adjunct professors, who have been in the intelligence community their entire career and have retired, and now are teaching for us. Walter Pforzheimer, for example, who has one of the world's largest collections of intelligence literature, but also wrote the National Security Act in 1947. Jack Thomas, former Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, who now serves as an intelligence advisor to Latham,\* but he also worked for the Secretary of Defense before, and Stilwell,\*\* and a number of other people. He's been in intelligence policy ever since he left. They teach for us. These people bring things like what you're talking about — experiences, and why things didn't work, and that's not necessarily the formal course. No one can sign up for a course and not get that. It's who teaches it as well as what is being taught. I think that's an important part of what we do.

**Student:** Do you sometimes feel that you may be teaching the wrong people? That you'd like to get your hands on some policy makers to tell them a little bit more about the process, and they can get a feel for what their intelligence officers should be doing for them? Is there ever an opportunity to have a seminar or to get hold of these people on a short-term basis to explain some of the problems on the issues that are involved in preparing an intelligence officer?

\*Former director, Office of National Estimates, CIA, and former director of the Office of Strategic Services; author of *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, 1949.

\*Donald C. Latham, Assistant Secretary of Defense, C3I.

\*\*General Richard G. Stilwell, Chairman, Department of Defense Security Review Commission; previously Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

**DeGross:** Certainly you're not going to get an individual like that in for a course. We do have congressional staffers that take courses, and staffs are very important today. What we do attempt to do is to provide opportunities through seminars, like weekend seminars, or a conference, where you will in a round table discussion get a policy maker together with other people. Hopefully, in the course of the dialogue there will be some learning that will take place. I think the initial reaction on the part of a lot of the intelligence people in Washington over the Iran affair and the NSC was that intelligence was getting the blame. Yet one of the things we teach intelligence officers is what the process is, and whom you have to inform, and why you do it, and the processes were violated. Yet, these people at the NSC weren't intelligence people really. That's one of the frustrations you have.

Let me talk about just a couple of other things. I am interested in preparation, writing skills. That's clear. Intelligence personnel have to be able to write, and we do provide mechanisms for them to write, not only during the various courses, but we also have a speed reading and writing course before they even get in the door. The third skill which I think an intelligence officer needs to have now is, he has to be computer literate. I can't say we encourage all our students to buy PCs, but we do have PCs available in their rooms where they study. They also have classified computer terminals and within a year or two the ability to get information from the classified libraries right into their study rooms will be a reality. The ability to get information, to use information, and to synthesize it will be there. I think that is a step forward, because information is the essence of intelligence, and you have to be able to get it quickly and use it fast.

For the things we don't teach, like language, there's the Defense Language Institute, the Foreign Service Institute, all teach language. There are lots of things I think probably should be taught and are just the sort of skills which people have to have had before they come. The problem is there is no undergraduate program for the intelligence professional. You have to draw the line somewhere and say, "This I can teach, this I cannot teach." If we're going to create an area specialist, I would love to be able to teach language, but it's not doable within our time constraints.

**McLaughlin:** How much do you control your own prerequisites?

**DeGross:** We're a professional school. How's this for dodging? The profession, therefore, sets up the

requirements, just as the medical profession determines what its prerequisites are. Within our own graduate program, we set up our own requirements (figure 3), but most students are not sent there for the graduate program. They come for another program, and then we allow them to take it simultaneously. For example, we have a two-week indications and warning course: indicators of impending hostilities and the need to give warning to the national decisionmakers. In order to take that course, you have to be going to a position that requires that, and those are identified. There is a lot of specialized training. The broader things we have a lot more control over.

The preparation of an attache I think is a more difficult problem, because you're taking someone who is basically a nonintelligence professional, and trying, in a rather quick manner, to provide him with the skills he needs (figure 4). An attache is a diplomat; therefore, he has to understand that he works for the ambassador. The ambassador represents the President. The ambassador is law. More attaches are fired because they run counter to the ambassador, than get fired for other reasons. The ambassador doesn't like the way they look. They get fired. That's something that a military officer needs to understand.

They also have to understand that they are there under a certain defined status. They have to understand what their diplomatic role is. They need to understand how they collect and what is legal for them to collect while they're abroad. They need to understand, also, about terrorism. About 25 percent of our course is now devoted to personal security, and that's risen in the number of years I've been there. We teach them defensive driving. We teach them never to go home the same way that they went home the night before.

We talk about the embassy environment and country studies. They do get some of that also. But 12 weeks to prepare a diplomat is not a lot of time. There's not a lot that can be done. I'm one of the people who I guess would strongly argue for the fact that there ought to be a separate category, which Congress has talked about a couple a times, a special career field for attaches. I think the amount of time spent preparing people with language would argue that the investment is so costly that it ought to be begun very early and they could jump back and forth between attache assignments and analytical jobs. That's my own particular preference.

I guess the last thing that I wanted to mention to you was structure. Where you sit depends some-

### **Subject Areas**

- **Strategic Intelligence Management**
- **Strategic Intelligence Operations**
- **Strategic Intelligence Area Assessments**
- **Quantitative Analysis**
- **Indications and Warning**
- **Scientific and Technical Intelligence**
- **Intelligence Collection Management**

**Core Courses: 7 required**

**Elective Courses: 6 required**

**Figure 3. Postgraduate Intelligence Program (PGIP-9 Months)**

### **Attache Course – 12 Weeks**

- **Observation and Reporting**
- **Security and Counterterrorism**
- **Country Studies**
- **Representation and Relations**
- **Embassy/DAO Environment**
- **Management**

**Figure 4. Attache Training Curriculum**



times upon how you see things. I'm at a joint school, therefore, I think joint is important. There are tactical schools, and they think tactical is where the rubber meets the road, and that's what's really important. There is within the Department of Defense a whole bureaucracy. You have about eight intelligence schools in the Department of Defense of which one is national. That's the Defense Intelligence College (figure 5).

You also have three national schools. CIA has their own school, and that's essentially a training institution for their requirements, although they call it Office of Training and Education. You have the Defense Intelligence College which trains all elements, or educates all elements, and then you have National Security's National Cryptological School, which trains people in cryptology. That's kind of the structure and to a certain extent it defines what we do. Obviously, or perhaps not obviously, we as a defense school do not teach covert action, for example, because that's not something that we get involved in. About 80 percent, I would guess, of the military who are in intelligence are in analytical jobs, or management jobs of analytical functions. So obviously, the thrust of our curriculum deals with analysis.


The opportunity that faces defense intelligence is the new missions that are coming. The role that de-

fense intelligence is going to play in arms negotiations. When Mr. Gorbachev decides, for example, that he is going to offer to bargain on weapons in Europe, the questions that get asked are: "What are the weapons? How many? What does that mean to us?" That can mean collection. It's an analysis of their capabilities, our capabilities, and then help during negotiations. I think one of the things we see is that intelligence is taking a front line in terms of arms negotiations. That's something that's new. It's not new that we're having arms negotiations, but the direct involvement of intelligence in this process is new. Verification is going to be one of the issues: Who is verifying intelligence?

**Oettinger:** I think we're taking a lot for granted. It may look, smell, and taste like intelligence, but it could be the definition of operational requirements. Who says support of negotiations is an intelligence function?

**DeGross:** The Defense Intelligence Agency has a whole support element for negotiations.

**Student:** Do they operate independently, or are they then providing material a little bit late to get there from Chicago directly to the negotiators, or are they inputs to a team that works out various answers?



**Figure 5. Postgraduate Intelligence Program (PGIP-9 Months)**

**DeGross:** We have a team that goes over and is with the negotiators. That's part of the briefing and all that goes on. There's a lot of back and forth. When somebody bargains this then you see what the implications are. I think in the negotiation stages there is a direct involvement of intelligence.

Second, I guess the role for defense intelligence that's relatively new is terrorism — combating terrorism. It's very hard because you don't have a defined enemy. You have an enemy but you're not sure who they are. They don't always wear uniforms. When you find out about them, they're probably so far down the line that it's the ones you don't know about, the small groups that have splintered from a larger group, that very often can be menacing. It's a new type of enemy with a new type of threat. We're trying to figure out how to prepare people to deal with counter-terrorism analysis.

The third, which I mentioned earlier, is narcotics. Those three are kind of new challenges to prepare people for. For example, with the counter-narcotics, that is not necessarily a military intelligence function, but military intelligence may provide some sort of supporting mechanism. We certainly are providing some training right now, and that training is something which has been defined as doable by the Department of Defense. The great difficulty, as I see it, is the problem of evidence. Within the narcotics field individuals have to be brought into a court of law and then there is the whole avenue of where you found out your information, and that gets into the whole issue of sources and methods. There are some problems which have not yet been worked out legally, but yet we can provide analytical training which will be very helpful.

The last one is Department of Defense reorganization, mandatory joint training, training for joint assignments. Washington is crazy over this. It is the real battle of the services and the joint agencies. Where that all resolves I don't know. We as a joint school could see lots of students coming through. Here is also the possibility that intelligence will be defined as not even being joint.

**Student:** Will you explain that? I don't understand.

**DeGross:** The issue is whether intelligence is a player, or whether it's like personnel. There is the possibility that the definition of joint will only apply to the combat arms. That the mandatory training will be done at the Armed Forces Staff College, or at the National Defense University, rather than at DIA. It has the possibility of being excluded as a joint agency.

**Oettinger:** It will be joint, lowercase j, but not Joint, capital J.

**Student:** For some reason we don't have a J2 for the JCS, we have DIA. You don't get credit for a JCS assignment if you go to DIA.

**DeGross:** It's one of the big battles that's being fought. This is really probably a lot of Defense Department personnel mumbo jumbo, but Congress clearly wanted credit to be given for joint assignments. That's one of the reasons why they passed the bill. What that means is, and if I'm over-simplifying please forgive me, you get promoted if you're in the Air Force, if you stay in the Air Force. Joint assignments are kind of looked at as places you can go to quickly but then go back to your mother service. And the same with Army, Navy, and it varies by service. The real way to win is to stay with your service and get the right assignments.

Congress didn't feel that was necessarily the right thing to do, so they mandated the idea of a joint specialty, with mandatory, I guess, parallel promotions, so that people in joint assignments would not suffer. If intelligence is ruled out as being joint, then it will probably suffer even more because the people who are willing to go to joint assignments will go to JCS, but they won't want to go to DIA. It is a very controversial subject in Washington.

**Oettinger:** Talmudic or Jesuitical training is probably the best preparation for that, rather than even Harvard or a defense school. This is reading from the Act: "The Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall periodically review and revise the curriculum of each school in the National Defense University and of any other joint professional military education school to enhance the education, etc., etc." The debate is over the definition of professional military education. What Bob said is that it may be that intelligence is not part of Professional Military Education, capital P, capital M, capital E, which is a thought.

**DeGross:** Legislation doesn't use capital P, capital M, capital E.

**Oettinger:** One of the interesting questions — I mention this in part because I think we ought to ask this question of Arch Barrett and Jim Locher\* when they come here toward the end of the semester is, "What was the intent? Was that capitalized in here?" One could imagine somebody sort of taking

\*Archie D. Barrett, Professional Staff Member, House Armed Services Committee; and James R. Locher, III, Professional Staff Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services. See their presentations later in this volume.

it as generic. If somebody slipped them this as if it were generic, and they thought it was generic, and somebody in the Pentagon is laughing their heads off and saying, "You slipped them this proprietary stuff — like Coca Cola — thinking that it is generic and now we nail them because it really is proprietary. We'll have to give a refund anytime you use that word Pepsi Cola." That's the ostensible battleground. What's really going on as usual, as one would have expected with the passage of a major reorganization, is that those who were interested in status quo are using every available means of bureaucratic infighting to perpetuate themselves.

**DeGross:** In true fashion, too. The responsibility of it was assigned to the Secretary of Defense. Legislation says that "the Secretary of Defense will do this, the Secretary of Defense will do that," but it also beefs up the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's responsibility. The Secretary said to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "It's your baby. Come up with a plan to implement this legislation and then report back to me." The Joint Chiefs of Staff as yet have not gotten their own new authority together so they're looking at it. The old lens is each chief of the service looking out to protect his own turf. I'm repeating what I have been told, but without any great deal of factual backup — I haven't counted it myself — that something like 60 percent of the field grade officers in intelligence are in joint duties. That would mean that the service chiefs would lose considerable control over a group of people in the intelligence speciality. But it also says that intelligence is more joint than many of the other career fields. So it should be.

**Oettinger:** Lowercase joint, not necessarily more capital Joint. A reasonable man asking a question on the surface and thereby delving into what lies behind the facade in terms of the bureaucratic interpretations of an otherwise sort of simple-minded reality. That's the way life is.

**Student:** On a different subject, the question of assessing how effective an intelligence organization, or its products, or its analysis is, other than sort of periodic crises and failures of intelligence, are there some built-in methods by which somebody outside the intelligence organization or somebody inside the intelligence organization could assess it and see how it is working? Whether it's working well? Taking an economic example, again, you could think of it as either a descriptive or predictive function, like trying to predict what happens in the stock exchange. You could ask somebody to do that; then, at the

end of the year you could hypothetically see whether you made money or not.

**DeGross:** One of the great problems of intelligence is that if you predict that there is the possibility of impending hostilities, for example, and then the government acts as if there are impending hostilities and takes action to make sure that it doesn't happen by introducing a policy which causes it not to happen, you never know whether your prediction was right or wrong. It is one of the problems. Agencies do have review panels for estimates, for example, they go back and look and see how effective they've been. There is a retrospective look.

**Student:** Is this a strong function in intelligence?

**DeGross:** No. I would say it gets lip service, especially in the CIA. I think CIA is doing more of it than other people, but it gets lip service there.

**Oettinger:** Compared to what? I would answer slightly differently and say that there's more of it in the intelligence world, at least in the United States, partly because of congressional oversight, than there is in most private organizations. I say this here on also a pragmatic basis, because among the various reasons for this seminar or other activities or structures or a combination of military and private sectors, aside from the belief that it's important that one can learn from the other, is that if you raise any of the questions that we're discussing in the seminar in the private context, you can learn far less because the mistakes are buried with far less fanfare than the mistakes in the public sector, at least in the United States. As a consequence, there is a good deal more between periods of lip service or inaction. There are occasional major inquiries that, aside from a certain amount of circus, do then from time to time shed a certain amount of light, provide useful advice, and correction, and so on, in a manner that by and large you do not find in private sector situations.

You may say, how does the private sector get away with that? Very easily, because nobody gives a damn, at least not to the same extent, when a private corporation goes under or a household goes under as they do when a whole bloody country goes under. As a consequence, the mistakes made in the private sector tend to be sort of unsung. Ninety percent of new ventures go bankrupt. By and large corporate entities appear and disappear with greater frequency than countries. Essentially they don't necessarily analyze their mistakes; they simply bury them. It's of less consequence. Little as there may be, I think on the whole there is more self-conscious and useful reflection and learning on these matters in the government sector than there is elsewhere.

**DeGross:** The stakes are pretty high.

**McLaughlin:** I'll give you another example. If you take something like the Blue Chip Economic Indicator Review, that's a fellow who puts together 70 of the major economic forecasters around the country, the economic forecasting services. Ninety percent of them never projected the sign change in the last two major swings in the economy. Less than 10 percent said it was going to stop going up and start going down, or vice versa. There are some pretty big stakes there, too. Forecasting is a risky business.

**Oettinger:** Especially when it is about the future.

**Student:** The only people with the authority to hold an investigation of the managers are those who will not profit by an investigation. The best you get is *Business Week* writing them up or something of that sort.

**McLaughlin:** The other thing which we found is that nobody documents success, contrary to the old saying about success having a thousand fathers. It is presumably because people are too busy exploiting it.

**Student:** That's correct. I guess you have a problem that they don't document failures; they're just trying to forget them.

**Student:** There has been some documentation of intelligence success that's still held a bit classic. I'm thinking particularly of the CIA Studies in Intelligence series. I don't know if they're still publishing it.

**DeGross:** Yes, they are.

**Oettinger:** That's what I said. There's more self-consciousness than there is in the private sector.

**DeGross:** The only other thing that one might talk a little bit about is the whole issue of secrecy. One of the problems is that our government is an open society and yet intelligence people are, to a certain extent, prepared to develop material that is not to be read broadly or widely, and yet there is a need sometimes for dialogue and interaction. This fine line between secrecy and openness in our society is a very difficult one. There are people who never want to talk to anybody. We ran a seminar out at UCLA and we invited a fellow specifically because he just sits and looks at his imagery all day long. He got out there and somebody who's an Africanist asked him a question. He said, "I'm sorry, I can't talk about it."

**Student:** The worst thing you could do!

**DeGross:** There is this problem about understanding why we do what we do and the context in which we do it. I don't know that it's widely understood.

## **Appendix A**

### **The National Foreign Intelligence Community**

The US National Foreign Intelligence Community is defined by Presidential Executive Order 12333 as including:

- The Central Intelligence Agency;
- The National Security Agency;
- The Defense Intelligence Agency;
- Offices within the DoD for the specialized collection of intelligence through reconnaissance;
- The intelligence elements of the military services;
- The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State;
- The intelligence elements of the Departments of Treasury, Energy, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
- The staff elements of the Office of the DCI.

The Central Intelligence Agency has the primary national responsibility for the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence, for conducting counterintelligence abroad, and for research and development of technical collection systems. It is responsible for the production of finished intelligence on political, military, economic, biographic, sociological, and scientific and technical subjects. The CIA is also the only agency authorized to conduct special activities (covert actions) approved by the President.

The National Security Agency is responsible for centralized coordination, direction, and performance of all cryptologic functions for the US Government. It collects, processes, and disseminates signals intelligence (SIGINT) information for DoD and national foreign intelligence purposes.

The Defense Intelligence Agency satisfies the foreign intelligence and counterintelligence requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified and Specified Commands. It is the major provider of finished military intelligence to national consumers. It is also responsible for coordinating the intelligence activities of the military services and managing the Defense Attache System.

The DoD offices for the collection of specialized intelligence through reconnaissance programs are responsible for:

- (1) Carrying out consolidated reconnaissance programs for specialized intelligence;
- (2) Responding to tasking in accordance with procedures established by the DCI;

- (3) Delegating authority to the various departments and agencies for research, development, procurement, and operation of designated means of collection.

Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps Intelligence collect, produce, and disseminate military and military-related foreign intelligence and counterintelligence in support of their respective services. When their intelligence activities are in response to national requirements (as opposed to tactical requirements of local commanders), the military services operate in accordance with direction from the DCI and in coordination with the CIA (outside the US) or the FBI (inside the US). The military services are responsible for monitoring the development, procurement, test and evaluation, and management of tactical intelligence equipment and systems.

The Department of State through its Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) collects information relevant to US foreign policy concerns. INR produces political, economic, and military intelligence on all nations, disseminates reports received from US diplomatic and consular posts abroad, and participates in the preparation of NIEs.

The Department of Energy openly collects political, economic, and technical information concerning foreign energy matters and nuclear weapons tests. While DOE is more of a consumer than a producer of intelligence, it does provide technical and analytic support to other intelligence agencies.

The Department of the Treasury openly collects foreign financial and monetary information and assists the Department of State in the collection of general foreign economic information. It conducts, through the US Secret Service, activities to determine the existence and capabilities of surveillance equipment which might be used against the President, the Office of the President, and other officials.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has the primary responsibility for counterintelligence and coordination of counterintelligence within the US. The FBI also conducts counterintelligence activities outside the US in coordination with the CIA and military services. The FBI is the agency charged with the responsibility for collection, production, and dissemination for foreign intelligence within the United States.