INCIDENTAL PAPER

Seminar on Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence

Defense Reorganization: A view from the Senate
James R. Locher, III

Guest Presentations, Spring 1987
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May 1988

Program on Information Resources Policy

Center for Information Policy Research

Harvard University

The Program on Information Resources Policy is jointly sponsored by Harvard University and the Center for Information Policy Research.

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E-mail: pirp@deas.harvard.edu URL: http://www.pirp.harvard.edu
I-88-1

Defense Reorganization: A View from the Senate

James R. Locher, III

Mr. Locher is a Member of the Professional Staff and senior staffer for the Subcommittee on Projection Forces and Regional Defense, Senate Committee on Armed Services, where he is responsible for military strategy and defense reorganization issues. From 1985 to 1986, he directed the bipartisan staff effort that resulted in the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, and was the principal author of the study Defense Organization: The Need for Change. Previously, he was the Senior Committee Adviser on International Security Affairs, responsible for force projection programs, including airlift, sealift, amphibious warfare, and rapidly deployable forces. In addition, he has held several positions in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation, and served as Executive Secretary of the White House Working Group on Maritime Policy, Executive Office of the President, on an effort that resulted in the Merchant Marine Act of 1970.

Locher: Last October 1st the Department of Defense entered a new era. Many people in the Department have not recognized it, but when the President signed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act into law, he set the way for a revitalization of the U.S. military establishment and the military profession itself. The Department of Defense fought the legislation at every step, so effective implementation is not assured. In the end, the Department rendered itself irrelevant to the process. The Congress, retired military officers, and people from the defense academic community were the ones who were involved and decided what was going to happen in terms of defense reorganization. There are some concerns about the implementation, and I'll talk a little bit about that as we go along.

While I say that the Department of Defense fought the reorganization at every step, we need to distinguish between the institution itself and individuals. While we were preparing our study on defense reorganization, and while we were actually going through the legislative process, we probably interviewed five or six hundred people in the Department of Defense in Washington and in the field. Our experience was that among the military officers, about 80 or 85 percent fully supported what we were doing. They could not speak out publicly on that, but privately they were prepared to tell us what their concerns were about defense organization, and their thoughts on what needed to be done. But they could not speak out publicly, which made the battle somewhat more difficult because we could not use these people while trying to convince members of Congress that changes needed to be made.

Student: What level were these people?

Locher: Actually, the kinds of people we were talking to ranged from the level of Army major up to four-star officers. I should say that field-grade officers were prepared to be much more forceful. As you went up, the percentage who were supporting us began to diminish, because more senior people were in much more difficult positions. If it were known that they were speaking out in favor of something which the most senior people in the Department, both civilian and military, were very much opposed to, they could be put in a very awkward situation. But privately they were very supportive, including a number of people at four-star rank.

There were a few people like General Rogers* who were very supportive both privately and publicly.

One of the things that I'd like to impress upon you, because it was miscast by a lot of people, is the nature of this battle. To introduce that issue, I'd like to read a quotation from a message to Congress from President Eisenhower in 1958 when he proposed the reorganization ideas at that time. He said, "Separate ground, sea, and air warfare has gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements with all services as one, single, concentrated effort. Peacetime, preparatory, and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service."

While Eisenhower said that in 1958, when we began this move towards reorganization of the Department of Defense, all of the things that he had talked about had not fully come about. Many of his attempts to force changes on the Department of Defense while he was President had been frustrated, primarily by the services. The key point in this regard is that the battle lines were not the Department of Defense vs. the Congress, civilians vs. the military, or warriors vs. bureaucrats. The battle lines were essentially drawn between those who sought a truly unified defense effort vs. those who would cling to traditional service prerogatives. This is a very important point. Many of the issues were not debated on that basis, but that was the underlying argument.

In my presentation, I would like to dwell on four items: the major problems that the Act seeks to solve; the fundamental purposes of the legislation; the implementation so far; and some unresolved problems. In general, I ought to say that almost all of the problems still remain unresolved. We have enacted some legislation, but the legislation has not taken effect. I'm not certain that it will be fully implemented. But I will talk about some of the things that we're still concerned about and that will need to be addressed in the future.

To warm up to this issue as we discuss the problems of defense organization, I selected two comments, one by Secretary Schlesinger, and another by former Secretary of Defense Laird. At the time that we were trying to convince people that we needed to take on this issue in the Congress and convince the Executive Branch that we were serious about it because there were tremendous problems, we got a lot of assistance from former defense officials, both civilian and military. I think the two comments of Schlesinger and Laird (figure 1) are critical ones: that we really had an antiquated organizational arrangement, and although we had put a lot of money into our defense effort, we were not going to be able to realize the full potential of that effort. I think that these were two key statements that we used throughout the defense reorganization battle to convince people that change was needed.

What were the fundamental problems that we saw in the Department of Defense? In doing this study,* we identified 34 problems, some of those in the Department of Defense, some of them on Capitol Hill (figure 2). I tried to bring those down to 10 problems that I'd like to talk a little bit about. Then we will discuss what we've actually done in the legislation.

The first was the imbalance between service and joint interest in the Department of Defense. The services absolutely dominated the Department of Defense. First of all, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was kept very weak. Each service, essentially, had an effective veto over what was going to happen in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The unified commands in the field were not really unified commands. They were confederations of single-service forces. The unified commander himself was kept very weak, and he had powerful and independent service components underneath him. So we continued to be dominated by a focus on service interests with relatively scarce support for joint needs in the Department of Defense.

The second major problem is related to the first; it was inadequate joint military advice. We had a system of marriage agreements, truces, watered-down advice. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had a tendency to provide advice to which all members could agree. When you get down to reaching a consensus on each and every issue, you are coming up with the lowest common denominator.

In talking about joint military advice, I think it's useful to think about the three types of advice. One was the informal advice: the President and the Secretary of Defense asking the Chairman or all of the

*General Bernard W. Rogers, USA, SACEUR/USCINCEUR 1979-1987.

*U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change. 99th Congress*, 1st session, Oct. 16, 1985. Washington, DC: GPO, 1985.

Comment — Former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger

"... In the absence of structural reform I fear that we shall obtain less than is attainable from our expenditures and from our forces. **Sound structure will permit the release of energies and of imagination now unduly constrained by the existing arrangements.** Without such reform, I fear that the United States will obtain neither the best military advice, nor the effective execution of military plans, nor the provision of military capabilities commensurate with the fiscal resources provided, nor the most advantageous deterrence and defense posture available to the nation."

Comment — Former Secretary of Defense Laird

"... This neglect of organizational issues, particularly organization of the military command structure, is self defeating. Without an effective command structure, no level of defense spending will be sufficient to meet the needs of the nation's security."

Figure 1. Criticisms

1. **Imbalance between service and joint interests**
2. **Inadequate joint military advice**
3. **Inadequate quality of joint duty military personnel**
4. **Imbalance between the responsibilities and command authority of unified combatant commanders**
5. **Confused and cumbersome operational chains of command**
6. **Ineffective strategic planning**
7. **Inadequate supervision and control of defense agencies and DOD field activities (e.g., Defense Logistics Agency and Defense Contract Audit Agency)**
8. **Confusion concerning the roles of the secretaries of the military departments**
9. **Unnecessary duplication in the top management headquarters of the military departments**
10. **Congressional micromanagement of DOD**

Figure 2. Fundamental Problems

members of the JCS to come in and provide advice on a particular issue. The informal advice normally got high marks. The Secretary of Defense, the President, or the National Security Adviser to the President felt that the informal advice was pretty good.

The second kind of advice was the formal advice that was worked through the Joint Chiefs of Staff system. That advice got very low marks. It was almost never used and did not play much of a role in Department of Defense decisionmaking.

The third kind of advice was the advice not given, and that was the whole range of issues that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not want to take on: the unified command plan, service roles, and missions. Anything that was going to touch on important service interests they would attempt to stay out of. The strategy that the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff put together was fiscally unconstrained because they couldn't deal with the tough choices. The Secretary of Defense didn't need a fiscally unconstrained strategy. He needed a fiscally constrained strategy so he could start making those tradeoffs between service capabilities, or missions, or whatever.

Student: Is this really true? Let's talk about the formal advice, the papers, because there you have something that you can actually go and look at. Is this really a true statement that that is committee pap, or is that a shibboleth? Did someone work out a methodology to assess the quality of the advice in the formal JCS papers? What is that based upon?

Locher: First of all, we were not given access to the documents. I worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for 10 years and so I saw a lot of the documents at that time, and I know that they played a very small role. They essentially were not considered in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. They really didn't deal with the issues that the Secretary and his office were confronting at the time. But somebody could say, "Well, things have changed since you were in the Department of Defense." What we essentially did was go to all the former Chairmen, all of the former members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretaries of Defense, people in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, National Security Advisers, and asked them their opinions on the quality of advice that had been provided.

I've just given you a couple of examples. Here, we're talking about the formal advice. General Jones saying, "The corporate advice provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not crisp, timely, very useful, or very influential." Secretary Schlesinger was a little bit more critical when he said, "The corporate advice is generally irrelevant, normally unread, and almost always disregarded." Secretary Laird said, "As now organized, the JCS are too frequently unable to provide effective, cross-service advice on issues that affect important service interests or prerogatives."

Student: Would these comments also apply to intelligence advice that would come out of DIA, which many view as the J2 of the JCS, the portion that supposedly has been put together and acts as a purple suit organization better than others? Does that also apply to that sort of advice?

Locher: I think many people would say so. In our studies, we did not focus on the Defense Intelligence Agency per se. But as you may know, there has been much criticism of DIA trying to echo services' views on particular intelligence issues. Admiral Stansfield Turner had a very critical article in the Op Ed section of *The Washington Post* last year, saying that DIA was not independent in that a lot of the things that they came out with and had to say were reflecting service interests. The people at the Defense Intelligence Agency say that may have been the case in the past, but they are working to be independent. But I should say that, on Capitol Hill, if the people are asked to choose between CIA and DIA on a piece of intelligence advice, they're much more likely to go with CIA because they think it's independent of the services.

Student: If they had to choose between a service intelligence agency versus the DIA ... ?

Locher: They'd go with DIA, but DIA still has a way to go to improve its image. It may be just a holdover from past eras in terms of the quality of their work. Unfortunately, it's not an area of great study on our part, but I'd be happy to tell you what I know about it later.

The third fundamental problem our study identified was the inadequate quality of joint duty military personnel. The basic problem in the Department of Defense is people generally do not want to be assigned to joint duty. They know they're being pressured or monitored for loyalty by their services while they're there. They're not prepared either by education or experience to be there, and they serve a relatively short period of time. The whole idea is, if you get stuck with going to joint duty assignment, get in, keep your head low, get your ticket punched, and get out before you ruin your career.

From the congressional point of view, the joint staffs, both the big Joint Staff in Washington and the joint staffs that work for the unified command-

ers, are our most important military staffs, and they were not getting their appropriate share of the best and brightest military officers.

Student: Would you make that as a blanket statement across the services, or would you differentiate?

Locher: You have to differentiate. As a matter of fact, I should say in making these comments, if I were to give you all of the subtle points here and there and to differentiate between the services, it would take me much longer than we're going to have. So these are fairly general statements that are sort of an average of the service responses. But you will find that the Air Force has been much better in terms of assigning people to joint duty. The Army, which had had more of an interest in the past, has begun to wane on joint duty assignments a little bit. The Navy and the Marine Corps have remained absolutely the worst.

Student: Is that still the case? During the conversation we had in the car on the way up I mentioned that now trying to get a job in JCS is very, very difficult, because there are about three people applying for every slot there. Of those three people, are all Air Force and Army, or is the Navy coming around?

Locher: No, with the legislation, the Navy's coming around as well with good people. The provisions of the law that deal with joint duty have not fully gone into effect. Most of those won't go into effect for another year and a half. But what's actually ended up happening is that people can see the writing on the wall: that we've said that joint duty is important to get ahead. In certain respects you have to have a joint duty assignment. We've made certain that we are going to get talented officers into these positions.

Student: I almost hesitate to bring it up now, because you're going to talk about continuing problems later on, but one that keeps hitting the newspapers, particularly the military press, is the ongoing problem with the education part of that scenario. Some people interpret the Act to require not only so many years of actual JCS type service, but also a schooling part of that which really locks you out if you look at the timelines involved with a lot of other jobs. That gets back to the original problem of why this is a problem of being able to get promoted by your own service if you're spending all your time going to schools and going into joint jobs.

Oettinger: Could you dwell on that for a little bit, because I'd like to tie his question also to your response to an earlier question about intelligence. I have a particular interest in that area. Last year I became a member of the Board of Visitors at the Defense Intelligence College, and so this matter of education and jointness and so on has become a particular concern of mine. The answer that, "We're doing it now" has always been there. Every year, no matter what you say, you're told, "It's different now than it was 10 years ago," and yet it totally remains the same. What concerns me is that you've indicated that intelligence is not one of the areas that was particularly studied in the bill. It is continually something of a stepchild as I testified before the Nichols Committee; more attention on military brawn and less on the brains of the thing. A number of things like Grenada and other operations where there were problems came at that end.

Intelligence looks like an area where some of these questions of ticket punching, and education, and getting messages to officers about the importance of jointness continued to be upside down. For instance, on the so-called "Professional Military Education" in Title 4, the intelligence schools are being read out of that as not being capital P, capital M, capital E. One of the questions I have for you is whether the language in Title 4 about the professional military education was meant to be generic. The way it's being employed right now is very narrowly, as there are certain schools designated that way and anything else is locked out. What's curious about that is that in the services that are for jointness — the Air Force and the Army — you see them sending some of their officers to places like the Defense Intelligence College and punching tickets. You don't see the Navy doing it. Conversely, we've had some interesting comments here about the Navy sending people, intelligence people, to the National War College rather than their line people. And why? Because the intelligence people then get joint assignments which are the ones that the real Navy people don't want or it's Navy policy not to give it to them.

And so in the Navy you send the intelligence guys to the joint schools so that only intelligence guys will be qualified for joint billets, and therefore, you end up having the image of participation but no real participation, because your "real" officers don't punch those tickets. I get a sense on that schooling part, which is where the message gets sent to future or rising officers about whether you play the joint game or not, that the messages that

are being sent are sort of business as usual; in the Navy you don't get anywhere by going to one of these joint schools, in fact we send our intelligence guys because they're expendable. In the other services, the schools that would provide some jointness, like an intelligence school, are off limits because they do not qualify for the professional military education as narrowly interpreted by the Joint Staff in light of the language in the law. These are quick impressions from one end of the spectrum, but I share the concerns that are implicit in our student's question.

Locher: Let me try to respond to that. First of all, as I mentioned, many of these joint officer provisions do not go into effect for two years. You're not actually seeing the effect of the law itself, but you're seeing people's anticipation of what the law is going to require. Traditionally, the Navy has not sent its line officers to joint colleges, and they have filled far fewer than their share of joint duty positions. Their technique would be to offer somebody who was not qualified. The organization would not accept him, and then the Navy would just leave the billet open. We are now seeing the Navy move smartly to fill the positions in joint duty that are assigned to the Navy, including flag rank positions.

We are seeing much more interest by people in all services, probably less so in the Navy given the orientation in the past, in having joint duty assignments. In the law we did not go into the education area because the idea of the Congress trying to structure professional military education was something that we thought we ought to stay away from. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has set up a Senior Military Schools Review Board headed by General Dougherty,* that is looking at what we need to do in terms of education. We did not define what joint military education was. The Department of Defense may identify it as only the three colleges of the National Defense University or they may include the Defense Intelligence College. There's more work that needs to be done on that issue, and we think we have some leverage on the department to get them to move out forcefully.

My basic view is that the kinds of pressures that have been set up in the law will cause all services, including the Navy and the Marine Corps, to want to get a share of their best and brightest into joint duty assignments and into the joint colleges. The other thing that will happen is that 50 percent of the positions in the Defense Intelligence Agency are going to be identified as joint duty assignments, so they're going to have to have joint specialists who will get higher promotion rates.

Oettinger: But they can't get that without punching tickets that are not intelligence tickets, at least the way things are going right now. It's just a very curious game.

Locher: As there's been some interest in this joint duty problem, I'm going to shift over to a specific presentation on that subject, and then we'll come back to the broader presentation.

In 1949, Hanson Baldwin, who had been somewhat of a critic of unification, said, "One of the tragedies of unification is that there is not at the top men who really know enough about each of the services to evaluate all of the services." That statement is almost as true today as it was in 1949. We have given very little attention to preparing officers for joint duty, and even less attention to rewarding them for joint duty. For the most part, we find that the situation is the following: Most military officers don't want to be assigned to joint duty. They are pressured or monitored for loyalty by their services while serving their joint assignments. They are not prepared by either education or experience to perform their joint duties. And lastly, they serve for only a relatively short period once they have learned their jobs. We are seeing a very quick turnover.

Our response to that was to create something that the law terms "joint specialty" as a shorthand (figure 3). It's just like any other specialty that you have in the Department of Defense. What it essentially means is that we have instructed the Department of Defense — and we've told them what they must do in some instances, and in other areas we've left it to the Secretary of Defense — that they must develop policies, procedures, and practices for the effective management of joint duty officers. We set up an occupational category called the joint specialty. The service secretary can nominate people for it. They're selected by the Secretary of Defense with the advice of the JCS Chairman, but before they can be selected — once they've been nominated — they have to go to a joint education program. Then we get back to the questions that Tony was asking about what is a joint education program. After completing such a program, they have to go through one full joint tour. Then they may be selected for the joint specialty by the Secretary of Defense. Admiral Crowe told me last week that he's actually going to set up a board that will review the performance of these people, both in their joint education and in their joint duty assignment, before

*General Russell E. Dougherty, USAF (Ret).

they would be selected for this joint specialist position.

One-half of all joint duty positions must be filled by officers who have, or have been nominated for, the joint specialty, and a thousand critical joint duty positions must be filled by officers who have the joint specialty. So what we're essentially saying is that there are a thousand critical positions that have to be filled by people on repeat tours. Right now we get almost no repeat tours. On the Joint Staff, for example, less than 2 percent of the people who are there have actually served there before. There are some critical positions where you'd like an officer to come in and really have some experience on joint matters, and some experience on joint staff work.

Far too often, we're seeing people who are coming in from the field without joint service experience. Two-thirds of the people in the Joint Staff have never served on a Washington staff before. About 10 or 12 percent have ever been to a joint college. As I mentioned, 2 percent had been on the Joint Staff prior to their current appointment there.

Student: You don't mean a repeat on the Joint Staff itself, do you? In JCS?

Locher: They could be in another joint assignment, and then come into the Joint Staff. Maybe they served in the headquarters of the unified command for their first tour and then they would come up and serve on the Joint Staff.

Student: That would really be the ideal; to serve somewhere out in the field or on the CINC staff, and then maybe go to school for a bit.

Locher: We required the Secretary of Defense to tell us what joint duty positions are. They now have identified roughly 9,000 joint duty positions. Fifty percent of the military officers in each defense agency will be included in that. Then you'll have the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the unified command staffs, the allied command staffs, and a few miscellaneous positions. But about half the military officers who are assigned to the defense agencies will be considered as being in joint duty positions.

Student: Is that a straight one, two split for all the services?

Locher: No.

Student: When you say 9,000, is it 3,000 for each service?

1. **Policies, procedures, and practices for the effective management of joint duty officers**
2. **Nomination — Service Secretary**
3. **Selection — Secretary of Defense, with advice of JCS Chairman**
4. **Education and experience requirements for selection:**
   - — Joint education program
   - — After completing such program, a full joint duty tour
5. **One half of joint duty positions must be filled by officers who have, or have been nominated for, the joint specialty**
6. **1000 critical joint duty positions must be filled by officers who have the joint specialty**
7. **Promotion policy objectives:**
   - — Joint specialty officers — not less than the rate for service headquarters staffs
   - — Joint Staff officers — not less than the rate for service headquarters staffs
   - — Other joint duty officers — not less than the service-wide rate

Figure 3. Joint Specialty

Locher: No. Traditionally, the Navy has filled many fewer positions. As a matter of fact, if you look at the command structure, we're much more oriented towards Army and Air Force commands. Normally, it's been roughly 40 percent Army, 40 percent Air Force, and 20 percent Navy. We might start seeing more of an interest by the Navy in getting a bigger share, because there are some rewards that we've set out for joint duty.

One of the things that we've done is establish some promotion policy objectives. These are not quotas. The law does not say this must be done. We have just said to the Secretary of Defense, "You shall ensure that qualifications of officers who are assigned to joint duty are such that these kinds of promotion rates will result. If you don't meet these promotion rates, you write to us and tell us why you haven't and what corrective actions you're going to take."

The officers who are selected for the joint specialty must be promoted at a rate not less than the rate for the Service Headquarters Staffs, which is the highest promotion rate in the Department of Defense. People who serve on the Joint Staff must have the same promotion rate, not less than that for the Service Headquarters Staffs. Other officers assigned to joint duty may not be promoted at a rate less than the service-wide rate. It is hard to believe, but in the Navy, officers assigned to our most important military staff, the Joint Staff, are promoted at a rate less than the service-wide rate, and the same thing for the Marine Corps.

McLaughlin: Without dragging you too far off, I look at that list that you just presented there and it still makes me wonder how much that addresses the Hanson Baldwin quotation in terms of understanding other services. It seems to me that the emphasis is much more on developing purple suiters without necessarily developing an understanding of the other services. I can think of some personal exceptions to that, whether it's a P.X. Kelley, the Marine Commandant, who's qualified in U.S. Army Airborne, or a Bob Herres, or Bob Rosenberg — Air Force generals who went to Annapolis. It seems to me that there are ways other than painting someone purple to create better understanding of other services. I'm not sure the list of actions mandated there really has the end effect of creating understanding of the other services, if that's the objective.

Student: The other thing I'd like to point out is that I'm not sure, at least from the Air Force point of view, that the education part of that quotation really applies. Having spent five years at Air University in the Air Force War Gaming Center building there, when we wrote our charter the second phase of the program was to do joint war gaming. The point was made too often, we trained by services but we always fight jointly. This was recognized. It's reflected in the curriculum with blocks of instruction at Air Command and Staff College and at the War College: units on the other services, and on joint and combined operations. These things are studied, at least at the Air Force schools, and we have officers from all the services attending those schools, as well as foreign officers. The very first school I went to in the Air Force after Officer Training School was the Armed Forces Air Intelligence Training Center at Lowry Air Force Base, Colorado, where we had officers from the Navy, the Army, and the Marine Corps also going through a 28-week course on how to be an intelligence officer. We studied tanks and artillery as well as airplanes, and ships for that matter. So I'm not sure that the Congress has really looked deeply enough into how some of the services, at least, inform and educate their officers about the other services, and about joint and combined operations.

Locher: If you talk to people at the senior military schools and ask them how much of the curriculum is devoted to joint matters and whether it is enough, without a person disagreeing, they'll say it's not nearly enough, that we're not getting enough joint education out of those programs. You talk about the war gaming and simulation center down at the Air University. It really has not gotten into joint war gaming now, except to the extent that they've joined with the Naval War College in some efforts.

Student: No, sir. They've run a joint game with the Army War College for the last five years. I know that for a fact, since 1981. We got the Navy in for the first time in 1985, but we have gone to the Naval War College and participated in games there as well.

Locher: One thing I should say is that the people who are running that war gaming and simulation center have been terribly disappointed over the slow progress they've made on doing joint gaming.

Student: Yes, it has been a very slow process, but what I'm saying is that the Air Force, at least, has been pushing it all along. Where they've run into opposition is primarily from the Navy, some from the Army, but more from the disorganization of the Army and the Army War College and the changes they had made there. There's also a general officer's course that was started at Maxwell for Air Force one- and two-stars, that involves a theater-

level war game. In fact, after the second game one of the recommendations made was that we get some Army generals to attend that course as well, because we didn't feel that in a theater-level game the Army viewpoint was being shown well enough. There wasn't an Army general pounding on the table and yelling for close air support, and these Air Force generals were all fooling around playing wing commander too much and not paying attention to the real priorities.

Locher: There's a question I'd like to ask you. If we have all these officers who have been adequately educated in joint matters, where were they in Grenada? Where were they in Vietnam? Where were they in the Iranian rescue mission? Where were they in *Mayaguez*? You just go down that whole list of operational failures and deficiencies. We were talking at lunch about Admiral Metcalf in Grenada and his understanding of the other service forces that were under his control. They could not establish a single ground commander between the Marines and the Army. They were operating right next to each other without any overall command. They did not understand each other's doctrine. There were just enormous problems. Essentially, having Navy airplanes and Air Force airplanes in the air at the same time was a major problem in Grenada, as were the inability to communicate and different fire support doctrine. Now, not all of those problems can be placed on the education system, but our view is that the education system can be improved; and part of the problem that we've seen is that very few people who have gone to joint colleges actually go into joint duty assignments.

The National War College has been seen as a plum for service high-fliers who are then going to go back into service jobs. We've essentially said we're going to make our joint colleges more effective. We want to make the service senior schools more effective in terms of joint education. We want these officers going back to joint duty. We're going to create something we call the joint specialist, an officer who's going to have some joint education. Hopefully, it's going to be a better education than he's had in the past, and he's also going to have some experience. We're going to require that 50 percent of all joint duty assignments be filled with people who've had that sort of preparation. They don't have it now.

Student: I'll just briefly reply to Grenada and some of those charges. I'm going to lay it where I think it belongs, and that's on the Marine Corps insistence on their own air/land doctrine, the Marines' resistance to the Air Force concept of a unified single air manager which we experienced from Vietnam on, and the Navy's parochialism. That's where I'll lay it. I think if there's any blame for a lack of jointness in education and training, you've got to lay it much more heavily on the sea services than on the Air Force. A single service acting in the way that they act can disrupt a combined or joint operation or command.

Oettinger: That's just not enough, because as far as one can tell, in Grenada there was a lack of the planning, intelligence, and coordinating functions that satisfied the Baldwin kind of thing. Even if what you say is true, even if they're dragging feet, you need someone to harmonize them. You certainly wouldn't want 100 percent of all officers to be joint officers, because the services do perform an important function, to be specialists in their brand of war fighting, and if that didn't exist we'd have to invent it. It's like the academic battle over departmentalization and specialization. If you didn't have it, everybody would be a superficial dilettante. You'd say, "Let's get rid of all of these superficial generalists and let's have somebody who knows something." Then you get somebody who knows something, but he knows an amazing amount of detail in a very limited area. Then you say, "How do you put them together?" The military has an absence of such people, and that's why John McLaughlin's question is important. Otherwise you lose the advantage of specialists who can orchestrate the thing. You've got all these violin players, you've got all the percussionists and so on. Who is the orchestra leader? You don't need everybody to be capable of doing that, but you need some.

Locher: As a matter of fact, if you think about joint duty, you're really only talking about 3 to 5 or 6 percent of all officer positions being in joint duty assignments. Even if you have a three-to-one base — you've got to be developing two other guys for every guy who's in a joint position — we're not talking about more than half the military establishment in terms of its officer corps. You're still talking about a relatively small portion. But our problem has been that the system has been designed to prepare people for single-service needs, and it has been designed to reward them for doing things that are important to their service, not to prepare this small cadre of people who have to be able to understand more than just their own service. We have not

been able to do it in the field because the services have remained fairly independent under the CINCs.

I think it was impossible to expect that Admiral Metcalf was going to come from CINCLANT, which was essentially a single-service command, as a subordinate commander of that organization and say, "Okay, now take the Army and the Air Force and go out there and do a unified effort." CINCLANT has Army and Air Force components, but it really isn't a unified command. As Eisenhower said, "Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must recognize the fact that we have to be unified." We're not doing that. When they were preparing for Grenada, each service did its own planning and had its own planning sessions without inviting anybody else, and then they expected to go down there and have an effective unified operation.

With the Iranian rescue mission, the same approach occurred. A long period of time was taken to prepare for the Iranian mission, but each service went off and did its own thing. They went to separate locations. There was no single commander. They weren't used to working with each other, and they were going to arrive in the desert in the middle of the night in Iran and expect the whole operation to work.

We think that there can be some improvements in joint education that will help produce the limited number of people that we need who can oversee the entire effort.

Student: You're still going to run into some very, very adamant doctrinal problems that no amount of education or even planning can overcome. One of them is the Marine air/ground team. The only way we solved that in Vietnam was by giving the Marine Corps I Corps, and the Navy their own separate route packages to fly into North Vietnam. And that's the only way it was solved.

Locher: You essentially divided Vietnam into five air wars. The Army, the Navy and the Marine Corps each fought its own air war. The Air Force had two air wars, because SAC was being run from Omaha out of Thailand and Guam, and then the Tactical Air Force in Vietnam did its own thing as well.

We've made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible for development of joint doctrine. He does not need to coordinate with the other chiefs. He'll hear their advice, but in the end, he's the one who's going to make the decision. There's always been a big problem with Marine air. Marine air arrives in the theater 40 or 45 days before the rest of the Marine Amphibious Force. But the Marine Corps had refused to allow those air assets to be assigned to the theater commander. That's all been changed now. JCS Publication No. 2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, has broken the Marine Corps' back on that issue, and said that those assets belong to the theater commander, and he shall determine how they'll be used.

We have a long way to go in joint doctrine. We essentially have very little joint doctrine, so when a Grenada happens, and service forces have to operate together, there are going to be tremendous problems. There are always going to be problems. In war, you're not going to eliminate them, but we're giving ourselves some major disadvantages now.

McLaughlin: It's worth making a comment about Marine air. The Marines on the ground are a hell of a lot happier with Marine air than the U.S. Army is with U.S. Air Force close air support. It's a problem that the U.S. Air Force has been trying to deal with for a long time, and it seemingly won't go away. The second problem we have is that while it's nice to say you're going to task those Marine air assets to the theater commander, the Marine response today is, "You mean we have to buy all that artillery that the Army drags with them. We've assumed that we will have organic air support, and if you start using it to support Army missions, we lose that capability." You can argue with the validity of their position, but that's the argument. If you've designed your fighting force on the assumption you're going to have all that close air support for Marine battalions, you can't suddenly pull it away.

Locher: I agree. I can see the Marine Corps point of view. I don't have any problem with that. I think at the present stage of the evolution of doctrine probably the only way to solve it is to give them their own fiefdom. The Air Force has a totally different view about the use of air power than the Marine Corps. That's where the problem comes about.

At this point, let me ask you a question. I do have a couple of additional slides to talk about this joint duty problem and what we tried to do to solve it. Would you like me to go through that or have you heard enough about it?

Oettinger: I think it would be useful to go on. My sense is that the joint duty and the training of individuals and so on are, in the long term, the critical elements.

Locher: They're getting the most press. The reason being, as you might expect, this was something that the services fought against tooth and nail. The Congress had some difficulty working on this issue,

because we don't know much about managing joint officers. We really didn't know how many joint officers we had. We had very few policies in effect, so the Congress was working to a great extent with limited information. We could sit down and think about all of these joint officer policies, and we could agree with each individual policy. The problem was when you put them all together, what would they mean? So, we set out some fairly forceful policies, because we knew if we did not the services would work to circumvent them, because officer management is their ability to control the system. When you control promotions and assignments, you have a big impact on what people in joint duty are going to do and how they're going to respond to your pressure. But we're going to have to make some modifications to the law. I think with their efforts to implement what we told the Pentagon to do, and with the serious study they've given it, they will identify some policies that would be counterproductive. We're going to need to make some modifications.

We're really shaking up the system, because in the past every officer could figure out what it was that he had to do to get to the top. Now all of a sudden we're saying, "That was fine when we could prepare people only for single-service responsibilities, but we do have to prepare some people for joint responsibilities." We have complicated the issue. It's no longer that "I can just do what my service says is important and I'm assured of getting to the top."

Student: Can I offer one final criticism of this joint training section? That is, you hit the nail on the head when you targeted the people who are going to get promoted, the people who look to the stars. You've assured joint training for those people who are going to be our future leaders, the generals. But is that really the whole solution? If you use Tony's analogy of the orchestra out there, the conductor has now conducted before, but has the orchestra ever played together? What about joint exercises? We need more emphasis on that.

Locher: The CINC has now been given the authority to prepare the forces assigned to him for their missions. He will also be given a budget controlling joint exercises. We believe that if we start with the people who are the CINCs and their immediate staffs, and they understand how all of this will need to fit together, they will prepare the forces below them for whatever joint interactions are going to be necessary with more joint exercises and by making certain that the people who are below them are responsive to their direction.

Student: That trains everyone, from general officers all the way down to the privates.

Locher: Our solution in that regard is to strengthen the CINCs and to give them fully capable staffs. One of the other actions we have taken is to indicate that before you can be assigned or promoted to certain positions you must have joint duty (figure 4). Before you become Chairman of the JCS, you either have to be Vice Chairman of the JCS, a service chief, or a CINC. Before you can become the JCS Vice Chairman or a CINC, you have to have the joint specialty. We're saying that these officers have to have had substantial joint experience.



Figure 4. Joint Duty Requirements for Assignments and Promotions

One of the problems we have now is that we're getting CINCs who have never stepped outside of their service. Their first joint assignment is when they become a CINC, or they had nine months just prior to becoming a CINC. A very limited time. Officers are just going straight up the service channel; the next thing you know, they're running a joint organization with no prior exposure whatsoever. So we've said, "You had to have the joint specialty, and you had to have one joint duty assignment of three years in length as a general or flag officer." We want these officers to be prepared for these responsibilities. A service chief has to have had significant joint experience, and he has to have one joint duty assignment of three years as a general or flag officer.

There has been a requirement in defense regulations since 1957 or 1958 that prior to promotion to general or flag rank an officer had to have a joint duty assignment. It's been widely circumvented. We've now gone in and said, before you can be promoted, with limited exceptions and waivers, you have to have had a joint duty assignment. That's currently defined as three and a half years, but that might get changed. You can ask Archie Barrett about that next week. That was something the House was interested in.

With that background, let me go back to the joint duty problems that I was talking about and discuss what we think we're doing to try to solve them (figure 5). As I mentioned, military officers do not want to be assigned to joint duty. We've created some incentives: promotion and assignment requirements that I just went through. We've now created much more meaningful work on the Joint Staff and on the CINC staffs. These people will really be affecting decisions. Too much of the work on the Joint Staff now is not very useful, and people there understand that.

We have some other mechanisms. The law requires that when a service nominates somebody to serve on the Joint Staff, he must be among the most outstanding officers of that service. And the Chairman and the CINCs will select all of the officers, either for the Joint Staff or for their headquarters staff.

On joint officers being pressured or monitored for loyalty by their services, we've provided some protection. First, there are the promotion policy objectives I mentioned. Joint officers have to be promoted at a certain rate. The Secretary of Defense will give guidelines to promotion boards about making certain that the joint duty assignments are given proper credit in considering people for promotions. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will put an officer on each promotion board that is considering people who have served, or are serving, in joint duty. So the Chairman will have his own representative on the promotion board. He will be looking out for joint officers.

Student: To what level? Down to the selection of majors?

Locher: To the selection primarily for major and above. The JCS Chairman will review all promotion board reports where joint duty officers were considered. The Secretary of Defense will establish some procedures for monitoring these officers' careers to make certain that at no time during their career is somebody coming along and trying to penalize them for what they did during a joint duty assignment. Then we have established some congressional reports and oversight. The Secretary of Defense has to report when he doesn't meet some of these policy objectives.

The Joint Staff and the CINC staffs are made much more independent in the legislation, so they don't have to go to the services. The services can't watch every move that they're making. We've created some countervailing pressures to this. The Chairman and the CINCs can suspend any officer assigned to their command or to their joint staff from duty, and recommend their reassignment. The CINCs will evaluate their subordinate commanders. That means that CINCPAC has an Air Force four-star CINCPACAF who reports to him, and CINCPAC will evaluate CINCPACAF's performance and that evaluation will go into the Air Force officer's personnel record.

Student: I might suggest that an evaluation on a four-star general is probably not all that meaningful, or even for a three-star.

Locher: It depends. If that three-star officer wants to become a four-star, he's not likely to get promoted to four-star if he's got a CINC's or a JCS Chairman's evaluation that says, "This guy was not joint; he didn't pursue his responsibilities from a joint perspective."

Student: But, who's going select him for promotions? Other Air Force officers, right?

Locher: He's got to get approved by the President eventually.

Student: Is the President going to go to the trouble of looking up those officer evaluation reports?

PROBLEMS	PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
For the most part, military officers: **1. Do not want to be assigned to joint duty**	**1A. Incentives** — Promotion and assignment requirements — Meaningful work on Joint Staff and CINC staffs **1B. Mechanisms** — Joint Staff nominees — among the most outstanding — Selection of all officers by JCS Chairman and CINCs
2. Are pressured or monitored for loyalty by their services while serving in joint assignments	**2A. Protection** — Promotion policy objectives — Guidelines to promotion boards — Joint officer (designated by JCS Chairman) on promotion board — JCS Chairman's review of promotion board reports — Procedures for monitoring careers — Congressional reports and oversight **2B. Independence** — Joint Staff and CINC staffs made more independent (JCS Chairman and CINCs strengthened) **2C. Countervailing Pressures** — Suspension from duty — JCS Chairman and CINCs — CINC's evaluation of subordinate commanders — JCS Chairman's evaluation of 3- and 4-star nominees
3. Are not prepared by either education or experience to perform their joint duties	**3A. Creation of Joint Specialty** — Education and experience requirements — One-half of joint duty positions — 1000 critical positions — repeat tours **3B. Education** — Curricula of joint and service colleges — At least 50 percent of joint college graduates assigned immediately to joint duty
4. Serve for only a relatively short period once they have learned their jobs	**4A. Length of Joint Duty Assignments** — 3 years — general or flag officers — $3^1/_2$ years — all other officers

Figure 5. Reorganization Act

Locher: Oh, yes. Because we're going to require the Chairman to evaluate all three- and four-star nominees. So on this nomination, even when it comes up through the Air Force channel and the Air Force can get the Secretary of Defense to send it over, the joint side is going to have a chance to send something over at the same time to the President that says, "This officer didn't do it. He shouldn't be rewarded."

Oettinger: To pursue the academic analogy for a moment, that's an extremely powerful thing. The only way to circumvent it in academe is for a department, our services, not to put anyone forward. On occasion you see people completely paralyzing themselves, which would be hard to imagine in a military situation, but you might tolerate that the way it's tolerated here. But the president of a university, who in other ways is totally impotent, financially, etc., etc., exercises enormous leverage through his review of every damn appointment in the departments. It's the one time that the departments are forced to surface arguments before the head of the whole university, who is assisted by review boards that bring in outsiders. So it ventilates the whole system, and within this context is very effective in ventilating things and preventing total implosion. How it will work in the military context is sort of hard to imagine, but it's not a negligible tool. In this institution it is a very powerful countervailing force to departmental specialization and introversion.

Student: It's going to be very, very interesting because the services are extremely jealous about their promotion boards and their promotion policies. I think the current brouhaha with Lehman* is a perfect example.

Locher: The problem the CINC now has is that he has no influence whatsoever over the future of his subordinate commanders. Their promotions and their next assignments are going to be determined by their service chief of staff. When they're put on the spot between the CINC and the service headquarters, they're always going to go with the service headquarters. They will give lip service to what the CINC wants; but if it becomes a tough issue, they're going to fall off the CINC's interests right away. And we've essentially said the CINC will have a role in selecting those subordinates. They cannot be appointed without his consent. He can exercise a veto authority which can be overruled by the Secretary of Defense, but those people have to be assigned with his concurrence. He gets to select the rest of the officers on his staff, and he evaluates their performance of duty. If they're not doing what he wants — any officers in his command — he can suspend them from duty. We've now given him a lot more personnel authority. He's had none in the past.

Oettinger: The earlier statute essentially gave unbridled, unlimited authority to the services to prepare forces, and the CINC fought them. But the notion of fighting something you've had no interaction with whatsoever was silly.

Locher: It's to give him the authority he needs to meld those forces together into an integrated fighting team. He does not have that now. One of the areas where the CINCs don't have any authority is in the field of logistics. To think that you're going to take these combatant forces without any logistics input and go off and fight is pretty silly, too. One of the key examples that we use is from my visit with Admiral Crowe in the Pacific. He had one of his service component commanders who wanted to put his war reserve materials in location Y, and Admiral Crowe said to him, "Location Y doesn't support our war plans, we need it over here in location X." The service component commander said, "Logistics is not a matter for consideration by the CINC." The Army — in this case it was the Army — said, it would put its war reserve materials where it damn well pleases them to put them.

Essentially what happened is that the CINC would be assigned forces from four services, all assuming a different war, trained and equipped differently, with different logistics policies, with no integration of logistics capability in peacetime, and then they would be forced to conduct an operation like Grenada, and it was just too much separateness to overcome.

McLaughlin: One CINC once told me that the only influence he really had over his subordinate commanders was that they thought maybe one day they would be CINCs too, so they had to show some respect.

Oettinger: One thing I want to bore in on is that everything you said about logistics also applies to intelligence. I regard that as a serious oversight.

Locher: We have one problem on the intelligence side. We have the intelligence committees in the Congress, and even the little work that we did on intelligence was a very difficult struggle, because the National Security Agency and the Defense Intel-

*John F. Lehman, Secretary of the Navy.

ligence Agency could always run to the intelligence committees. It really hamstrung us. But I'd be happy to talk about that.

Just to finish up on what we tried to do to solve some of the joint duty problems. I mentioned the education and experience problems. We set up these education and experience requirements for people who become joint specialists. We've required that one-half of the joint duty positions be filled by those people, and then we have the repeat tours for the most critical positions.

Student: Where did you come up with that 1,000?

Locher: Guessing. But amazingly enough, it's ended up being fairly accurate, although it was based upon informal discussions. Nobody knew what the number was, and we just selected 1,000. We indicated to the Secretary of Defense, if that's not the right number, if it's 500, if it's 1,500, we'd be happy to adjust, but it was a starting point. As it turns out, the Pentagon initially identified about 1,100 critical joint duty positions, and they're at roughly 1,000 now.

We've specified that the curricula of the joint and service colleges have to be rigorously reviewed. The Senior Military Schools Review Board is doing that. At least 50 percent of the joint college graduates must be assigned immediately to joint duty.

Now, as to the rapid turnover, we've established some lengths of joint duty assignments: three years for a general or flag officer, three and a half years for all other officers. These things are under very severe attack now by the services, and they may have some legitimate complaints.

Student: Let me make one thing clear. I have absolutely no criticisms of the goals and objectives outlined here in this joint officers specialty. In fact, I agree with them wholeheartedly. I have four years service in a joint position to back me up, and I have no problem with working that either from the service point of view or anything else. Where I do have a problem is on the education side as it affects officers past 12 years of service today, and I'm thinking of myself in particular. I'm a graduate of all three levels of professional military education, either by correspondence or in residence. None of those schools was a joint school, and I have no desire to go spend another year of my life at a joint school, particularly after this year at Harvard. I've got enough education. The Air Force has been very good to me in that respect, yet I'm excluded from being a joint specialty officer and having that opportunity for a promotion, if you will, despite the fact that technically I'm qualified for flight rank because I had a joint duty tour. The fact of the matter is it's the joint specialists who will have an inside track on being selected as flag officers, I would think.

Locher: One of the changes that may be made in this regard is that two joint tours may end up being the equivalent of a joint education and one joint tour. Admiral Crowe has recommended that we make that change. Right now the Secretary of Defense has the authority to select the first pool of joint specialists, and there are very minimum requirements, so he can grandfather people. The law recognizes that officers came up through a very different system, and all of a sudden we're changing the ground rules right underneath their feet. So we have transition provisions. We have waiver authority, and we've asked the Department if they need longer periods of time. Because even if you say this requirement for promotion to general or flag rank does not fully go into effect till 1992, there are decisions that have to be made today if you're going to qualify an officer and he's got to spend three years in a joint duty assignment. He's going to have to go into that joint duty assignment fairly soon if he's going to be able to meet the requirements in 1992.

This is an area where we are going to continue to adjust things. Our view on the Senate side is that as legitimate problems are identified by the Department of Defense we ought to adjust them before all of these policies lose credibility. It's an area that we're going to have to work on for a while. There may be some problems that we've created, areas that we have not given appropriate attention to.

Now that I have completed my presentation on the joint duty problem, I will return to my broader presentation. The next point is one that we've touched on already to a great extent, and that's the imbalance between the responsibilities and command authority of the unified combatant commanders. Even though we created some unified commands during World War II and then we formally created them in 1947 and 1948, they never have been unified. They've been unified only in name. They've essentially been confederations of single-service forces. The commander has been very weak, not really even able to prepare his forces. To hold him accountable for the ability of his forces to carry out their missions was inappropriate given his limited authority.

Oettinger: For the record, you meant 1947 and 1958, you said 1948, or was there something in 1948?

Locher: The authority to create the unified commands was established in 1947, but we didn't create some of them until 1948. So it was 1947 and 1948.

We talked a little bit at lunch about confused and cumbersome operational chains of command. The role of the Secretary of Defense in the chain of command was very confused. The role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was confused, and the unified commanders in the field had very little authority with respect to the chain of command below them. The CINCs were required to go through all of the service layers. So when General Bernie Rogers had that Marine battalion ashore in Lebanon, if he wanted to have tight control of that situation and to shorten that chain of command, he could not do so. He was required to go down through all those levels, and there were about five or six levels between himself and that battalion commander. It was a situation in which we had a lot of confusion, and we could not streamline the chain of command as appropriate to the situation.

Ineffective strategic planning. Strategic planning is really neglected in the Department of Defense. Everybody's chasing resources. The whole system in the Pentagon is dominated by programming and budgeting.

Student: My comment has more to do about operational planning. I'm thinking in particular about operations such as the Iran raid where it seems, according to some critics, that there was a deliberate attempt to make the operation joint — some even criticized Grenada for that — when in fact the circumstances may have called for single-service or possibly dual military force operations, as opposed to making all four services participate in some way, somehow, so they would all get their fair share of the pie. It seems like this type of approach is taking jointness to the extreme when you're making everyone get a fair piece and then claim a little piece of the victory if it is successful, and if it's not successful you can always do a lot of finger-pointing.

Locher: Are you saying that is what we have done in the legislation?

Student: No, I'm not saying this is it. I'm just saying that in the past this look at jointness has almost been taken to extremes where people seem to be looking at it as, "Let's get everyone involved," even though it may not be practical to do so.

Locher: That's not jointness. That's very much a service self-centered approach. You can ask the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Okay, in Grenada, did you decide to divide up the pie so that all four services could be involved in an operation that was relatively small in scope, that could have been done by fewer than four services?" They'll say, "No, we didn't do it." I think that's correct. They didn't actually have to say, "I want a piece of this action," or "The Marine Corps wants this." It was an unwritten rule. Everybody was going to get a piece of the action so they could get credit for it.

Student: Does this solve that sort of problem?

Locher: We think it solves it in the following regard. Now you have a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who's going to decide what is the most effective arrangement based upon the situation. It's not going to be a consensus-building decision with all of the members of the JCS. The Chairman can go to the President and say, "The Marine Corps should do the Grenada operation, and that's it." And he can make it stick. Right now he can't do that.

Student: He's going to advise the Secretary of Defense or the President that that's the way it ought to be done.

Locher: That's correct. He's just an adviser.

McLaughlin: I guess it was the Iranian hostage rescue mission where General Volney Warner said that the operation appeared to have been designed with the award ceremony in mind.

Locher: It just had a nice flavor to it. All of the services involved and ...

Student: And then when it went wrong there was a lot of finger-pointing.

Oettinger: That's not joint, that's anarchy.

McLaughlin: It's the committee mentality that you've gotten with the JCS historically.

Oettinger: I suspect, though, that the new legislation helps. It does not eliminate such problems, but it does seem to provide pressures towards reducing them somewhat, to the extent that the advice comes from the Chairman, not as a committee spokesman but as an individual, and if the thing gets screwed up, it becomes a little bit clearer that either he gave bad advice or the National Command Authority didn't take it. The chain of accountability is a little bit clearer than if things just sort of materialized by unwritten, unspoken rules in a committee action. "Solved" may be too strong, but the legislation sets incentives to reduce the problem.

Locher: To refer back to a previous point of discussion, none of these problems have been solved yet, but we have tried to create mechanisms that are

going to reduce the problems that we're talking about. This one, where everybody is getting a slice of the action, has been a serious problem in the past.

Strategic planning is a terrible problem in the Department of Defense. We don't have a strong strategy-making tradition in the Department. Long-range planning is relatively neglected. We're really sort of chasing resources. The Congress bears part of the blame for that, because we're demanding attention by the Department and senior officials to today's problems and programs.

The defense agencies and the DOD field activities have not been adequately controlled in the past. They sprang up piecemeal beginning in 1958. Most of the attention has gone to the service budgets. We felt there was a need to provide for better supervision and control of those activities, especially because some of them have very important wartime support roles, but they're really oriented towards peacetime efficiencies. So, we have seen some very severe problems there.

There's a fair amount of confusion concerning the roles of the secretaries of the military departments. When we created the Department of Defense in 1949 — after fiddling around for two years with the National Military Establishment — we really never went into the law and redefined the role of the secretaries in the military departments.

They had gone from being the heads of independent executive departments to being subordinates of a powerful Secretary of Defense, but we never redefined their role. There was a lot of confusion as to what the role of the service secretary was. I think it complicated the work of the Secretary of Defense, and he had a tendency to rely less on those people, which created a lot of problems.

We saw a lot of unnecessary duplication in the top headquarters staffs of the military departments. Then we also have the problem of congressional micromanagement, which is a very severe problem and has not been fully solved.

Student: By your requiring these reports, aren't you continuing this micromanagement?

Locher: In a sense we are, but I'll tell you some of the things that we have done. In the Goldwater-Nichols Act coming out of the Senate side, we eliminated two-thirds of the recurring reports that the Congress required from the Department of Defense.

Student: I want to get one thing on the record. This comes from *The Wall Street Journal* on the 2nd of April, an article by Tim Carrington, talking about congressional micromanagement. There's one paragraph. "In 1984 the Pentagon sent 1,300 witnesses to appear before 29 congressional committees and 55 subcommittees. That same year the Defense Department responded to more than 120,000 written requests and 600,000 telephone calls from Capitol Hill." The Congress really needs to get its act together on supervising and overseeing.

Locher: You've been waiting all afternoon for me to give you that opening. I didn't make all of those telephone calls, but I probably made a substantial portion of them. I'd be happy to talk about the problems of the Congress. In our study we have a chapter on the Congress, and the members of our committee took a greater interest in that chapter than in anything else that we had written. The problems of reforming the Congress are enormous. In defense reorganization, one of the things that the Senate Armed Services Committee attempted to do, within the committee's jurisdiction, was to reduce the burdens that we were placing on the Department of Defense.

The first effort that we made was to assess all 558 reports that are required on a recurring basis from the Pentagon or the President by either our committee, the Appropriations Committee, or in the national defense field. Two-thirds of those have been eliminated. That removes a big burden from the Department of Defense. We have made it much tougher for reports to be required of the Department of Defense. We've cut down on the questions for the record. We attempted to reduce the number of our hearings. But the really big changes we can't make on our own. Either it involves changes to Senate rules, or we have to get the House Armed Services Committee to cooperate with us, or the Appropriations Committees. We're trying to do a two-year defense budget, which we have required the Department of Defense to submit. That requirement originated with the Senate Armed Services Committee. There are just enormous problems with a two-year budget. Whether we're going to be successful or not is hard to predict, but there's almost no interest outside of our committee. But there are some enormous problems in terms of congressional micromanagement.

Student: Over lunch we were talking about some of the political problems. With all this political maneuvering in getting this thing through, were there any compromises?

Locher: You're asking us to bare our souls here a little bit on that issue. If you look at the study that

the committee printed,* you'll see recommendations that are much more forceful, such as abolish the Joint Chiefs of Staff and replace them with a group of wise men to be known as the Joint Military Advisory Council. It was our view that if we offered recommendations which were exactly where we wanted to come out, we would be compromising from there, and we'd come out with something less. We decided to offer more forceful proposals as a starting point.

The idea of a Joint Military Advisory Council had been offered by people in the past. General Bradley and a number of other people had proposed this idea. So it had enough credibility and was something that we could select to let the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff know how serious we were on this issue, how disappointed we were in their performance, and how drastic the measures were that we had in mind. Essentially that provision came to be a "bullet trap" in that the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and much of the Department of Defense spent most of their ammunition firing at this idea of a Joint Military Advisory Council. Our real objective was strengthening the JCS Chairman. We thought that was something that was doable. You could debate the merits of this Joint Military Advisory Council, but in our view, we couldn't start off by saying, "We want to make the Chairman the principal military adviser and give him a Vice Chairman," because then we would have been forced to compromise from that. We held onto this idea of a Joint Military Advisory Council — and it was just a staff recommendation — but when we put out the study, when the staff testified in front of the committee, when we received all of the media attention, the department spent a lot of its energy fighting off that idea.

There were certain things that we were not able to achieve in the legislation, and these are some of the unresolved issues I'll turn to later. But for the most part, we were able to achieve what we had in mind in terms of organizational changes. Part of that came about because, as you know, the House had started this reorganization work first, but they had focused solely on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Senate had decided it had to be a much broader reorganization effort. But the House got some momentum going. Then the Senate built on that to do our broader legislation. When our legislation was voted out of the Senate 95 to nothing, it gave the House a real shot in the arm, and then the House could look at going further. We ended up compromising in the conference with the House Armed Services Committee. There are a few things that did not get done, but for the most part we're fairly satisfied with what we were able to work out. All of this was very carefully considered. You're talking about three or four years' worth of work.

Let me go straight to the fundamental purposes of the Act, and how we hope to achieve some of them (figure 6).

One of the fundamental purposes was to improve the quality and enhance the role of professional military advice. What ended up happening was that Secretaries of Defense knew when they were getting mush from the JCS. They ended up often going to civilians to get military advice. They were civilians who often were not qualified to provide that advice, but a Secretary of Defense had nowhere else to turn. We had the view that military expertise must be more effectively applied to the very complex defense issues that we were facing. What did we end up doing? We made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. What did that mean? It essentially meant that the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff became advisers to the Chairman, and he was the decisionmaker in terms of the advice that would be offered to higher civilian authority.

There are certain instances in which the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff can take their views to the Secretary of Defense, the President, or the National Security Council, or any of those groups could ask them for their corporate views or their individual views. Or if they disagreed with the Chairman, then we gave them the right to present their views. But the normal process is that the Chairman is the principal military adviser. All the former duties that were assigned to the corporate JCS are now assigned to the Chairman. He manages the Joint Staff. He decides under what procedures they'll do their work.

We sought to strengthen civilian control of the military. We didn't see any major problems here, but we did have these problems in terms of the role of the Secretary of Defense in the chain of command, and the authority of the service secretaries over their departments. We felt there were some useful clarifications that could be made, particularly in the area of intelligence in the military departments. Many people in the military departments said intelligence is an operational matter and, therefore, the service secretaries had no business being

*op. cit,; see page 148.

1. **Improve the quality and enhance the role of professional military advice**
   — Military expertise must be more effectively applied
2. **Strengthen civilian control of the military**
   — No major problems, but a number of useful improvements
3. **Strengthen the authority of joint military officers**
   — A fundamental shift of power and influence
4. **Improve the preparation of, and incentives for, military officers serving in joint duty positions**
   — Better joint command and planning skills
5. **Enhance the effectiveness of military operations**
   — Integrated fighting teams
6. **Strengthen central direction and control while increasing decentralization of execution and other management authority**
   — Both can be improved
7. **Clarify the operational chain of command**
   — Clarity of command lines is critical
8. **Reduce and streamline the defense bureaucracy**
   — Size and complexity hinder effective management
9. **Reduce congressional micromanagement**
   — Burdens of congressional oversight must be lessened
10. **Provide for the more efficient use of resources**
    — Defense resources are not unlimited
11. **Improve the supervision and control of defense agencies and DOD field activities**
    — Improved resource management
12. **Implement fully the National Security Act of 1947**
    — Current inconsistencies confuse authority and weaken management
13. **Provide for continued study and significant management attention to defense organization issues**
    — Many issues remain unresolved or unclarified

Figure 6. Fundamental Purposes of Reorganization Act of 1986

involved. So there were activities that were actually done in the military departments in the intelligence field that were not brought to the attention of the secretaries of the military departments. Some of these things, particularly in the Army, have backfired here recently. So we sought to strengthen civilian control, not that we had any real concerns, but that's something that Congress is going to be very careful about in doing its work.

Strengthen the authority of joint military officers. The one thing the law does is provide for a fundamental shift of power and influence from service officials and organizations to joint officials and organizations. The Chairman has been made more powerful. We've created a Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assist him, who's the second-ranking military officer, and the CINCs have been made much more powerful. They now have the kind of authority they need to carry out their responsibilities.

We have already talked a lot about improving military officers for joint duty, so I will skip that subject here.

Enhancing the effectiveness of military operations goes back to this command and personnel authority that we have given to the CINCs. They now have all of the authority they need to prepare all of the forces in their command for assigned missions.

On this next purpose, there are two actions that have been taken in terms of strengthening central direction, but also decentralizing. The central direction part of what we've done is try to get much better strategic planning. We've required that the strategy document prepared by the Chairman must be fiscally constrained. We've required that he prioritize the operational requirements of the CINCs, and that he look at what the services are doing with their budgets and compare them to these other yardsticks that he's been required to develop. We tried to get more attention on strategic planning in the Department.

In terms of decentralization, a lot of the authority that had been held in the military department headquarters has now been pushed out into the field to the CINCs.

We've clarified the operational chain of command in terms of the Secretary of Defense. We made certain that everybody understands that neither the Chairman nor the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in the operational chain of command, and we've given the CINC the authority within his command to specify his chain of command. So when we go back to that Lebanon situation, if General Bernie Rogers decided, "I want that battalion commander reporting to me, and that's the only way I can get the kind of operational control I need," he could do so.

Student: Could I ask you to repeat that last statement about the chain of command?

Locher: The chain of command runs from the President, to the Secretary of Defense, to the unified and specified combatant commanders in the field. Neither the Chairman nor the other members of the JCS are in the operational chain of command. It does not flow through them. We have given the President and the Secretary of Defense the authority to use the Chairman to help them carry out their command functions, and there's a couple of ways he can do so. He can transmit orders that they give as he does now. He can also be used to oversee the implementation of their command instructions.

On each one of these points that I listed very briefly in figure 3, I can give you a full page or two of actual points in the law that are designed to achieve some of these objectives. I've just tried to hit the highlights, as this could take us quite a while.

We've attempted to reduce and streamline the defense bureaucracy. We felt that the headquarters organizations had become too large. The span of control of senior defense officials was just enormous. The Secretary of Defense had 42 people reporting directly to him. The service chiefs had between 34 and 48 officials who reported directly to them. There was too much duplication in the military headquarters staff. We've tried some consolidation there. We have actually forced people out of these headquarters organizations in an effort to streamline them.

We talked a lot about the burdens of congressional micromanagement. We have taken a number of actions within our committee in terms of eliminating reports. There's a lot more that needs to be done. Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) is now chairman of the Committee, and he has reoriented our focus away from the details of the defense budget to the larger strategy issues. We've had 16 hearings on U.S. military strategy, which has been a rather novel subject for both our committee and for many of the witnesses who testified. After having our committee muck around in U.S. military strategy for a couple of years, the Department of Defense may be mighty happy to get us back into the weeds.

I've talked a little bit about providing for the more efficient use of resources. What we have done there

is try to create a much tighter strategy, and to provide some yardsticks for the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman to use in evaluating how the services are using the resources that they are given. We have done considerable work in terms of providing improved supervision and control of the defense agencies. Individually they don't have a very large budget, but when you put all 14 or 15 of them together, they do control a substantial amount of defense resources.

We've attempted to implement the National Security Act of 1947 fully. There were numerous inconsistencies, many dealing with the military departments and their relation to the Secretary of Defense and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The law also continued to refer to operational responsibilities of the military departments which were eliminated in 1958. We have attempted to remove those inconsistencies.

We've attempted to provide for continued study and management attention to these defense reorganization issues. One of the key points is that our understanding of defense organization is very, very poor. Our thinking about these issues was retarded because the people who wanted to defend the status quo were extremely powerful, and they were able to blunt almost any initiative to think about these ideas.

What kind of a general staff did we need, or people for joint duty? What should the Office of the Secretary of Defense look like? What kinds of responsibilities do they have? What authorities should the unified commanders in the field have? All of these kinds of thoughts have really been studied very little in the United States. When we did this work, we were breaking new ground in many areas. We have attempted to continue to require that these issues get some attention in the future.

Student: You're breaking new ground here in the States, but did you look, for example, at the British reorganization or some of the others?

Locher: We talked about that a little bit at lunch. We actually did. As a matter of fact, Harvard had a seminar along with the University of Kentucky, back when we were starting our defense reorganization study. The one that was held here at Harvard focused on the defense organizations of other countries.

Our basic problem was that the United States is different. We're like the British and Canadians in some regards, but very different from the Germans, the Soviets, or the Israelis. Different in terms of our missions, our history, and the balance between our services. What we ended up deciding was that we could look at what they had done, but the ability to draw direct lessons from those other countries and apply them in our system seemed too remote. All of those countries had a more centralized effort than the United States did. Our services remain much more independent than in any other country. We had horrendous debates talking about our system, and if I were going to try to say, "Well, the British have done this," it wouldn't help. For example, if you discuss the Falklands war, you can get into debates as to whether their organization enhanced their ability to prosecute that war or not. It seemed to me that we were going to add tremendously to the debate without actually providing clear lessons.

Oettinger: In the limited amount of time remaining, I wondered if you could expand upon the issues that are unresolved or unclarified.

Locher: There are a couple of issues that I'd like to talk about. There are three things that are holdovers from defense reorganization that have not been adequately addressed so far. The most important of those, in my view, is the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Those of you who have read some of the things I've written and some things that Professor Sam Huntington has written on this subject know that we have the view that there is a need for very strong mission orientation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Currently, the Office is organized on almost an exclusively functional basis. When I say functional, I mean manpower, installations, logistics, and research and development. That came about in 1953 when OSD was expanded with six additional Assistant Secretaries of Defense and a Director of Defense Research and Engineering. It was decided to have the Office of the Secretary of Defense mirror-image the services, so that the Secretary of Defense could control the functional activities of the services.

It's important that the Secretary of Defense be able to do that to a certain extent. But his real role is to be an integrator of service capabilities to carry out the major missions of the Department of Defense, none of which can be done by any service on its own. If you look at the organization that supports him, it's designed for functional integration — we can do manpower planning department-wide — but not for what we call mission integration. We actually had proposed in our draft legislation that there be three mission-oriented Undersecretaries of Defense.

At the time that we put that into our draft bill, Senator Goldwater and Senator Nunn agreed that a

stronger mission orientation in OSD was going to be needed in the future, but we had not been able to build a consensus behind it, either in the retired community that was working with us, or in the Committee. We did not want to force that major change on the department without more of a consensus behind it. If you talk to Secretary Schlesinger and Secretary Brown they'd say, "You're absolutely right. OSD needs more of a mission orientation, but I'm uncomfortable with this change that you're talking about." We weren't going to turn all of OSD into a mission-oriented organization. It was going to be balanced. There would be three Undersecretaries of Defense who would have mission responsibilities. There would continue to be at least a couple of Undersecretaries who would worry about functional areas, and then various Assistant Secretaries of Defense.

If the Secretary of Defense wants to ask someone to think about NATO defense and all of its elements, he has nobody to turn to. He can turn to Richard Perle who can talk about NATO policy, but then you have the NATO manpower issues, the installations and logistics, and the research and engineering issues. We've often seen Richard Perle pronouncing policies with respect to NATO, and the research and engineering officials going down the exact opposite path.

We have essentially what we call functional diffusion.

Oettinger: You're addressing an ancient and pervasive problem which industrial organizations all tried to solve by having matrix organizations, so you've got the functional managers and the product-specific or mission-specific people. I've never found anyone, anywhere, who was happy with whatever point they were at. It's a perpetual tension, and it leads me to a question which you're not articulating, or maybe you'll get to it. Why is the Congress prescribing the organization of OSD so tightly in contrast to letting successive incumbents exercise their judgment in juggling this? It seems to me that no matter where you are you'll always want to be somewhere else, because these matrix organization questions are never resolved to anybody's ultimate satisfaction, and therefore, casting one approach in concrete is bound to be problematic.

Locher: First of all, we didn't do that in the law. We've not mandated that change. We have required a whole series of studies on the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The other problem we have is that the current Secretary of Defense is not moving in this direction. I think there is a crying need for more of a mission orientation. We're not putting the defense budget together based upon what our mission needs are. We're not making decisions on that basis. There is sort of a precedent for mission-oriented officials in OSD. When Bob Komer served as the NATO adviser to the Secretary of Defense, he did not have an organization to support him, but he had a position in the hierarchy where he could cut across all of the service lines and all of these functional lines, and he could pull things together and say, "What do we need in NATO?" The INF (Intermediate Nuclear Force) program was a result. The Long-Term Defense Program was a result. Those programs would probably never have happened with an official who's buried way down in the organization and who only had a functional slice of the action.

To answer your question on matrix organizations, the whole Department of Defense is a gigantic matrix organization, because you have the combatant commands in one dimension and you have the services in another. The Department of Defense has remained on the traditional, functional, organizational basis that dominated American business for the first third of this century. But as American businesses became larger, as they became international businesses, as they became conglomerates, they found that the functional organization did not enable them to compete. So what did they do? They turned themselves on the side and they sliced themselves down along their product lines. That's where they actually had to compete, and with the functional structure, they were not able to do that. The Department of Defense has to make the same transition, because we're not competing on functional lines, we're competing with the Soviets and other adversaries on a mission basis.

This functional diffusion at the OSD level is not single service, it's multiservice, but it's broken out on a functional basis. Then you go to the service headquarters staffs and you get into a functional organization on a single-service basis. Lost in all of that is, how do I pull all of this together to compete with the Soviets in the Persian Gulf, or NATO, or provide for maritime superiority?

We see that the Office of the Secretary of Defense is not organized to provide the Secretary with the kinds of capability he needs to carry out his most important responsibility, and that's the mission integrating role. We created a unified Department of Defense, and a Secretary of Defense to pull the capabilities of the services together to carry out major

missions. We don't at present have the ability to do that.

One of the unresolved problems is shifting part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense to get this mission orientation. Going back to congressional micromanagement, we've required four studies from the Department of Defense on this issue: one by the Office of the Secretary of Defense; one by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; one by the service secretaries combined. They're going to submit a single report. Then we have an independent contractor doing the study.

Oettinger: But why not leave the organization of OSD more at the Secretary of Defense's discretion?

Locher: In the law, we have done that. We have removed many of the congressional prescriptions of the past. There are very few things about his office that are specified. We now require that there be an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, an Assistant Secretary of Defense for C^3I, and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, and that's all that's required. OSD does have to have a controller. He does have to be a civilian official, but we've not said what level he has to be.

The Secretary can organize the rest of the office as he sees fit. But we are convinced that this is a change that has to be made sometime in the near future. It is a fundamental change in the Department of Defense. We're now actually giving the Secretary of Defense the chance to make the change without the Congress forcing it upon him.

Student: Why not organize the JCS along the same lines, because they're certainly organized functionally?

Locher: Yes, they are.

Student: Let me ask at the same time — why not do the services the same way?

Locher: You'll find in this study that we talked about the idea of organizing the Joint Staff on a mission basis. Our views were influenced by two considerations: the Joint Staff works with the unified combatant commands, staffs out in the field that are organized on the traditional military basis, and we didn't need to have both OSD and the Joint Staff organized similarly. As a matter of fact, there might be some advantages to having them approach the issue in a slightly different way. If we had to choose between one of the two, we'd rather have a mission focus in OSD, and let the Joint Staff continue with its traditional military approach which would then link into the unified command headquarters out in the field.

Student: It seems to me that logically if you're concerned about strategy and you want the Joint Staff to produce viable strategy, then they have to integrate their functional staff and look at mission areas, because that's the only way you can develop strategy. Perhaps you're leaving them at a disadvantage if you reorganize the DOD.

Locher: We did not want to specify the organization of the Joint Staff. We're a little more reluctant to structure military organizations than civilian ones. The law does almost nothing with the Joint Staff. Traditionally it has not. But we have specified two Assistant Secretaries of Defense. Congress has said to the Secretary of Defense, "We think mission orientation is important. We're going to require these extensive studies of this issue. Mr. Secretary, now is your chance, because if you don't act the Congress is probably going to force you to do something in this area of mission orientation." I think it is critical, and I think a lot of the problems that we see in the Department of Defense, some of which I'll go over in just a moment, are related to that.

The second area that was left undone was on the defense agencies. They have received such limited attention over the last 30 years that there was not much information and analysis to work with. What we really needed was a rigorous re-examination of the defense agencies. Were they doing what was appropriate? Had they gathered too many activities that could be better done by the services? Could they be structured better? There is a set of reports coming in on that issue as well. The defense agencies are joint organizations. They play important roles, but they have been relatively neglected in terms of management attention.

The third issue is the Congress. What do we do about congressional review and oversight of national defense? The Congress has been working harder and harder and accomplishing less and less. We thought that one solution might be a two-year defense budget which could reduce the demands of the Congress on the Department of Defense. We're trying to implement a two-year budget this year — that's what I've been working on the past couple of days, the authorization request for fiscal years 1988 and 1989. It's very difficult to do the second year, primarily because decisions that you would make for the second year depend upon information you do not now have. They're dependent upon things like test results on R&D progress. Just in the few

months since the budget has been submitted, there have been so many fact-of-life changes to FY88 that spilled over to FY89 that it is very difficult to think about how we're going to do a comprehensive two-year defense budget. Our current thinking is that we will approve fiscal year 1988, the current budget year, in its entirety, and in 1989 we will try to approve those programs that are stable and noncontroversial. We're going to be building the two-year budget from the bottom up. It won't be a complete effort.

Student: Whatever happened to the idea of appropriating funds not by fiscal years' programs but by milestones? In other words, take care of the whole R&D effort; take care of the whole full-scale development effort; the whole production effort?

Locher: This year we're going to try to have milestone authorizations ....

Student: Authorizations but not appropriations?

Locher: Right now we're having a hard time getting the appropriators to agree. The appropriators are essentially our controllers. They're the budgeteers at the tail end who come in and scrub the budget very carefully. They argue, "You want me to scrub the budget two years in advance; how can we possibly do that?" They're the ones who come in at the tail end and all the facts-of-life changes come to them. They find out what programs really can't be executed, and they cut them out. They worry about where we are in terms of the congressional budget resolution. We're having a difficult time with the appropriators, and a problem with the House of Representatives as well. They get elected every two years, and they'd like two cracks at the defense budget rather than one.

Student: To me that's an illogical way to lend stability to our programs.

Locher: Do milestone authorizations? You're right. We're starting to have problems with some of these ideas we've already tried, like the multi-year procurement. A few of those things have gone sour: the CH-53/MH-53 helicopter. We've developed a problem and we're in a multi-year procurement of that system. The preliminary indications are that it's cheaper for us to continue with the program than to cancel it, because we've gotten ourselves into a multi-year procurement. We're actually thinking about continuing to pour money into a program before we know whether the problems can be solved or not. Those issues are fairly difficult, and a lot of the cheap talk about, "Gee, the Congress ought to do this and that," just doesn't work when you actually get down to thinking about how they'd be implemented.

Let me mention two other things. One is strategy. We have very serious problems in terms of military strategy or national security strategy. It is very poorly developed. We just don't have a tradition of strategymaking. We don't put our attention there. We've got a long way to go in terms of preparing our thoughts in that regard. Related to that is the fact that we do not have a direct link between our budget and our strategy. We push a lot of paper and give a lot of lip service to what strategy work we do have, and then we build a defense budget from the bottom up, focusing on what the services want. The Senate Armed Services Committee has been questioning the witnesses this year to tell us what the mission deficiencies are, based upon our strategy, and then how the authorization request relates to those deficiencies. They absolutely cannot do it.

Student: This may seem like a naive question. What do you mean by a strategy? Is Congress the organization that actually develops that?

Locher: No. Congress is not the group to develop a strategy.

Student: Who is?

Locher: The Executive Branch. That's their responsibility.

Student: Who in the Executive Branch?

Locher: Well, the National Security Council has to develop what we call national security strategy, or grand strategy, and the Department of Defense has to do the military strategy component of that.

Student: When Senator Nunn says that the Congress ought to be spending more time establishing the strategy ....

Locher: No, not establishing the strategy. We ought to spend more time overseeing our strategic thinking.

Student: What does he get to oversee?

Locher: He asks the Department of Defense to appear before the Committee and tell us what our military strategy is. How can we make decisions on the defense budget without an understanding of what we're trying to do?

Student: Exactly. That's my point. What do you get to see? What is presented to you as a national strategy? Is it all motherhood?

Locher: Yes. This year, because we held 16 hearings on strategy and we had some outside experts

who had some fairly forceful ideas, we were able to turn around to the defense witnesses and say, "Hey, what about that idea?" We've moved them a considerable distance; we've forced them. The only thing that our committee can really do is become a highly visible audience for strategic thought. We're never going to formulate a strategy. We don't have the time, the expertise, or the access to the information. Most of the information in the field of strategy is not brought to our attention. It's considered internal working papers of the Executive Branch. But we can cause defense officials to testify on C-SPAN about our strategy. When they get asked the tough questions and they don't have a response, they're going to start working on it.

Oettinger: One level would be mutually assured destruction versus selective targeting versus the SDI kind of thing.

Locher: Yes, that's part of it.

Oettinger: A trip wire in Europe versus in-depth defense, etc. These are the kinds of things that you mean?

Locher: That is correct. Now, for example, Admiral Crowe testified, and he had a very thoughtful statement. Part of his statement was a net assessment that says, "Despite the great increases in U.S. defense spending over the last six or seven years, trends in terms of NATO and Warsaw Pact capabilities continue to be adverse to the West." Crowe's statement says, "So the United States needs to increase its defense spending and everybody needs to be doing more in NATO." Senator Nunn said to him, "Admiral, what you're saying to me is we have just gone through a process where we have increased our defense spending by 45 percent in real terms, and we have not made a dent in this problem. As a matter of fact, the trends continue to be adverse to us, and all you're asking me to do is more of the same, pursuing a policy that by your own calculations has failed. What alternatives do you have to suggest to us?" And he had none. It was just: We need more money, more resources. But what are we going to get the Europeans to do? What alternative strategies do we have? Are we trying to do things in Europe which could be better done by the Europeans? Why are we doing the heavy ground forces reinforcement of Europe — something that is very difficult for us to do? The Europeans have considerable manpower they've not fully utilized. Why don't we think about bringing to bear capabilities that are easier for us to do, emphasizing our strengths, and get the Europeans to do some other tasks. Why aren't we doing more in terms of defense industrial cooperation with the Europeans?

NATO has two and a half times the GNP of the Warsaw Pact, and 50 percent more manpower, and yet we have not yet been able to develop a credible conventional defense. Why is that?

Student: These burden-sharing issues have really been moving in cyclical fashion for the past 20 or 30 years now.

Locher: My view as to why they're coming up now is that when we were able to increase our defense budget very rapidly ....

Student: After a period of decrease.

Locher: Right, after a period of decreases. In the late 1970s we were pressuring the Japanese and the Europeans on the burden-sharing issue. Then as we started to increase our defense budget, our thinking became too unilateral in nature. If we just get our defense budget up, we'll start to solve some of the problems of our coalitions.

Student: At the same period they were decreasing where we had been decreasing, they had made some major increases, so there was a dichotomy of who was doing the increasing and decreasing at what time period.

Locher: I'm not saying that they were decreasing here in the 1980s, but they've not been growing as rapidly as we have. They've been down below 3 percent; 1 or 2 percent if we're lucky. But now what's happening is that our defense spending has reached its peak and it's going to flatten out for a while. We have made almost no force structure increases, except in the Navy where our needs are probably less than for the other services. Everybody is coming to the realization that the United States can't do it alone, and that we do have a coalition strategy. We've been marching to our own tune the last five or six years, and if we could have remembered that throughout this decade maybe we could have been pushing some policies and programs in the past that would have produced more in terms of coalition defense.

Oettinger: I think that's a great note to leave us thinking, and let me thank you.