# *Program on Information Resources Policy*

*Center for Information Policy Research*

*Harvard University*

# Technology, Intelligence, and Command

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transcriber with the Army Security Agency. Since he
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He has been Chief of Staff for the Information Security
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Mr. McManis addressed the seminar on 14 February,
shortly before the start of the Desert Storm ground
campaign.

**Oettinger:** You all have a copy of Dave's biogra-
phy in hand. This is the third time he is here with
the seminar, and it is a special pleasure to introduce
him because he is a long-time friend. Because he is
a friend I tend to take liberties in arguing with him a
bit more perhaps than with others, though David has
been able to take care of himself very well. It's a
real pleasure to welcome you again, Dave.

**McManis:** Well, since this is my third time here,
and since this is such a cheap outfit, I only get
lunch. However, it was a very good lunch, I have to
say. I feel I can do things on my own terms and last
time I was here I had a fairly formal presentation, at
least for part of my talk, and this time I have almost
nothing prepared and so I'm going to ramble for a
few minutes. Then what I would really like, I want
to do it for me, and this will be the payoff for me, is

to get the interaction with you and discuss some of
the areas I'm going to touch on which will hopefully
have relevance and some currency, too.

I took the opportunity, since I am an old hand up
here now, to look back at the previous sessions I've
come to, and dialogues that I've had with Tony and
John, and I was struck by our prescience in terms of
looking back at 1984 as being the first time we had
problems of warning and command and control.
Looking back, we were right on, and even in 1989
that was true.

**Oettinger:** I agree.

**McManis:** That's right. So we're off to a great start.
This will not last for long probably.

In 1984, I reflected back on most of my career
which has been in command and control, and
warning. Looking back to early days in the White
House, the period of crises — the sixties and seven-
ties. The technology was being really dragged along
I think by our requirements to communicate, to
provide good information to our national leader-

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ships. This is also colored in large part, and now I see this a little better in retrospect, by political realities, by personalities, the natures of Presidents, the way they operate. Now, over some 32 years, I can look back and, having worked closely with a number of Presidents, and not too far away from a number of others, I've seen the differences in the way they've operated. My history goes back primarily to President Johnson, who, for the first time, found out about hands-on control of military forces. My experience was in the White House Situation Room, moving the troops around the sandbox, and I Corps, and telling the commander in the field where they were to be the next day. Absolutely insanity, in retrospect, but we found a new toy, maybe that was part of it, and warfare entered into a different world. Certainly the Vietnam experience was a political as much as it was a military experience, one, which has had dramatic repercussions on all that has followed, and I think today, particularly, I see it in the way we are conducting the war in Southwest Asia.

**Oettinger:** On your Johnson comment — a lot has been made of Johnson doing things out of the Situation Room, and remote control, and so on. Of course, Truman did a little bit of that with MacArthur and MacArthur learned to disconnect his teletype. It was not long before countermeasures were developed into this White House relationship. An interesting record of that, I think, can be found in earlier talks here by General Stillwell, General Cushman, and John Grimes. If you look up the articles, they will give you an account of the Korean tree-cutting incident, in some detail. Stillwell and Cushman were first-hand participants in that. You begin to see that Dave has just described what happened in there. They were well aware of what happened under Johnson and they took special precautions for that not to happen again. So, you have a record there of the countermeasures, if you will, in what was an internal bureaucratic or chain-of-command hassle. But the story continues and so my guess is one is going to see overreactions in this conflict, to whatever the excesses were the last time. A splendid term paper topic for someone to look at the evident flow of action and reaction to this perennial problem.

**McManis:** In retrospect though, I know it's much more complicated than that because at that period of time in the sixties and early seventies, the information available to decision makers was relatively constrained. It was getting better. We had access to very little real-time information. And more importantly, the press coverage of those wars was delayed significantly, and was often very narrowly defined and focused. Again, this is just to contrast with what's going on today and the absolute obsession that most of us have over CNN. I mean, talk about the current addiction of the nineties, it has to be CNN. Those of us who were close to the war, and in fact in the Pentagon, we have 23,000 people in the building, there must be 10,000 television sets all tuned around the clock to CNN, and we were absolutely addicted to it. It changed our whole perspective and our way of dealing with the war in many ways, knowing what was going on. I'm not sure I understand this phenomenon very well right now, but it's made a fundamental impact on the conduct of the war. So we are reacting in a number of ways, both to things that went on before but also, again, tugging along the technology as we have progressed through the crises. The other side of that is the issue that, of course has been part of my growing up, the issue of warning, and what's really happened there. I maintained early on, and I still maintain, Tony, that we are very capable of warning — we can warn. But I would have to say, we blew it again in terms of Kuwait. No less a figure, than the then J-5, Lieutenant General Lee Butler who is now CINCSAC said, "We had the warning from the intelligence community — we refused to acknowledge it." That's pretty damning to come from a J-5.

**Student:** But isn't that sort of habitual that people listen to the warning that fits their mindset?

**McManis:** You bet. Absolutely. Again, back in 1984 we spent a lot of time talking about the problems of warning. Before we finish today, I want to talk a little bit about the new paradigm of warning that's present at the Pentagon today, which tries to account for all problems of ambiguity for mindset. We are making some progress but it certainly has been very slow.

**Oettinger:** But David's last remarks, go to the heart of our discussions about this, both privately and in this seminar. I'm glad we got in that thing you critiqued, about the simultaneity of the perception of progress. Which is undeniable, and when David refers to the technology, remember that's undeniably progress. While at the same time some things don't change, they don't get better, they don't necessarily get worse; they remain perennial problems. In sorting that out, it seems to me there's a central problem that one has to wrestle with in order to be able to deal with continuing change.

**Student:** Your talking about warning, it seems to me, is a real problem. I mean: 1) evaluating the warning you have, how much probability of it actually going to happen, 2) what kind of response can you take beforehand? I mean, with the kids of Kuwait, it could have been very politically damaging to have gone in and formed a preemptive strike against Iraq, and so I doubt if that would have worked anyway.

**McManis:** In retrospect, it's easier to draw suppositions about what you could have done. In the Kuwaiti example, there are many who think that, very early on, diplomatic activity condemning the potential act, would have been sufficient to dissuade. Instead of what we almost had was a condoning or encouraging of the ultimate act.

**Student:** While he was sitting on the border we said, "Well, what you guys do is your business."

**McManis:** That's exactly right.

**Student:** Almost encouraging.

**McManis:** April Glaspie. I was not close enough as to how those decisions were made, but it was really incredible to see that dialogue with Hussein just very shortly before he invaded Kuwait. And also to see that all the indicators were there. This was not that they (the Iraqis) are standing up and swelling out their chests and getting their feathers all preened out. Rather, the logistics tail was there. It was clear that something much more aggressive was about to occur and many of us think now that the original intent was to actually go into Saudi Arabia. Had we not taken military action that would have been a clear consequence. Easy to speculate on that now.

**Student:** To what degree do you attribute that to disconnects between the intelligence communities, DOD, and the State Department?

**McManis:** I don't think it was disconnects as much as it was the classic set of warning problems. It was the fact that there was ambiguity in the situation there; there was a real mindset in terms of our view towards the Iraqis and what their intentions were; and we almost didn't care. We swung from being very supportive of Iraq, just as we supported Iran a number of years before. Now as long as they weren't going to do anything really harmful we were just going to sort of let them "do their thing."

**Student:** Could it have been other factors such as the mesmerization with what was going on elsewhere, like in Eastern Europe?

**McManis:** Yes. That's an excellent point, too. Again, it's our inability to shift focus quickly and to have that very narrow kind of focus which again is a very critical warning issue. The problem of ambiguity, problems of consensus, problems of alternate views, we've talked previously about. The community did not do well, that is the national security community, not the intelligence community. The community did not do well at establishing alternative views of the crisis as it developed, and I think that was a major failing. I still believe we know how to do it, and if allowed to work, it would work exceptionally well, but we keep blowing it. I guess I did previously say, "But we always find a new way to blow it." I made a note that Tony back in 1984 said, "Whatever the warning system may be it's only part of the bigger whole," and I think that's a very profound statement. Warning does not stand on its own in any way. I'll probably come back to this a couple of times today. It's already been pointed out it's a process of trying to decide at what point you can exercise what kind of alternatives, what kind of ameliorating actions to the event.

**Oettinger:** If I might make a suggestion for those of you who are interested in this. Events of fifty years ago are easier to deal with in that respect than current events. The literature of Pearl Harbor, which by now has gone through actuality, analysis, revisionism, counterrevisionsim, etc., etc., is about as complete a literature as one can imagine. For events that still have more relevance today than the Pelopponesian War. If somebody's interested in that, spending the semester reading up on Pearl Harbor, would be an awfully good way of understanding the difference between what you can do beforehand and what becomes evident through several cycles of post-event revisionism about what could have been done or should have been done. You've got fifty years now of analysis of those events.

**McManis:** Be careful of that, too because it's a good study of the sociology and psychology, of the decision-making process, but it is not a good analogy for what we have today in terms of having a better view of what is going on in the world at any given point in time, in close to real time. I think that's the real difference. And I don't understand quite yet what the media does to us, to the decision-making process today.

**Student:** This may be a simplistic statement; but, do we then assume the decision-making cycle is

much more reduced now, and as a result what kind of impact does that have on the prospects?

**McManis:** Certainly in terms of time. It's certainly shortened in many ways.

**Student:** In some respects you have to decide within a short time. Not only do you have to develop strategy, you also have to execute it at the same time.

**Oettinger:** Please, let's dwell on that for a moment. Dave said things that sound a little bit pro-technology. My view of the technologies and the instantaneousness, and so on, is somewhat different. I think that what it does is undoubtedly, and this is where the progress comes from, make things possible that were not possible before. Yes, and I think the way it's different is that the range of options is much greater today than it was at the time of Pearl Harbor. That's undeniable. In that sense, time has an arrow to it. But David, one of the options is, I know all this stuff, and I do not make a decision until tomorrow morning. I sleep on it.

**McManis:** If that's conscious, that's all right. I think that's great.

**Oettinger:** I think that as people become more sophisticated, one would hope for example that a George Bush who has had more experiences than some of his predecessors in the intelligence business, might more consciously than somebody else say, "Hey, I can react to this in a few days. I mean I can sleep on it, or I can let it go for a month." Procrastination as well as instant reaction is an option.

**Student:** The difference though is in the past you could always make a decision in a matter of seconds, then change, no matter when. The decision is simple. The process of execution is much more relevant now in that before you might have made a decision, you might even have had time to kind of adapt to this as it went down through the system to full execution. Now, perhaps that time frame has been abused.

**Oettinger:** Look. Take Graham Allison's *Essence of Decision* about the Cuban Missile Crisis.* You don't change bureaucracies or instruments any faster today than you did x years ago. The fact that the commands travel with the speed of light does not mean that organizations or policies change any more quickly.

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*Allison, Graham T., *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.* Little, Brown, Boston, 1971.

**McManis:** I'm not arguing that point. I'm saying that the transmission of the decision to the ultimate audience that it's going to affect is much quicker. In other words, everybody knows the decision has been made.

**Oettinger:** And misunderstanding, and misinterpretation, and screwing up. The old adage that isn't it wonderful that computers can in 1 millisecond make an error that used to take a hundred people a hundred years. I warned you I was going to misbehave, but go ahead.

**McManis:** No, no, you haven't misbehaved at all yet.

**Student:** I guess we've overlooked the people that do the analysis and the decision making. You've not, I know that, but the discussion has not consistently focused on the person who does the analysis or the things inside that person's head that shape his decision. That person has not changed an awful lot in seven or eight thousand years, but some things have changed. One of the things that has changed significantly is not just getting the word out, it's seeing the response to the word through someone else's eyes. And that is very, very different. That's a CNN issue of, "gee whillikers, I didn't know that was going to happen."

**McManis:** Well, again in the earlier presentations we talked a lot about the problem of perceptions, putting yourself in the shoes of your adversary, trying to understand how his thought process goes, what he is reacting to; and that's something I think we do a little better today, but not well. So, yes, these are all "Warning 101" kinds of lessons. The ability for the decision makers to have a greater array of facts, at their fingertips, when they make that decision is very significant. They still have to take some action even if it's inaction, and their ability to absorb the warning has some relevance to what they have to do to respond to it. If it's a diplomatic demarche, it's easy to take a fairly small change in the warning posture and far off that demarche. It doesn't cost you a lot to do. If it's the call-up of a military division or the shipping out of the airborne, that's very significant, and they better have a damn good confidence level in the warning before they do that. Again, we're simplifying this, but the whole range of options is significant, and it's incumbent on the decision maker early in the process to be engaged in the warning process. I said this both times I was up here before. The warning people, in the intelligence community just can't

open the door and say, "Watch out, here they come," and slam the door again and let the decision maker go on his merry way. That's absolutely fundamental.

**Oettinger:** In this contrapuntal way, let me say that one of the banes of every executive's existence, whether it's in the military, civilian, government, corporate world, or university or anywhere else, is this notion that top management has to be involved. Because if top management were involved all the time in everything that everybody says they ought to be involved in (because otherwise when they get involved at the time of decision making it's too late), they would never get anything done. I agree, as a part of this dilemma, why do we always screw it up in spite of progress, is that this notion is correct. Yes. The chief executive, at whatever level, should be involved, but in most instances on a day-to-day basis that is simply not practical. In terms of my thematic thing about balances, that question of how do you run your affairs if you're a decision maker, whether it's a sergeant, or a general, or whatever, so, that yes you're engaged, and yes you're detached because, otherwise, where the hell do you strike that balance?

**McManis:** That's a profound trade-off and what I find interesting from an NIO/Warning (National Intelligence Officer for Warning) perspective is that we now have the capability. In many ways the loop gets longer. We can detect the beginnings of a mobilization for war, and we can watch it for three or four weeks. What I find interesting is how well or how poorly the NIO is able to go to a decision maker at, say, week two of mobilization and say, "Look, there's a real possibility you have to take action, so prepare yourself for this." But at the same time say, "I want you to realize that two weeks from now, if these things go the following way you're going to have to take this action." Prior to Desert Shield/Storm, Charlie Allen, the National Intelligence Officer for Warning, wasn't able to get that commitment from anyone. He just kept going back to policy and decision makers and even a week before the event, where it would almost have seemed to have been incontrovertible, that the Iraqis were going to take military action, people still weren't willing to commit to a significant decision on it. I'm fascinated by that, and it definitely gets at the issue of the trade-off between engagement and more freedom to manage.

**Oettinger:** Wonderful term paper, by the way.

**McManis:** Charlie Allen, with whom I still have a close relationship, has done a very good job of carrying on what we were trying to do in the mid-eighties and what Bill Casey, (Director of Central Intelligence), was very supportive of. Casey understood some fundamental things about intelligence. The first is that intelligence is warning. That's all we're in business for, to provide warning. There's nothing else; we're not there just to have fun and do esoteric analyses, we are there to warn. If we are not doing that, then we probably should go off and build harpsichords or something like that. I had the support of Bill Casey and that was pretty good support. Casey was willing to fire my memos over to the President and get action. Charlie Allen has to go today and try and find who'll answer the door when he knocks, and he's knocked on a lot of doors, and some people have answered. He's been able to build up a pretty good clientele out there throughout the Washington area, but it's spotty and he doesn't have the backing of the institution, which I think is absolutely criminal. But, it's just a fact of life.

**Oettinger:** It wouldn't be the first time. This is one of those concrete ways that David described earlier where personalities matter. The Constitution of the United States hasn't changed. Incumbents and their appointees have different ways of reacting to what kind of flows they want from where.

**McManis:** Probably. In 1984, I remember saying one of the fundamental lessons in warning for an analyst is you've got to dare to warn. Your institution, they can't lop off your head every time you do it and then try to prove that you weren't quite on target. It's constant pulling and hauling.

Your class has done a lot of good work on warning though, Tony. So we're off to a good start. As my presentations changed over the 5-year period. The second time I came back I was playing more of a technocrat. I really was pushing the technology side, so I started off with a really neat video showing some modeling of hydrodynamic events and talking about how we can get information to people, and particularly to our national leadership. The problem which we've had is endemic in the system, just too much data, too little information. We still don't know how to take this fantastic amount of stuff that we're collecting, that's what I had to say. Everybody knows we have that vacuum cleaner in the sky, and we're reading every bit and baud, and we know everything that everybody is doing at any given point in time, which is fantastic propaganda, and I hope everybody in the outside world believes

that. It's not quite a reality, but nevertheless, we do have some vacuum cleaners in the sky which are bringing down lots of data and I will tell you very candidly that most of it goes right in the bit bucket. Yet there's a tremendous amount of very good information which could be used to inform our leadership. So we still need to find better ways of presentation and I think what we're seeing today, the contrast, Tony and I talked about coming over here, is that today the tools are being developed from the bottom up, which are enabling us to handle a lot more information, present a lot more information to our decision makers, in graphic form primarily. I think that's one of the most exciting things that I have seen in terms of Desert Shield, Desert Storm, is that really for the first time, in a real conflict situation, our war fighters in the field have graphic presentations of the battlefield. The problem is that they have four such displays facing them, but they're all side by side. So we've made a significant stride, and the nature of our collection, reporting, command and control today is such that the information going into those displays is basically all real time, or very near real time. We don't have the problems we used to have of lack of synchronism with some information being two days old while the other is up-to-date.

**Oettinger:** Again a footnote on that. The progress clearly comes from that technical capability, and perhaps one argument might say we have learned our lessons in terms of graphics and displays, since the shootdown of the Iranian airliner, where some of the problems have to do with the difficulty people had in interpreting displays, and so on. That kind of problem can be ironed out; and so, in that sense, I completely agree with David, there is progress. Now there is something, however, more fundamental also at play and this goes in the jump he's made from presidential decision making to the pilot in the airplane. Again, let me dwell on this a moment, because there may be a very interesting term paper or papers there as well. These are thoughts that I haven't elaborated, to even my own satisfaction, but I want to try them out with David here, and the rest of you react.

There are some things that are immutable to technological wizardry. One of them, for example, is flying an airplane. I don't know how many of you are aware of the fact of how little a pilot in a commercial airliner does these days. They sit there, whether they're sober or not, it really doesn't matter until they have the runway and lose their way taxiing, which unfortunately a couple of them do.

**McManis:** They're under positive control.

**Oettinger:** But, up in the air on autopilot, gee, they sit there having a cup of coffee, it doesn't matter. A lot of, let's say, the umpteen thousand sorties a day and the air traffic control over Iraq, etc., etc., is at that level of the technical element where you are flying airplanes, or you are doing some other kind of test where the technology is extremely helpful. As distinct from the other end of the spectrum, where the President of the United States or whoever sits there and says, "What am I going to do with this? It is not nearly as clear that at that end the real-time users make a significant difference. My sense is that there's a whole spectrum of stuff in between, which we don't understand very well. We lump it all together and don't have a good differentiated sense of what sort of the airplane flying, bullets guiding. You see all this stuff on CNN with the laser — boom!, the Baghdad building got it. Then the next day you don't know what the hell it was that we blew up. We hit it, but what was really underneath it? That illustrates two points on that spectrum, that technically you know you hit the thing, but the question then of what is it you hit, was it the right target, and then ultimately another layer up, what does that say to the President in terms of how does he react to the news stories about it.

**McManis:** There are two dimensions to this, Tony, and you've touched on both of them and they're clearly not the same. One is the presidential level. We can array before the President a bunch of diplomatic, political science papers, intelligence assessments on what's happening, and give him what we're seeing happening through our various ways of collecting through the attachés, through the ambassadors, through our technical means. It's a question on what's the President going to do with them, and again, that's a personality-driven thing. George Bush, I'm not that close to the president, but what he seems to do, is pick up the phone, and call Maggie and say, "Maggie, what do you think about this?" That was a very healthy event, and in fact that the use of the telephone today by our national leadership, that's what made the coalition work. I just have to give tremendous credit to the President for picking up the phone and working his peers out there in the world.

**Oettinger:** Talk about progress, because there are good records of early days, I'm trying to remember which president it was that said, "I don't need a telephone in the White House." Ten, twelve years ago the State Department wouldn't deal with

telephones at all. So that's an extremely significant statement that you've just made; a radical change in outlook in terms of that particular instrument.

**Student:** You said that the information collected in the frontline of the fight can be monitored in Washington, right. So, who does that screening?

**McManis:** Let me talk about it in just about one minute. I want to finish up here on the president first because that's really the second part of what Tony's talking about. I think that we need to work the issue of what presidents have, how they utilize it, and what sort of options we give to them because this gets back to the fundamental issues in warning. At what point does the decision maker have to make a decision because something has to be done. That understanding is very critical, and so you have to have a president who can start interacting with the system right away. I think, George Bush, has been doing that.

At the other end, we need to look at, and I hate to use the term tactical warning, but, at the weapons system warning level, what's happening on the battlefield, it's a very different issue. We're talking about watching war fighters pick up a gun, cock it, and pull the trigger, and we want to do that to the extent we can. Without going into detail I will say that we have very good capabilities to do that today. I won't say that on Day One of the confrontation in Kuwait that we had very good capabilities; but, the overall system was sufficiently robust to give us, in amazingly short order, very significant technical capabilities to monitor the battlefield, and to provide that information both to the Commander in Chief in the theater, to Norman Schwarzkopf, and the capability to provide it to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, and the President. Now, the significant thing here is that in the good old days we would have had the sandbox in the White House, and tactical decisions being made by the President. In this confrontation, a very clear decision came down from the President, endorsed by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs: The CINC in the theater was going to run the war. The modulation from Washington, I will guarantee you, has been absolutely minimal.

**McManis:** The intermediate bureaucrats are still there, they haven't gone away; they've changed significantly. Within the Pentagon, the Goldwater-Nichols act has made for a much more under-control, intelligently planned, operational approach to war fighting. The reaction to Vietnam, that is not wanting to drive the war from Washington, is really

very significant. Also, the fact that we're able to share data at all the locations, both in the field and in Washington, almost simultaneously has changed the equation too. Looking back to Vietnam, an awful lot came back to Washington before it went out to Vietnam for action.

**Oettinger:** Let me complicate that a little bit more. It's true as far as it goes, but there's another very fundamental dilemma which, again, has to do with the finiteness of the decision maker and the fact that an individual decision maker can't look at all this stuff, whether he's in Washington or in the field. Therefore, you either rely on the staff you have, which is the people who report in the field or the intermediate bureaucracies, or you create another bureaucracy besides that bureaucracy to be your intermediaries. Now it's only a very idealized thing that assumes stuff can travel to decision makers without intermediaries because the decision maker does not have the time.

Now, look at the record in seminar. You'll find something. Richard Beal, who came here a number of years ago, tried to provide an information system for the White House.* Tailor that, in David's terms, with the personality of Ronald Reagan, his proclivity for videos, etc. And you'll find Beal's account, in whatever year it was, and you'll find in last year, 1990, Jim Lucas' scenario.** Jim Lucas worked for Beal and, let me tell you about a couple of reactions that this set up. If you try to do that analytical work in the White House, you now have a war between the White House bureaucracy and the other bureaucracy. Not only that, but because you set up the dynamic of this information system it's subject to alternative uses. It happens to be the system that Ollie North used to do the hornswogglings in Iran-Contra. So you have something that starts out as a very innocent, simple-minded-sounding principle and once you start ramifying you say, "My God, I've got a real complex mess here." So this question of what the role of the middle bureaucracy is, does not appear if you think of decision makers as abstract points. But the minute you start saying, "Well, the decision maker's a figment of the imagination because it doesn't live long enough to do all

*Richard S. Beal, "Decision Making, Crisis Management, Information and Technology," in *Seminar on Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, Guest Presentations, Spring 1984.* Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA: 1984.

**James W. Lucas, "The Information Needs of Presidents," in *Seminar on Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, Guest Presentations, Spring 1990.* Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA: 1990.

the things that he/she is supposed to decide." Then the bureaucratic intermediate, bureaucratic dynamics come into play again, and I say the Beals and Lucas give you a sense of how the dynamics of this intermediation works.

**McLaughlin:** But let me add a note because we don't know how all this stuff works and how it will change. There's reason to believe, looking at an awful lot of the commercial world, that a lot of that bureaucracy in between really has been obsoleted. It's not dead yet, it's still wandering around. I'm reminded, talking to an executive of a very large corporation, who will remain nameless, when he described how they had a very large corporate planning department, that took up a floor of the office tower of Manhattan and they had recently abolished. They found out that they did very good work, but it was always behind the curve. Management was making all the decisions without any input from them. They would launch a study which would reach solid conclusions, but long after the important decisions had been made. They decided that the management should get some more telephones, some more computers, and encourage people to interact more directly and get rid of the 50 planners. I think we're going to see that happen in a lot of bureaucracies but there's less pressure at the moment.

**McManis:** But, again, a little more specifics on Desert Shield and Desert Storm, restricted now to the Joint Staff piece of the bureaucracy. The roles of the Joint Staff in this crisis have been clear from the very beginning. The nature of the command was such that there are roles that had to be undertaken within the Pentagon. The J-2, the intelligence arm at CINCENT was, by design, a very weak J-2. It did not have adequate resources. So even though we in the community were able to dump tons of information on them; they couldn't handle it. They couldn't even go through the data. So we augmented the J-2 at the Pentagon with a very large, very strong analytic cell. In fact it's the first time we've ever taken service intelligence analysts, analysts from DIA, and NSA, and, barely, CIA, and put all of those analysts: imagery analysts, signal intelligence analysts, and service analysts, at the same tables, working the single problem together in support of the CINC.

**Oettinger:** That's a miracle.

**McManis:** Absolute miracle. By God, it's working, it's working well. The J-3 (I don't want to say

anything nasty here because I don't intend it at all) in this situation, has almost been relegated the role of press briefer. And poor old Tom Kelley gets up there every day and wishes he had taken his retirement when he was going to. He thought he was going to run a war, and he's not running a war, because that's being done in the field and they don't need that augmentation out there.

I talked to the J-5 yesterday, and hopefully he's worrying about other big issues in the world like he should be worried about, as well as what the Middle East will be after the war, and what our involvement is going to be.

The J-6 is responsible for communications and interoperability. Again CINCENT did not have a strong J-6. The J-6, from the communications standpoint, has done yeoman service. It's just phenomenal, whether it's just for telephone service for the troops, or to bringing back huge bandwidths of collected intelligence.

The logistics folks have just done a fantastic job of coordinating the flow by air and by sea. The intermediate bureaucracies, as you called them, have done exactly what they should be doing. Although we all, in the intermediate bureaucracy like to get down there and play in the war, play in the sandbox, that's really been resisted to a very significant degree. For me, with all my experience in crisis management in the Pentagon, it's been a frustrating experience to be on the sidelines. One of my favorite stories about the "Intermediate bureaucracy" was about the evacuation from Beirut twenty years ago. We had some poor little Navy chief driving the landing craft away from Beirut loaded with American civilians and 12,000 flag officers from the Pentagon were effectively looking over his shoulder. Absolutely incredible.

**Student:** This has been lauded on every aspect of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The downside of the process which is, in my viewpoint, is that in these future types of crises how often are we going to have six months to catalyze and focus everything we have to a convenient enemy, who sits there in Kuwait City and does nothing but take pictures for that period of time.

**McManis:** But, how much of our reaction was also tempered by how long it took us to get troops and supplies, etc., there? Again, it's a real herky/jerky kind of thing.

**Oettinger:** The positive thing I hear in this exchange in the last few minutes is that the options are there and are being exercised. I keep hearing David

say, "Well, you know this one is best done on-site, that one is best done in the Pentagon, etc., etc. To me that is the real world, the real progress in terms of the technology from 20 or 50 years ago is that those options are there. Then when I hear the options are intelligently exercised, that's a good one, as opposed to one that gets screwed up.

**Student:** In every way, if Desert Shield had never even been Desert Storm, we still would have gained an enormous amount of trade-offs, at the minimum, in the process of having to do this kind of enormous operation.

**McManis:** I've jokingly talked in the Pentagon about this being the world's greatest OT&E, operational test and evaluation, for everything. We have now, in the Pentagon, an automated logistics control system. Apparently it's just really worked like gangbusters. I know how the intel systems have worked and they've worked like gangbusters. I know about as much about how effective the weapons have been as you do. We're all watching CNN.

We're seeing the cruise missiles fly by on real time on CNN. Most of the systems seemed to work very well. So, we really are learning a lot, and part of it we would not have learned without going into Desert Storm. Perhaps I'd just as soon not have learned those lessons, but we are learning them now that it's happened.

It's very interesting. Finally, for a lot of reasons, all the right things are happening, all the right things are coming together. I always get too optimistic and Tony usually brings me down to earth. There are some glitches, this has not been easy, it just hasn't happened magically. There have been some very strong actors in the Pentagon as well as in the field. There have been enormous arm-wrestling contests between the Pentagon and the CINC, but once they're behind us, they're behind us, and things go on. I think it's been good.

But what I see happening in this joint intelligence center, the JIC, is the concern and, indeed a focus, not on what's just happened but really on what we think may happen tomorrow. Again, with a few key analysts who dare to warn, being willing to go out and look at what many would consider to be very radical alternatives. Again, just from the press it's very easy to look at Saddam Hussein and say, "Hey, he has something else in the inventory there, we're not out of the woods yet." Let's just look, for example, at the aircraft that have flown to Iran. Every right-thinking person says the Iranians are

going to hang onto those aircraft; they've isolated the pilots, so on and so forth. But "what if," is the question that has to be asked and it's the question that's being asked in the JIC. That's a healthy kind of thing and it's being asked by the Secretary of Defense. It's being asked by the Chairman. It's being asked by CINCENT. What if that worst scenario should occur? That is all of a sudden for whatever reason, a 100 plus topflight aircraft take off from Iran and head down and decide to whack a couple of our battleships, we will hopefully be there to meet 'em and greet 'em. But we won't be surprised by it. A lot of this has come from having these people of diverse backgrounds, and really the best people that the community has to put up. We are not just assigning people to do a job. There's tremendous value coming out of there.

**Oettinger:** Well, I was thinking of a couple of things. I think the diverse backgrounds is important here because this is theater warfare of a kind that involves genuinely multiple services. Which is one element, because there have been previous successes of this kind, and the willingness to think and ask "what if" questions is, I think, a different dimension from the Joint because they both happen to be in play here.

I was thinking of that because you walk into the Naval War College at Newport, and if ever there was a single service institution, that is it. One of the things that greet you on the wall of their war gaming center is a statement, I forget by which hero. It was Chester Nimitz, of course, it was Chester Nimitz, about the fact that they were not surprised by anything that happened in the Pacific because everything that was tried by the Japanese Navy during World War II had been war gamed at Newport many years before by the officers who happened to be there. Now, a combination of luck and smarts, and willingness to ask "what if" questions, so happening to luck out and ask the right questions, not involving jointness, so that these are two independent dimensions: one, the willingness to ask "what if" questions independent of the services or jointness, and the second being the jointness which is relevant here. So, what David is saying is that both of those ingredients, each of which could have been absent or present, are fortunately present in this instance.

**Student:** The thing I find most remarkable about everything that is going on is that over the past 10 or 12 years, at least, is the evolution of two seemingly mutually exclusive phenomena: the ability to

provide massive amounts of information in a very short period of time, which would tend to make one think there would be over command and over control. At the same time there's been the development, with which I first was associated in the Navy — something like the composite warfare commander doctrine — command by negation, where you don't use all this information to look over the shoulder of the gent who is doing it. It looks like that's now been carried to the national command level in telling the CINC, "It's your war, you run it, submit your plans. If I have a problem with it, I will tell you."

**McManis:** The CINC was provided with some boundaries: For instance, "Try to stay away from civilian casualties to the extent that you possibly can. The war is to liberate Kuwait, it's not to do more." Those are very general kind of instructions. That's right.

**Student:** Somebody smart somewhere was looking out, seeing those two things developing simultaneously.

**McManis:** I've said this a number of times to Tony, and this, of course, has been the delight of my being at the Pentagon at this point in history. I've never seen a better team at the Pentagon. It's on both sides. Again, I'll credit Goldwater-Nichols with making a very robust, superbly manned joint staff, not just the senior staff chiefs but all the way down through the ranks. I'll credit Dick Cheney for putting together a good team on the OSD side. You will see less turf being fought over in the Pentagon than I've ever seen in my 30-some years in the government. People just want to get the job done and it's been an absolute delight, and I think now that we've put it to the test, by damn, it works.

**Student:** Being a signal corps officer, one thing that strikes me about this, and you haven't really talked about, is we've been able to conduct this operation with relatively robust communication networks. If we had to operate with any type of the difficulties Saddam Hussein is operating with, where we don't have triple, quadruple networks passing information. How well could we do? Would we be doing our job right now in terms of how the battlefield operation is being controlled? Where would we be if any of our communication networks were taken out, for any reason? Of course we haven't even gotten into the ground war stage where our communication links are much more tenuous than they are right now. I just think that perhaps

operating in a benign environment like we are right now is giving us a bit of false sense of security.

**McManis:** Well, it's certainly giving us an advantage. I hope it's not giving us a false sense of security because I think we all understand that, particularly in a ground confrontation, that while our communications will remain relatively robust during that period, it's not going to be the same. Communications discipline goes to hell amongst other things. In a different environment where, say we were confronting a Soviet Warsaw Pact threat, it would be a very different game, where there was some capability to interdict our communications. Our communications capabilities are really very vulnerable, probably even to terrorism.

**Student:** I have just come from NATO and I know just how vulnerable those communications are from the Army theater down to Corps. It concerns me that the lessons we've learned from this may be a bit misleading.

**McManis:** Again, within terms of lessons learned, we don't want to immediately apply the lessons of a Desert Storm to a future Warsaw Pact operation, or vice versa. Clearly, the way we planned to do battle in the Warsaw Pact is not much like what we're doing on the desert.

**Student:** I'm just talking about the lessons in terms of management of joint staff at Schwarzkopf's level.

**McManis:** Again, the view from the field is much clearer than what I have of how things are being managed in theater. What I see is a clear delineation of responsibilities amongst the subordinate commands out there, to the point where they can operate, probably to some extent, with some, or do operate, with some autonomy. Again, without having folks back in Washington looking around too much, that probably helps that process a lot too. From here it looks pretty good. I think it would be interesting to get views from the field at some point in time.

**Oettinger:** Let me underscore that. I agree with the point that I think he's trying to make. In terms of the future, after-action analyses, things that would probably look pretty awful if they were happening in the European theater, and equipment that might have performed differently under European conditions may be doing better in an environment while there is a Corps where all Hell's breaking loose. The rest of the world is in fairly stable and relatively benign shape and I think that certainly differentiates this environment from others that might be.

**McManis:** Not being a military planner or strategist, it's obvious that having military supremacy is a very significant factor. Really, the folks over there are just having a ball.

**Student:** It's the pros against a high school team. The other part of the thing is that next year, I think we're going to see half the Army writing after-action reports, as you said earlier; and the other half's going to be trying to figure out what the Army's going to look like after the war.

**McManis:** Well, just to respond to that. there is already a significant effort to look at lessons learned. The J-1 was tasked, before Desert Storm, early in the days of Desert Shield, to start pulling them together. Again, not to get anybody in trouble or put anybody on report, but just to see how the system works. My experience with most lessons learned is we just file them away. But also, I say, the next war won't be the same as this one. Although we all think, I hope we all think, at lunch we seemed to have some consensus that a lot of folks are going to be in the Middle East for a long time.

**Student:** Do you see at this point, significant structural changes as a result of this, rather than just temporary changes to accommodate?

**McManis:** Within the U.S. bureaucracy?

Boy, it's really early. It's almost like assessing where we are in the war. What do you say after 28 days, whatever? In the intelligence community, most of the folks at the senior levels that I'm dealing with, say we really stumbled on something that was right for this crisis, and may be right, in a different construct for the next crisis. We've all said we really need to have a physical facility that will accommodate that kind of operation where you can literally walk in, put your analysts down, and have the terminals and connectivity with the information systems. What we had to do with the JIC this time was, and fortunately, in the mezzanine basement of the Pentagon, for those of you who know your way around — not one of the most attractive areas in the world — there happened to be an area that was undergoing renovation and, once a decision was made to set up a JIC, boy, within seven days, they had it fully equipped with Sun workstations, full connectivity to the whole system, and we had some of the best community analysts there working a full watch. There's a lot of luck as well as a lot of effort to make all that happen.

**Oettinger:** One additional comment. It would be worth bringing this point up again when General Gray is here. Again, by the nature of the Marine Corps mission, this problem of pulling the pieces together, I mean, you've got to at least work with the Navy, the Marines have paid more attention to dealing with this over a longer period of time than other services. So bring it up again, and you'll find some of those concerns expressed in the article by Gray that I handed out today.

**McManis:** Watch out for Gray because he's been brought up as an intelligence officer too, so he will speak truth. Or truth as I see it.

**Student:** When he said the physical construction of a JIC, I just remembered from years and years and years on Navy ships where working with Marines, there was always the need for the amphibious JIC, and we never even had the right equipment, or philosophy, or anything. NAVSEA Systems Command said it was a ship. The Marines would say it's a flag ship for a Marine amphibious application.

**McManis:** A good point. That probably gets back to the other part of the question. Maybe in terms of some lessons learned on the other side, it's not just having the JIC. One of our biggest concerns, and one of our biggest difficulties from Day One of the deployment was end-to-end connectivity. Again, we started off almost at the point of shouting out the door and hoping somebody out there in theater was getting the message, and I will tell you at first it was very doubtful if anybody was getting the message. There was a terminal out there someplace and an awful lot of good stuff was going right to ground. We worked that and we worked it very hard, and we're reasonably comfortable with the connectivity today, but you could sort of lay it out as a macro diagram of how the national community is connecting with the CINC and just make straight lines, but the reality is there are three, four, five, six different systems sort of overlaid on one another, which, hopefully, at the distant end, are at least in the same room. But they're still not really getting it together in the way we'd like. In fact when Duane Andrews (ASDC3I) comes up, in a month or so, put him on the spot about end-to-end architecture for command, control, communications, and intelligence, because that's going to be one we have to pay more attention to.

**Oettinger:** But, you see "end-to-end," and it goes back to your point. One of the reasons why benignness, in some respect, is less of an issue, is that while planning in this respect has been miserable, reality has outpaced planning. Again, this is

part of the technology and the democratization on the retail character. There is now much more redundancy than was unplanned for than there would have been under all the planning. Which is another reason why I look skeptically at nattering this about the Iraqian wisdom of Saddam Hussein and his having all that redundancy. Maybe he planned it but I think we're suffering from Russian ten-foot-tall syndrome nowadays — it's Iraqis are ten-foot tall. If I look at an oil country which is also trying to modernize, etc., and has all these foreign contractors, etc., etc. The odds of redundant fiber optic, microwave, and 16 other networks being built simply because there's 16 different contractors operating, and five oil companies, and so forth, well, why the hell not? In the United States, the Hinsdale fire for example, got a lot of the private sector up in arms about redundancy, and so people started doing things on their own to provide themselves with multiple paths, etc., that all of AT&T would have taken a decade to do, if it ever got around to it. At least with respect to communications this is one area where the combination of technology and economic pressures means that the odds are that in most places you will find greater connectivity than you would have suspected under the old end-to-end planning, things which never quite make it until it's too late.

**Student:** But in Saddam's case with all of the Soviet technology and advice he's been getting, that redundancy is part of their overall strategy.

**McManis:** Yeah. It's more than that. I think the Iraqis are very good engineers and they had a concern about security both in the vulnerability of their own communications which came out of the Iran-Iraq confrontation, which we helped educate them about, and they learned a lesson in a way that no other power we've ever faced has learned. When they talk about communications security or operations security they are very serious, because the alternative is you're going to get shot if you go into clear speech on your HF radio. It's as simple as that.

**Student:** That brings me to another question. A lot of the things that are being reported don't mean anything to average Joe citizen. But, from what I can watch, and read, and hear, having worked the problem for years, it tells me exactly where I left off — what we know about them and what now somebody else knows that we know about them. Was this a conscious decision that was made to say, "Well, hell, the shooting started so we're just not going to keep any secrets now." Or was this something that

was stumbled into and now is going to be hard to recover from?

**McManis:** Who knows? Probably all of the above. First of all, we are still keeping some secrets, there are still a few secrets we have locked up in vaults, thank God.

**McLaughlin:** You haven't heard the news today.

**McManis:** There are fewer and fewer. Even listening to Mr. Cheney yesterday in his speech to the Chamber of Commerce was pretty good, pretty revealing. Although it was revelatory of stuff that probably everybody knows anyway. That's right, he talked about communications, and I really do guess, hopefully, it was a conscious decision that was made. Also, watching those press conferences, and the continued pressure out in the field and here to say something, I think the Pentagon really has wanted to help the press and the American people, thereby, to the extent they can.

**McLaughlin:** And to prove that there was an active command and control center in the White House.

**McManis:** We'll always have those incidents. We really have the openness, despite the press complaining to the contrary; and it's really quite amazing. The frustrations of the press in trying to get at BDA, bomb damage assessment, really reflect no more than our own frustrations in the community to try and do the same thing.

There are a lot of lessons to be learned from coalition warfare. I don't think we've ever really done anything quite this way before. I wouldn't be surprised if we have another strange set of partners again in the future, but it'll be a different set. Our partners today, the Syrians, who I would put in the same category as the Iraqis in terms of deviousness and willingness to do ill in the world, are our allies today, just as the Iraqis were sort of allies not too many years ago.

**Student:** One of the major lessons I think we learned from this thing, that we were tremendously vulnerable in the first six weeks, even the first eight weeks, as far as what might have happened to us if the Iraqis decided to go into Dhahran.

**McLaughlin:** There is, maybe, another major lesson, one perhaps forgotten since 1972, which is that a lot of medium sized third world nations may decide not to mess with the meanest mother in the valley. I think this may be the U.S. in some respect, saying, "knock it off, guys." I don't think that Syria,

Iran, or anyone else wants to face what Iraq confronts today.

**Student:** Two questions. What does yesterday's occurrence indicate about dual phenomenology in war, the ability to determine what's the use of the bunker in that particular point in time, and how does one share intelligence with those who were enemies yesterday and may be enemies tomorrow?

**McManis:** The flip answer and the real answer is, "very carefully." The command is a joint command out there and we operate on the assumption that whatever we send out there is shared. Believe me, for guys like me, who spent 30 years behind barbed wire, that's an ulcer-causing condition. If you go into it knowledgeably, you can do a lot. There will be a price to pay for that. We've made the assessment and we say the price we're going to have to pay ultimately is probably worth the gain we're getting. We probably could not have done this without a coalition. I think it's been very important to us. We've been willing to pay a price for that, but the long-term price is going to be very significant.

**Oettinger:** May I argue mildly against that because I think the price would have been the same, coalition or no coalition. I'm overstating. But no lead in anything including technology, an economic lead, or anything lasts forever and if you don't share it as we did for some gain immediately, as in this situation, it'll get stolen or eroded sooner or later. It's not a question of principle but only a price. I think one of the critical things to keep in mind when one is talking about technological, or weapons, or economic edge is you've got to keep running just to stand still. The notion is that somehow there is a wall that is impermeable, and there are stark decisions. I think the choice is between slower erosion versus sharing at a reasonable price. Again, a wonderful term paper topic.

**McManis:** I think your qualification is right though and there really is the trade-off, as long as you do this consciously. Again, we in the intelligence community have sensitive sources and methods that we want to protect; we will always be extremely conservative about that and we will always predict the end of the world should that next source, or next method be revealed. When the Secretary of Defense says, "Gee, I just looked at today's imagery," and you say, "Oh, God, what are you talking about?" That's been a deeply held secret that we can move imagery around like that.

**Student:** Isn't there something more to it though? I mean it's beyond just technology, it's also techniques.

**McManis:** Absolutely. The concern I have is looking at any of our coalition partners right now, or most of our coalition partners, few of whom understood the depth of our capabilities, to collect information. But, even more importantly, who now are becoming very sensitized to their own vulnerabilities. The business of the intelligence community is to prey on vulnerabilities. With Saddam Hussein, he learned that lesson, he learned what his vulnerabilities were, and, boy, I'll tell you he's played it right. We've never faced a tougher partner in terms of access. And that's a collective, I don't care what source, what type of collection methodology you're talking about. We've never faced a tougher partner, including the Soviet Union. Again, we worry about others becoming comparably tough. As Tony said, it's countermeasure-countermeasures and this goes on indefinitely.

**Oettinger:** You can never sit still. Never, never, never.

**Student:** What are your thoughts about the event yesterday, the bunker, and the things the Saudis said; they pointed that out as a command and control target.* The press was asking the question subsequently about whether intelligence knew there were civilians in there, perhaps an ignorant question but nevertheless an important one in the eyes of the people who saw that show. The follow-on conclusion that I'd ask you to discuss is, what is press politics doing to the decision-making process in the Pentagon? Is it having a dramatic impact in making decisions it would have made if CNN wasn't there, simply to ensure that public opinion, U.S. public opinion, Iraqi public opinion, and all the Arab nations, are staying on our side?

**McManis:** I'm going to duck the first part of your question for two reasons: 1) I honestly don't know all the facts, which is a good excuse, and 2) probably if I did know all the facts I couldn't talk about them. In terms of the impact of the press on the Pentagon, I'm reasonably convinced that the Pentagon leadership has a fairly robust ability to stand up to the press. I have been impressed, as I'm sure you

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*This refers to the bombing of the Amiriya bunker in a suburb of Baghdad. Allied intelligence had identified the bunker as a Command and Control facility. Approximately 300 Iraqi civilians were killed when the complex was bombed.

have been, by looking at Pete Williams and what's going on, but I have not seen them caving to concern about civilian casualties. We've been very concerned from day one about civilian casualties, but not at the expense of protecting American lives. I don't see that changing. I've seen some of the decision process going into selecting targets, and we select targets for all the right reasons. Hopefully we have the fullest knowledge we can about what's there we've selected, targets in civilian areas but they've been military targets, and there's going to be collateral damage. I think the comments that Secretary Cheney made about collateral damage from SAMs and other things are very true but it's always been the case.

**Student:** I guess that CNN is probably keeping the decisions we're making much more honest.

**McManis:** I wouldn't argue with that.

**Student:** I'm saying a more honest attempt at reporting.

**McManis:** But the going-in ground rules were such that we would have the right goals.

**Oettinger:** I would not overplay the role of CNN in this respect. I think we've been through 20 years now of concern over such matters. I think both ethical concerns and the fear of going to jail have a lot more to do with it than CNN. I think in the years since Vietnam, since Watergate, since Lieutenant Calley's trial, you name it, there's a whole bunch of things folks worry about that are likely to have much more influence on anybody, from a lieutenant in the field to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

**Student:** Would we have hit that bunker if we knew there were civilians in it?

**Oettinger:** Look, I think I said before you came in, if one looks at communications nodes, whether in the United States or anywhere else, it's sort of hard to imagine in 1991 that they would be anywhere but in a population center. So you have a real dilemma, which is that, if you believe that a strategy of decapitation or getting at the nerve centers, etc., etc., is essential because it's a lot cheaper ultimately in everybody's lives than going after muscle, you make a decision based on that. In most parts of the world today, probably by now including much of the Soviet Union, the bulk of the communications facilities are civilian communications facilities over which military traffic passes. The Soviet Union is the last major power that made a concerted effort to have absolutely separate civilian and military

networks. Whether that has lasted or can last much longer is in doubt, and I don't know of any other place in the world that did. I have no reason to believe that Iraq would have been significantly different. My guess is that once the President said, "Fight the war; do what is necessary," we're not going to do a Vietnam, tying hands behind back. That was probably kind of a foregone conclusion. So, in terms of casting it as current intelligence, I think it's a matter more of complete knowledge of where the stuff is.

**McManis:** In terms of where we are technologically and operationally, and politically, we have never had such a close interaction among the players as we do in the targeting game right now. The information flow to the targeteers, the consideration of factors, the flowback to the intelligence analysts for BDA purposes has never worked so well. It used to be that the targeteers went and did their thing. Again, that was one of those where we fired our reports out the door and they might or might not pay attention to them, depending on what they saw. They relied strictly on the gun-camera photography, for BDA, which accounts for those incredibly high kill rates in Vietnam, and not much else. Now it's a very tight interaction. I can't go into a lot of detail, but it's just incredibly tight the way folks are working these kinds of issues over there. It's very impressive.

**Student:** Almost every joint exercise in which I've participated we've always gamed avoiding civilian casualties, and then from a live fire episode, A-6 where Lieutenant Goodman was lost over Lebanon, attempting to take out artillery pieces that were put in relatively dangerous areas. We knew that they were stationing artillery pieces on tops of apartment buildings. The logical thing to do if we didn't care about civilian casualties would have been to use one of the 16-inch guns, but we didn't do that. The battle group commander made the conscious decision to use manned aircraft so that he could direct the bombs so as to avoid civilian casualties. So CNN being there, in Baghdad right now has nothing to do with that decision that's made.

**Oettinger:** One of the arguments for giving the media more information is that we've nothing to say. The degree of self-justification and puffery, and so on, and self-importance grows up. It's one argument, I would say, for giving them more real information so there's less self-churning and self-congratulations, and self-analysis.

**McLaughlin:** I want to make a few remarks on your most immediate remark. I think maybe it was in Dave's presentation, back in 1984, when he talked about one of the reasons Lyndon Johnson got playing in the sandbox was the fact he couldn't get a straight story from the field. To the degree that you want to invent the use of the 6,000 mile, or 9,000 mile screwdriver, passing back bad information is a sure way to do it. It will invite intervention from higher levels every time.

I want to talk a couple of points on the media. I think there is a lot of smoke and mirrors here, but maybe something real. The real issue is, I think, that people have different expectations today. The same way for the first week, I'd go down and turn on CNN every morning and find out how long are we going to continue doing that. I first got a glimpse of that, in the Tianamen Square thing where people really sort of thought that something would happen next, and it didn't. The Chinese weren't playing the game for CNN or for the *New York Times,* so they just stopped the game. I think that was a great shock to a lot of western intellectuals, and the media. I think there is — I don't want to overstate the idea of wrapping up the miniseries or whatever — but I think there is an enhanced expectation of moving the story line along; we've got to get back on schedule. But on the other side, and I'll invite you, if you're interested in the topic, to go back and look at 1984 proceedings when we had Leo Cherne here talking about television news and national interest.* There is a colloquy there among the three of us. Leo's point was how can the President make policy when network news is always second guessing him. We talked about, let's not confuse what's on the media with reality in a couple of senses. I am convinced to this day that it was not the reporting of the war in Vietnam that eventually eroded popular support for the war. It was body bags coming back over a 9-year period.

**Oettinger:** It is reports by rotating combatants. Through their families, and their letters, and so forth.

**McLaughlin:** For the first four or five years you had lots of popular support. Over time, it wasn't the pictures of body bags, it was the body bags themselves. When you've got a small town in Ohio with

12 killed in the Marine Corps in one week, well, that starts to make an impact. It's cumulative.

Well, at any rate, we have to be careful. The media has a great vested interest in making you believe how important they are. That's how they sell advertising, by telling how influential the *New York Times* or NBC evening news is. They have deluded themselves, and I think they've deluded a lot of their critics.

**Oettinger:** They have deluded a lot of their critics, they've paid them off.

**McLaughlin:** There's a very good body of literature, much of which is summed up and reported for our program by a woman by the name of Christine Urban about how people collect and process information; it's a very complex process. I invite you, if you're interested, to look at that level of complexity.*

One of the things we constantly discovered is that even if the media has a message to deliver, which I think they frequently do, that they have their own message that they want to deliver, but it's not necessarily what is seen by the public. Now to me, seeing all those people wandering around the streets of Baghdad is pretty good evidence that we've been avoiding collateral damage with a vengeance. Why are all those people out there shopping in mid-day.

**McManis:** Ignoring the air raid sirens.

**McLaughlin:** Right. Speaking to a bunch of newspaper publishers last year I said, "I found it fairly remarkable that after 18 months of the presidency of George Bush, with every leading newspaper and every network dumping on George Bush, every day and every night, he had 80 percent support. Doesn't that tell you something about the influence of the network news and the *New York Times,* and *L.A. Times.* They found that a puzzling message, by the way. The message as actually perceived by people is not what the networks or the newspapers may start out to generate in the first place.

**Student:** I'd like to get back to a point you made in the beginning where you said, when you were talking about Vietnam, that was more a political than a military war. I think if we listened to Clausewitz he'd say, "All wars are political in a sense." I just wondered what you had in mind,

*Leo Cherne, "Television News and the National Interest," in *Seminar on Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence: Guest Presentations, Spring 1984.* Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, February 1985.

*Christine Urban, "Factors Influencing Media Consumption: A Survey of the Literature in *Understanding New Media,* edited by Benjamin M. Compaine-Ballinger, Cambridge, MA, 1984.

because I've noticed observers of this particular war in the Gulf saying there's actually two wars going on. The Americans or the coalition is fighting a military war, according to Queensbury Rules and all that, and Saddam Hussein is fighting a political war, dirty as you like. However he wins political points is what you focus on, and of course, that's where I think CNN is a very important weapon for him in the sense that perhaps the two key political nerve points for a President are too many Americans getting killed or too many Iraqi civilians getting killed. In the case of civilians he's got the CNN there to help him get that across to the American domestic public as quickly as possible. So, it seems to me that, while that sort of information might not affect the conduct of the war militarily, it must have an affect on the President and how his decision making is arrived at. I was just very interested in your reaction.

**McManis:** I think on the point of why I called Vietnam a political war, it was just a gross simplification, but it really was a war run by politicians. I guess that's what I really meant to imply there. We did not let the war fighters do what war fighters are paid to do to a particular extent.

**Oettinger:** Oh but look, but in that sense then the U.S. Civil War was a political war. This sleazy railroad lawyer named Abraham Lincoln ran the damn thing sitting there by the telegraph and overruling his generals and his cabinet.

**McManis:** It's still true, though. I think the negative aspects of that were very evident and still are.

I want to grab control back just for a minute since this is my nickel. I really had planned initially to read something into the record and now after the last hour and 40 minutes, I think it's even more important that I read it into the record even though it's a kind of boring thing to have happen to you, but then you'll have it at your fingertips.

I mentioned early on the ex-J-5, Lieutenant General Lee Butler, who now is 4-star CINCSAC, who I think is one of the absolutely, most brilliant military officer I've ever run across. When I moved to the Pentagon he and I started a love affair because he was so caught up with the warning process and the importance of warning to the planning process. Lee brought together what he called "Roundtables on Warning" which were monthly seminars, if you will, for Joint Staff personnel at the senior levels to talk about how warning plays with the planning process, with the logistics, with the decision-making

process. We tried to orchestrate it for this year but Lee got away from us, but someday hopefully, you'll be able to get him here. I suspect we've not heard the last of Lee Butler. Once he reorganizes SAC maybe he'll come back and reorganize the Joint Staff. Lee made a speech right after the invasion of Kuwait back on September 27 to the National Press Club. I selected just a few extracts, and if you'll indulge me while I read them I'd like to leave them here for you.

Obviously when I say "I" it's Lee Butler, when I say "we" it's the Joint Staff and the timing now being five or six months ago.

"Face-to-face with the reality of powerful new adversaries, shrinking forward presence and reduced resources, it became clear that we could no longer make assumptions about, and assign fixed values to, variables in the response equation which were now absolutely crucial with respect to outcomes. Foremost among these variables are warning time and political decisions regarding response, reserve call-up, and resort to commercial lift assets. With respect to warning — the most critical and elusive factor in operational planning — I have concluded after months of reflection, that there are only two legitimate answers to the question of how much warning will be available in a given crisis. The short answer is, 'I don't know,' and the second slightly longer is, 'That depends on how the crisis arises and unfolds.'

"I have also formulated the following dictums about warning time. First, to guess wrong when dealing with a powerful adversary is to lose. Second, warning time isn't warning time unless you exploit it; otherwise it is wasted time. And, third, the propensity to avail oneself of warning is inversely proportional to the amount of time perceived to be available. This is because crisis response always entails a high element of risk, encompassing political, economic and military considerations.

"Consequently, we have embarked on a new contingency planning strategy which puts a premium on what I call 'Graduated Deterrence Response.' Its premise is that a crisis can arise under a variety of circumstances that will in turn condition a variety of likely or possible responses. Its most operative feature is that where appropriate, we will task regional planners for not one but several response options, or 'concepts of operations' as we call them, keyed to specific conditions of crisis onset. The governing factors will be spelled out to these planners in terms of the crucial variables of warning time and decisions regarding response timing, reserve call-up, and lift availability.

"This new planning construct underscores the importance of early response to a crisis. It also facilitates early decision by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths which begin with bite-size, deterrence-oriented options carefully tailored to avoid the classic response dilemma of 'too much too soon, or too little too late . . .'

". . . If it is in fact true that 'warning time,' or as I would prefer to call it 'available response time,' is increasing with respect to prospective future conflict in Europe, that may well prove to be a curse as well as a blessing. Clearly it is a blessing in that NATO can and has begun to reduce its force posture, readiness levels, and other Cold War defense burdens. It will be a curse if we and our Alliance partners fail to sustain the potential for reconstituting large, competent forces to hedge against fundamental reversal in Europe or in a world-at-large where new and renewed threats might arise . . ."

I didn't mean to put a damper on the proceedings by that. I think that it is very profound and shows the thinking at the highest levels of the military.

**Student:** Was that speech made before the crisis?

**McManis:** This was the 27th of September.

**Oettinger:** Folks, you've got another few minutes to ask the former NIO questions.

**Student:** Could I just shift the focus, picking up on what the general wrote there. I guess I've always had the feeling that Gorbachev was the greatest thing that walked the face of the earth in the 20th century or he is the biggest con artist ever to exist, and it's starting to look more and more like perhaps he was a con artist, or at least he's coming under pressures that are making him reverse his field.

**McManis:** I'm not a Sovietologist, maybe he's just a human being like everybody else. Neither 10 feet tall nor 4 feet tall.

**Oettinger:** I think it's self-delusion on our part that perestroika and glasnost, etc., is over. You look at the history, say of the French revolution, the Russian revolution, etc., etc. Two, three years after the initial whatever, things started getting out of control and chaotic because the old regime is no longer viable and the new regime isn't in place yet, and all hell breaks loose. My guess is, that that's what's happening, that this was a very sincere, capable guy who succeeded in demolishing enough of the old regime to get things unstable.

**Student:** I guess that's the whole point of that remark and I guess the question: are there some

indications that what we're missing could in fact be warnings?

**McManis:** I think one of the real risks of this whole thing was we in the West embraced all of what Gorbachev was doing. Both his initiatives which we said were right on. They're moving down the path we think they should have been moving down for a long time. And the euphoria we experienced with the demise of the Warsaw Pact had a real risk of blinding us, and today what we have in the Soviet Union is an incredibly unstable situation. Instability inherently brings significant threat, and you put Soviet instability together with stability in Southwest Asia that's a terribly volatile world.

We've got a rough decade ahead of us.

**Oettinger:** You know in 1789 the French stormed the Bastille. By 1792 the French Republican Army began to march across Europe, and then you have 10 years of Napoleon. I'm not suggesting facile historical analogies, but it wouldn't be the first time that after three years crazy things might happen.

**Student:** In that regard, I guess we have some decisions to make here in the next couple of years or sooner, in terms of forces in Europe. I hear rumors that VII Corps is going back to Europe basically to pick up their things and move elsewhere. What do think are the realities?

**McManis:** The only reality I know today is that all bets are off. I've gotten that from the horses' mouths. We just really don't know. We're clearly going to have a reduced military structure as soon as we can. Cheney's already said it may not be as soon as we promised. That's a given; we're already way behind the power curve. We just don't know what the new world construct is going to be.

**Student:** In terms of VII Corps and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, at all three political levels, the agreement has been made for smaller units, multinational units, looking at say three Corps in the central region max, rather than four: two German and one U.S. mixed.

**McManis:** There should be a decision in April if we're able to move along. But, I understand that NATO is also going through the hand-wringing exercise: What happened, where were we in all this, and what did this mean?

**Student:** 1404 is nowhere close to being rewritten.

**McManis:** But NATO strategy and policy statements have always been years behind reality.

**Student:** At the same time the Czechs are saying, "Why don't you guys stay for a little bit longer?"

**Student:** I think all of the European nations are not anxious to see us leave. But I agree with you; I think we're going to see a corps in Europe for the next two years whether or not we design our land force a little differently as a result of these changes, and I think we have to. We can't just cut the budget at the margins and cut the structure of the margins. We have a new kind of world to plan for.

**Oettinger:** Yeah, but to echo some of the things that John McLaughlin said in the memo, about your topics, I hear you the way he did, suggesting that maybe there's a planning process that will take care of all that. What Dave said was, "All bets are off." That means that the odds of being able to do systematic planning in any conventional sense, that will be worth a damn, are small. While the question then is, "What do you do?" Again, this is an advertisement for the Marine Corp Doctrine Manual, and its approach to addressing that problem. The challenge that I put to you, and again, you're welcome to try to do term papers if you happen to believe, which you're entitled to, that is bullshit pieties or something, then come up with a better one. That problem of dealing with a situation where planning, like warning, becomes very iffy because the events are so chaotic, is a central problem of our new world order, and so I commend it to you as a topic to be taken very seriously.

**McManis:** We're pretty far down the road to a new unified command plan and a new command structure. I think that has not been derailed but it certainly has been put on the back burner. It's going to get a look-see, and I think Chairman Powell is doing that almost on a daily basis. He's saying, "That which I envisioned makes sense in the way we're operating now." I couldn't begin to guess where that'll end up; I suspect it won't be that far from what he originally planned.

**Oettinger:** I'll bring us a handout the next time. It has some words of Powell's, two or three pages worth, on strategy for the 1990s and I'll give that to you as grist for the mill.

**Student:** Is this a case where business may be able to inform national security operations? There's a book that I started reading and got totally bored on called, *Thriving on Chaos*, which is four or five years old.* It is that kind of chaos that has been driving my friends in the economic world crazy where all of your plans fell apart because your assumptions were wrong, and almost everything changed on you. Maybe we can learn something from them.

**Oettinger:** We can pursue that topic at other times during the semester. It's one near and dear to our hearts. We should thank Dave now.

**McManis:** Thank God I don't have to fly to California. I would say this is probably the most fun I've had since the last time I was here.

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*Peters, Thomas J., *Thriving on Chaos: Handbook for a Management Revolution.* Knopf/Random House, New York, 1987.