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The Pitfalls of Peacetime Military Bureaucracy
Richard T. Reynolds

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The Pitfalls of Peacetime Military Bureaucracy

Richard T. Reynolds

Since 1994, Colonel Richard T. Reynolds, USAF, has been Chief of Plans for U.S. European Command, based in Stuttgart, Germany., where he is responsible for a wide range of planning activities, including noncombatant evacuation, peacetime engagement, peace enforcement, and full-up combat operations. Previously, he was a military doctrine analyst at the Airpower Research Institute, College for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. During his assignment at Air University, Col. Reynolds wrote his book, Heart of the Storm—The Genesis of the Air Campaign Against Iraq, *which was published by Air University Press in January 1995. Following his graduation from Lawrence University, Col. Reynolds joined the Air Force in 1972, and has spent most of his career in fighter operations, serving in both the United States and in Europe. In 1989, after a three-year tour of duty at the Pentagon as AWACS Staff Officer, he was selected to attend Harvard University as an Air Force National Defense Fellow. His treatise* What Fighter Pilots' Mothers Never Told Them About Tactical Command and Control—and Certainly Should Have *was published by the Program on Information Resources Policy in November 1991.*

Oettinger: For Rich Reynolds, it's a homecoming. He was our Air Force National Defense fellow several years ago. You are already familiar with him from his writings, which you should have read by today. One of his charms is that he gives as good as he takes, and so it should be an enjoyable discussion. With that, I just turn it over to him. Welcome back, Rich.

Reynolds: Thank you for giving me the opportunity to be here. I am not a scholar. I'm simply a planner and a writer. During the past 20 months I've served as the Chief of Plans for U.S. European Command. In my view, this position, which I did not seek, is punishment for having produced a book critical of the planning establishment. It was as though the establishment were saying to me, "If you think you can do it better, just go ahead and try, Mr. Smart-Aleck." And so, I did. I began work on *Heart of the Storm—The Genesis of the Air Campaign Against Iraq* while assigned as a researcher at the Air Force's Center of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE). Initially, my bosses were not keen on the idea of doing anything on "contemporary events." The establishment viewed research on such things as risky and premature. After several months of cajoling, I was allowed a limited amount of freedom to pursue the project. Unknowingly, I made a deal with the devil when I agreed to give every senior officer I interviewed the opportunity to read the transcript and add or delete from it at will. Because of that agreement, it took a lot longer to write and, ultimately, publish the book. I was ill prepared for the kind of controversy the book generated. I don't know if Tony told you anything ahead of time, but ...

Oettinger: I wouldn't want to prejudice anyone.

Reynolds: Good. There was a tremendous effort to stop publication of *Heart of the Storm.* I hope you all noticed the damning letter, prominently displayed in the front of *Heart of the Storm*, written by the Air University Commander, Lt. Gen. Jay Kelley. Much of the Air Force senior leadership and the bureaucracy that supported them felt very threatened by this little book about Gulf War planning. In the overall scheme of things, *Heart of the Storm* was an insignificant work, with less than 20,000 legitimate copies in circulation. I was told that when the book went up to the Pentagon for review, the Air Staff did an investigation and discovered that all of

the copiers in the Pentagon increased their usage by some 400 percent during the time *Heart of the Storm* was undergoing review for initial publication. This increase in copier usage was attributed to illegitimate copies being made of the *Heart of the Storm* manuscript, and overzealous staffers sending copies of it everywhere they could. A team of lawyers advised Lt. Gen. Kelley that even if he suppressed publication it was likely an "unauthorized" copy would make the press and cause the establishment even more problems.

I found the whole review and publication process very strange. Bureaucracies to me are a fascinating thing. People are like sheep. They all like to smell the same. If a sheep smells differently, he is driven from the herd. Strange smells frighten sheep. Things must remain constant for herds of sheep and, I suspect, for large bureaucracies like the military establishment. I think bureaucracies also tend to be comfortable with themselves and distrust outsiders or ideas that run contrary to their own way of thinking. Thomas Kuhn says it far better than I in his book *The Theory of Scientific Revolutions*.* Dr. Oettinger, ever the optimist, argues that bureaucracies keep what he calls "white blood cells" like me and other nontraditional thinkers around to cleanse the system, and keep the bureaucracy alive and well. I harbor no such optimism. I believe all bureaucracies eventually crumble from within by their own diseased ineptness and inability to react quickly to change and crisis. Bureaucracies tend to be lethargic in nature.

When I began my research for *Heart of the Storm*, I was not aware that there was simply an air campaign and nothing else in Schwarzkopf's bag of tricks in the early days of August 1990. What I discovered was that the CENTCOM staff, a large, bureaucratic staff, was incapable of producing a comprehensive, viable plan in the short time available to them after the invasion of Kuwait. That intrigued me. How could this huge staff ...

Student: When you say CENTCOM, are you including CENTAF with that?

Reynolds: Sure. Quite frankly, though, I'm really looking at the headquarters staff of Central Command at this point. I'm not looking at the components at this juncture, although this same argument can be made about CENTAF as well. I think you'll see that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait generated a knee-jerk reaction from the U.S. military bureaucracy to counter with a force on force option. What I postulated I would see during this investigation was a very robust planning system at CENTCOM that produced a legitimate plan for General Schwarzkopf. That's not what I found. Instead, I discovered a bureaucracy so bloated, and so used to doing small, finite parts of a useless planning equation, that they accomplished nothing of significance. The original CENTCOM warplan was 1002-88. Rick Atkinson speaks about it at length in his superb book, titled *Crusade*.* The plan dealt with a Southwest Asia invasion by the Soviets. Long before the Iraqi invasion, General Powell told General Schwarzkopf that 1002-88 "isn't right." Powell urged Schwarzkopf to develop a new plan that dealt with today's reality, not an already extinguished Cold War threat. Powell warned Schwarzkopf that the old 1002-88 would cause CENTCOM to lose valuable infrastructure dollars when stacked up against other unified command plans in the head-to-head competition for defense dollars. An attempt was made by Schwarzkopf's staff to correct the plan and refocus it, but that effort was far from complete when Iraq invaded Kuwait.

Oettinger: Could you tell me what timeframe this was?

Reynolds: From 1988 to 1991. During the hunt to create a new plan, General

* Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.

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Horner* tells us that the State Department would not allow CENTAF to show Iraq as an adversary, even for planning purposes. The countries had to be identified as Force Red and Force Blue. As far as the intelligence community and the State Department were concerned, Iraq was still a friendly nation and should not be looked at as an adversary. This notion of "friendly and enemy" nations is an important point to ponder when you look at current and future planning efforts. Not being able to do prudent planning against a potential adversary could lead to disaster. That is why the planning community has switched from threat-based to capabilities-based planning. Capabilities-based planning engenders few hard feelings and allows many more options and scenarios to be examined and studied. Today's friend could well be tomorrow's enemy or vice versa. Imagine what General Washington would say if he knew how closely we were cooperating with the Brits!

In any event, what I saw as I did my investigation was a group of well-intentioned folks with almost unlimited resources—CENTCOM, Tactical Air Command, the Joint Staff, and others—all trying to do something, but in the process producing little of value. What fascinated me was that a small cadre of folks, well outside the mainstream, were able to penetrate to the core of the planning process, all the way to the presidential level, and help produce the kind of sweeping air campaign you see described in *Heart of the Storm*. That really is the essence of my story. The success of this maverick group of planners and pilots raises the question, "Why are bureaucracies so inefficient?

It is, I believe, a truism that technology can be a force multiplier for both good and bad. We see this routinely in the Gulf War, where the U.S. military logistics engine was able to send huge numbers of aircraft and machines everywhere to pick up troops that sometimes were not where they were supposed to be because the plans that called for them to be in a certain place at a certain time were outdated and inefficient. We see systems that are able to tell you how many hours it has been since the pilot of a C-141 cargo airplane has had crew rest, but can't tell you what this young pilot is hauling. As a consequence, during the Gulf War and even today, things are often shipped with little or no visibility on where or what they are in the pipeline.

We're not too bad at deploying because deploying is something we do all the time. We send things everywhere. But to put our combat forces in harm's way, in an intelligent fashion, to make an adversary bend to our will with a minimum of bloodshed and expenditure of national treasure, is something that we simply do not do very often.

It seems to me that the problem is that the military doesn't deliver its most expensive product (the waging of war in the defense of the interests and survival of this country) except on the rarest of occasions. Deterrence is the preferred product of the military establishment and its keepers. Deterrence is far less expensive and does not test the military establishment to the fullest. War does. By contrast, the chief executive officer of any company, be it a woolen mill, AT&T, or GMC, is delivering its most expensive products all the time and putting them out for competition in the open market. These executives and the companies they represent are "at war" in the commercial sense of the word. I would argue that what we see in the triumphant revival of General Motors, and the American car industry in general, is a reflection of their being at war for the last 10 years with the Japanese and having won the latest series of skirmishes. Prior to the introduction of the Japanese and Europeans into the car market, it appeared that the Americans could sell virtually any kind of vehicle to the consumer. That's changed. And when it did, there were those within the bureaucracy who predicted that the American motor industry was doomed to failure because it could not change. I think that until the American motor industry cleaned its management of "old think" executives and "business as usual workers" the American industry was not competitive. Now they seem to be on top.

* Gen. Charles Horner, USAF (ret.), CENTAF Commander during Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

I predict another period of calm in which all of this redevelops, and we'll see another change. Perhaps the Europeans will hold the top spot for a while. God knows they've been trying to do so for some time.

The military establishment does the same thing. The kinds of people who rise to the top in the military bureaucracy in peacetime, are not, in my view, the same kinds of men and women who rise to the top in war. That's not a John Wayne thing. It's asking for different kinds of skills and a different type of personality.

I believe that in a peacetime military environment, especially now under Goldwater-Nichols (which your professor is eminently responsible for bringing about, and I'm still angry with him for doing so), what goes a long way is your ability to schmooze, if that's the right word. What we have now are people who have good tactical skills coupled with excellent social skills, but with little knowledge or understanding of strategic planning and its consequences. This was not always the case. After World War II there was a concern that you didn't want to get too close to actual combat conditions because it could cost lives, and when you've lost so many lives for so long, this becomes a very big concern. The United States found that without realistic training our aircrews were being shot down like cannon fodder in the Vietnam war because the skills necessary for survival in air combat had been sacrificed to "safer training." Unfortunately, the training did not train the aircrews to fight, merely to fly. That has since been rectified with realistic combat environments like Red Flag, Blue Flag, and others.

However, our realism extends only to the tactical level. Once beyond fighter-on-fighter engagements, we sink back to a level of ineptitude. Show me one really senior officer who actually participates in a large-scale exercise, I mean really participates, and doesn't simply walk into the command post or tent to take an update briefing once or twice a day while his subordinates struggle to make the thing work.

I was the J-5 for Atlantic Resolve 94, the biggest European exercise since the days of Reforger (Return of Forces to Germany). Atlantic Resolve involved over 13,000 troops in combat training areas and a multitude of computer simulations to mirror a force of some 65,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. Our Joint Task Force (JTF) commander was a U.S. Army three-star general, a tanker by trade. Contrary to what I had seen in the past, this three-star lived and fought the battle with us for 36 days. What I found out as we prepared to fight this battle was that the air component commander had no concept of how to build an air campaign plan. This man was a U.S. Air Force two-star general (now a three-star and working in the Pacific) in charge of an entire numbered air force! He was very uncomfortable with the idea of planning an actual campaign and had no idea as to how to go about such an enterprise. Neither did his subordinates. Oh, they knew how to take out a bridge or shoot down a plane, but they had no idea how to construct a campaign, and, most importantly, they were not interested in doing so. Their entire "plan" consisted of supporting the ground commander in whatever kind of air support he needed. This was, of course, music to the ears of ground pounders. At last an airman who promised to provide close air support where and when it was needed! The problem was, at what cost would this support be provided? Close air support is a mission of last resort. It means the air campaign has failed. Ground forces should not have to endure heavy attack from the air if the air planners and executors have done their jobs.

I went to the chief of staff, who was a Navy admiral, and I said, "Sir, this isn't going to work. This guy is not putting a campaign plan together. I can't get him to do it. He's glad-handing with each of you guys." I argued that he was doing this because he wanted to make sure that he gets another star some day. He wanted to make sure that he was not going to be competing with anybody, that he was just going to help the other guys. "When you need to go four days, I'm going to be there. Don't you worry about that."

I said, "Sir, that's B.S. That's not how you do an air campaign." You need a strategic campaign as much as you need a tactical campaign, and one normally should precede the other. But you've got to have

it, and it's got to be orchestrated. And it should be, perhaps, a combination of forces and not simply air. But this wasn't being done. I said, "Hey, look, my job, as the J-5, is to put all the campaign plans together and give it to you in one basket and tell you whether they mesh or not, so your plan, your overall scheme, will make sense. By the way, what *is* your overall scheme, General?"

You don't ask those kinds of questions. I'm telling you that. I'm trying to convince these senior leaders, in a nonthreatening way, that they must change and learn how to plan strategically if they are to succeed in this wargame. They are not interested in what I have to say. These emperors are not pleased with what this peasant is telling them. Quite frankly, most of them haven't had the time, or energy, or training to focus on strategic level warfare. They're great at the tactical level. They're great sticks (pilots). They're great tankers. They're great whatever it is. But not at the strategic level. So there's this reticence. All of a sudden you've got this wild-eyed colonel, who's the J-5, saying to the JTF commander, "Your air component commander is an idiot. Fix it. Fire him. Do something. Make him give you a plan." The three-star JTF commander is saying, "I can't say that to the air component commander, because, look, if I tell him that he isn't worth a shit, I might not be worth a shit either. I don't know anything about air. He's supposed to know about it, not me. I'm a ground guy (perfect example of tactical versus strategic thinking) ... Hey, maybe we're all naked." And maybe they were.

But the model was a good model for Atlantic Resolve, because when the war started, nothing changed. I was not successful. You're looking at a failure here, because I could not convince the senior leadership to force one another to come to terms. The land component commander was coming on my side, slowly but surely. I finally won him over the first day of the war, because that's when we lost 5,000 guys in the first couple of hours of the battle. We lost an entire German division. They were gone, pounded to pieces, because the enemy air was alive and viable. No enemy bases had been attacked, no enemy control centers destroyed, no enemy munitions depots eliminated. Our air was busy "supporting the ground guys" and in the process losing the war.

Well, this went on for three days until the losses were so high an attempt was made to attack the enemy air where it lived and generated from. It was my worst nightmare. It's like what would have happened in the Gulf if Warden* and his small group of zealots had not convinced Schwarzkopf that strategic attack was a reasonable thing to do. That's when the exercise arbitrators came in and General Maddox, the commander of U.S. Army Forces in Europe (USAREUR), took personal control of the exercise. He was a big man, with a full head of white hair and two pearl-handled 45-caliber automatics in jet black holsters dangling from his prodigious waist.

Oettinger: Something like General George Patton?

Reynolds: Well, but he was neater than that, and he had a bigger belly. These guys were scared to death of him. I mean, the fear was palatable in the command post. When you heard the words, "Maddox is in the area," the pucker factor ripped through the command post, affecting privates and generals alike. I was no exception. I was the unlucky guy picked to brief him on what it was we were doing. General Maddox swaggered through the command post doors and took the center seat. He looked left and right and without saying a word motioned for me to begin the briefing. You could tell he delighted in the fear he generated, especially among the senior officers. He was arrogant, but so am I.

I told him about the failed air campaign and the high casualty figures. He already knew about it, but he used the briefing as a tool to grill the component commanders. He said he'd fix it and he did. But how he

* Col. John A. Warden III, USAF (ret.) was the Air Force deputy director for warfighting concepts and leader of the Checkmate planning directorate during Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

fixed it, in my opinion, was wrong. He ordered an "improvement" in kill ratios. Soon after his visit, all of the friendly missiles were getting one-to-one kills. Patriots, even Stingers, were bringing enemy aircraft and missiles down, sometimes two and three times at a clip. It became apparent that Army air defense had suddenly become invincible. I began to understand that what General Maddox was interested in was not to improve his commander's skills as strategic warriors but rather to ensure that the correct set of data would be available to support Army requests for additional infrastructure and funding. General Maddox, I believe, was trying to make sure that his exercise proved the things that he wanted to prove in order for funding to be forthcoming for his command.

The current military leadership is quite adept at running a peacetime system. Unfortunately, it is my view that they are not particularly adept nor interested in the strategic skills necessary to fight and win a war.

I would argue that what I have seen in my time as a chief of plans bears out this concern I have with bureaucracy. I have to say this very carefully. When I first went to United States European Command and took control of planning functions I asked, "Where are the plans? Show me all the plans." This they could not do. They were working on plans only peripherally. The bulk of their time was consumed with tasks that did not directly relate to plan production. I brought this up with my immediate boss, an Air Force two-star general. Of the 135 officers working in the Plans and Policy Directorate, only 10 were working on plans, and of those, many had been siphoned off to do other things. I asked my boss for more manpower. "Sir, it says we all work for you in the Plans and Policy Directorate. Why then do I have only 10 guys to do at least 50 percent of the work in this directorate? Why do you need so many guys doing policy? We should have more guys doing plans. Fifty-fifty would be okay with me." He laughed, of course, but after more discussion and some loud complaining by yours truly, we did increase the size of the division. Still, it was nowhere near enough to cope with the planning load.

What I noticed was a reticence on the part of staffers, by and large, to get plans completed, because it's not pretty work. It's Joint Operation Planning and Evaluation System (JOPES) Volume Two work. It's annex after annex to get done. We seemed to attack this problem in all the worst ways. The bureaucracy didn't want to focus on anything so complex as planning. It was always piecemeal and second-rate staffing.

We had to come up with ruses to make the bureaucracy work. So, the first thing I said was, "How were you doing this before?" I was told, "Well, we sent the plan out. We sent it around to the various directorates, and then they would put their annexes in it, and then we'd get it back." Well, that's dumb. Where's the synergy in that? Let's do something where we have everybody together. We had to buy tons of doughnuts and stuff to entice people to attend the conferences on the various plans. In addition, we made the attendees participants in the planning process. We divided into groups of no more than six people each and elected a spokesperson from each group to present his/her group's findings to the entire assembly. The conferences were kept short—no more than three days maximum. We achieved consensus and commitment from these people in record time. They went away owning a part of the plan. My people became the architects for change. It was modestly successful.

Initially, the intelligence community didn't want to be a part of this process because deliberate planning is not immediately rewarding. What they want to play in is strictly the crisis role. By doing that, of course, the argument always is: I don't have enough people to do both. I only have enough people for crises. If all the bureaucracy can manage is crises, that's all it will ever deal with: crises. And the plans will become irrelevant. More and more I saw that people were trying to do plans, but they would never finish a plan.

The result of that, in my view, is that if you don't have something as basic as a strong plan for your area, when you come under attack from all of the other unified commands, as the dollars shrink, is that you lose when they ask, "How much in-

frastructure should we put against your particular command?" Well, if you don't have a coherent, executable plan, according to General Powell, you don't qualify for infrastructure. It is no surprise that CENTCOM gets a big chunk of infrastructure dollars, because everybody now understands that CENTCOM has to defend against that Iraqi horde. Before 1990, CENTCOM was a place you put all your old elephants to die. It was in Florida. It was nice, sunny. You know, nobody serious went to CENTCOM. In fact, the argument I heard when I was doing this research went something like this, "Hey. Hey. Staff guys, CENTCOM, zeroes, man." I said, "What do mean they're zeroes?" "Well, you know, second team guys get sent to CENTCOM." Here's a little statistic for you. This is a bureaucracy statistic. Of all the key positions at CENTAF (this I have researched), how many do you think were filled during the war by CENTAF guys who were there before the war? Any guesses?

Student: Very few, but that's also not unusual.

Reynolds: Why is that not unusual?

Student: Because in peacetime we are horribly understructured and undergraded, and part of our planning process, although we don't come out and say it, is that when war comes we reinforce every staff with upper grade and better people. You know it happens, and I know it happens, and we've all been part of it.

Reynolds: I'll come out and say it. I think what they did is that they hurt a lot of people doing that. There was only one guy who stayed in position that I'm aware of, and that was Horner. They kept him. He almost lost his job, because before the war started Schwarzkopf said, "I'm going to fire you." There was an incident when, two days before the war kicked off, Schwarzkopf went down and toured the facility at CENTAF, and he said, "What are all these airplanes? Where are they all going?" They were B-52s specifically. "Well, sir, they're going to ..." He said, "I told you I wanted all the B-52s on close air support. All of them. You do that to me again, you're fired." So Horner came close to losing his job. This is also the result of a bureaucracy. Imagine, you've worked at this place for the longest time, and in comes some shiny young guy; and in this case he's got hair, he's hand-picked, and he slides into your slot, while you're relegated to second- and third-tier work. That's what happens in a bureaucracy.

So what I'm really saying is that these peacetime bureaucracies (CENTAF, USAFE, PACAF) are merely shells that keep the positions alive with bodies, but when the balloon goes up an entire different cadre of folks is going to occupy those billets, or at least the critical ones. But any position other than a command position in those places was considered as, "We're putting you out to pasture. You're at a numbered Air Force position. You're 9th Air Force; I mean, hey, not important, guy. You're set to die." So naturally when the balloon goes up, you're pushed aside and other people come in. That's what bureaucracies do in peacetime, because they're allowed to, and I think it is a dangerous dilemma that we face here.

Dr. Oettinger told me that when he started this many years ago he thought about bureaucracy in terms of: "How do we fix it?" I think he told me that he no longer asks that question. Instead, he asks: "How do we live with it?" And I'm not sure we can.

Oettinger: In any system that is humane, like the civil service or one where a person has tenure or whatever, and you can't fire anybody, you've got to put them someplace. It may be that staffs are the least harmful place to put them. I remember a case where we had to deal with the Boston police department and their dispatch office. We were involved, along with a neighborhood consulting firm, in realigning some of the functions of the Boston police department, and we were so proud because we had managed to effect a significant potential reduction of the staff of the dispatcher's office. I remember the commissioner read-

ing this report with less than enthusiasm. He said, "What you don't understand is that we worked very hard to get these crazies off the street, and now you want to put them back out again." We had missed the metric. These guys were over-staffing the dispatcher's office because it was the least harmful place where you could put police officers you didn't want on the street and you couldn't fire.

So there often is more to it, and the detailed way in which I would put the remark you attribute to me is that when I see the same what to me seems like a screw-up happening over and over again, I begin to ask myself if maybe it's functional and I'm missing the point; that is, I'm not seeing what functional role it plays. So this business of the peacetime staff being the wrong one is such a recurrent theme. In the Civil War, you see the agonies that Lincoln went through with all his generals and the many tries it took him to get sort of the right blend. You have it in both World Wars. So that's kind of the argument that I'm making.

Reynolds: Yes. I know what you're saying.

Student: Let me ask a question of you, sir. You've described this from the CINC level, and I concede that a huge CINC has absolutely huge staff directorates by the time you get up there. But the thing is, so many of our military operations now are done at the lower level. They're done at the Army Corps level, which is a JTF. They're done at the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force level, which is kind of tactical, and then you append other things to it and it still makes it work. They do it on a fairly routine basis, and they produce the actual war plan because they actually do exercises. It's true that the general does not participate, but at least the rest of the staff seems to, and there's usually not quite as many budget things involved. Even something like IFOR (the Implementation Force in Bosnia) is still not that many units. It's not like an entire EUCOM. I'm sure that becomes involved, but it's not a EUCOM war.

Reynolds: I'm glad you brought it up. You've hit on exactly my objection to these staffs. The IFOR experience has been all-consuming for the EUCOM staff, and for most of the forces in Europe today. When that really started, we had inklings of it all along, all along, all along, but when it really kicked off, everybody on the EUCOM staff went to days that began usually at six, first briefing was at seven, you didn't go home until ten or eleven, and then you did it all over again. The IFOR effort is division-size force insertion. In my view, it should not consume the energies and manpower of the entire EUCOM staff, but it does. That is the simple reality of the situation. I am amazed by how much energy IFOR consumes. It's not a war. It's a peace enforcement operation. What is the overall strategy in Bosnia? How does this military strategy relate to our national strategy? What are the end states that we're seeking here? How do we measure success? How do the components, be they air, land, or sea, reinforce those things? As a planner I want this plan in a nice plain box. I haven't seen it yet.

USAREUR got out of the box. And what I mean by that is we had a congressional mandate for a number of folks who could be in theater. Define "theater," you ask? Good question. Is the theater BH (Bosnia-Herzegovina)? Well, some said it's not just BH, it's Hungary, too. Okay, it's Hungary, too. Others said, no, it's Germany as well. Still others said that the congressionally mandated total of 25,000 troops applies to anybody, anywhere, doing something for the mission. It became a nightmare to track the number of folks involved in this operation and still get the job done. In my view, this was a problem invented by bureaucracy.

Oettinger: What is the 25,000 troop thing?

Reynolds: The number of troops Congress allowed to be committed in support of the BH peace initiative.

Oettinger: Oh, that magic number!

Reynolds: So, all of a sudden, the guys who are out fighting the battle, the guys who are going forward, man, their fangs are out. They want to go to BH and do something. They want to do something for peace. They want to hold an orphan, you know, whatever. The logistics guys aren't moving fast enough to suit the combat outfits selected to deploy into BH and Hungary. So what happens? The battalion commander makes the decision to deploy on his own. We had busloads of guys who left without authorization from the logistics community. As a consequence, those of us at the headquarters staff were called on the carpet. Our four-star commander would look at us and say, "There are more people in the country than have been authorized. I'm not going to have that. I'll hang you because they'll hang me."

So, even though the system breaks down, part of it is because—what's our product? What do we produce? I'm not a Total Quality Management proponent, but it does have some very sensible aspects to it that are worth consideration: Who are our customers? What's our product? How do we produce our product?

I will give you one last little story before we open it up. We are in the process of putting together a wide series of plans, as are all unified commands, in trying to cope with this new world that we face. Some are for war, some are for peace, some are for noncombatant evacuation operations—a whole host of things. We need to work very quickly to get these on the books, and we need to make them usable. Bureaucracies, in the past, had a plan, and most of you have done plans. They're about 6 to 10 inches thick, printed on both sides, about 1,000 pages. We've got to throw such dictionary-sized plans away. We need to consider human nature. Human nature says, "If it's that thick, I ain't reading it, because when you ask me to read it, if it's a deliberate plan, and a crisis occurs that relates to the plan, I simply won't have time to read through such a behemoth and cull from it what might be useful in crisis planning. I need something right now for the crisis, something thin and readable. Something immediately useful." Bureaucracies are loath to create such things.

I went to TRANSCOM (Transportation Command at Scott AFB, Illinois) last fall to mate a time-phased force deployment document (TPFDD) to a major EUCOM plan. This is an important planning step, because it ensures that the plan is transportationally feasible and has the necessary bombs, bullets, and bread to do the job. There are legions of people involved in this process at Scott—all of them experts, some of them in the military, others high-ranking civilians. During the first four days of my first conference I sat through numerous briefings on air, sea, and land traffic flow to the area of operations. Exquisite graphics showed the breakout of bulk tonnage that was being shipped, by whom, and when it will arrive. The calculations required to figure this out are enormous, and are done by computers that run all night each night of the 10-day conference. Only it doesn't really mean much. What you quickly learn is that the input data on port size, capacity, and infrastructure are hopelessly flawed and of little concern to the experts who manipulate the data. They are enamored with the process, not the reality of making a real force flow into a combat theater. What was far more important to the experts charged with making the TPFDD flow with the plan was to ensure that the computer model moved things smoothly. Period. Short tons could be moved to places that, perhaps, existed or didn't.

This is not an isolated case. This is what happens, in my view, when bureaucracies get out of control and don't have to account for it. This can go on for years and years, because as you put a plan together, if it's not executed, if the TPFDD has never really flowed, who will know? Who will know if it's wrong? Nobody will know. That's precisely why the logistics flow in the Gulf was such a debacle and took extraordinary effort to repair. The system worked in spite of itself, but at great personal expense for all those who participated in the effort. Bureaucratic incompetence during the deliberate planning stages was the reason behind cargo aircraft in Desert Shield landing to pick up loads at places where soldiers had long disbanded. Poor

deliberate planning was also responsible for incorrect combat loads being calculated for determining the number of cargo aircraft and ships necessary to deploy units. Many Army units took far more tonnage to the fight than they were authorized to take.

Student: One thing that I'd be careful of is there are a lot of things that bureaucracies do badly. It is easy to focus on what they do wrong, but I would argue that especially when you look at sending 250,000 or 300,000 men into the field, the logistics train that goes along with that and what's been done right is also pretty tremendous. So, when you tamper with bureaucracy, sometimes you can destroy a lot of what it does right at the same time you try to fine tune it.

Reynolds: But the potential for good, I would argue, was enormous. If I could ever meet the data with the ability to crunch data, I'd agree with you.

Student: I absolutely agree. More of what I look at, and I guess it's part of my question, is the synergy between the staffs, where I think there's a military mindset, especially among the commanders at each level, and when they develop plans, they don't want to go outside their own organization. They don't want to ask questions, especially of the command higher up, CJTF to CINC, CINC to DC/NCA (the National Command Authorities in Washington). Each of the organizations has a piece of the puzzle, the can-do circle, and if they would work together, not be afraid to ask questions, and then develop the plans, we'd be a lot better off.

As an example, there's Bangladesh Sea Angel. The way the Marine staff ran it, it was a CJTF. He would not allow his staff, for the most part, to go back to CINCPAC to clarify issues, to find out what other capabilities were out there to meet the problem. No, he had to show that if there's a problem here, we can define it and fix it ourselves and then go out and tell them what we need to do it, versus being a little bit more creative, in that we don't know all the capabilities out there—Army, Navy, Marine Corps. Some of it ought be, "No, let's tell them that we've got a problem here and see what their staff comes back with," and then between the two, match them.

Reynolds: Bureaucracy lays a heavy price on being creative.

Oettinger: Yes, but there's more to it than that. Again, forgive my fanaticism about my main theme about balances. You're stressing the good of raising questions up to a higher level, which, of course, then invites responses. Now, if you look at the record of the seminar, you'll see a number of presentations. There's one series that is particularly interesting, which involves General Cushman, who was present at the Korean tree-cutting incident,* and Stilwell, who was his boss, and the folks in Washington, and a guy named John Grimes, who was a civilian weenie in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.** It's a marvelous account of how, in planning their responses, there was deliberate seeing to it that no word could come from on top, in order to avoid what derogatorily is called the long screwdriver syndrome by the folks who remember Lyndon Johnson sitting in the White House and trying to call the shots tactically in Vietnam.

I stress that because I want to counterpose it. It's not an easy problem. You're absolutely right, but these guys are right, too. You have a serious problem there of at what point do you do it versus how do you avoid the guy in the helicopter who is not on the ground, or the guy in Washington

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* John H. Cushman, "C³I and the Commander: Responsibility and Accountability," and Richard G. Stilwell, "Policy and National Command," in *Seminar on Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, Guest Presentations, Spring 1981.* Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, December 1981.

** John Grimes, "Information Technology and Multinational Corporations," in *Seminar on Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, Guest Presentations, Spring 1986,* Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, February 1987.

who is not on the ground, mucking around with something that he sees only dimly and answering the wrong questions at the wrong time, or, worse yet, turning it into an order that is detached from the situational reality? So you've put your finger on it and it's a difficult problem, which is another one of those difficult balances to maintain.

You're shrugging. I don't quite know whether that's agreement or argument.

Reynolds: I agree with you.

Student: Sir, you talked about Atlantic Resolve, and even though there were a lot of problems in that the higher levels and maybe general management were doing it ostensibly for promoting the system and the technology that was involved, it's becoming more and more prevalent that technology has kind of taken over and, specifically, simulations are becoming a lot more of training, even at the tactical level. Do you think that the simulations like Atlantic Resolve and stuff that will come after that go anywhere toward solving some of the problems you alluded to about the strategic inabilities?

Reynolds: No. Now do you want me to elaborate on it?

Student: Please.

Reynolds: Okay. Until we can do large-scale simulations with the same level of reality that we have in flight simulators, where guys who go in a simulator and get things thrown at them actually come out sweating, scared, and changed, I don't think that will happen. There was not the sense in these large-scale exercises that people were dying, or that you were losing, and you stood the chance of being captured or killed. I think that kind of realism—and I think it could be done—is necessary.

Oettinger: Can I disagree with you about that?

Reynolds: Sure, go ahead.

Oettinger: I think this is an absolutely vital point in trying to understand the capabilities and limitations of technology organizations and so on. You said some key words: "*If* it can achieve the same degree of verisimilitude as a flight simulator," and I think that's a big *if*. A simulator for the path of a missile or a bullet is duck soup, by and large. Physics is well understood, atmosphere is well understood, even nonlinearities that may affect things are fairly well understood. Relationship between the output of the model and reality—very good—minor deviations. Flight simulator—pretty good in terms of the mechanics of the airframe and its environment itself. What the whole system does with the pilot in there who's running the simulator is, of course, a random function, which is the point of the simulator, and, in fact, the whole point is, that when you crash in the simulator, you are unhurt, which is why you use it as a training tool.

Now if I tried to simulate a system, an aircraft with pilots in it, it gets to be a little more difficult. To jump now to a whole battalion, a whole economy, a whole nation state—no way, José. The degree of complexity ...

Reynolds: I've heard people say that, but I watched Arnold Schwarzenegger in that one movie, *Total Recall*, and I'm convinced that if I can dream it, I can live it.

Oettinger: Right. Absolutely. That's what drives life. If you can put a man on the moon, why can't we? And more crimes have been committed in the name of that illusion ... You disagree, so speak up.

Student: I certainly do. I don't know dark blue or light blue operations as well as I should. I'm an Army guy. You're familiar with the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) where we are moving simulations up to division and corps staffs being under intense pressure—admittedly it's only for 10 days or so—for the build up to it. I don't know why, within our joint system, we're not going to get the same sort of resolution for things like Atlantic Resolve and Ocean Venture and Gallant Knights and

all the other joint exercises. The problem right now is with the physical simulation itself, with the software and building it and designing it. You'd probably be more clued in than I would on where that's going because that's your job right now. But, again, simply within the ground forces and direct support of them, I guess all the Army guys in here have been through a BCTP, at some level, that is intense, and it does all these things you're talking about, exactly like a flight simulator. You come out of there after 10 days whipped, beat, and ready just to go home and cry for a couple of days.

Student: And the reason why it's good is because it is so complex. It's gotten to a point now where they throw an awful lot of variables at you. When you actually send a truck somewhere, if you don't request the fuel for it at the same time, the message is going to come back 10 minutes later, "Your truck ran out of gas."

Student: You need to have road clearance, and escort, and all the goddamn things that go with it. But the problem is the software of the simulation. It's immensely expensive, of course, to run these training sessions.

Oettinger: And what I hear Rich say is that at a certain level of complexity beyond that, it's not even the complexity of the simulation, it's the fact that nobody's got the data that make it real.

Student: I don't doubt that at all, so we've got to build that. When you're talking about an air campaign plan here, we had not done an air campaign plan since 1945. So, that was the first air campaign plan that had been done in 45 years.

Reynolds: And it wouldn't have been done if these guys hadn't decided to do it.

Student: I can't answer that. That's inside your system, so ...

Student: Are you positive of that? Partly what I got out of your book, and I'm not sure myself, was that on the CENTCOM, CENTAF side, they were responding to a specific situation where first they were going in without clear guidance from NCA as to what their mission was. So first they were to go in with a defensive mindset, stabilize the situation, and then go on from there, whereas, when you look at Warden on the Checkmate* side, he was not tied up in that side of it. He could automatically look at the offensive side. I am not certain that CENTAF would not have gotten there once they stabilized the situation.

Reynolds: I disagree. I disagree because I wish that were the case, but from what I saw there was nobody thinking beyond beak-to-beak kinds of fighting. There was no discussion whatsoever of strategic attack or the usefulness of that kind of an effort. There was a direct and complete focus on attriting (engaging and killing) the enemy forces, period.

Student: Well, that's what your campaign plan was in the end. It was a 38-day attrition battle.

Reynolds: Why do you say that?

Student: Well, it certainly wasn't an air campaign of maneuver.

Reynolds: Oh, I think that the maneuver was that the ground forces held the forces in place and air moved and destroyed them. But they did so, first, by taking out things like electricity. That wasn't any kind of an attrition. They simply shut down the command and control within that country, and they shut down the air defense system.

Student: Oh, Jesus, and they did a superb job of it and all that, but over a 38-day period, that's exactly what it was: a hierarchy of attrition.

Reynolds: But not of forces.

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* Checkmate is a directorate within Air Force Plans, and was largely responsible for drafting the plans for the air campaign during Desert Storm.

Student: I read the Marine Corps *FMFM-1* manual, and it seems from this discussion that there's now an effort to somehow put the air campaign into terms that I see as really not topical. Why does it matter whether it's attrition or whether it's maneuvering? What are we supposed to learn from that? Why not just sort of describe it in terms relative to itself?

Oettinger: Let me try to address that and see if Rich and our guests will agree because my eyes were opened over lunch on something just like that point. It sounds like inter-service rivalry and so forth and so on, but that isn't the answer to your question. It's deeper than that.

Student: Gee. I don't even think it's that.

Oettinger: Here's what I thought I heard. I may have heard it wrong. What I think I learned is that doctrine was to use air power in conjunction with ground power along the air/land battle line where . . .

Student: No.

Oettinger: Well, that's what I heard.

Reynolds: That's Army doctrine.

Student: No, it's not. The air/land battle is one thing, but air/land battle is Army doctrine that is part of joint doctrine. Army doctrine is just how we do tactics and operational art, which is only a component to meet the strategic aim or the strategic end state, which is joint doctrine.

Reynolds: I would agree to that, but first of all, joint doctrine is not fully established at this juncture. The Army has way too strong a foothold. But that's another story.

Student: And we (Army people) will continue to have a strong foothold.

Student: Over lunch we were saying that in 1990, joint doctrine was not alive and living. You just said it yourself: there was no air campaign planned, and the SAMS (U.S. Army School for Advanced Military Studies) guys who were present in CENTCOM did not have an air campaign and a ground campaign planned. When Schwarzkopf told them what to do, they did not provide him with an acceptable plan for either medium.

Student: It evolved over time.

Reynolds: I don't think it evolved from that staff. In fact, when I interviewed them, that was the question I asked: "Why, when the SAMS guys came to you, did they not put an air element in? Why didn't they feel obligated to do that?" The answer was, "Because we didn't think it was necessary. We knew that it was being taken care of, because we already had seen Warden's plan."

I don't mean to digress, but when Schwarzkopf got the briefing the first time, it was very secretive. He only had himself and his deputy, and it wasn't until the second time that he brought in some of his staff. He wasn't going to make that public until he was sure. Again, it's as I put in the book. I think Warden really felt, when he came back on August 17, that Schwarzkopf was going to take it over, hand it to his guys on the staff, or give it to CENTAF, and make them do it. And Schwarzkopf said not "No," but "Hell, no." He wanted Warden and his guys to continue on that.

Student: This is that reinforcement or augmentation staff that actually performed the functions needed to get it done.

Reynolds: Yes, but what I'm hearing you say is that if you've been assigned since I knew you, and you were working in his staff, and your job was to pump gas—you were supposed to pump gas, and to plan to pump gas—and then the fighting kicks off, and he fires your behind and tells *me* to pump gas, am I augmenting you?

Student: Absolutely not.

Reynolds: That's what I think happened.

Student: I'm not disagreeing with you, but that's also not the point I was making, so I don't how we got to that.

Student: Colonel, why hasn't Goldwater-Nichols helped the quality of staff at your unified commands? Now your hot runners have got to go there at some point.

Reynolds: The quality is good. I've got some of the smartest, best guys on my staff, by far.

Student: Then they need leadership in order to get these people to produce the product you want?

Reynolds: No. Here's what happened, in my view. In fact, our staff is a great example of this. This is an interservice thing, too. In the J-5, the way it was originally set up, the division should be a wonderful blend so that the division chiefs should be Army, Air Force, et cetera. Well, if you look around, of the eight divisions, seven are Air Force, led by an Air Force guy. Now, when you pull the books, you see that's not the way it's supposed to be. The guy who's serving as the division chief for European affairs is really filling a major's slot, even though he's a colonel in my division, but there was a lot of horse trading that went around. Now, it's not the Air Force. All the other services in the J-5 that I work in believed that it was an attempt by the part of the Air Force to take control of that J-5, and it's not. It's utter bureaucracy that was too lazy to switch positions around, and because the Navy says or the Army says, "Here comes the division chief," your division chief is leaving. "Replace him." "I can't, we sent him to SAMS, so he's not going to come." "Well, are you going to send somebody, because the Joint Staff can ask only the services to supply them?" "Oh, yes, we'll send them." I've had a chemical officer on the books for two years, and I left the position open because I knew what the Army wanted me to do. The Army staff didn't want to fill that billing. So, I just left it and I went empty. I had to keep the slot empty, because if I'd have filled it with any other service guy, I'd have lost that demand on the Army to give me a chemical officer.

So, are the guys bright? Yes. But what they're trying to do is get through three years of a joint tour, and it's different than what you're used to. It's different because, first of all, everybody smells different. We've got a lot of sheep. We're all together and we ain't none of us from the same herd. That bothers everybody. And so you say, "Well, okay, that won't make a difference. We're all smart guys, we can work together." Yes, you kind of do, but now you're working with guys who are from different herds from all over, and so finally, well, you get a little herd that's called J-1. Then you get another little herd of sheep, they're J-2. They're usually a big herd of sheep, by the way, because that's the intel. They're huge, and, boy, they make a lot of sheep you-know-what!

Then you've got the poor J-3. That's the one thing where the J-3 works better than the J-5, and here's why. The J-3 is always at war. My guys were complaining because when I got there they worked almost 80 hours a week. I've cut that number back. The J-3 guys are still running 80 hours a week. These guys are always sick. There's always something bad happening with them. But, you know what? They're one another's buddies, and it doesn't matter what their uniform is, because they're at war. There it's one crisis after another. But they're just as dumb as dirt, constantly reinventing the wheel, doing crisis planning without solid deliberate planning behind it.

My argument is that what unified commands should do, especially the J-5, is build solid plans like solid airplanes. Call the plans "tanks" if you like. But J-5 should build them, because they've got to carry the commander's intent, to whatever crisis he wants to fight. The poor J-3 guy just says, "No, I don't want to fly, I want to walk there," and he'll put it on the wings, but he'll never start the engine. He just drags the thing off. So, what they've got is basically oxcarts that they're working each time, and they're working *so* hard, but

they do love one another because they've got to work together.

Student: I think that's sort of a general staff.

Reynolds: Like the Germans?

Student: As an outsider, it boggles my mind that this system is in place. What is this stuff? You know, taking people over, loyalty to some sort of subunit and putting them under some sort of staff for three years when they really don't have the training or the desire to work in that environment? That forces men to work together. The whole thing just seems sort of crazy.

Reynolds: No, because if you have a general staff, what normally happens is that those people do become very imperial. They lose touch with the actual operations, and they ask for things that are so ludicrous and impossible that it will never get done because it just doesn't work.

Student: First of all, to what extent is that making some sort of caricature of the general staff when it could be different? And second of all, isn't it possible to have some sort of organization for training these sorts of officers, or some sort of separate career path? I don't really expect a response ...

Reynolds: The Germans have that. They wear red lapels. Theirs always are red.

Student: The normal people have yellow ones.

Reynolds: The hotshots have red ones.

No. That doesn't work, because you have to have your union card. If I'm a joint officer, if I'm the commander, and I want to talk tanks, I need a guy who did tanks. For planes, I need a guy who did planes. That was my argument.

Student: Are you saying that the staff should be made up of officers representing every conceivable type of armament that could be involved?

Reynolds: Yes. Isn't that ludicrous?

Student: That is crazy.

Reynolds: Okay, but watch, here's why it works. The proposal is that we do away with unified commanders. That's Rich Reynolds' proposal. It's kind of like yours, only I don't want a general staff. I believe that we should J-3ize everybody (it's just like "circumcise," only with J-3 and a "z") in that we do away with these unified staffs, and we bring the components in to wherever the CINC lives. And then they duke it out themselves.

Student: Then there is no middleman.

Student: What is their supporting staff?

Reynolds: 30 to 60 guys max. If he has any more than that, you should ...

Student: Are they all part of same group—Army, Navy Air Force, Marines all mixed in, and they are all J-3? I argue, highly, against that, in Professor Oettinger's terms of the balancing when we were looking at data on the CINCPAC side. Why do you need two separate staffs, or five separate staffs, basically doing the same kind of plans and policies? You do need a balance where one organization's working joint and is feeding to their flag what this looks at the joint side, and then you need a counterbalance with each one of the components' supporting staff ensuring that he's getting service components in specific issues.

Reynolds: I do that. That is the environment I live in. All I'm telling you is that it's manpower intensive and utterly wasteful.

Student: Yes, but I've never seen the staff operator, if he was senior on that

particular staff, who will not change the input coming from his staff to meet his particular requirements. So, if you try to do that all within one staff, whoever is senior member in the J-3—Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine, flyer, tank driver, whatever—he's going to influence the input.

Reynolds: That's okay, because all the "J"s are irrelevant. Let me back it up. This is another Rich Reynolds observation. I believe that all of us who are in the military are children for most of our careers—23 years, 6 months, and 16 days. By that, I mean that we are not commanders. The only time you're a grownup in the military is when you are a commander. My two-star J-3 has no vote when the commanders talk because he's a kid, too.

So the real position to achieve is command, and this is where I think I can do what you want without a general staff. The CINC is a very purple guy, meaning he is ambivalent to the service peculiarity that he wears, because he has to be, not because he's a good guy and we pick only guys who are really ambivalent. That's not human nature. He's ambivalent because his behind is on the line to ensure that the U.S. interest will be carried out in his area of responsibility, and he is smart enough to know that no single service can do that.

So my suggestion is, first of all, do away with unified commands. The next is to make all components one star less than the CINC. This will get less star positions, less money talk. Because as it is now, CINCUSAREUR is a four-star. CINCUSAFE is a four-star. CINCNAVEUR is an admiral. So, is there an equal among equals or better among equals? Yes. And, yes, General Joulwan* is certainly the boss, but I've got to tell you, when he watches this posturing, it would be much easier to say, "Frank, sit down, shut up. This is what I want you to do. Right now. Do it!" And he will. You know why he will? He wants expert leaders sitting in this very chair that I'm sitting in, because he wants to wear four stars. But once they're wearing four, it's like chief master sergeants of the Air Force. What a terrible waste! It is! You can't shoot them. You can't do anything with them. If they're good, they're good. If they're bad, you live with them, because you can't say to them, "Look, I don't really like your performance." "So what? I have a zillion stripes up my sleeve." Nice, he couldn't care what you think. So you'd have more leverage.

Student: But you've got to change everything from there down. And then you've got a three-star Naval component commander and his Sixth Fleet commander is a three-star, and theirs is ...

Reynolds: No. We're going to fix that, too, by God!

Student: Well, you're going to be doing a lot of fixing.

Reynolds: This is an interesting part. I know we're saying it for humor, but you know what? If we ever tried it, you watch, the bureaucracy, not just the guys, would rise up to stop that in a heartbeat because everybody wants as many of those guys as they can get, because everybody wants to be one.

Right now, you young guys who are going in, the real young ones, have got it made. The reason you have it made is because your group's going to be small enough to reflect the positions that are out there. For a lot of these guys here, though, their group is gigantic. I mean, my year group was supposed to have 50 wings at least, 62 actually, and it's down to 20. Boy, you've got to be the good of the good. They just came out with the commander's list for wing commanders. You have to be on this list now. The oldest guy selected for colonel's wings had 23.9 years in the service. The youngest guy was 19.3. The average number of below-the-zones (early) promotions for those guys was four; you had to have four to be on the list. There were some guys with seven. So that's the bureaucratic world that you're entering, but

* Gen. George Joulwan, USA, NATO Supreme Commander since 1995; previously SACEUR/CINCEUR.

it's only going to be a ripple. You guys are in the middle of the ripple. But if you're in intel, you'll be a general for sure.

Oettinger: A couple of additional remarks on this. This discussion is a marvelous introduction to your reading of Allard,* when you get down to this later on in this semester, because these very issues he's raised, as we've discussed them, are dealt with at much greater length. And, so, keep this discussion in mind as you read Allard.

The other comment that I want to make is that Rich makes a lot of sense. It runs, though, into yet another one of those nasty things. There is currently a great drive toward flattening organizations. Information technology is one of the drivers: it lets you easily communicate with anybody anywhere, so you don't need all these useless guys in between.

Yes, that's wonderful, but how many people can a guy, at one level, talk to? The lore on that has changed. Their numbers have been like 3 or 20 or 7 or whatever, depending on whose theoretical analysis you read and what the fads in the business schools or the service schools are. I don't have an answer, but I do point out to you that the flatter you make things, the more things the guy at the next level up has to reconcile, and each of us has some limit as to how many hours there are in the day, how many people you can talk to, and how much stuff you can synthesize in your own head. Pretty soon, when you've exceeded that limit, if you've got any brains at all, you say, "I need a layer between me and the next one who will do the synthesis for me." Now, that's called a staff, and you've now heard eloquently what happens by way of perversion of the staff. And so, when the staff gets too perverted, you get the notion that we've got to eliminate it. When you have eliminated it you re-invent layering because you can't aggregate it. It's another one of those nasty balances that I keep calling to your attention.

As I say, I don't have any answers. What I hope is, as you do the reading and thinking in this course, that you will form your own views about how you would juggle this, so that when you're in the hot seat someplace you say, "Here's what I've got to do, given what I now know." But you know you've got a problem, and you don't get mesmerized by some panacea that says you either build staff to lighten your load or you eliminate them to lighten your load. At the extreme, neither of those is an answer.

Student: A question for you. Colonel Mann has a rather scathing critique of Air Force officer professionalism in the last chapter of his book.* Basically he says, "These guys can fly, but they can't plan their way out of a paper bag." Now, is that changing? In the Army, we saw a problem several years ago and decided that we were going to establish our own school for training war planners, the School for Advanced Military Studies. Has the Air Force established any such thing?

Oettinger: Is Mann rated (aircrew) or what is he?

Reynolds: Yes.

Oettinger: So then he speaks with some authority.

Reynolds: And he is smarter of the two of us by far. So that's why he sent me instead.

I think, yes, there is a planning school, but one of the things that has been my experience is that the Army has done a better job, in my view, than we have. Your templates that you put down, the indicators, the standard way you do things along those lines, to me appear to be much better. Our

* C. Kenneth Allard, *Command, Control, and the Common Defense*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990.

* Col. Edward C. Mann, USAF, *Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates*. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1995.

argument always is that "We're flexible, you're rigid." I mean, you Army guys need a personnel carrier to carry around your manuals, let alone fight. But I think that the Air Force is lacking in that area, and we lack it all the way through our senior leadership. I asked General Horner what he thought about doctrine, and his retort to me was, "Doctrine is bullshit."

The Air Force tends to look at doctrine very simplistically. There's no reward for it. Cool guys don't do doctrine. I hate to be so simplistic, but there's a kernel of truth in that. I'll find it.

General Loh,* when asked that same question, said, "Doctrine to me is global reach and global power. That's what I teach my commanders. Anything else and they would go to sleep." Visit any Army place, especially Carlisle Barracks, and you see many statues of men, and most of you, those who went to West Point and elsewhere, can recite what these men have accomplished in their lives. If you go to Air Force places, you will see there are statues of machines, because we love machines.

In fact, there is a great book called *The Icarus Syndrome*,** which I would recommend to all of you, and it very clearly points out this Air Force love of machines over men and how that affects where the Air Force is going in the future and what it is today. I think what happened is that the Air Force senior leadership, not intentionally, has co-opted itself to say, "Look, if you'll just leave us alone" (*you* meaning the rest of the services) and give us the money to buy our machines, we won't bother you." The Army shows its doctrine strategy when it goes to the Hill. Even the Navy does the same thing with its silly *From the Sea* manifesto.

But the Air Force is even worse. They're the worst of all because when they go to Congress to ask for more money and manpower they take the "Bomber Road Map," the "Fighter Road Map," et cetera. Notice, they're separate maps. They have little road maps for other things, too, and it's all neat little numbers. We've been losing money since the 1970s, and our cut has been smaller, because we're not smart enough to be able to say, "Hey, this is how it's all strategically tied together. This is what we're doing for you to make sure that we can fulfill our mission of defending the United States through control and exploitation of air and space."

Student: Boy, I agree with that totally, except that our [the Navy's] message does not sell and yours does, and you get the bucks.

Reynolds: We don't get the bucks.

Student: That's true ...

Reynolds: The only bucks we get are to carry Army guys to places that they don't want to go, with C-17s.

Student: I mean, with the B-2 and B-1, you finally built a goddamn airplane that costs more than a ship.

Reynolds: It doesn't cost more than an *Aegis* cruiser, and they didn't give us enough of them. But we lost the bubble because the problem is our senior leadership. They have been unable to talk strategy and doctrine, and they have to be able to talk it in a language that makes sense for infrastructure dollars in the defense of our nation.

An illustration of this shortcoming on the part of senior leadership is evidenced in the treatment of the terms "global reach" and "global power." The original concept behind it—and I was there when they were debating all this stuff initially—was that it's not "global reach and global power," it's "global reach and power." I mean, what is reach and what is power about a 141 carrying a load of bombs to Dhahran? Is it reach or is it power? But, boy, it didn't take the Air Force too long, because we are sheep that like to be separated in ever smaller herds. If you fly into ACC today, the

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* Gen. John M. Loh, USAF, Commander, Air Combat Command.

** Carl H. Builder, *The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air Power Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the United States Air Force*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publications, 1994.

minute you fly over the main hangar on base at Langley Field, I guarantee that what you'll see written in big letters across the top of that hangar is, "Air Combat Command, Home of Global Power." When General Fogleman took over Air Mobility Command, he changed the call sign of the Air Mobility Command's flagship to "REACH-1," signifying that AMC was home to "global reach." Okay? So, that, if anything, solidified that split between reach and power and ensured that the Air Force would remain divided into separate camps as defined by the aircraft you flew. Airpower is indivisible and whole, not piecemeal.

When you ask a Marine what he is, he tells you he is a Marine. Ask an Air Force guy that same question and he'll tell you what he flies. It's that kind of division, whereas the Marines, and I think the Army to a great extent, and the Navy as well, are capable of keeping an integrated whole.

Student: No. You're right, the Marines less, but the Navy's segregated by surface, subsurface, aviation, and then within each of those communities, depending on what you drive, by how good you are.

Reynolds: Well, then, I would still allege it's not good for any of us.

Student: Agreed.

Reynolds: And if we could win ultimately, it would be to make us all simply sailors, soldiers, airmen, and Marines.

Oettinger: Enlighten me, and again, If I'm wrong, stop me. If I'm right, then explain what my question is driving at. What I get all through your book, in this whole story of the Gulf War (and you even cited the end-gain questions that got screwed up, et cetera), is that it turned out sort of all right, didn't it? You used air power in a strategic sense, but not in the extremist Douhet sense. And, in fact, then, the ground forces came in to do their piece, and it wasn't even the luck of simultaneity or the attitude of, "We do it all ourselves and you other guys aren't necessary." It's sort of a reasonable job. Now, leaving aside, then, how things got screwed up and so on, how did something so, on the whole, reasonably intelligent, happen? You keep explaining the screw-ups, but if I look at the outcome or how it actually got done, it wasn't that bad. And then I say to myself, "How come that kind of flexibility doesn't remain part of the way you're looking at things?" If I'm attacking a strawman, then stop me.

Reynolds: No, I think it's an excellent point, and it's one that's been made before. There are those who would argue, just as you have, that in any conflict those people who can solve the situation will rise to the top, and they will do so. I think that there's a false sense of security with that, Tony. I am not a Warden admirer to the *n*th degree. John Warden has some severe flaws. He does not know, nor did he ever know, how to handle people very well. He handles ideas. And as I said to you before, the difference between Warden and the doers and the brotherhood, which is the term I use to refer to the general officers, is that the general officers are faithful to each other. If you are one, you are not going to offend another one, not unless you really have to, because it's just not politic to do so.

Warden was faithful only to ideas. I believe, in my heart of hearts, from the research that I've done, that if Warden had not come along the war would surely have been won, but there would have been many, many more body bags. I think that was his contribution, in that I think there are a lot of snuffies (ground guys) out there who really need to thank him for his idea, because it kept the first Marine from going across the line before the first bomb was dropped.

Now, Schwarzkopf wouldn't have wanted that to happen, but his staff was giving him no alternatives other than that. I think that's the difference. I'm not content, and I don't feel comfortable, saying, "Don't worry about it. There'll be another Warden along," because we kill Wardens—at least the Air Force does. Now, maybe the Navy tried to kill Mahan for a long

time, but in the end, they rewarded him with an admiralty. The Air Force was not so generous.

Let me tell you about the extraordinary lengths to which the Air Force went to end John Warden's career. It was well known that John Warden had done extremely well in this campaign. It was he who briefed the Secretary of Defense numerous times. It was he whom Powell personally tried to shut off numerous times. It was he who briefed Powell numerous times on what was happening, and if you stop to think how extraordinary that is, it is unbelievable, truly, in terms of a bureaucracy. The bureaucracy should never have allowed that, because here in this huge labyrinth of intel information you've got NSA, CIA, DIA. You've got special rooms that are available inside the Pentagon where very good work can go on, as those of you who have been inside and worked there know. And everybody who wanted to know anything about what the hell was going on in the Gulf War went down to this Checkmate room, which was BF-771, I think—a rat-infested, crummy, cockroach place (I know, I used to work down there). The room was terrible, but he made the Secretary of Defense go there routinely.

The Air Force military leadership was angry with him. On the other hand, the senior Air Force civilian, a Rand-trained intellectual by the name of Don Rice, was very pleased with Warden and his accomplishments in the Gulf. Dr. Rice, said, "I want John Warden to be a general." This was before all that stuff was adjusted in Congress, and it didn't look like the brotherhood was going to let that happen. Rice said, "Okay, you guys, we'll see how serious you are about this. I want this guy made into a general. I'm going to send him to a one-star slot, at Air University, to fill the air command and staff position there. That slot will have to be filled by a colonel, for a while at least, until you can get it back. So, make him a general."

The brotherhood voted no. Warden never got his star. He was retired as a colonel, 30 years in service, by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, who flew down to Maxwell Air Force Base to retire him. And as you listened to the things he said about him, the vision, all the rest of this, you're saying it doesn't jibe with his leaving as a colonel.

Then, when you watched this Warden get up and give this retirement speech, you're thinking it's going to be like all the others that you've heard, and they're so painful when they talk about when they were a lieutenant, et cetera. Instead, Warden's entire speech was about how he wished that he could be with the force because the future of the Air Force was so exciting. He launched into a 30-minute diatribe about what he sees for the future, and the last thing he said was, "May the force be with you," and he walked off the stage.

But they killed him. Now, I would have thought they'd have kept Colonel Warden around for more ideas, because he didn't want anything but more work. That's all he asked for. You could beat him into submission with a club, and he was back the next day, and never even knew you shot him. But they killed him because they didn't like that in a man, especially in a man who wears stars.

My last point, and I'll quit. General [Jimmie] Adams was a four-star when I interviewed him. He was becoming very agitated the more we discussed John Warden's role in the Gulf War. I said, "Sir, I don't understand why you're getting upset. John Warden worked for you. He was a piddling colonel. He was a washed-up colonel. He had been fired from Bitburg and relegated to the basement of the Pentagon in a program so obscure that no one could find him. Why didn't you just kill him?" He slammed his fist down on the table (he really did; you'll hear it on the tape, if you care to listen to it), and he said, "Nobody can control John Warden. Nobody. And I am sick and tired (Warden was still on active duty at this time) of being tasked by John Warden." Because here is what Warden would do, routinely, over and over, if he worked for you. You'd say, "John, I don't want you to do this. It's a good idea, but the time isn't right for it. Don't do that. Okay? Here's why it's stupid, John." He would go to his boss's boss and say, "My boss just told me that my idea was stupid, and here are the reasons why he said it," and he would faith-

fully recount your reasons. He'd say, "But he's wrong, and here's why." And if Tony said, "No, I really agree with them, with those who don't accept the idea," he would go to the next guy above him. He did this not one time, not two times: he did this his entire career, and they hated him for it.

So I say, to change all this, we need to get pack mules like John Warden around. We need to keep them around. You don't have to make them commanders. They can fail at command, but you have to keep them around because they bring fresh ideas to old bureaucracies. I think John Warden's ideas saved 10,000 to 20,000 folks in the Gulf War. Maybe some of you are alive today because of Warden's ideas. And probably a hell of a lot of Iraqis are too.

Student: You say that perhaps they are keeping white blood cells around?

Oettinger: Either way, the killing was figurative, wasn't it? I mean, he was around. He got paid.

Reynolds: Yes, but for a measly star, they could have had him for another five years.

Oettinger: Yes, but, you know ...

Student: But it's not part of the rules, and it never has been, for good reasons. The battlefield is a place that demands discipline, yet we also need free thinkers. We've got to have the people who can balance both of them to succeed and rise to really high levels within the system.

Reynolds: My fear is that we do not have people who can balance those things. I think we have wonderful people who stay within the box, and they are not free thinkers.

Student: Yes, it's too bad. I certainly have seen a lot who are outside-the-box thinkers who survive. And a lot of times it's not required to be an out-of-the box thinker. It's required that you hammer things back into the box so they will work there.

Reynolds: Your experience is different than mine.

Student: Okay. A belated question. Colonel Harry Summers, I guess, is still somehow affiliated with the Army War College.

Reynolds: He owns it, I think.

Student: Well, exactly. He was retired 10 years ago now, but he's a bright guy, he writes a good book, and so they keep him on as a civilian adjunct faculty member, or whatever. Obviously, Air University has such positions. It seems to me that Colonel Warden would be the ideal candidate.

Reynolds: They would kill him. They'd never let him go there. It wouldn't happen.

Student: The other related issue is that air campaign planning is not a foreign concept. I'm a former Army guy; I read about how the World War II strategic bombing campaign wiped out oil production. That is a good idea. Why isn't that taught at Air University?

Reynolds: It's now being taught at our Strategic Airpower Studies (SAS) course at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery. We have a corollary to the SAMS course where we take our best officers and expose them to strategic thinking. Interestingly enough, in my staff I've tried hard to grab SAMS and SAS guys. I have no SAMS and SAS guys on my planning staff, and yet there are six of them running around EUCOM.

Student: This is not too much of a change in path. Colonel Reynolds talks about doctrine, and in Air Force ROTC I've gotten a lot of doctrine. Basically, the stuff is pretty sterile, or the way they teach it to you is sterile. If you were the colonel in charge of my detachment, I would never have a conversation about how Air Force

doctrine came about. What I would do is memorize Air Force doctrine, and I understand that as a young guy coming into the program, that's kind of the rule. But it's my sense that the excitement of what's going on in the Air Force isn't about how you write doctrine.

Reynolds: We have failed, then, because doctrine is not something you should memorize. It's a living thing. Doctrine changes all the time, and it will change with you. I mean, as new systems come on line, if doctrine is old, we will be defeated by that doctrine. So in my view, we've done a very poor job of teaching and communicating how important doctrine is. The Army does a better job. They have a four-star in charge of TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command), right?

Student: Yes.

Reynolds: We've got a colonel in charge of our doctrine. Bob Kaufman is a very nice guy. I know him. He used to be at the Boston Program. But we need to do better, and guys like you writing to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force would help. Believe it or not, he would listen. If you said what you just said to General Fogleman, he's a very good listener, and he's asked for that kind of input. If you did that, you have no idea what an impact you would have.

Oettinger: As a matter of fact, you can have a conversation with Paul Capasso, who will work with Fogleman.

Reynolds: And Fogleman would write you back, and he would probably call you. You're the kind of person who needs to say that. It's much better than if I say it. You would have tremendous credibility as a young guy saying, "Hey, help me understand." Fogleman has a master's in history, so he has a good sense for this.

You haven't said anything all day. I can't tell if you like this or not.

Student: Yes, it's great. I am a little bit disillusioned, I guess.

Reynolds: I'm sorry.

Student: But it took you 20 years to get there.

Reynolds: I was disillusioned for a long time. I'm no longer.

Student: You made a comment earlier about J-2 folks and being an intel weenie. I'd like to get your operational and planning viewpoints, and since you're not reticent, I don't need to tell you not to sugar-coat it.

Reynolds: Oh, thank you. I probably would have if you hadn't said that. The intel community has an unfair advantage because they have power, because they have knowledge of something, or, at least pretend to. No, I'm not saying it to be mean.

Student: Therein lies the truth of it.

Reynolds: In about the second half of that book we started to talk about how the air campaign planners abandoned intelligence the way it was normally flowing in the Gulf War because they couldn't get the right thing. There's a very evil character in my second book, if I bother to write the damn thing, and his name is Colonel Jim Blackburn. You might know him. He plays a wonderful villain in the book. It's not that he's a horrible person. He's a nice man. He's an evil character because he's like a Henry James novel. He doesn't know he's bad.

Blackburn was in charge of making sure specialized intelligence photos were available to the crews that had to fly the missions in Iraq and Kuwait. They never got them. You know where they were? They were in Jim Blackburn's office. When I said, "Jim, what is the story on all this? What happened there?" he said, "Well, it's so simple. The pilots and planners didn't ask for the right thing." I said, "Huh?" He said, "They didn't ask for the right thing. They should have asked the intelligence staff in Riyadh for the photos, and then the intelligence staff could have asked me, but they didn't do it that way.

They didn't go through the proper channels." I said, "Wait a minute, Jim. Do you speak French?" He said, "No." I said, "Well, if you came with me to France and you said you wanted a hot-dog, and I wouldn't let you have a hot-dog until you said 'hot-dog' in French, what would you think of me?" "Well, that's stupid." I said, "Well, so are you." But that's what he did. And, yet, when we finished the conversation—and this was a very long interview—he still walked away not understanding why I thought that he was dumb.

Oettinger: That's fascinating, because I've never heard that one before. The usual intelligence ploy is less on substantive matters than on organizational and budgetary matters, where, especially toward the Congress or the White House, and so on, you answer only the literal question. Since most Congressmen and most White House staffers don't know the lingo, they'd never know exactly how to ask for an exact read. You find a lot of these in the recent congressional debates on that question: "Why don't you answer the question as you understand it, instead of being so literal?"

Reynolds: Let me give a new perspective. I have an ever bigger indictment.

Oettinger: Good grief!

Reynolds: And I have to do this one gently. All right?

Oettinger: You have three minutes in which to do it.

Reynolds: I can do it. Here's what they did. There was another, much larger, issue to answer your question. The planners, when they were putting all this together, said, "You know, I can't deal with the system that the intelligence community uses to identify targets, because I'm not smart enough to remember all this. So, instead, I'm going to call a surface air defense target *SAD*. I'm going to call them *SAD1*, *SAD2*, *SAD3*, and I'm going to call an air target ... (you know, just you figure it out. I won't even say all this.) So, you'd get all this together, and when the commander says, 'Now how about ...?' that way my planners, as we're laying this out, will understand, because they'll have memorized it. When I say, 'Hey, SAD10, we've got to hit it again. It was a bad hit,' they'll know exactly where that is. They'll know what it looks like. It'll be in their heads."

So, they said to the intel guys, "Hey, we're doing it this way. Can you just cross-reference this for us so that when you talk to them you put both that other number that you use plus the one we're using?" "No way. I ain't doing that. That's stupid. The only way you're going to get information on our targets is if you ask us, and have all your people ask us, by our numbers."

Now, they're working in the same building ... well, kind of. They wouldn't do it, and it was a matter of principle. It went all the way up to your friend Leide*. I wish I had been here when he was here, because I would have asked him about that. And he defended that, as did all of those folks in the chain, including the little villain (because he's a little villain in the story), Blackburn.

Oettinger: But, you know, this is chickenshit. The old arguments, the green door arguments, have to do with protection of sources and methods, and there were some bare bones of justification. This, to me, is appalling.

Reynolds: It's not bar talk. It's real. So I don't like them very much.

Oettinger: I'm afraid we've sort of run out of time, but not out of steam, nor have we run out of esteem. Now, what he was afraid of, having been here before, et cetera, is that I'd give him a T-shirt. But we

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* MGen. John A. Leide, USA, Director of Intelligence for U.S. Central Command during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, spoke to the seminar in 1994 and 1995.

have something else that you can carry with you. It's a small token of our esteem.

Reynolds: It's a gold coin, but I assure you it's under 10 bucks.

Oettinger: You can use it to hurl at enemies.

Reynolds: Thank you all very much for being so patient. I really appreciated your giving me the time to do this.

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