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The Philosophy of Intelligence
W. O. Studeman

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The Philosophy of Intelligence

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National Security Agency, a position he has held since
1988. He has served in the U.S. Navy since 1963,
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officer in Air Anti-Submarine Warfare Squadron 23.
Following postgraduate education, he was assigned to
Amphibious Group One, including deployments to the
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mander of Naval Operations Staff as Executive Assis-
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ity, Norfolk; and Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
for the Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet Staff. In 1980,
he returned to Washington and ultimately served
as Executive Assistant to the Vice Chief of Naval
Operations, and as Commanding Officer of the Navy
Operational Intelligence Center. His first flag assign-
ment was as the Director of the Long Range Planning
Group and Executive Director of the Advanced
Technology Panel of the Chief of Naval Operations
Executive Board. He was named as the 53rd Director
of Naval Intelligence in 1985, and served in that
position until he assumed his present duties.*

Oettinger: Our speaker today is Vice Admiral
Studeman, who is the director of the National
Security Agency. You have seen his biography, so I
won't take any of his or your time to introduce him
further. He has agreed to take questions as they
come along, so as soon as they occur to you, feel
free to chime in. He will speak about whatever he
cares to, and these days, given the changes in the
world and the likely changes in the missions, out-
look, and so forth, there's plenty to talk about. With
that, I'm happy to turn it over to you, Bill, for
whatever thoughts you'd like to share with us.

Studeman: Let me say that I'm delighted to be
here. This is not the first time I've done this. I went
back to my alma mater, a small southern school in
Tennessee that also has an intelligence curriculum as
an elective given by the vice chancellor, and I spent

an entire afternoon there about a month and a half
ago, so I had sort of a chance to practice this.

But I seriously consider this to be your time, not
my time. I'm happy to talk about whatever you
want to talk about. I find that this is difficult to do
for those of us who spend most of our life totally in
the classified environment, but there is increasingly
a lot of effort going on at the academic level in the
United States, with a large amount of interest being
focused around the intelligence community. I think
this is probably the right thing to have happen, even
though those of us in the intelligence community
are not used to being subjected to this kind of
scrutiny and dissection — past, present, or future.

I think that intelligence and the role of intelli-
gence in the history of countries, particularly the
United States, are not that well understood. I think
that even the history of World War II is not yet

completely written, and will not be completely written until the true role of intelligence in its totality is fully understood. My observations of it now, after almost 30 years in the business, spanning certainly the Vietnam War and lots of crises — the Cuban Missile Crisis and others — is similar: the role that intelligence played in the background, silently or unstated, is not very well understood in terms of how the average historian goes about describing the role and importance, significance, capabilities, limitations, and the nature of the business.

I thought I would do several things. I view this as a potpourri kind of approach because I didn't know how much of this your elective group had focused on before. I was going to try to do as rapid a tour as possible through a broad cross-section of activities, focusing principally on something that, I think, probably hasn't been done for you.

I would like to talk a little about the basics first and I promise I won't spend very much time on that. I'd like to talk about the concept — and I'm talking here mostly, obviously, about our perspective in terms of United States intelligence and the United States intelligence community. I think it goes without saying that in this country intelligence is principally technically oriented and it's externally focused. In many countries around the world, in fact probably in most countries, when you talk to people involved in the intelligence and/or security business, you'll find there's a balance between internal and external focus, or, in some countries, there may be totally an internal focus. That is, the threat is perceived to come from within, not from without. I'm talking about the American system which focuses its intelligence resources, particularly foreign intelligence resources, on the outside. It's interesting that that point has to be made now because the whole business of trying to deal with counternarcotics, which is both an outside and an inside problem in the United States, is forcing us into a very close and uneasy relationship between the foreign intelligence community on the one hand and the law enforcement community on the other. We are culturally so different from each other that we're having a lot of problems trying to rationalize how we will operate together, and how the law will permit us to execute the functions that essentially were written in such a way as to keep us apart. A similar situation exists for those of you who are in the military. As you know, you came in the military and there was a strong ethic and a law called *posse comitatus* that, essentially, did not allow the military to be used for any kind of law enforcement or domestic purposes beyond the

National Guard or Reserves for certain things. That has been an ethic in the military for certainly much of this century and it's now breaking down quite rapidly as the military moves to assist the law enforcement organizations. The problem there, again, is the legal authority associated with both of those activities.

Let me talk about the basics: what intelligence is and what it isn't. I'm going to talk about pure intelligence. I'm not going to talk about covert action because I believe covert action is a function that's executed by a segment of the intelligence and policy community, but it's not what I call intelligence. Intelligence is simply, in my view, collecting, analyzing, processing, and reporting information. The fact that some of it is classified is neither here nor there. Some of it clearly involves sensitive sources and methods, and I'll talk about the range of sensitivity here in a few minutes. But clearly, intelligence is really information gathering — for specific purposes, obviously. It comes in two categories: positive intelligence and counterintelligence. Whether counterintelligence is a subset of security or whether security sweeps up all the activities associated with counterintelligence — counterespionage, physical security, security of information, security of personnel, all those are terms that I'm trying to use — they all, basically, in my view, fall under the rubric of the term "intelligence."

Intelligence responsibilities certainly go across a very wide spectrum. In the military we talk about indications and warning. At one end of the spectrum we talk about threat assessment. We talk about estimates. We talk about basic information categories that are available: arms control, compliance verification, and monitoring. So it's a fairly wide spectrum of specific disciplines broken down within it.

Then, of course, you can slice it another way by "INTS." The world is made up of COMINT, or communications intelligence, and electronic intelligence, one focusing on communications, the other focusing on things like radars and other electronic equipment that give off RF (radio frequency) energy. There's imagery intelligence, radar intelligence, visual intelligence, literature intelligence, human intelligence, acoustic intelligence, and a new term that's been invented in the last 10 years called MASINT (measurement and signature analysis) looking at things like optical sources for use as weapons or as sensors or even as communications devices.

These categories tend to be associated with agencies, but that's not, I think, a fair statement anymore. A lot of things are blurring. The U.S. intelligence community does tend to be vertically oriented by agency. We'll talk a little bit more about that in the future. But it is horizontally oriented either by subject or by "INT" or by some other governing factor. So you do need to view national intelligence, or theater intelligence, or even intelligence at the level of forces, as a matrix type of operation.

The three dominant INTs in the United States are IMINT, HUMINT, and SIGINT. SIGINT is a major producer of intelligence, but I think that it is important that you recognize that all those INTs shouldn't be played individually; that there is a symbiotic relationship that naturally exists between them and they need to be played together so that imagery can be used to cue SIGINT, or SIGINT can be used to cue imagery. Between the two of them, they can tell a story that one or the other might not be able to tell all by itself. There is this synergistic relationship and this fusion and correlation and multidisciplinary analysis that goes on at all levels for all kinds of intelligence. It occurs more frequently in the military, and for the military problem fusion is the only way to do business for the future. We have constant lessons of that every day. We are now sort of beginning to learn, even with the drug problem, which we're spending a lot of time on, that if we put together the human intelligence from the agent in the street and mix it together with electronic intelligence or maybe even imagery, the story that is told of past events, forensically, or current or future events, is much more clear by using this fusion process.

I think it's pretty clear that most of U.S. intelligence is, as I've said before, technical. Even the human part of it is very technical. We tend to be a technical society fascinated by technology applications. We think that there are no limits to what technology can do and therefore we have applied and taken technology to extraordinary heights in terms of applying it to the intelligence problem. It is also, in my view, a weakness because we've used technology as a substitute for the human skills required. Where you see other countries, like the Soviet Union or Eastern European, or Third World countries, or even some other advanced countries, that can't afford the level of technology that we have and who have maintained their human intelligence skills, their ability to do the things I'm going to talk about in a few minutes is really quite good.

You can view intelligence in another way. You can view it in a target orientation. The target orientation means military intelligence, political, economic, diplomatic, sociological, or scientific and technical. We can talk about these trans-national problems we've already talked about — terrorism, counternarcotics. It can even be worrying about what other countries are doing with regard to environmental progress. There are a lot of dimensions if you will — the total dimensions that you would want to study for any other purpose are the same kinds of dimensions that interest people and decision makers, and are the daily diet of human intercourse and competition.

The most important thing about the intelligence business, of course, and the thing that we are most concerned about, is protection of sources and methods. Intelligence does use open sources, and for the future, obviously, as the world changes and there's either a reduced threat perception or, in fact, the reality of reduced threat, there is a sense that the world will become more open and that information on the traditional targets that we've had to use, sensitive sources and means to penetrate might be much more readily available just for the asking or by turning on your television and watching the Cable News Network (CNN). Clearly, the intelligence community, even now, uses virtually all sources of information. When we bombed Libya, for example, in the aftermath of the LaBelle Disco, we got more bomb damage assessments and a sense of what was going on inside Tripoli around those targets from listening to the CNN guy talking on the balcony of a hotel in Tripoli than we did from all the electronic surveillance devices that we had focused on the problem. So they play together very well. The media tend to rush to the scene of targets of interest either before, during, or immediately after anything that's a hot spot and, therefore, we can mix and match the unclassified together with the classified to tell a story. And that's all intelligence is essentially trying to do — to tell a story.

Let me tell you what else I'm going to talk about. I've divided this into five areas. I've finished the basics. I'm going to talk a little about the community. I want to spend most of the time talking about what I call the philosophy of intelligence — what are the fundamental kinematics — the things that you need to think about if you step back a way: what are the parts of intelligence that are the most important, particularly to those of us who are professionals, that we really need to think about? If

you were a good intelligence officer, I believe you would embody all of the philosophical pieces of intelligence I'm going to describe. I'll talk a little bit about signals intelligence, but because it is a sensitive subject I'm not going to spend very much time on it, and perhaps I might even talk about communications security and computer security because most of you know that the missions of the National Security Agency are code making and code breaking. We have the national responsibility to build the information systems security used by the Defense Department and all the other elements of the government that are involved in classified activities. Then I want to talk a little bit about the future to finish off and, again, I think you ought to feel free to interrupt or to think about questions as we go along.

Oettinger: You mentioned earlier, and maybe you'll get back to it under one of those headings, the legal and cultural shock of the new-found relationship with the law enforcement agencies, and I hope that somewhere along the line you'll come back to it.

Studeman: I think I will but I'm not sure it's programmed. You'll probably have to ask a question about it.

In terms of the community, I brought along an article I'd like you all to see. It came out of a counterintelligence quarterly but I think it's a very important thing for people to recognize. It was written by a CIA senior talking about the origins, theory, and problems associated with the intelligence community. I think it's reasonable to say that the United States intelligence community is probably still in evolution. In other words, we have not reached what I would call the highest degree of enlightenment in terms of our activities, organizations, and our interaction. That's probably not unique to the institution of intelligence.

The intelligence community is made up of what I call vertically oriented monoliths. The National Security Agency is the largest single monolith in the intelligence community. It is the largest agency; it is also a defense agency, so it is part of the Department of Defense, but it's viewed in a slightly different construct than the others. It has these two missions I described to you before and to a degree it is monolithically responsible for one of the INTs, which is unique: it has signals intelligence as its mission. No other intelligence agency has only one INT that it rallies around and has as a mission. The CIA certainly doesn't, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) certainly doesn't, the service intelligence

organizations or the counterintelligence organizations are not necessarily focused on one intelligence discipline. NSA is responsible for operations and management and most of the resources and development associated with the business of signals intelligence. So even though the front end of the system and the manning of the United States signals intelligence system is predominantly military, those military units out in the field still respond to the tasking and the management provided by the National Security Agency.

Oettinger: Would you please illuminate what I think I heard you say a moment ago, that the National Security Agency (NSA) is a part of the Defense Department?

Studeman: It's a defense agency, like DIA, or Defense Logistics, or Defense Communications, and I report in essentially the same way. Interestingly, for oversight my reporting chain is quite complex.

Oettinger: Has the distinction of the Secretary of Defense being the executive agent for a national INT vanished for all practical purposes?

Studeman: No, that's precisely what he is. He essentially is the national executive agent for SIGINT because he owns the National Security Agency. But, of course, the Secretary of Defense has a lot more power and I think you've probably seen it wielded here recently. Much of the intelligence budget, both in terms of people and money, resides in the Defense Department; therefore, when dramatic things happen to the Defense budget, in terms of the downturn or in terms of an upturn, you will find that the Secretary of Defense personally will have some important influence over the intelligence budget. Now, admittedly, that may ultimately be decided by the President in a forum involving the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; but nevertheless, the Secretary of Defense, because that budget is buried in the Defense budget, has a fair amount of influence over intelligence dollars.

So you have all these organizations which I've described to you that are either agencies or departments that participate in the community. There is a community staff. Judge Webster, who is the Director of Central Intelligence — there is no title, by the way, called "Director of the Central Intelligence Agency" — by virtue of the law is also in charge of the Central Intelligence Agency. Some of you might have seen that there have been several attempts to

table legislation in the Congress not too recently. In fact there is still some legislation under consideration to allow CIA to have its own dedicated director and to create a Director of National Intelligence, DNI, if you will, who would have budget and policy authority over the entire community, but would be separate from the guy who runs the CIA on a day-to-day basis. So the DCI has the CIA on the one hand, and he has a very large Intelligence Community (IC) staff that is separately located downtown in a building very near the White House. The IC staff basically controls the foreign intelligence program budget. The Intelligence Community staff is also the place around which community activities take place from the point of view of its National Intelligence Estimates, policy, and budgetary considerations.

The vehicles that the DCI uses are things like the National Foreign Intelligence Council and the National Foreign Intelligence Board. Those community vehicles are used for policy, for architecture, for budget decisions, for programmatic decisions, and they're also used to staff the substantive intelligence estimates, and to approve them on a community-wide basis. There is also the National Intelligence Council, a staff that's divided into functional kinds of areas, and there are national intelligence officers who have responsibilities for regional or topical things like the Soviet Union, or general purpose forces, etc. Beyond that there are also community vehicles such as signals intelligence committees and human intelligence committees, which try to track what is going on in terms of basic requirements and dollar matching and try to influence in a general sense what's happening in terms of investment and collection, even try to influence the direction for day-to-day collection kinds of activities. So we have this large community structure which is made up of thousands and thousands of people dedicated to community-type activities.

As I said, the community also has these vertical orientations by agency, and these organizations tend to be culturally unique. I've been in two or three of these cultures. I'm an intelligence officer by profession, but now I'm in the signals intelligence business. I was the Director of Naval Intelligence before this, so I was in the Navy culture. I spent a lot of time with DIA, so that's another culture. I've certainly spent a fair amount of time here recently with the CIA. Each one of these organizations views the world slightly differently, is organized differently, and has a whole series of cultural dynamics associated with it, most of which I think contribute positively to the mission, but some of them in my view contribute negatively to the mission and need to be overcome as we progress along with more of a community orientation. When dollars get tough, competition between agencies for money and programs becomes tough, and community leadership becomes an important requirement.

Oettinger: I don't want to derail you from all of your agenda, but I'd like to spend a couple of more minutes on that. A year or two ago, when Bob Herres was Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, we put a somewhat similar question to him about the services versus jointness and so on, and was the balance about right, and he thought it was. The essential point being that the military enterprise as a whole, like the intelligence enterprise, is too big to have as one piece so you've got to slice it up. The minute you slice it up, you have the cultural differences and so on that you described, but you can't get away from it. So can you go just a little bit further and say in terms of what you described, is it on balance, off balance, you know, and if you had to make adjustments, what would you adjust?

Studeman: I'll leave this article behind because I think Troy has captured, if you will, some of the essence of the problems, and the tension areas, and where things have to be worked on for the future. You're exactly right. You have to recognize that intelligence is a very big enterprise in this country. There's an article in the paper, I guess it was in the *Washington Post* this morning or yesterday, that said that the intelligence budget is $30 billion. I can't confirm or deny that, but I can tell you that it is in the multiples of billions of dollars. The people engaged in intelligence is a very large number. It's not measured in the millions as the armed services are, and of course, it is made up of a lot of complex and disparate activities.

The real problem, in my view, has to do with making it play together, and it deals with all the classic problems. All organizations tend to be oriented toward credit, control, turf, and jealously guarding their charter. When you are trying to solve the kinds of problems that we are trying to deal with in the world today, you have to go across agencies in order to solve problems, and I'll talk to that in a minute. If you're going to, let's say, become involved in some kind of HUMINT technical operation, the National Security Agency doesn't have the mission to conduct HUMINT. We have the mission to conduct SIGINT. So immediately the requirement to do it with a human on a clandestine or covert basis means that we have to interact with somebody

else. That interaction can be either with the services or it can be with the Central Intelligence Agency, or the DIA, in some cases. So what you have when you play these disciplines together, like HUMINT and SIGINT, together with the charters of the agencies, you find that more and more of what you have to do with the future requires — demands — absolutely, utterly, and certainly, that you play cooperatively in order to make progress in any given area, whether it's technical or whether it's substantive, or whatever. That applies not only to collection, but also to analysis, processing, reporting.

Clearly, one of the things that the United States intelligence system does, that is probably not matched by any other country in the world, is recognize that intelligence is of no value if it isn't moved very rapidly from its place of origin to the consumer who needs it — moved in minutes if not seconds — certainly in days if it's less perishable. But the United States intelligence system has put together an architecture, and this is where we cross over very heavily with the command and control aspects of this seminar. There isn't an intelligence officer in the business who isn't or hasn't been involved in the business of command, control, and communications because it's so endemic to our business. It's not only a question of getting the data, but it's also a question of moving it very rapidly to the consumer. That, then, starts getting us into this problem that we were talking about at lunch: how much of it do you move to the consumer, do you sanitize it, what's the consumer going to do with it, and how does it risk sources and methods? It's a double-edged sword. So we are talking about a business where, for the future, if one agency decides it wants primacy over the other, or wants to move onto its turf, or wants all the credit, or wants to control totally and absolutely a given area of enterprise, that kind of effort really works to the detriment of the whole. The community concept is in, but the community concept is only as good as your ability to manage the community efforts in a positive direction and it doesn't take very much counterforce to come along and cause it to stop happening. I happen to believe right now that there's probably the best form of community activity I've ever seen in my almost 30 years in this business, but we still have a long way to go. Particularly, we have a long way to go to play these things together in order to deal with the problems of the future. I'll talk a little about those later. So, again, I'm not going to say much more about the community unless you want to dwell on it.

Let me talk a little bit about the philosophy because I think this is the most important piece. I find that I can use this in a classified or an unclassified environment. I spend a lot of time with naval intelligence, particularly people at the midcareer level, and a lot of time with people in the defense intelligence business. I gave a talk to the people in the Defense Intelligence College not too long ago and it contained essentially these same philosophical points. No matter what business you go into, many of these philosophical points would serve you probably equally well in business as they would in intelligence.

It's very important, first off, in the business of intelligence that you have an ability to tell the important from the unimportant. It's amazing to me how many people are not capable of doing that. Even today you'll encounter people who are processing information and something critical will come through and for some reason or other they either didn't recognize it as being important, or, in the sense of whatever else they were working with, they let it sit off to the side. This point of being able to tell the important from the unimportant is key to the next series of philosophical points.

The first obligation of every intelligence officer is to achieve deep penetration of the target — a simple concept. We're not looking for superficiality, just as you wouldn't be in business; we're looking for quality, deep penetration, deep knowledge of the target. If you're talking about a military target, you want to understand its strategy, policy, doctrine, organization, technology, people, where it came from, its history, how it thinks about the world, how it behaves, how it operates, how it communicates with itself, virtually every piece of data that would be required to have a total understanding. That is what I call deep penetration. It's amazing to me how many people are satisfied with shallow penetration of the target, and it goes back to being able to tell the important from the unimportant. If you recognize that this target over here is the dominant, most important target that you need to put an effort against, then your obligation is to achieve deep penetration. That means then that you can't be satisfied with anything less. That means that you constantly have to work and think about this process in reverse. Think about it in the context of counterintelligence. Think about it in the context of the spy cases and how the KGB or the GRU achieved deep penetration of the United States, and particularly the United States Navy, in the era of the Walker and

Whitworth cases. They conformed to the first obligation.

Oettinger: Excuse me. You're punning a bit on "penetration."

Studeman: You can use whatever term you want to use, but I believe that penetration means, essentially, unfolding and revealing information, much of which was intended to be kept secret or certainly veiled in some way from the other person.

Oettinger: Okay, would the HUMINT aspect of that be one facet of it? You did mean it more broadly?

Studeman: Certainly. I'm not talking, necessarily, about just human penetration. I'm talking about, if you're vulnerable to imagery, or if you're vulnerable to signals intelligence, and that's the way you're going to achieve that penetration and understanding, then that's a very critical piece of it.

The next thought that kind of goes along with that has to do with this concept called preparation of the battlefield. This is an old Army term and it goes back again to the sense of being able to tell the important from the unimportant. Today's intelligence systems have to be flexible. Tomorrow it may be the Philippines. Yesterday it could have been Panama. The week before that it could have been Libya. The week before that it could have been Chad. The week before that it could have been something else. The system that we build is inherently designed to be highly flexible but you have to get a sense that a crisis is coming. There may be an Indo-Pakistani war coming. There are major problems in the Philippines. We know, as professionals, where those hot spots could be. You don't just stand around as an intelligence professional and wait for the event to take place. You start building the structure. You start evaluating your capabilities to track and follow and penetrate those activities before they happen. So this concept of preparation of the battlefield is very important. It means you think about the problem before it happens, not when it happens.

Student: With the changes that are occurring now all over — particularly in East Germany, West Germany, and the Soviet Union, is it harder to identify the hot spots to target and, in fact, how can you penetrate if things are not as controlled?

Studeman: That's a good question. I think that, for the most part, we've had success in the last 10 years or so with intelligence, Grenada excepted, which was a total zero in the intelligence database

(at the start) for all intents and purposes. By the way, it probably deserved to be a zero. You can cold start on a problem like Grenada and not worry about intelligence, but you may take losses as a result of not having all of the intelligence that you want. It is a tough thing to predict where these hot spots will be and, of course, there are worldwide hot spots, and there are hot spots that are relative to U.S. national interests. The really important thing is to be able to identify the ones that are of critical importance to the U.S. national interest. The hot spots can end up being very much subsets of other problems. We keep a very heavy eye on the Soviets but right now the community is spending a lot of time working, as one might imagine, on the ethnic minority problems in the Soviet Union. We're not only talking about the Baltic States, but more importantly, we started with Azerbaijan and Armenia and working to the Ukraine and the Baltic States and now are focusing more on the Georgians and Lithuanians and the Estonians. So, those are the kinds of things where again you sort of have to say, "Here is a problem. I know that there is going to be an audience out there. We're a service organization." We then have to be able to respond to specific interests in an area. You look around and you inventory your capabilities. You cross the technical spectrum, the human spectrum, or whatever, and say, "How do I play all these together? Maybe move them, orchestrate them, set up special kinds of cells?" At NSA, for example, to support the Panama operation, we had a Panama cell set up. We didn't have to do anything special, but if we hadn't had a Panama cell, we would have had to set one up. A Panama cell was set up there about a year and a half ago, and it was a breakaway from the Central American cell, which is working Nicaragua, El Salvador, and the like. So, again, it's purely a question of sticking your finger in the air and sort of smelling the wind blowing, and trying to do something about it — but do it before, not when — that's the key lesson you need to inculcate in young people today.

Student: We had Mr. Negus* in here last week, the DIA Director, and one of the things he talked about was in line with what you were saying about having to anticipate hot spots. He admitted quite tacitly that, despite their best efforts, they were caught a bit unawares in terms of the quickly unfolding situation alluded to in the Soviet Union and in the Warsaw Pact area.

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*Gordon Negus, Executive Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.

Studeman: You're talking about what's happening politically in the Soviet Union right now?

Student: Yes, sir, politically, and the overall situation. He made the statement that the command and control in the Warsaw Pact is gone, that their back is broken. Are you in agreement, is that a standard agreement?

Studeman: Absolutely. There is no Warsaw Pact, in essence. There is still a staff and there are still low-level links, but in essence, there is no Warsaw Pact. You're right in the sense that the intelligence community, having been more insightful than even the Soviets themselves or the rest of the world, certainly, has not been able to predict accurately the amount and the pace of change that has occurred on the landscape of the globe in the last two years.

Student: But both of you gentlemen are in such high-ranking positions, and you come out and say that. It rolls right off the tip of your tongue so easily, and I guess the thing for those of us in the trenches is like the Swedish guy with the hot water bottle. How does he know? How can you possibly know that it's dead, when they've still got all their forces, they've got all the things that they had?

Studeman: But they haven't got them. Already the Eastern European countries have started to restructure their forces and that restructuring is going on right now. In essence, they're walking an entirely different path. They couldn't put those forces together and execute the standard classic Eastern European-Central European scenario today without patching it all back together. They have already walked away from any capability to do that. The political environment we're talking about certainly wouldn't support any of that. An exclusively military environment won't support that either. Now that's not to say the Soviets aren't dangerous, or that there aren't dangers involved in Eastern Europe or with the Soviet Union. There are lots of stability questions that still make the Soviets dangerous. They still possess a large and disparate and widely deployed, even within their own country, nuclear stockpile. Some of these nuclear facilities are in areas that are points of ethnic unrest and revolt. We've seen situations where the Soviets are extremely concerned about the security of their own strategic and theater weapons. So there are all kinds of dimensions to this that simply can't be predicted, but in the classic sense the old European threat as we have known it until now is gone.

In the whole argument between Cheney and Webster over irreversibility, it's very important that somebody read specifically what Webster said, because for the most part Cheney agrees with him. Cheney says that notwithstanding that, the Soviets can still represent a danger to the United States and that, therefore, there is a need to keep a strong military posture in the United States and not to walk away from it suddenly and completely. What Judge Webster said in his statement to the House Armed Services Committee, which has been touted, of course, as a disagreement and was picked up by the media and to a degree confirmed by Cheney, was that there are three areas of irreversibility. They had to do with the ability of the Soviets to achieve hegemony in the Central European scenario, which is exactly what we're talking about. They are not capable of executing the classic central front attack, the Warsaw Pact attack that we have touted for so many years. Enough has changed both within the context of the Soviet Union and within the context of what's happening in the Warsaw Pact to make that not executable. It's probably, based on what we see right now, not reversible. In other words, they're not going to be able to stuff the toothpaste back into the tube and get the Polish army, and the Hungarian army, and the Czech army back in line and back up to the level of strength required to execute that kind of war. The other two areas that Judge Webster was talking about had to do with the economic state of the Soviet Union, essentially saying that the Soviet Union is an economic basket case, and that's not easily reversible. The third area had to do with having walked away from the power of the Party in its classical Stalinist sense. Those are the three areas that Judge Webster specifically cited in his discussion, no more than that. I think that even Cheney has generally agreed that those areas are probably going to be hard to turn around, but Cheney then takes the extra step and says that the Soviets still represent a threat, and when you combine that with the other threats that exist out there in the world, there is still a need for a strong, viable, properly constructed and constituted, high technology, military force. A little bit of that is the natural interaction that goes on with the Congress, who want to walk away completely and totally and say there's zero threat, it's now a benign world, and they want to get in this huge peace dividend and the only way they're going to get it is to go to the Defense Department. So that, essentially, is the politics of all that.

Student: Do you support the idea that, since these three areas that were perceived as the major ones where we have resources have changed so much, we should de-escalate our intelligence?

Studeman: I don't think that intelligence ought to be de-escalated — ever. What we're doing is trading in an old world for a new world and intelligence has a very viable role to play in the new world, no matter what. The leadership of this country believes that and that's the reason why intelligence is not receiving the same level of cuts as defense in general is. Clearly when you get to the level of the Congress, and we've not yet finished the debate on the next year's budget, it's still up in the air as to how much intelligence will be hit by these figures.

Oettinger: Forgive my penchant for platitudes, but Thomas Jefferson is said to have said that, "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty."

McLaughlin: I think if anything the requirement is up, although not in terms of people talking about it. I have a son who's a scout pilot in the Eleventh Armored Cavalry Regiment over in Fulda and we were visiting him the weekend the Wall came down. I said, "The amount of resources I could use over the next couple of months debriefing East Germans, Hungarians, and whatever — I could spend, literally, hundreds of millions of dollars creating an enormous intelligence trove which I'll be able to play out over the next 10 years." I'm sure that nobody budgeted for that.

Studeman: It's not been budgeted for, and it's a significant problem right now. We anticipate a problem handling all the people who could come across and volunteer to tell us x, y, and z in virtually every category you could possibly imagine — some of it may only be of historical interest, and some of it may be of downright significant intelligence interest.

Student: Considering the developments in Eastern Europe and inside the Soviet Union, there is now a tendency toward looking for the peace dividend and reducing the defense budget. Do you agree with this? I consider the situation in the Soviet Union still volatile because if something happens to Gorbachev and he is blamed for all these things that are happening in his country and in Eastern Europe, there would be a backlash. Supposing he is kicked out and this new group tries to reestablish hegemony in Eastern Europe? That will be a very big problem.

Studeman: You can envision a hundred scenarios like that, some of which would keep you awake most nights, many of which certainly require a strong intelligence capability and many of which require a strong military capability and that's all that the Secretary of Defense is essentially saying. I quite

honestly tend to be more middle of the road in terms of predicting what's likely to happen in Eastern Europe. I don't think the Soviets have indicated any aspirations for trying to retake the Eastern European countries or necessarily and categorically preventing the unification of the two Germanys or anything like that. But who knows? I think it would be a real problem trying to stuff the toothpaste back in the tube in terms of taking back hegemony over the Eastern European countries. Now, that said, keep in mind the Soviet Union is the only country in the world that has successfully stuffed the toothpaste back in the tube on several occasions, but they were able to do it country by country by country. They didn't have to face the Eastern European countries as a whole, and as each day passes, one gets a sense that the Eastern European countries are more willing, like the Baltic States, not ever to let that happen again. I think it would be a real problem for the Soviets — of course, it would be a problem for us as well.

Student: But, Admiral, forgive me, from your position I think that your being able to come up and say, "You've got to keep intelligence" is very easy. We're going to cut these other things because we have to, but we must keep intelligence.

Studeman: But it's not that simple. We're not talking about just intelligence. We're actually down at the level of talking specific programs.

Student: That's all right, but my question that follows that is, if we take your statement as truth and you extrapolate from it, it seems that you have to then somehow identify what forces you will keep against what threats, because obviously your intelligence is only good as an indicator to tell us now that we have the information, we have to strike or we don't have to strike. If we have nothing with which to strike, or we have the wrong things with which to strike, because as Mr. McLaughlin always says, "We have the Fifth and Seventh Corps in the central region and they're not doing us a damn bit of good in the Philippines where everything went to hell in a handbasket," what do we do? How do your agency and other intelligence agencies help us to determine what the threat is and what should we do, in your estimation, to prepare for it? What kind of forces should we have in the next years?

Studeman: Well, that's a galactic question, of course. That's an understatement. We do that by producing intelligence, by essentially trying to describe the current and potential future state of

play, by making estimates about where these individual situations will be going. Those are running calculations that are constantly being updated. We're talking about thousands of data points that are constantly being aggregated by the intelligence community, mixed with the unclassified data, put together in an intellectual exercise, and put out as a product that's designed to stimulate the policy maker on a day-to-day basis, whether he's military or he's civilian, so that he can anticipate where he wants to go with his policy — how he wants to anticipate problems of the future — how he's going to think about those problems before they erupt.

Student: But you still didn't say what we're going to do. What, in your estimation, should we have, should we go light or should we go heavy?

Studeman: I'm not sure quite honestly where your question is focused. Are you talking about how the military is structured?

Oettinger: He wants to know which airplane he should fly.

Student: What are you seeing? Do you foresee us having to reduce the forces from heavy kinds of Army forces?

Studeman: That's already clear on the horizon. You know, there's a CFE (Conventional Forces Europe) reduction that has a limitation of 195,000 in the corps and we're going to 195,000 in Central Europe like gangbusters. We'll be at 170,000, 150,000, 120,000 in my view, within the next year or two and 30,000 in the rim — 225,000 total in Europe and going down. So, sure, we're lightening up, but then you've still got to be prepared to fight the war in Europe, should it come. I think that what you're looking for and what we're looking for is going in the direction of flexibility so that you can deal with any problem, large or small, across any dimension. Now if you think about the nature of those problems, they could be anywhere from nuclear or weapons of high lethality being used in a regional construct — Iraq firing a weapon at Israel, Israel nuking Iraq. The scenarios are endless in terms of the kinds of things we're talking about and whether or not the United States chooses or doesn't choose to play in those kinds of regional conflicts, but lightening up is certainly not a matter of speculation, it's actually happening. It's happening every second in the Pentagon. If you read the paper, it's obvious that the military is essentially on the ropes in terms of where it's going for the future in military technology, the size and scope of the military, and I think that what

they're trying to do is preserve capability. As the Chairman said, he doesn't want a hollow Army. We don't want a hollow Air Force or a hollow Navy. We want to be able to get there and protect our own national interests.

That said, it's pretty clear that military force alone isn't necessarily worth all that much. It's got to be played in the context of other kinds of things — political objectives as well. Things have gone well when they have been in concert. You can argue over Panama, I guess, but I still believe that was the right thing to do. In my view, it reversed a set of trends that were headed entirely in the wrong direction. It's had a dramatic ripple effect across all of Central America in the day-to-day battle I'm trying to fight. The quality of life in Central America, in Latin America, is not always an easy thing to deal with, but that's kind of where we are now — on the margin, rather than dealing with the Noriegas of the world as we did before.

Student: Sir, keeping in mind Professor Oettinger's need for balance, when General Wood* was here he pointed out how dependent the intelligence process is on requirements generated by customers. So, how will intelligence officers be able to anticipate under a structure where they can only devote resources to those items that have requirements?

Studeman: I tend to be a little cynical about the intelligence process as articulated by a bureaucrat. I'm not beating up on Norm Wood, I'm just telling you that the real world is a world in which the intelligence professionals interact with people who are operating at the strategic level, or the tactical level, or the policy level, and they are the ones who generate the requirements. The requirements are dynamic. There are also static requirements around; NSA operates off a standard national requirements list and everything we do is sort of built around that on a static basis, but the real action is in the ad hocs. The real action is in the ebb and flow that I was talking about in this context of trying to keep the system dynamic and in this concept of preparation of the battlefield where you really do move sensors around, or move intelligence capabilities around, to improve your ability to deal with that target because it is a target of national interest. We're getting away from the philosophical points here and talking about current events. That's the point I was trying to make.

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*Major General C. Norman Wood, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF.

Oettinger: Oh, but I think you're also making an important philosophical point that yes, there is a formalism of requirements as there is in universities.

Studeman: And they're like death and taxes in the intelligence business. You sort of have to have them there.

Oettinger: Just like departments in universities. But what keeps universities alive is that it seems to get done outside of departmental lines so that the next generation of activities can get born in spite of the old order. And if I might, I want to underscore something which struck me as this colloquy was going on about the way Admiral Studeman brought in this matter of "importance." When he first said, you've got to focus on the important, I said to myself, "Ah, motherhood," but then he went beyond that in a way that I want to underscore because, looking at our whole record, I don't think we've found quite as eloquent a statement as yours of this notion of deep penetration or of preparing the battlefield and so on. It takes the notion of what's important out of the motherhood and the retrospective vein and into the prospective, or at least the prospect of doing better than one might otherwise, or the prospect of doing better than if one got wedded to requirements that are products of battles of 10 years ago that finally have wended their way through the bureaucracy. For those of you who have looked at intelligence and thought of things through the eye of scholarly literature, it takes you out of the realm of the post mortem study of Pearl Harbor where you discover the things that should have been observed way back when, with hindsight, and rather gives you some recipes for trying to catch them with foresight, it seems to me. Now having said that, I didn't hear you say, and I hope you won't say, that this is a recipe for infallibility. I mean, it's doing better than one might otherwise.

Studeman: It would be highly presumptuous for anybody in my position to talk about fallibility or infallibility. This is a human system and it's no better or no worse than any other enterprise.

The next philosophical point I wanted to make, again, is congruent with this. It has to do with the concept of targets that count. Again, there are targets out there that are not worth very much even in the military context. If you have just so many smart bombs, or smart weapons, or precision-guided munitions to apply against the problem, it is very important that you not just willy-nilly run out onto the battlefield and drop them around on anything

that pops up, because there are targets that are of very little value in terms of your macro objective of war winning or battle winning, or whatever other activities are going on. Intelligence plays a very significant role in identifying the targets that count as opposed to identifying the targets that don't count. Of course, identifying targets that don't count is equally important. So we have a situation where perhaps a battlefield commander generates a huge campaign plan that tends to be target-list oriented, whether in a dynamic sense, as it is on the battlefield, or whether in a static sense, which tends to be the modality with air forces, and, again, the real critical factor there is, "Does that target count, and if it does, what's it worth?" It's even more complicated with the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact because part of the problem is that the Soviets, when they go to force generation, dramatically alter their calculation of targets that count. A target that at a pre-war period might have been of x-value, after force generation is of y-value — possibly less, possibly more, usually less. So, again, this concept of targets that count is a running calculation. These points are in no set order, by the way.

It is very important for intelligence officers again to think constantly about the future. What does the battlefield of the future look like? You asked that question a little bit earlier. I can describe it to you in technical terms and it's important. Think, for example, simply about the concept of stealth on the battlefield. What is stealth? Stealth is an airplane, an F-117, a B-2? No, it's not. Stealth is a concept that has to do with management of battle space. There are stealthy vehicles that already exist on the battlefield. Today's insurgent guerrilla, today's nuclear attack submarine, today's terrorists are all essentially stealthy, technical vehicles, just like a B-2. They're designed in the offense to reduce the battle space of the enemy and in the counterstealth context to gain back battle space. Stealth is a very important concept in my view. It has to do with these other major concepts that we've talked about for years — MATS, management of time and space. It's surprise, those kinds of things that Clausewitz and the other military sages, be they Oriental or European, have talked about for years. It's the use of space, and the use of unmanned vehicles — remotely operated vehicles, autonomous vehicles. It's smart munitions — new and improved forms of lethality.

Think about it for a minute. What's different in warfare today as opposed to warfare of the past has to do with the number of precision-guided muni-

tions that exist on the battlefield. It doesn't make any difference whether we're talking about assault breakers, cruise missiles, or air-to-surface tactical missiles, or whatever, launched by aircraft. These things are now starting to exist in large numbers and intelligence plays a very critical role in targeting them. These things are not so smart that they know precisely where the target is. They've got to have kind of a basket before their own indigenous logic can work. Intelligence plays a significant role in supporting targeting associated with all of that.

These areas though, like command, control, communications, and intelligence supporting the targeting are in my view as critical to future success on the battlefield as the actual instruments of war — the airplane, the bomb, the missile — are for the future, particularly if you want to do it efficiently and effectively. Particularly if you want to do it in the modern context, as we're frequently asked to do today where the politician demands, "No collateral damage," or the other kinds of outrageous rules of engagement that we get presented with where we have to limit or focus, in effect, on how the attack is executed. Again, think about what's happening in the world relative to where the military picture fits in, as opposed to where the sociological, or the political, or the diplomatic, or the economic fits into the future. Think about the context of any of these transnational issues that we're talking about.

Oversight is a philosophical point that's very important. Young people can't generally relate to it, but it must be there. The things that keep the intelligence community, or any other kind of activity, going on in the government, particularly black type of activities — covert action, whatever — from essentially coming up on the rocks, are protected by the fact that you have to have a robust oversight capability there. I still maintain that you would never have had an Iran-Contra today if the White House hadn't gone operational, point one, but point two, it went operational in the absence of an oversight process, which had never allowed the National Security Council to come in and stop the process going on, because the oversight mechanism that was there was never utilized. It would have protected them from all of that in my view. The same applies to the intelligence community. We have to have continuous determinations, running calculations, organizations whose life blood it is to determine whether you're operating legally and within the realm of propriety. The activities that do that are Inspectors General and General Counsels, for the legal aspects of it, and whatever additional oversight

mechanisms you set up to ensure these stay out of trouble.

I don't want to go on about security, counterintelligence, or counterespionage, or another category: leaks in the government. We talked a lot about that at lunch. Intelligence plays very heavily in ensuring that security exists. It's the reverse of the offensive aspects of it. It's preventing deep penetration of the target by the enemy. It's preventing him from being able to determine what targets to count on. It's preventing him from being able to prepare the battlefield. That's all the reverse kinds of things. The thing that's difficult, of course, in today's society, as we sort of mentioned at lunch, is how do you arm the government or any other activity with the necessary capabilities, or technology, or policy, to allow this to happen in a free and open society? And much worse, how do you deal with the leak problem, which I think is much more insidious? It's much more a "death by a thousand cuts" kind of thing because it's so endemic to today's society where information is considered to be free, where everybody considers that they have not only the need to know, but also the right to know. The press thinks that everybody has a need to know exactly what the National Security Agency is doing, certainly the little things that we're doing that we get caught at. Certainly their right to know is not even questioned. The right to know and the need to know are being blurred and lead you to things like John Walker saying the other day that espionage is just another form of insider trading. You know, that's an absolutely outrageous statement for anybody to make but nevertheless it's been made, and the fact that people in this country aren't subjected to much greater penalties as a result of having conducted espionage is another symptom of that process.

Oettinger: Bill, I think we agree there is a great distinction between the Walkers and the press. Let's set the Walkers aside and focus on the press for a moment. I've seen some excerpts from a book coming out in one of the Nieman Foundation publications here by Josie Melman and Dan Raviv on Israeli intelligence and the relationship between Israeli intelligence and the press. It struck me while looking at those excerpts that we're a little bit more like the way it was maybe 20 or 30 years ago, when the President could pick up the phone and call the publisher of the *New York Times* and say, on a first-name basis, "Hey, you know, it would be better if this story didn't run for a couple of days or a week." The impression that this guy gave, I don't know how accurate it is, about his relationship with the

Israelis, is that there was a much cozier kind of relationship where on the one hand the press would forbear from reporting something on which they would agree with the military that it would seriously damage national security, but at the same time they got enough insight so that they could make their own judgment.

Studeman: It happens only in very rare cases today in my view.

Oettinger: In the United States?

Studeman: Quite honestly, anywhere. The media is the same virtually everywhere, in my view. I think that the Israelis are in a much better position because it is a very small and very heavily interlocked group. We're talking about a state where the ability to do these kinds of things is really vested in several hundred people who are not the thousands or hundreds of thousands of people in our bureaucracy, in our media bureaucracy here.

Student: And a society that still feels its survival is at stake....

Studeman: It's based on security considerations. I believe that it simply won't happen here and I don't believe it even happens for very long inside Israel. It just depends on the situation.

We have a fundamental problem here where the press feels that if the government doesn't keep this a secret then it's open season on being able to comment, analyze, print, and otherwise disseminate this information. It's very difficult because in my view the government still does not possess all the tools nor frequently even the will, because of the power of the press. Because of the risk that they would take, they have to be very careful. There's a law in the U.S. code that prevents the publishing of signals intelligence information, it's 18 U.S. Code 798, that's quite explicit about making any person or, if you read into the law, the media liable should they publish anything that is of signals intelligence origin. That statute has never effectively been used against the media, it's only used against individuals. Even in the case of Bob Woodward's book, *Veil,** there's clear admission on the part of Bob Woodward that essentially he is describing programs in violation of this law.

I talked about the importance of the concept of community in the sense of how you go about doing business. Lots of things go along with that. It means

that there's an obligation that falls to people within these individual vertical cultures to learn the cultural dynamics of the other community and to learn how to interact and get along and behave and still be effective professionals in their business. They still have to be able to pursue programs that are in the national interest, so the concept of community in my view will play much more of a role.

Oettinger: You've alluded to the community earlier and to the question of how you get them to work together. Now both the military and the intelligence community have had umbrellas over them since 1947: the idea of a Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense a little bit later in the military. Yet it's now been three or four years from having had to pass the Goldwater-Nichols Act to tighten the screws on jointness, et cetera, et cetera. At least the Congress felt obligated to do that. In what you just described as these vertical things, and so on, do you see a need for Goldwater-Nichols-like tightening up, or do you think it's about right, or that it's just a matter of juggling? What's your view of where that sits?

Studeman: I always have a great deal of difficulty with the Congress coming in and passing a law that's designed to fix problems, although sometimes it works effectively. You could debate the benefits and liabilities of Goldwater-Nichols relative to jointness from here until the cows come home. The intelligence community does not necessarily need to have such a law imposed on it, although somebody may perceive that's a problem at some point. I don't think parochialism impairs the progress of the community today to such a degree that it requires that such a law be passed; however, I do think that there is an obligation on the part of the thoughtful people up on the Hill, particularly the Intelligence Committees, to keep the pressure on in areas where we find we're not doing well. It's generally in areas that require multiagency attack or coordination. They do keep the heat on to a substantial degree, but it's also important that we keep the heat on ourselves. In fact, I think we generally keep more heat on ourselves than they're capable of executing. We still view the Hill as a sort of common enemy at this point in time and limit what we tell them in terms of the details while we try to argue it out and solve the problem ourselves. That just is the nature of the adversarial relationship that exists, although I, for one, tend to support the concept strongly.

Dealing with Intelligence Committees is dealing with what I would call the highest form of oversight

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*Woodward, Bob, *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987.

in this country. That's what Intelligence Committees do for a living. They not only approve your budget, but they're also executing oversight; therefore, the net effect of the interaction between the community and the Intelligence Committees, in my view, is always positive. We may agree to disagree on lots of issues but I generally consider them to be marginal. But there's no need for the Intelligence Committees to pass a law to say that somehow or other jointness needs to be achieved inside the community. I think that we're already moving in the direction of much more cross detailing of people. Jointness is really sort of a macro form of cross detailing, plus a directed form of organization which, in my view, is of questionable effectiveness.

Oettinger: I now want to put to you the question you said I should remind you of later. You now have added to that this cloud of law enforcement agencies which make the service-joint-combined hierarchy look like child's play.

Studeman: It does. I think it's something that's going to evolve again. It's going to be something that we're going to struggle with, and the major problem is that the law enforcement organizations tend to be so culturally different from the military that they don't generally think in strategic terms: they think only in tactical terms. They generally only worry about the security of their own information and not the security of anybody else's. They know that the measure of effectiveness tends to be how many lawbreakers are apprehended and successfully processed by the courts. The mere concept of having due process in the courts means that when you have apprehended somebody, you take all your sources and methods, including wiretaps, electronic surveillance, and everything, and you bundle them all up and you send them off to a courtroom to be used in public trial, which is the law of the United States. Every American citizen is entitled to a free and open public trial by a jury of his peers. It sets us apart from virtually every other country in the world. There are really no secret courts in this country. There are secret courts in the military, which come under another law, called the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Military court proceedings are probably better structured to protect sensitive information.

Essentially what we're trying to struggle with right now is a situation in which the military has one set of authorities to do certain things against foreign targets outside the boundaries of the United States or maybe certain limited authorities inside, and the law

enforcement authorities have other authorities and clearly one doesn't have the authority of the other. The military doesn't have the authority of the law enforcement guy, the law enforcement guy doesn't have the authority of the military guy. So the question is, how do you play them together toward a common objective? If you're trying to interdict a drug shipment that's coming from outside the country, how do you play the authorities together, how do you coordinate, how do you command and control, how do you share information, and what is it you do about that?

Oettinger: You know what's frightening about it, Bill, is I look back on the years of the CIA-FBI wars in the J. Edgar Hoover days. It sort of suggests that it doesn't take a hell of a lot for a catastrophe in terms of collaboration or failure of collaboration in that kind of a situation. There were only two major players involved, and for years, with this outside and inside problem. They got all screwed up, partly because of personalities, but also partly because of structure. So that sounds like a serious worry.

Studeman: It is a worry. What we have here is a formula that suggests that problem solving in this area is going to be very difficult; but I will tell you that now, after having been engaged in this activity intensely for the last three or four years, but certainly more intensely over the last year and a half or two years than ever before, I'm much more optimistic about it than I was even a year ago. I think our ability to resolve these issues with the help of the Congress and with the help of imaginative people who will adjust the law, the real concern is what ultimately that will mean over the long term for the role that the military would play inside the American society. The Founding Fathers suggested that military forces, including a lot of the intelligence capability, should really only be used to deal with problems outside the United States, not problems inside the United States. So when you get the military playing essentially the role of policemen, you start to draw near to things that have been accepted in lots of other cultures which in my view are not as advanced.

Student: Has there been any attempt made to change the rules of the game, for example USID 18, to allow the people in the COMINT community to work on that, because they're forbidden to have any interface at all with U.S. persons or U.S. corporations?

Studeman: No.

Student: Will that change in your opinion?

Studeman: I don't think the law will change and I don't think USID 18 will be rewritten. USID, by the way, is an NSA intelligence community directive, but it's usually derived from the law. What I think will happen, basically, is that some kind of arrangement will be worked out whereby we can operate in support of law enforcement activities under their authority. But keep in mind that in many cases their authority isn't substantially different from our authority. If there's a U.S. person in consideration in this issue then what will have to be pursued are the logical kinds of protections you would need under the law, whether it's getting a warrant or minimizing your collection. But it would have to be justified in a court.

You're beginning to get at the nub of precisely the kinds of problems that we're trying to resolve right now and it gets much more complicated than that — 10 times more complicated. You might well imagine we're trying, for example, to collect signals intelligence, if you will, and resolve a net operated by the Coast Guard, which is a law enforcement organization, by the Customs Department which is a law enforcement organization, by the DEA, which is a law enforcement organization, and the National Security Agency, complete with all the services and all of our partners involved in that business. You have a formula for an extremely complex authority resolution that has to be worked out. So we have a very, very tight oversight process that sits on top of this whole counternarcotics operation.

McLaughlin: Tom Clancy makes it work.

Studeman: It's always perfect in a world where the media or the literature people can cut through a lot of these involvements. Keep in mind that, for lack of a better way of saying it, and to use the vernacular, we're essentially diddling with some fundamental framework issues that have set institutions in the United States apart and have drawn very clear lines of division in authority between them. These transnational problems tend to force you into blurring those lines and there are some inherent dangers in it and it has to be managed in a very elegant kind of way.

Oettinger: It's very threatening to both. Again, in my search for balances, one extreme seems to be that what this does is set the stage for leaks or misuse of information on a colossal scale, violation of civil liberties, etc. On the other hand, the failure to share sets the stage for "intelligence failures" on a colossal

scale where everybody comes in retroactively and says, "You all knew this but you failed to share." You say, "Well, we tried to protect civil liberties." So it seems to me that all of the things that we've learned over the last 30 years, by way of errors on both sides, seem at risk here in a whole new environment where folks are trying to find their way. Is that reasonable?

Studeman: I would agree with that. One of the important things that has to be achieved in all of this, of course, is that as you start to try to solve these problems, you need to be able to step back a way from the trees and look at this in the context of the forest, and to think strategically. Otherwise, the whole heavily funded effort to involve the military in counternarcotics could end up being doubly damaging, in the sense of not only do you close the gap in these divisions, but you also achieve failure. I've been in the military long enough to have spent a lot of my life in Vietnam. I've already fought one war with my hands tied behind my back, and I don't particularly relish fighting another one that way.

Student: That's essentially what Admiral Larson said two weeks ago in the Pacific. He said his concern was that he was going to end up fighting another Vietnam, not in terms of an actual war in Vietnam but rather a very difficult type of highly restricted action.

McLaughlin: Because in 20 years people are going to be saying, "Well, we knew back then you couldn't win this war."

Studeman: The Congress set the military up to be the fall guy because they made you responsible, but keep in mind they only made you responsible for a very interesting set of it. They only made you responsible for the monitoring part of it; they didn't give you responsibilities for interdiction. They only gave you a very narrow slice of the pie. There are these dangers that have to be overcome, so the only way the military is going to be able to win the war is by operating in concert with these other people who do have the authority to do it and then working together to give us the instruments and tools required to do it. Then the degree to which that represents a danger to U.S. persons and that sort of thing has to be very carefully managed. So it's a tough problem.

The last philosophical point that I wanted to make, and I think it's relevant to the future, again has to deal with the fact that the United States doesn't do any of this alone. We have many close

partners and friends that we deal with in the Pacific Rim. In Europe, the world is changing in character, and we're not so close with people we used to be close with anymore, and new people are coming on line. One could even envision partnership arrangements with Eastern European countries for the future that were absolutely not possible certainly during the last 40 to 50 years. It's very important that the United States keep this concept of doing things together in an alliance because it's becoming obvious that we can no longer afford to bear the financial burden alone of being the world's intelligence microscope. We are going to have to share this and, in fact, have shared with our allies for a lot of years. In a period of time when you now have a shift in the world where we might find ourselves in both a partnership arrangement and in competition with the European Community as it stands, or the Eastern Bloc, or things that could happen in the Asian Rim, those kinds of things need to be very carefully managed because you will find in that kind of construct that issues will come up that will tend to be divisive. Those divisive issues need to be addressed in such a way that you don't shoot yourself in the foot from an intelligence informational point of view. That's becoming more and more difficult as each day passes, particularly with the traditional old allies who may no longer feel the requirement to have a close association with the United States and they're quite happy to walk away, or to impose on us some severe restrictions as to how we can operate.

I see the intelligence structure, the architecture of intelligence for the future, changing. Keep in mind that we've been flying peripheral reconnaissance around target countries of the world; we've had access to forward bases from which we can fly black airplanes; we can operate large terrestrial field stations; we can do this, that, and the other. We can have a large forward infrastructure that will essentially not be possible in the context it was in the past. So these partnership arrangements and how you manage the community of partnerships that you have with people are going to be critical.

I've skipped over a lot of the philosophical points and I think we've addressed a lot of the issues that are relevant to the future. You know, it goes without saying that we can't even keep pace with the changes happening in the world today. We've already described a lot of the things that I think are going on. Our problem in the intelligence community is: in the midst of all this change, how do we keep access? Access is a very important issue. Access equals penetration. Your requirement is access to a target. So, how do we do that in a world

that is becoming technically more complex, a world that's becoming technically interactive, where our own technology is being used effectively to prevent us from being effective? Truly the intelligence business for the future is going to continue to be expensive. Will we continue to bear the weight of that great expense? It will be more and more risky. A lot of the information that we've been able to get more or less for free in the past, we're now going to have to dig for, and when we have to dig for it, it automatically becomes more difficult both in terms of cost and risk, because then you can't just do it technically, you have to mix the human and the technical, and you can't generally do it from afar, you have to get closer to the target. These kinds of fundamental problems are associated with the range of things that you do in the intelligence business.

Oettinger: I'm a little bit lost. Help me get this out, Bill, because what I used to hear, you know, was how uneven things were in an open society like ours which anybody could penetrate, versus the Soviet monolith. The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and so on are opening now to a point where, at least in some realms, somebody said a couple of months ago there was so goddamn much of a deluge that they couldn't cope with it, for historical, contemporary, or prospective reasons. There was the loss of access in the days when you had adversarial things with Iran and we lost some things. Is this part of a trend? I mean, we are on the one hand having spigots opened that were completely shut. Neither are new phenomena.

Studeman: Well, unfortunately, I think one of the problems we have in the intelligence community is viable measures of effectiveness. How do you measure that — based on the number of reports you produce a year — how many pounds, how many classified documents? I wouldn't do it on the basis of any of that. The real issue is intelligence in the general sense of what's going on, evaluated by professionals, being effective in supporting the decision maker, the policy maker, the person who is your customer. I believe that means again that you're going to have to play across these intelligence organizations and it means that you're going to have to be willing to invest in focused kinds of reasonably expensive activities. If you take the signals intelligence business alone and you measure the spectrum of intelligence, you start at the low end with clandestine and covert or special, if you want to call it, low profile or whatever. As you move along here you have big terrestrial stations, and then you have all the sea, air, and land mobiles. Then you

get to the space business. Then you notice our system has been very heavily loaded in the context of this front end and because we've had a big front end, we've been able to do a lot of this kind of thing and access targets. As life becomes more difficult in this kind of area, you are going to have to slip back to the lower end of the spectrum, which means that you're going to have to operate on a full-spectrum basis. When you get to the lower end of the spectrum, while the costs don't go up relative to something like an overhead in the classic sense — that is, the cost of the TWT (traveling wave tube) or the technical device, or whatever, there are different kinds of costs you have to pay down at the low profile end. There are the cross-cutting costs, there's the risk cost, or a political cost; they are what it takes to be able to integrate across organizations that have multiple missions. Clearly, you have to be much more selective down here. You're only accessing things in a much more narrow construct.

Student: Sir, one question on that. There is conventional wisdom around that says with glasnost and perestroika, in fact, information isn't so difficult to get anymore.

Studeman: Information is becoming much more easily obtainable. The question is, "Is it the information you want?" Is Gorbachev telling us precisely what the general staff and the military are doing in terms of contingency planning for Lithuania today? Does that appear on the front page of *Izvestia*?

Student: To some extent, it may not, but it may be that the folks from Lithuania are telling us.

Studeman: They could be telling us.

Student: Is there a key, though, that was made for looking at retreating back to more difficult and more costly approaches of getting that information? Is there a trade-off in terms of more easily accessed, valuable information that may be balancing this to some extent?

Studeman: Exactly. You can draw another curve here — human to the technical — and what you'll find is that the human end has a parallel down at this end. I mean the media serves in a human context. If an ABC guy, Peter Jennings, conducts an interview with Gorbachev, that's intelligence.

McLaughlin: Can I go back to near the beginning? You mentioned in your opening that no one still appreciates the history of World War II, from whatever end, with intelligence background now.

Now Her Majesty's Stationery Office has published a four-volume study on the subject.* We've also had a number of people who have talked a lot about Ultra War, Enigma, the American Magic, Japanese Purple, etc.

Studeman: I think that now what we're beginning to see are books that talk about what the intelligence did. What we still don't understand is how that intelligence interacted with the policy maker or the battlefield commander and that's going to be harder to ferret out. How much Enigma, or Ultra, did Montgomery use? Some of that is being done but it's being done more by commentators on the side and researchers than the principals themselves. I was reading an article coming here about how Mark Clark during World War II was alleged to have refused being provided any Ultra material because he thought that somehow or other it was going to detract from his reputation as a field commander. It turns out that that's probably not the case. Mark Clark was probably a significant user of Ultra material. He certainly was at Anzio and other places. Again, it's that kind of interaction I think that needs to be analyzed.

I know we go through all these crises. I've certainly been through a lot of them in my time. Just having gone through Panama, what was the significance of both positive and negative intelligence, given the nature of how the intelligence was targeted there? What role did intelligence really play? That can be a lifetime research project for one guy alone and that's given a target where we were already inserted in the middle and already knew virtually every dimension of the target — from the weather, to the landscape, to where all the military facilities were, to what technology the target did or didn't have, to who the personalities were, and what they used to communicate with each other and that sort of thing. Again, I think that this makes for an interesting research area, specifically from World War II. Vietnam would be another interesting area, or Korea.

Student: You talked about NSA being able to provide the battlefield commander with intelligence. You didn't specify at what level you meant battlefield commander.

Studeman: NSA in this case is a euphemism for the United States SIGINT system.

*Hinsley, F. H., et al, *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations*, London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1979.

Student: So you're probably talking about the two-star level?

Studeman: No, I'm talking about the United States SIGINT system providing targeting information to a guy down to the level of combat direction. The point is that technical intelligence is used at every level whether it is indications and warning at one end of the spectrum or targeting at the other.

Student: Well, I need to ask this for my F-4 colleague, Captain Shuman. How do you feel about JSTARS* coming in, because one of your big points was that you need to make certain that the targets are of value and here we've constructed a battle plan, at the theater level probably. We're trying to work it through and suddenly we've got a platform which is identifying ground targets in real time, and linking to airborne platforms and Army ground platforms, and Navy platforms, conceivably, that can hit the targets. How do you feel about that?

Studeman: I think it's great, but again keep in mind I never depend on one dimension of intelligence. JSTARS is RADINT, okay? You may call it operational radar information, but basically it's RADINT information. My view, basically, is if you're going to do proper targeting on the battlefield, you interact with RADINT, SIGINT, with all the other INTs including standard imagery, in order to do that.

Student: But there is a difference, sir. What you brought up is a good point because I was going to use that in the JSTARS scenario as well. The difference between JSTARS and any of the other platforms that you mentioned is it would have the capability on board to direct forces.

Studeman: We already have plenty of intelligence capabilities today that support combat direction. In the Navy we do it all the time.

Student: But what I'm saying is that it is the combat directive. There's going to be a JSTARS platform out there. The pilot is going to be in his F-4 or Mirage if he's lucky, and it can divert him to a target.

Studeman: Come on now, let's be a little realistic. Let's go back to the point here about being multidimensional. If you want to depend on one large airplane with an MTI (moving target indicator) radar in it to tell you where the target is, and you're going

to deal with the Soviets who are capable of erecting enough radar reflectors on a battlefield so that you couldn't tell where squat was, and if you want to depend only on that on the battlefield, in my view, you're headed in the wrong direction. You're headed in the direction of a fall. What you need to do is depend on a platform that can fuse as many different sensors on the battlefield to tell you where the enemy is simultaneously, use the command and control system to integrate that, and provide it as combat direction to the fire support people who need it for smart or dumb weapons.

Student: But by the time he stepped, it's ours. In other words, we've got a platform that, if it works, just as many of your platforms can work....

Studeman: You have a mini-JSTARS today, by the way. Today you can take a combination of reconnaissance aircraft and whatever and build an architecture to enable them to interact on the battlefield and you have a surrogate JSTARS that has multidimensional sensors — link the Army's Mohawk together — whatever.

Student: But that's very different from the concept behind JSTARS in the radar sensing style....

Studeman: I'm not going to argue the efficacy. I'm just telling you as a military professional. By the way, I don't make distinctions between intelligence officers and operators or policy makers. Intelligence officers, in order to be successful, have to be good operators, good policy makers, good communicators, good at command and control, you know, architects, or whatever else. It's in the art form.

Oettinger: Can a simple-minded civilian step in here for a moment? What I hear is a "So's your mother," kind of an argument. You've been giving the Army this guff about intelligence and so on, and here I hear a professional intelligence person saying something about,"You operational types don't want to let an intelligence guy on board."

Studeman: I said Grenada.

Oettinger: What are we paying taxes for? Explain to me your side of this.

Student: That's not the issue.

Studeman: I don't think this is a "we-they" kind of thing. These are friendly kinds of arguments that take place, I think, at any time and it's sort of the give and take of the business.

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*The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System, an airborne radar provides real-time location of moving ground targets.

Oettinger: The net result seems to be, though, that at numerous critical moments the stuff doesn't get there because one side or the other, in the course of a friendly debate, has sort of said, "We won't let you get it, or we won't let you exercise it." Usually one hears the comment in terms of, "That's why I want to nail him for a moment." They're usually in terms of the intelligence people not wanting to play and you just interjected here about the operators not wanting to play. I'll pursue this privately a little later.

Studeman: I would only say there is one point of danger, which is that you have to be careful. The military is always for what they call "the single solution to the problem." We invent wholesale weapons systems that are advertised as single solutions to problems. In fact, it's not that easy. The reality of the battlefield is that generally single solutions won't work. They may work in restricted scenarios, but against a well-equipped enemy who's had a chance to think about, plan for, and develop countermeasures for the single solutions, they almost always don't work. Therefore, it's important to think about investing elegant technology into a moving target indicator radar surveillance capability that can stand behind the battlefield no matter whether it's survivable or not back there, and continue to inter-act. But keep in mind you also have AWACS back there and you also have RC-135s, you also have a big system and you need to have all that with a sophisticated enemy in order to tell where the target really is and to perform all the other functions. So, it is important that you not think too uni-dimension-ally. It's back to your balance issue. You have to keep a balance of capabilities on the battlefield, in my view, in order to deal with these sophisticated problems. That's the only point I'm trying to make. We can agree to disagree about the degree to which JSTARS will be a heavy swinger in x, y, or z scenarios, as opposed to something else.

Student: But when should or shouldn't it have commit authority? That was my whole point, not as a sponsor of JSTARS, but instead to say, "Should or shouldn't it have the ability to commit resources?" whereas intelligence systems have the ability to inform a commander as to whether or not he wants to make a decision. I am saying, in the case of JSTARS and AWACS, both platforms have the ability to go far beyond that and commit weapons resources immediately on target.

Studeman: There's a very doctrinal argument that's occurring here right now, which varies with every culture you go into. In the Navy, there is no doctrinal argument about the role intelligence plays in combat direction. I use those terms specifically, that is, the role that intelligence plays in saying that your target is over here and providing the precise parametrics in regard to where that target is. An intelligence officer is not going to stand there and say, "You fire that Harpoon at that target." That's going to be done by a military commander. He's going to take that information as information, but he will use it. He won't care whether it came from an intelligence guy or an operator out there with a radar or a guy who is orbiting over the target looking at it with his eyeball and not having a bomb on board. So it is an important argument and it's been an impor-tant argument for a long time. Where does intelli-gence end and where does combat direction begin? Combat direction is generally considered to be the purview of some kind of military operator on the field. I don't make distinctions between those kinds of people anymore; I gave that up about my third year in the Navy because the Navy doesn't make those distinctions. They are basically useless arguments. What you need to do is build an archi-tecture that is attuned to the military functions you need to have supported. If they include JSTARS and all the rest of these in order to do that, then that's what you bring to the battlefield. Then there are other considerations that determine whether those platforms are really there or not or whether they will function or not.

Oettinger: I can't think of a better or more ecumenical note on which to end this. Thank you for a fantastic discussion.

Studeman: Oh, no thanks is required. I can't tell you what a pleasure this has been just to get out of Washington, D.C.