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The Policy Aspect of Intelligence
C. Norma Wood

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Thomas K. Latimer; James W. Lucas; C. Norma Wood;
Kenneth M. Duberstein; James Cassity, Jr.; Gordon Negus;
W. O. Studeman; Joseph Zadarecky II

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

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Chairman
Anthony G. Oettinger

Managing Director
John C. B. LeGates

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The Policy Aspect of Intelligence

C. Norman Wood

Major General C. Norman Wood is the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force. He entered the Air Force in 1960, and began his flying career with the Strategic Air Command (SAC) as an electronic warfare officer in 1962. The positions he has held in the Air Force include serving as Chief of the Current Intelligence Branch, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, at SAC Headquarters, and later as Chief of the Defense Analysis Branch, J-2, Headquarters, Military Assistance Command-Vietnam, with dual responsibilities as chief of the Operational Intelligence Division for 7th Air Force headquarters. In 1979, he became Deputy Commander for Operations, 544th Strategic Intelligence Wing, and took command of the wing in May 1980. General Wood served as Executive Director for the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1981 to 1982. In 1984 he became Deputy Director for the National Strategic Target List, Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, Offutt Air Force Base. He was named Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence at Air Force Headquarters in 1985, and was assigned to Headquarters, U.S. European Command as Director of Intelligence (J-2) in 1986. General Wood assumed his present duties in 1988.

Oettinger: Today's speaker, Major General Wood, has experience that ranges from serving as an electronic warfare officer to the broadest intelligence community-wide, nationwide, worldwide kind of overview which harks back to an earlier assignment where he was the Executive Director of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) where he had his presidential view. It has recently been announced that he will become the head of the Intelligence Community Staff next year. It's hard to think of anybody in the United States who has had that kind of variety, from sharply focused to the most stratospheric view, and I hope you will just share with us those various perspectives. With that, it's all yours.

Wood: Thanks, Tony. I've really been looking forward to the opportunity to visit with you, and I would welcome questions as we go along. I would only tell you that I have an agenda that I think will take us from point A to point Z and cover most of the things you students need in the policy arena, and if you interrupt with questions, which I'm willing for you to do, you just have to remember we might not get to Z. But it's O.K. with me.

I had the opportunity to talk with several of you at lunch and we had quite an interesting time. I know we have one Japanese student and I thought it would be interesting to relate to you one of the things that's being talked about in Washington right now. What's being said is that to be an operative in today's world, you really need to know four languages. Of course you need to know English because almost everybody operates using English now. You need to know French because that's the language of diplomacy, and you need to know German because they're becoming the 800-pound gorilla in Europe, and you need to know Japanese — just in case.

I want to focus primarily on the policy aspect of intelligence, without getting down into the nitty gritty of war fighting, which is the reason for much

of intelligence. So I'll talk to you a little bit about the activities, the intelligence cycle itself, how we go about that; a little bit about the utility of intelligence; and then I'd like to look at the community in its broadest aspect as to how we really put things together. I'll talk a little about my personal role now as a Service intel chief. Each of the Services has a Senior Intelligence Officer. I know that the majority of you are military folks here incognito, so you can identify with that. Next, I thought I'd talk a little bit about the national forums that intelligence is discussed in, a little bit about our ability to satisfy objectives — joint service, combined operations, and finally end up with a little bit about the challenge of the budget. Perhaps I should start with the budget, because that's really what drives all the issues that we face, but I will leave it for the last.

You have to understand that we in the intelligence business are not out there just to be gathering intelligence and doing things with it to satisfy ourselves. If we were a profit-making organization we would more easily be able to identify our customers, those people involved in the execution of national strategic policy. The President is the primary customer for all intelligence, and then the agencies of the government. DOD obviously is a customer for intelligence with respect to war fighting. The State Department is a customer for intelligence with respect to dealing with foreign governments in the diplomatic and political arenas. Energy becomes a customer when you're talking about nuclear kinds of things. Treasury becomes a customer because we have to know about the economic goings-on of foreign governments. So, there are a lot of customers out there for intelligence to satisfy. Now, the problem is, not all of them know exactly what they want from intelligence, and therefore, it's difficult for us to operate in that environment.

Oettinger: Norm, could I throw the first interruption at you? The customer does not know what he wants?

Wood: Not always.

Oettinger: Not always. A perennial? In the way you put it, there's a notion that maybe in nirvana the customer will know.

Wood: No. I don't mean to say that. Because the events of the world change so rapidly, what the customer wants now and in the future may be different, and he may not understand that. As an example, the customer has always wanted to know about the enemy. In that context, we're talking Soviet Union — you want to know economic things, you want to know political things, you want to know military things, you want to know all those things. We know that. But the world is changing, and maybe we want to know more about counter-narcotics now. So, 10 years ago we didn't identify those questions to be answered, and we find it easier to answer questions about a geographic enemy than we do about a nongeographic enemy that you can't define so well, such as counter-narcotics, or terrorism, or something similar.

The intelligence cycle on this chart is true no matter what you're talking about, whether you're talking about military, political, economic, or anything else. Someone has to establish requirements, and the way we find out what our requirements are is through a process that's identified in Executive Order 12333, which says that we will organize to solve the problems that the President is faced with most often. As each of the Cabinets develops its requirements, there are a number of collection assets that you apply to the problem. We talk in terms of "INTs" in the intelligence community: HUMINT, IMINT, NUCINT, SIGINT — in other words, human intelligence, imagery intelligence, nuclear intelligence, signals intelligence. Many times you have to choose which one of those collection assets is best applied to the satisfaction of the requirement. Do you want a spy to go get you something, or do you want to take a picture of something, or do you want to listen to something. There are all kinds of different ways to approach that solution.

Once you get the raw data, then you have to convert it, turn it into something that's useful. If I were to get you some radar data and say, "Okay, we hear this and it goes beep, beep, beep," it's not useful to you. But if I tell you that I know that the thing that goes beep, beep, beep is a fire control radar that can shoot you down at 40,000 feet, then that's useful to you. So that's what we call exploiting or processing. Then we have to figure out some way to match that with something else that's happened, to compare, contrast, and combine it; that we call analysis and production — we evaluate it.

Sometimes we take a lot of hits in the intelligence business because the Cable News Network (CNN) gets there first. Some of our customers will say, "Gee, you didn't tell me anything I didn't learn on CNN." I don't feel we should apologize for that, because that's a collection asset. The fact that I didn't buy it doesn't mean I can't use it. The prob-



Figure 1. The Intelligence Cycle

lem is, they don't have to be right — they just have to put it on the air. So in our analysis, I'm concerning myself primarily with what is correct.

To give you another illustration, let's say I just got a pot of money to go out and get intelligence. So my target is probably the Soviet Union. (I'm going to talk in historical terms here, as the world turns.) So I'm putting that pot of money against the Soviet Union. Now, if there's a coup in South Yemen, I probably haven't used much of that money to cover it. But CNN has got a group of stringers out all over the world, and if they bring in some data they're going to pay them for it. So it shouldn't surprise you that there's somebody in South Yemen who wants to make a buck who says, "Hey, CNN, there's a coup happening here and let me tell you about it," and so they get it and put it on the air. By the same token, the CNN guy can walk up to Tony and say, "I'm from CNN, tell me all you know about this coup," and he spills his guts. But I can't walk up and say, "Tony, I'm a spy. Would you tell me all you know about the coup?" So, there is a difference.

Oettinger: You forgot to ask me about my price!

Wood: I've gone a long way around to tell you this: open source information is still good stuff.

Once we analyze our information and produce it, we've got to figure out a way to get it to you. We can get it to you in whatever form is best for you: we can mail it to you, we can wire it to you, we can fax it to you, we can transmit it electrically in real time, whatever.

The most important part of the cycle to each customer is the feedback. Was the customer satisfied? In many cases, you'll say, "Great, I told you to find out this, you found it, I've got it, I'm happy." In other cases, the customer might say, "Well, you only got half the data I wanted." Now we'll establish a new set of requirements, and go right back to the system and try to satisfy it. So it doesn't matter what the problem is, and it doesn't matter whether it's DOD, or Energy, or counternarcotics, or you name it, it's the same cycle that applies. Many of you, after you get out of this prestigious institution, are going to go to work for government or an industry, or whatever, and you're going to be one of

the people who establishes these requirements. So I would only say to you that the more specific you can be about what your requirements are, the easier it'll be for us to try to satisfy them.

There are some players in this business that I have alluded to earlier, but when we talk about something like the Intelligence Community, all of us think of NSA, DIA, and CIA. We don't often think of the ones that I mentioned on the bottom here: Commerce and Treasury. Sometimes we forget that there are some Congressional committees: the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), the House Permanent or Intelligence Select Committee, the Armed Services Committees — each have a big play in this because they control the purse strings.

Oettinger: Excuse me, Norm, while you're on that one. One of my personal hypotheses, and I'd be interested in your reactions to it, is that between when we first met and now the balance of power among these various committees has shifted fairly heavily toward the congressional side, to the point where one might say with respect to intelligence, that from an imperial presidency we might have gone to an imperial Congress. Is that nonsense? Could you comment on that from where you've sat?

Wood: It is shifting, and primarily it's because Congress now has the same amount of information or access to the same information that the Executive had previously, and controlled. But a lot of that has to do with the oversight of some debacles. The Iran-Contra thing caused the Congress, the Legislature, to get more involved in what the intelligence community is about. As they got more involved, as they passed laws that said the President had to report on covert action and that kind of thing, it opened the door to let them have the same access on the Legislative side that the Executive has, and I think that in itself has brought greater power. These two Intelligence Committees (the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence [HPSCI] and SSCI) are the primary ones and the staff — I'm not talking about the members themselves — has come predominantly out of the intelligence community, and they know where the skeletons are, they know



Figure 2. The Intelligence Community

the questions to ask, they know where to get it. So there's a great deal of emphasis now on the Congressional side.

We show the National Security Council here on the chart not as part of the community, because they're really part of the the policy process, and therefore, the dotted line.

The PFIAB, where Tony and I first met, is a unique organization. It came into existence in the Eisenhower years, and it's made up of people outside the government — people who have no axe to grind, very well-known people, who just kind of say, "Mr. President, we know what you want this large community to do, we'll just go look at a couple of things to see if they're doing what you think they ought to do." They don't receive any compensation. They report directly back to the President and say, "It's doing well or it's not doing well."

Of course, at the center of all this is the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Intelligence Community Staff. This is the new job that Tony was saying I'm going to; I'm going to be the Director of this staff. So, it's a pretty wide-ranging group of folks.

I thought it would be interesting to present it to you a little differently, though, now that I've kind of shown you that these are all the players. Let's talk about it in terms of what it does. We'll start with oversight. The two primary oversight organizations are the PFIAB and the Intelligence Oversight Board. As I said, they are made up of nongovernment people. You would recognize some of the names — Henry Kissinger, for example; when I was associated with it, there were Claire Boothe Luce, Leon Jaworski, Edward Bennett Williams, and Allen Greenspan. The members are those kinds of people, who have access to the President, who can say independently what they think. The Intelligence Oversight Board is a board of just three people, one of whom, the chairman, has to be a member of the PFIAB. They're interested in legality and propriety, making sure that the intelligence community is not violating the Constitution or any of the laws or executive orders of the country. So, those two boards exercise the primary oversight for the President, making sure that everything is done correctly.

If you want to talk about the policy aspect, then you've got to look at the functions of the National Security Council and the DCI. The National Security Council, of course, is a statutory unit made up of the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and — as observers — the National Security Advisor and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs when they're discussing military matters. The DCI wears two hats. On the one hand, he's in charge of the Central Intelligence Agency. On the other hand, he's in charge of the Intelligence Community. So the policy *direction* for the intelligence community is set here, from the President through the National Security Council, and given to the DCI.

Oettinger: It's interesting to point out that today that chain is unusually professional, because the President himself is a former Director of Central Intelligence.



Figure 3. National Foreign Intelligence Community: Oversight



Figure 4. National Foreign Intelligence Community: Policy



Figure 5. National Foreign Intelligence Community: Management/Direction



Figure 6. National Foreign Intelligence Community: Implementation

Wood: General Scowcroft was a former advisor to the President, and his deputy is Bob Gates, who was a Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. The DCI was FBI chief.

Oettinger: It's an unusual constellation in that respect.

Wood: And the Secretary of Defense was on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. We have two organizations here. We show the Council and the Board and the community staff that I had previously shown in the center of the chart to say that the management and direction of the community are there. The difference between the Board and the Council is really very slight. These are all intelligence folks. I sit on the National Foreign Intelligence Board, as do representatives of all those bubbles on the previous chart. The Council includes the operators; the Board includes folks who ought to determine the priorities of things. You see, we on the intelligence side should not decide what the priorities should be, but the people whom we serve — the State Department, the DOD, the JCS — have to help decide what those priorities are. So that's the difference between those two bodies. I also sat as an observer on the Board, as the Chief of Air Force Intelligence. Then finally, you get to where the rubber meets the road, and that is the implementation, and at the bottom of the chart are all the folks that you saw around the circle. That's where all the policy, management, direction, and implementation flows.

A lot of people say that we have a lot of duplication in the intelligence business. I won't deny there is some. I hope it's useful. There ought to be some checks and balances in keeping analysts honest. You wouldn't want to see DIA making the only analysis of something without somebody looking over their shoulder. DIA does some of that; NSA does others. The difference in the services is that we primarily focus on those things that provide us an intelligence input to our specific needs. For instance, in the Air Force, as is the case with the other services, one of my primary functions was to provide intelligence to support the weapons acquisition process. If we're going to build a new widget, like the B-2 successor or something, you have to know what the threat is going to be.

There are some interesting stories that have happened that have been real disasters. Let me talk about the weapons system acquisition process just a little bit. If you're going to build a new widget, somebody has to decide you need a widget. Usually it happens in a "closet" and inside that closet are what we call weapons acquisition people: engineers, designers, bureau chiefs, and a contractor, somebody who wants to build it. In this closet the acquirer and the contractor get together and they say, "We're going to build this widget." The acquisition guy says, "Well, what's the threat?" The contractor says, "I'll help you define it." Right there we're starting into trouble, and because it's in a closet, nobody else knows about it. They want to keep it very secret; they don't want some other company building it for one thing, and besides that, if it's a new capability, you don't want the enemy to know about it, so you stay in this closet. You keep building it, and building it, and building it, you get more ideas, and the contractor keeps saying, "The threat's great, you know, we've been checking with all of our contacts, and we're really working the intelligence community, and they don't tell us there's anything to shoot it down."

Well, pretty soon it gets far enough along that you've got to start bending metal, and you can't do that in a closet. So it comes out in what we call a gray world, and they say, "Oh, by the way, Air Force Intelligence, we're building this new widget, we've got to show it to you, because we're going to start bending metal, and now we'd like to know what you think about the threat." Then, we look at the threat and we say, "It'll never survive." "What, what? You mean we've got to stop bending metal? We've got to stop the process, we're losing profits?" We say, "Sorry about that, but here's the threat." So everybody is mad at us.

We've had a lot of weapons systems that that's happened to, or it's gotten so far along that you've got them on a ramp and they finally come in and say, "What's the threat?"and we say, "It's dead." Some say, "See how the government wastes money to build this weapon system that can't even fly." So, it's been a big problem and we've tried to attack that over the last few years by getting the acquisition guy and the contractor to let us come in the closet with them. As they design it, we apply the intelligence to it as they go along, so that when they start bending metal we don't have to stop so we don't do something dumb. This applies not only in the Air Force, but also in the Army and the Navy; we have the same problem. We hope that we've fixed it, but it is a challenge. What got me started on this story was to tell you that there is a need for Air Force, Navy, and Army intelligence. Because obviously we know more about the air than the Army does, the Army knows more about tanks and the kinds of threats that would be applied to them than we do, and so that's one of the reasons that we do that.

Oettinger: Could you repeat the same story but from a somewhat different point of view? You're now the Air Force, but as executive agent for some national program. Would the way you just described the situation be similar, or would there be different channels, other problems, what?

Wood: It would be similar. Let me start at the top of the process and say that there's a Defense Intelligence Agency which is concerned about weapons systems for all three services. There's a money threshold, if you will. If a weapons system cost x-number of bucks, DIA has to be involved. Then there is, I'll just use Air Force as an example, you can write in here Army, Navy, or whatever. Then there is an acquisition group of folks, they're Air Force also, and they're the builders. Then there's somebody out here who's going to use it, so the users have to tell the acquisition people what they want. Then we have something called an FTD (Foreign Technology Division), an intelligence organization that has to do with S&T (scientific and technical) data. They know what the enemy is doing in a lot of respects, so they have to feed in, and all of this then comes back up through the Air Force executive agent. Now, if it's a program that DIA has to get involved in, when we have said, "O.K., the Air Force is the executive agent for this program, and now we're ready to go up to DIA," at that point we've got to come across to the Army and the Navy. They have S&T organizations as well, NSIC for the

Navy and the Missile and Space Center for the Army. They will input to their services and say, "Yeah, we agree that threat is correctly depicted, or we've got a little bit of data that makes it a little different." Then they feed it back in and it goes to DIA, and DIA validates it. If it doesn't exceed that money threshold, the Air Force will validate it. So the system is all looped together so that you do get joint service activity.

Other things that we do as a separate service in the intelligence business are support our specific field commanders. I should probably put this chart up to give us the right song sheet for this. I'm not a war fighter, I'm the Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, and I don't ever go to war. All I do is organize, equip, and train. What that means is that I have to provide those threat assessments that I just talked to you about in terms of new weapons systems. I have to participate in preparing estimates and policy guidance, and I have a budget, the Programming, Planning, and Budgeting System. To give you an example, if SAC, out there in Omaha, decides they need a new computer system to handle all the intelligence data that they've got, then they come to the Air Staff because they need some equipment, they need a new computer to handle intelligence products. I then have to work that through the Air Staff budget to try to get the money for them to do that. At the same time I'm going to go over to the TAC, Tactical Air Command, at Langley. I'm going to go over to the Military Airlift Command in Illinois, and then I'll say, "Do you guys have a need for this, too? If I'm going to try and get it for SAC, why not try and get it for all of you?" Then we get a unified position to try to work that through.

I also have to provide sensitive, compartmented intelligence oversight. If there's somebody anywhere out in the Air Force who needs to know about sensitive intelligence compartments, I have to authorize him to do that. There has to be a focal point for that. Each of the services has that. I monitor the system's development as it occurs, once we get the money to do it, and we start building it.

I sit on a lot of national boards. I showed the NFIB (National Foreign Intelligence Board). I sit on the Military Intelligence Board. A lot of people think we don't talk much service to service; I've got to tell you that's not right. We talk a lot; we're not always able to get on the same song sheet, but we talk a lot. My counterparts in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and the Director of DIA sit down

Organize, Equip, and Train

- Threat Assessments
- Preparing Estimates, Policies, and Guidance
- PPBS
- SCI Oversight
- Monitors Intelligence Systems Development
- Represents National, DOD, and Service Interests at Forums

Driven by National and DOD Directives

Figure 7. Air Force Intelligence Mission

together as the Military Intelligence Board. For instance, if there's going to be a National Intelligence Estimate on what we think Castro's going to do, now that he's isolated as one of the few communist countries of the world, I would bring a perspective from my analyst viewpoint, the Navy would bring theirs, and so on and so forth, and we would meet together as the Military Intelligence Board to develop a DOD position on that. Then we would take that DOD position to the National Foreign Intelligence Board. We have lunch together once a month to discuss things that are not substantive. A lot of people think because we're in the intelligence business we spend all of our time working substantive intelligence issues, and that's not true. We have to worry a little bit about the career fields we oversee, how we move people through it, how we get budgets to operate, whether we're servicing the U&S (unified and specified) commands and all that kind of thing, not related to substance. So there are other things.

Student: You play into the war fighting doctrine. At what point does Air Force intelligence go into helping set our doctrine?

Wood: Are you Army?

Student: Yes, sir. Then, with the air/land battle future now being in a big jumble, we're trying to decide what our new doctrine is going to be. Where does intelligence play into that?

Wood: Okay, let me answer them one at a time. I could have sworn you were Army, and I'll tell you why.

McLaughlin: Aren't the Army the only people worried about doctrine in the U.S. forces?

Wood: Let me tell this story first. With respect to doctrine, the Army writes doctrine, fights by doctrine, and dies by doctrine. The Air Force writes doctrine and ignores it. The Navy doesn't bother. So the services approach doctrine from a different standpoint. Let me respond to your first question, "How do we play in the doctrine?" My staff writes Air Force intelligence doctrine. We just recently coordinated on a new product called Joint Intelligence Doctrine, so we do play. Having said that, it is not as meaningful as some would have it.

I'll give you an example. In Europe you've got an Army Headquarters, you've got an Air Force Headquarters, and you've got a Navy Headquarters, and I'm up here at what we call a U&S command. The Army has a lot of intelligence folks in Europe, the Air Force has a lot of intelligence folks in Europe, and so does the Navy. Until Goldwater-Nichols was passed, which said, "You guys in the services pay attention, you've all got to work together," they didn't think much about jointness. It wasn't until 1988 that we had something called a Joint Intelligence Center in Europe. It's just amazing to me to think that we've been operating in Europe all these years and there's never been anything that brought all that intelligence together. So the Army has something over here called EACIC (Echelon Above Corps Intelligence Center). The Air Force has something too that was called COIC — Combat Operations Intelligence Center. The Navy has something called NAVLANTCOM — Navy Atlantic Command. All of these organizations produce intelligence. I apologize for speaking in so many acronyms and I'm going to try and simplify this for you that don't have a military background. But the Army fights in a theater with Corps. So what we're talking about here is, there is a theater, there is a subordinate command, and under here is a Corps. Now Army doctrine says there can be only one intelligence center at Echelon Above Corps. Here's Corps, here's an Army Intelligence Center, and so according to Army doctrine that's all you can have in the theater. But now look at what happened in 1988. We established a Joint Intelligence Center, which is Echelon Above Corps. The Army said, "Wait a minute. How can that be, it's impossible, you can only have one and we've already got it established." So, we say, "Well, new rules." "No, doctrine says." So I went to see General Weinstein, who was the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence at that time, and he said, "Yeah, it makes sense. What do you want it to say? I wrote the doctrine and I can rewrite it." So, the point I'm making is, doctrine is only as good as it's written. Although I don't want to minimize it, you've got to have some rules of the road, and it is important to have it written down, but it should not be the thing that determines the activities that go on. It ought to be a guideline, and it is. But anyway we solved that, and they said, "Okay, you can have two intelligence centers above corps in the theater." I didn't mean to minimize your question because it's very important to the Army and I understand that. And we do write it and we do participate in it.

Student: As part of your mission you said that you're responsible for training and that you have interest at forums. My question is, particularly pertaining to developmental-type training, career development, what type of efforts are really going

on at this level, or is it too far above to deal with the human resource aspect? I'm talking basics.

Wood: O.K. now when you say human development resources, I don't know whether you get into the psychological aspect of whom we pick or whether you're getting into "I've got a bunch of folks and I want them to do things."

Student: You want to train them. You want them to be cognizant of their career growth and you want them to be motivated, and be good people.

Wood: O.K. Let's start with the requirement. When you go back to the first chart that I had, I'm going to start with collection and processing. We want to put people inside this chart, so I've got to train them. We have our basic training school at San Angelo, Texas; the Army has theirs at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and the Navy has theirs at Dam Neck in Virginia. I'm going to speak only to the Air Force, but the Army and the Navy are similar. So we say, "To do all the things that we need to do in intelligence, what kind of folks do we need?" Well, we need some HUMINTers. Those are people in blue suits, not spies. We're prohibited from being clandestine spies, sneaking around countries. But we are allowed to manage spies. I can go out and recruit a German, I can go out and recruit a Frenchman, and I can get them to spy for me. So I need some people who are trained, who know how to do that. I also need some SIGINTers. I need some people who know a lot about communications intelligence, I need some people who know a lot about electronic intelligence, and they need to be trained a certain way. And I need some IMINTers, imagery people, who need to know how to look at pictures and to tell what's on the picture. I probably need some people who know about mapping, charting, and geodesy, because that's big business in today's services. We're so technologically superior, if you will, that we can't get a weapon from one place to another without knowing what the ground looks like under it, because we want to map it, use terrain guidance, and that kind of thing. Then I'll probably need some people who are just overall general intelligence folks; we call them applications folks.

So I have a schoolhouse that is designed to give me all those kinds of people and that's really all we train to; we call those the basic skills. They all go through the same course, it doesn't matter what we call it, but it's a basic course of about two to three months, and no matter what they're going to be, they go through this basic course. As soon as that course is over, then they start splitting out and they go to a specific course designed to teach them their business. The longest courses are the SIGINT (signal intelligence) and IMINT (imagery intelligence) courses. The others are much shorter, but they differ in length. Then they graduate in a particular specialty.

Then at some point in time we need to teach them some functional disciplines — collection management if you will. You're at about your 10-year point, you've already learned a technical specialty and now you're going to learn collection management. Maybe we want you to know a little bit about computers and databases and how to manage those, so you'll pick up a little bit of that. Finally, out here at the end, we want the overall manager. So you can take a career and you can run it from 0 to about 20 years, and during that period of time we want them to get what we call some professional military education (PME), and so we'll send them here to learn how to be a good captain or major, and then we'll send them over here and learn how to do command and staff kinds of things. Then we'll send them to another school and we'll teach them how to do war planning. That doesn't necessarily have anything to do with intelligence, but it rounds them out as Air Force officers, Army officers, or Navy officers. So we have some pretty specific ground rules for this. In the HUMINT (human intelligence) area you don't just choose it, you're interviewed for it. You mentioned something earlier about training and development skills, I thought maybe you'd get around to this. Psychologically, you want a person to go out and pretend to be James Bond, if you will.

Student: I was talking also on a long-term basis, when you want to make sure that you have the very best human resources possible. Aside from a standardized set of coursework at the college and the PME levels, are there intermediate levels where these people can go in and get, say, a career development or a time management or motivational-level lecture?

Wood: Oh, yes, that occurs. Primarily we do that in the PME structure. But also at each level, when you're back in here at 1 to 7 years for instance, we have what's called a Lieutenants' Management Development Seminar and all kinds of things, and then at different points along the way. But it's not career specific, it's the officer development part. If you ask some people "What do you do?" he or she might say, "I'm an Air Force officer," and he just happens to be an intelligence officer. Whereas you ask somebody else and he says, "I'm an intelligence

officer," who just happens to be an Air Force officer. So there are two different ways to look at it; one is the professional, "What do you do for your country?" and the other is, "What do you do as a specific skill in the Air Force?" We try to train to both of those.

Student: Are only officers allowed to get this type of training?

Wood: No, officers and enlisted across the board.

Student: Sir, do you consider yourself an Air Force officer or an intelligence officer?

Wood: An Air Force officer who just happens to be an intelligence officer. Do we have any Navy guys in here?

Oettinger: No, not this year.

Wood: We have found over a period of time that the Navy does take greater pride in their service than the others do. If you go up to a Naval officer and you don't know him, he usually says, "I'm a Naval officer." Whereas if you go up to an Air Force or Army person, he'll say, "Well, I'm in the computer business or I'm an intelligence officer." It's a little bit of a slant on how you look at what you do.

Oettinger: I'd like to go back toward the comment you made earlier about the threat. You mentioned the Soviet Union and then as an aside said, "Sort of historically." In the references you made to the various folks involved, it also had a fairly traditional, national level, service level, and joint level kind of thing. Over the last couple of years, and I suppose for the foreseeable future, along with all of the now dark and unseen threats and possibilities and so on there are also a larger number of players, specifically related to drugs and so on, such as law enforcement agencies (LEAs) and God knows who else. Speaking about the several charts and several topics you've dealt with so far, I wonder if you could say a little bit about your perception of what the enlargement, if you will, of the players does to this set of LEAs and whoever else. Is it insignificant?

Wood: No.

Oettinger: Is it of major significance? Comment a bit about that.

Wood: Okay. With the turn of events of the past six months, we are really undergoing a great philosophical change as to what we're going to do about "the threat." We felt very comfortable when we knew who the enemy was. The enemy was the Soviet Union, and we were very comfortable about targeting that, working other issues. Somebody said the other day, "What is the difference between Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the United States?" "The United States is the only one that has a communist party." The world is topsy turvy.

Oettinger: My wife was watching something going on in East Berlin the other day and she looked at me deadpan and said, "That country is ripe for a communist takeover."

Wood: In fact, we're organized around the old threat in the intelligence business. If you go into DIA or CIA, they've got the communist division and the non-communist division, and one of them is going out of business now: the communist division. You can count the communist countries literally on two hands now, maybe even one if you want to count Nicaragua in the free democracy half. I think that the jury is still out on how that's going to pan out. But, the point is, when we have geographic areas that are our targets — North Korea, the Soviet Union, Cuba — that's an easy, comfortable thing to do: we can just devote so many assets to it and collect against it.

Now, who's the enemy? Counterterrorism, counternarcotics, the industrial base of some countries? That's more difficult to do. How do you target that? On the one hand we're changing from a geographic threat to a functional threat that's difficult to put your arms around, and at the same time, to go back to the first chart, for years we have focused collection on denied areas. Now there are fewer denied areas. As we are going to enter into arms control agreements with the Soviets, we're going to walk their soil and they're going to walk our soil. In Eastern Europe, you're going to be able to visit Prague and Warsaw now without any restrictions; that's no longer a denied area. So we've got to redesign the intelligence collection apparatus.

Now think about how you do that, because it's a real dichotomy. All of you know what national technical means are. Satellites, right? So you want to do something by satellite; that is an easy problem. All you've got to do is throw money at it, and technologically you can do anything you want, and that works really well in denied areas. Now what are we going to have to do? We're going to have to use HUMINT, spies. You don't have to throw much money at that, but it takes a long time to put one in place. So now we have to change our objectives,

topsy turvy. So all of this is causing us great consternation right now, and no one can stand before you today and tell you what our objectives are in terms of that. We don't know what the terms of the START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) agreement are; we don't know what the terms of the Conventional Forces in Europe are. If we reach an agreement with the Soviets on chemical and biological warfare, which is the thing we most recently came up with, we don't know whether Libya is going to abide by that. Is Syria going to abide by that? So have you solved anything?

Let's think about who's the winner in what has happened in the last six months. Now take yourself back two to three years, and let's say the communists, the Soviets, have some objectives that they want to achieve. What are they? Denuclearization of Europe. The demise of the NATO alliance. Get U.S. troops out of Europe. Those things happened; who won? And yet we're cheering that those things are happening. So, not only do we not know what the new world is going to look like, we don't even know who won. So, it's really an unstable period. I would say unstable is good at the moment, but it's causing us great, great concern.

We're going through budget throes right now. Again, I want to talk Air Force only, but it applies to any agency of the federal government, really. There are three things complicating what we're doing. We call one of them DMR, and it's Defense Management Review. It could just as easily be State Department review, Treasury Department review, because everybody is going through it. It says, "You've got to do everything more efficiently, so everybody look at what you're doing and decide whether you're doing it right." We're looking at things like intermediate headquarters. If you've got a SAC out here in Omaha and it does neat things, you've got a 15th Air Force out in California and it does things, and then you've got a wing out here that actually fights the war, what purpose does that intermediate headquarters serve? What it does is keep records on all these guys in the wing to tell these guys at SAC about it, and maybe you don't need it. So all along we're looking at intermediate headquarters and trying to figure out if we need them. We're looking at all the intelligence units in Europe. Electronic Security Command's got folks there; I've got folks there, the Foreign Technology Division's got folks there; there are six, seven, or eight of them. All of them have a colonel running the operation, all of them have several manpower people, and personnel people, and record keepers and everything. Well, what if we put them all together as an intelligence organization? You'd eliminate so many billets and so on and so forth, and get efficiency.

At the same time, you've got Gramm-Rudman, which says, "The federal government has got to get rid of the deficit, and, oh by the way, you're not going to get some of the money you thought you were going to get because we sequestered it because you didn't reach your goals, so therefore there is less money. So you try to be more efficient, do it with less money. And at the same time, peace is breaking out all over, and so therefore, what do you need a big military for, anyway?" So we've got all three of those things pulling and tearing on us right now, and we're trying to do something very logical. We're trying to say, "What kind of Air Force do we need for the future?" when we don't have any idea what the threat is.

Student: I'm just curious. Do you think that you have a biased view on whether intelligence should get more money as you cover larger areas of the world?

Wood: My view is biased, but you don't have to take my view. I think that you need more intelligence in a time like this rather than less. You have to remember, to get back to what we started with, that the function of intelligence is to provide information to the policy makers. In a period of instability the opportunity for surprise is even greater than in a period of stability. To go over here, and say let's go back a year, we're very stable, we know who the enemy is, peace is preserved, the deterrence is effective, we can focus our intelligence effort. I know exactly where I can spend that pot of money I had. Now I come over here, to today's situation, and I'm unstable. I don't have a well-defined threat. I still have the pot of money but now I don't know where to put it, so maybe I need more to cover a wider area. I don't know that, but I'm just saying that's a hypothetical solution.

Student: Would the argument then be that the military doesn't use much money, although intelligence in general does? Maybe the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; Customs; and the Commerce Department should get more of the budget because you're talking about things like investigations, the change in the threat.

Wood: You know, I don't mean to be facetious, but your guess is as good as mine. What I'm trying to say is, that is the dilemma. That is what's going

on in Washington as we speak. DOD is going to get a smaller piece of the pie, as they should. Everybody is going to get a smaller piece because of Gramm-Rudman. It is not directed just at the DOD. This is the federal government, which says, "You guys are still building up too big a deficit." Until a year ago the military resisted counternarcotics. The military said, "It is not our mission; go away, leave us alone." The President said, "Narcotics is a serious problem for the nation, and therefore that's a national security problem." We have been told, in no uncertain terms, and my chief told me, "Counternarcotics is a national security mission; now go figure how to do it." So missions are changing now to a mission that we didn't even know we had two years ago. We have to devote X amount of money to it at the expense of something else.

Oettinger: The last couple of sentences are a critical point historically because part of the reluctance, and correct me if I'm wrong, Norm, goes back to Watergate and earlier days with domestic and other police-like missions having been taken up by the military in a manner that later became the subject of a considerable soul-searching congressional investigation. So that the reluctance of the military, from where I sit, certainly is quite intelligible, without a fairly explicit policy directive from the top that says, "This is national policy," and I think of that whole set of political overtones going back a year or two. Is that reasonable, or is that not a major problem?

Wood: We're a mission-oriented organization; somebody gives us a mission, and we go do it. Now like everybody else you can read the papers that say counternarcotics is a problem and I'm going to establish a czar, his name is Bennett, and we're going to go fight the narcotics problem. We're going to take all the assets in the federal government and we're going to use them against it. So here I am, in charge of Air Force intelligence, and I say, "I can see the handwriting on the wall, I know it's coming, I want to do something, what should I do?" The powers that be in the Air Force say, "Sit still, it's not our mission ... yet." They finally decide that we're going to fight it and the way we're going to do it is through the U&S commands: NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command), CINCLANT (Commander in Chief, Atlantic) in Norfolk, PACOM (Pacific Command) out of the Pacific, and SOUTHCOM (Southern Command) are going to be responsible for it. They are what we call U&S commands; they include Army, Navy, Air Force. They've got the mission, and I've got to organize, train and equip for it. So I go to meetings where we sit around the table and the subject is counternarcotics, and I raise my hand, as do the Army and Navy guys, and we say, "What do you want us to do to help?" They say, "It's not your mission." So even though I know I've got to do it, I can't get anybody to tell me what my part of it is. So what I figured out is that the thing that I can do that has the least cost and that I can perform and function is train. As you were talking about earlier, somebody, someday is going to wake up and tell me, "Why haven't you trained the Air Force intelligence folks to recognize the counternarcotics problem?" So I called people out in San Angelo and said, "Put in some blocks of instruction on counternarcotics." Eventually my Chief of Staff said, "Now you've got that mission," and I said, "Great, let me tell you what I'm doing. I'm training people for that and I'm also providing people to the U&S commands to fight it."

But it's a bureaucratic snafu. I just made a counternarcotics trip as a matter, of fact. I went to NORAD to find out what they're doing and then I went to El Paso, Texas, which is where the El Paso Intelligence Center, EPIC, is; there's also a Joint Task Force there. Then I went to Miami and talked to Customs, and the Coast Guard, and the DEA (Drug Enforcement Agency) folks, and visited a task force there. It's really a mess.

The problem, as I see it, is strictly one of organization. You've got the Coast Guard, the DEA, you've got Customs, and let me just say et al. Now these are law enforcement agencies, they can go out and put handcuffs on people. The et al. is the county sheriff, the State Police, that kind of folks.

McLaughlin: And a very big FBI.

Wood: Okay, now those are what we call in the military business operators. They're going to get the job done. Then you've got to get intelligence to them. The FBI has its own intelligence, Coast Guard has its own, DEA has its own, Customs has its own, et al. has its own. There is nobody up here in charge. They say that the czar is, but actually he's exercising no control because, figuratively speaking, these are all in different departments of the government, and they are all vying for that pot of money that is labeled counternarcotics. In the DOD, all we can do is the intel, because by law we can't go out and put handcuffs on anybody. We've got a lot of intelligence, and we've got to figure out how to get it up into those organizations.

What I'm trying to push right now is EPIC, because it seems to me that's the one place where it can all be focused together and be the intel guide. But EPIC says, "You guys are giving us too much, we can't handle that." Somebody's got to tell them that's their mission. So it's really a mess right now, and all of these folks really don't like DOD coming along. They say, "You're an 800-pound gorilla and you want to be in charge. Leave us alone." So the DEA guy goes out into some county in Texas and says, "I'm going get that guy coming across the border," and the county sheriff says, "Not on my property you're not." The state governors have to get involved. It's a mess, but it's a changing mission and the federal government has got to deal with it. The intel has got to figure out how to serve all those customers and that's a challenge in the new job I'm going into.

Oettinger: As long as I've got you diverted, can I divert you a little bit more? I picked up another comment that you made and I'd like to ask if you could go a little bit further on it. You spoke about denied areas becoming no longer denied. Now some years ago, only half facetiously, people were bemoaning the asymmetry between the United States and the Soviet Union. They've got all this denied stuff and the United States is an open society and so on, and so the Soviets have a much easier job in gathering intelligence. My view was that, on the contrary, it's a much harder job because although we bemoan leaks and *Aviation Week* and so on. Think of all the noise and think of all the poor guys sitting in Moscow trying to figure out what is real and what is not in that torrent of information. When we turn this around and we now have those open areas, does that half facetious remark hold up, or is it pure nonsense? Does the problem become harder? How would one go about dealing with whether it's easier or harder?

Wood: Sure, I think it's a simple question, Tony. If I'm an intelligence operative and you give me the choice of operating in a denied area or a open area, I'm going to choose the open area because that's the easiest. So I think that the fact the areas are going to open up is going to make it a lot easier for us. When the Soviet Union was a denied area we had to go in clandestinely and try to operate without getting caught, without it being found out that we were there, not knowing who all the players were, and that kind of thing. Now we're going to be able to go in, we're going to be able to pick up their telephone directories or their government charts. Now we're going to know whom to target, we're going to be living there, we'll be able to co-opt the neighbor more easily. It's just going to be a much easier thing. Wouldn't we love to be inside a design bureau!

Student: In light of your intelligence cycle chart, it seems to me that the question really is focused on two of the different areas. The area of collection is easier, but Tony's point is that analysis and data reduction could conceivably be much more difficult.

Wood: Obviously, the more information you gather the more difficult it is to process.

Student: So I think the problem is that there are really two different sections of that cycle.

Ernst: Isn't there a huge difference, though, in terms of requirements, because all of these things are in a political context? In the current political context there are a lot of things that the Russians wouldn't do, even if they could, because even low probability of getting caught has too much political cost. You see this a little bit in Nicaragua, where the new president's greatest strength, if any, is the outside politics, not her position. I think the requirements have changed to a massive extent.

Wood: They have, and I would agree with you. Obviously, the political, in many cases, is the dominant player in any of this. We like to think in the uniformed services that military intelligence is the reason that all of this exists, but that's not true. The political and economic are every bit as important.

Oettinger: Let me pursue that a little bit further. Going back, in terms of your egg diagram, what about your relative reliance on open sources — your stringer in Yemen and so on. In terms of your own flexibility, do you have greater reliance on open sources until you know what the targets are? How does one deal with this?

Wood: We're not going to throw out everything that we've already established. We're not starting with a zero-based system. We already have an intelligence network established with various collection modes. We would add to that from the open sources and it will just be one more element that you compare and contrast.

Oettinger: It seems to me that hasn't been done very well in the past.

Wood: I'd disagree with you. We've had a lot of success in the scientific and technical area where guys go to consortiums and meetings and talk on the scientific level where the most important thing to them is the pure science, not the politics. We've been very good at that.

Student: What percentage do you think of your intelligence community is actually local — the people who live in the countries and are actually natives of the countries?

Wood: Small. I don't know; less than five percent.

Student: So the people you have now in those communities are mainly Americans that you've planted?

Wood: The thing that's difficult there is that you're assuming that I have perfect knowledge.

Student: What do you think?

Wood: Five percent. Let me talk a little bit about classification and compartmentation, because I think this is important to understand in a group like this. There are classifications: Confidential, Secret, Top Secret. But just because you have a Top Secret clearance doesn't mean you know everything that's Top Secret, because there's a box for this and there's a box for that, and we call it compartmentation. So even though I'm the Chief of Air Force Intelligence, I know only those compartments which have been opened for me. I would assume that most of them have, but you never know what you don't know. So when you ask a question about clandestine operatives, if you will, that's a compartment that not everybody knows about. It is very difficult to come up with a meaningful statistic. As you progress farther up the chain you think you know more and more, but you never know how much you don't know.

McLaughlin: Let me add something for the record for anyone interested in going back and doing some readings from earlier seminars. When Fred Demech was here, he talked about some countervailing trends here. We may have fewer denied areas in the sense of more access to the Soviet Union, but at the same time, in the terrorist field, for example, if you talk about going into Beirut, Beirut is essentially a denied area, at least if you're trying to gain access to a cell of six people who are from the same family. I think along the same lines there were certain comments that Rae Huffstutler had in 1988, again relating partially to the technology, but also to where the technology breaks down as you try to get finer grains of information. So I would recommend the Demech and Huffstutler articles if you want to pursue some of these issues.*

Wood: I really was just going to talk a little bit about the budget here at the end. I can illustrate that best by just saying that this is what you want to keep in mind: that we've got to get some bucks to put weapons on targets. To get there to the other place, you've got to have some integrated intelligence that you give to the guy that can make it happen and then he executes it. So that is, in layman's language, what our challenge is and as we try to do that we have a lot of players in the system. From an Air Force standpoint we've got some airlifters, some people who need modern equipment to carry troops to Panama or wherever. You've got some tactical fighter kind of guys who need small airplanes to go in hot and heavy on a target. We've got some strategic folks who need B-2 type aircraft to do a strategic mission, long flights, with lots of weapons. We've got missiles that need to go a great distance and carry great weapons. So there's a diversity of people that you're trying to satisfy in the budget arena.

We have a very good system within the Air Force that allows us to do that, and it even works in the intelligence environment. It starts at the top with what we call the Air Force Council. The Air Force Council is all the three-star guys who sit in Washington. It's the statistician, it's the operator, it's the comptroller, it's the Inspector General. All these people have grown up in the Air Force, gotten to the three-star level, and brought with them a bag of expertise that talks about the Air Force et al. Below that we've got the Air Force Board, made up of selected two-stars in the Air Staff. In this you have a broader scope; now we're talking about the Judge Advocate, we're talking about studies and analysis, we're talking about transportation, we're talking about plans and that kind of thing. Below that we have another group called the Priorities Review Group, and that's made up of colonels.

Every system, every competing program in the Air Force, has what's called a PEM (program element monitor), so there's some captain or major whose only function in life is to represent a particu-

*Fred R. Demech, Jr., "Making Intelligence Better," in *Seminar on Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, Guest Presentations, Spring 1987*, and Rae M. Huffstutler, "Intelligence Sources and Their Applications," in *Seminar on Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, Guest Presentations, Spring 1988*. Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1988 and 1989.

lar program. Let's take the B-2 just as an example. At some point in time when the B-2 was to be funded some guy was told, "You're the PEM for the B-2." (It's probably a bad example because the B-2 is such a large money program it wouldn't be given to a major.) Now, he's got to go out into the Air Force and find out who needs that program: does SAC need it, does TAC need it, do others need it? He tells them to send him all the data on why they need this, and what they want it for. Then he has to present a justification with some of these folks to this colonels' group that's across the breadth of the Air Force and say, "I really need this program, and it's important to the Air Force for this reason." Out of all the PEMs that come to them — the Priorities Review Group has to prioritize and say, "For the good of the Air Force, we really need these kinds of things." Of course, remember there's been a Defense Guidance that's already been issued to say that we want to have a strategic bomber. Once it gets past this group it goes to the Board, and the Board then has to agree that this priority is right and they may rearrange the priorities of this group. From an intelligence standpoint when you're working through this system, there's really a series of questions that have to be answered. What do you need? How fast do you need it? On some things we need intelligence in near-real time; other things can wait a little longer. Is there something else out there that can provide the service? Are there other users who would make it more efficient? The last question you need to ask is: Where's the money to pay for it? To get that money, it's got to be able to compete through this system and survive. When you line them up and it's 1 to 20, you draw a line and say, "I can only afford 10 of them." If it falls down below that, then you've got to go back into this system and convince them again why it ought to be funded.

We have to operate exactly the same way with intelligence systems. The difference is we have two pots of money.

Oettinger: As you were talking it reminded me of the academic tenure granting process which is almost ironclad guaranteed to replicate the past; to make it impossible for anything new to happen. Would that be an awful guess?

Wood: No, because the players change all the time, and they bring new experiences to the table. The Defense Guidance changes, the operations of the world change.

Oettinger: So you think this is more flexible?

Wood: It's a very good, flexible system. What we're talking about there is Air Force money, and we call that Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA). That's intelligence money that comes through the Air Force. On the other side, there's something called the NFIP (National Foreign Intelligence Program). That's money that the DCI controls. Remember that chart (figure 2) we showed with the guy in the middle who's in charge of all the intelligence. He has a big pot of money and that's split up into two different kinds: general defense intelligence program and the cryptologic program. So this is non-Air Force money that can be applied against Air Force items and it all comes together in the Air Force budget. In many cases we have to fight a battle within the Air Force as to which side of this funds it, and many times the Air Force will say, "Cut a program," but we'll say, "Hey, the money comes out of the NFIP pot and therefore you can't cut it, Air Force."

I want to end my part of it with an illustration of how the budget affects intelligence policy. The subject is the SR-71. The SR-71, in my personal view, was one of the best intelligence collection systems that we've ever had. It could go places where it was invulnerable, it could collect SIGINT and IMINT, as well. We could use it in a crisis, have it on demand. It's a high-flying airplane, the Blackbird. So when I came back from Europe I found out that the Air Force was going to cut the SR-71. During my entering interview with my Chief of Staff I said, "I really need to know why we're going to get rid of the SR-71, because if I'm going to be a team player, my views and your views need to be the same, and I need to know what your views are." And the Chief of Staff said simply, "I can't afford it."

Here's why he couldn't afford it. He's got an SR-71 that the Air Force has to operate and it costs a lot of money. The SR-71 comes back with a product that is 99 percent a national product used by the NSC, used by the JCS, used by DIA, used by U&S commanders, whatever. Not Air Force; that's the point. The money that it cost to operate that SR-71 is from what we call operations and maintenance costs, it sits there in the Air Force budget. We have less than a dozen airplanes and they require special tankers, special gas, so you had to have not only those small numbers of airplanes but also some tankers that could go with them worldwide, and that costs Air Force money. For the amount of money that it took to operate the small number of SR-71s, the Air Force Chief of Staff could buy two fighter

wings to put Air Force weapons on Air Force targets, which is our mission. So he had to make a decision, "Do I want to spend my money for these guys' product, or do I want to spend my money on something that's my mission?" and he chose the Air Force mission. He did not deny that the SR-71 was a good collection tool. It's simply, "I can't afford it. If the guys who need the product (national users) want us to keep flying it, let them pay for it."

Oettinger: So they should pay for it out of the GIDEP (Government-Industry Data Exchange Program) or something equivalent.

Wood: They didn't come up with the money and the system went away. This was a case where the intelligence value was never denied, but the budget drove the problem. That's the simple part of it. Now, remember that there was a war going on in the Persian Gulf and we needed some intelligence. Somebody said, "Air Force, go fly an SR-71 in the Persian Gulf." To do that required three refuelings, and nine tankers. We flew one mission into the Persian Gulf and the price tag was $3 million. Now that's $3 million that the Chief of Staff hadn't put in his O&M budget, so someone in the Air Force had to give up $3 million. And then these guys said, "Fly three of them," just because he had the airplane, and it cost $9 million. Remember what I told you about Gramm-Rudman: there's less money. So not only couldn't the Air Force afford it, we almost can't afford to have it around because users are going to send it someplace. So the budget got the SR-71.

Oettinger: Let me be simple-minded, Norm. In discussing this you also referred to fighter wings as an Air Force priority. Now a while back you referred to your role in the sense of Air Force training, fielding, and so forth, and not the war fighting element. Presumably these fighter wings, like the SR-71, etc., are supporting some CINC somewhere.

Wood: But the CINCs didn't come in and ask for it either.

Oettinger: Now, is that a breakdown of communications?

Wood: The question was asked, specifically of EUCOM (European Command), "Do you want the SR-71?" and he said, "Don't need it."

Oettinger: Right. So we're talking then about a conscious priority judgment rather than an inadvertent failure of coordination.

Wood: Absolutely. I'm not attacking the process. I'm just trying to illustrate how the budget is the driver.

Oettinger: But there are circumstances where the budget is the driver because of a breakdown in priorities in the process. And this is not the case, you say. Even in a conscious way, with the right folks having their bells rung and so on, the budget becomes a constraint and something that is thought less of a priority by all concerned is cut off.

McLaughlin: Let me pursue that one step further, though, because between those two extremes is also the game playing range, whenever you talk about user chargeback systems. I'm sure that some of those people who would love to have the SR-71 sitting around on call for a mission were also convinced that when the Air Force came back and said, "We'll keep this only if you want it there," that the Air Force built this thing 20 some years ago to support SAC, post-SIOP (single integrated operational plan) to go out there and see what was still standing so we can knock it down. Now, has that mission disappeared?

Wood: SAC says it has.

McLaughlin: I'm saying that there are other people across the river or whatever, saying, "Well, if we don't fund it they're going to want to keep it around anyhow." There's where you really run the risk of something falling through the cracks. It's not totally ignored and it's not a totally conscious choice.

Student: You're talking about the game that's played, the politics, and I think you've all heard that in terms of the MAJCOMs (major commands) coming in and doing the same thing, as when you were showing that POM (program objectives memorandum) process. You know that happens all the time when they say, "Uh, we don't want that," because they know full well that the Air Staff will plug that in and pay for it. I think that's what he's referring to on the outside as well.

Student: I wanted to follow up on the earlier question about doctrine. You suggested the services place different priorities on doctrine. What are the tradeoffs? What for example, does the Air Force lose as a result of its emphasis on doctrine, or lack thereof, and what is the Army gaining and conversely what is the Army losing by doing that? What's the balance?

Wood: I can't comment on that because I just haven't thought that through.

Student: I have two totally unrelated questions. The first question is, in terms of saving money since intelligence is not a war fighting capability.. .

Wood: Wait a minute, I'll disagree with you there. I think intelligence is a direct support to the combat.

Student: It's support, but people in intelligence don't go out and kill people. Could it be done more cheaply by having all civilians run the analysis, collection, and so forth?

Wood: It depends on where you want it. If you want to take the intelligence with you to the front lines, probably not. If you want to do it all centrally and count on the communications system to be invulnerable and support you wherever you are, then sure, but I don't subscribe to that.

Oettinger: I think the point also goes deeper than that. If you start polling operational people, the J-3 types, the notion of relying entirely on civilians for their intelligence inputs I think would frighten them even more than the already frightening notion of having to rely on intelligence people for intelligence.

Wood: I'll give you a real example: INF (intermediate nuclear forces) inspections. We assemble teams and take them to the Soviet Union to check on the SS-20 destruction. Everybody lines up and says, "I want to go, I want to go, I want to go, great opportunity." We send civilians and military and they go and they come back and the civilians say, "I don't want to go again." We can't involuntarily send them, so we send military over and over, because it's a hardship. The civilians wanted to do it once, and you can't blame them. Why should they want to do it again? It was a mess, but with the military we can just say, "Get on a plane and go," and that's in peacetime.

Student: Sir, on something that's direct intelligence, but it's direct tactical intelligence, war fighting, is there any hope for the Joint STARS* program?

Wood: It's flying right now in Europe. We've got one airplane in Mildenhall and it's gone out on, I think, three training missions.

*The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System, an airborne radar that provides real-time location of moving ground targets.

Student: It seems to me that's something where the Army would say, "We want that, definitely."

Student: The Army can't have anything that has wings on it unless they go round and round.

Student: That follows with what you said earlier, though, because the Army loves that the way the other agencies love the SR-71 and the Army has always said, "We want it," because they know the Air Force is going to pay for it. We're trying to get you guys to pay for that.

Wood: The budget runs everything. It's the bottom line.

Student: A couple of weeks ago the Open Skies proposal was big in the news. What are your comments on that? What type of aircraft did they use?

Wood: Well, there's a debate about that right now. Almost everybody is leaning towards the 135-airframe from our side. I don't think that's a good airplane. I think the C-130 would be better because we want to get down below the clouds, and fly low and slow; that kind of thing. They're debating it.

Student: Do you have any women that are two-star, three-star generals in the military?

Wood: In the military, yes. I think we've got one or two two-stars and half a dozen one-stars. Now, do you want me to tell you why Air Force intelligence doesn't? That's a big problem. I'm not being chauvinistic here. In the intelligence business, I have 21 percent women. The average in the Air Force is 11 percent. I don't want that many, even though they're some of my best analysts. Now, why don't I want that many? Because the attrition rate for woman is higher than the attrition rate for men, and so if I have more than my share and I lose them faster, I won't have any majors, because by the time they're old enough to be majors, they're gone. The men don't go, and so it's a problem and we've got to try and solve it.

Student: Why do they go?

Wood: Marriage, and babies, and the tradition of our culture that they go where the man goes. A lot of that is changing, and I have some women right now whose husbands follow them, and that's the kind I want. I had a colonel who worked for me last year, a female, who made colonel five years early. She made major early, she made lieutenant colonel early, she made colonel early. She was the senior intelligence person in her year group. She would have been a general in two years, and she got out

because her husband didn't want her to stay in the military anymore. I need some heroines, because when our young women look up, they only see men. There's plenty of opportunity there if you, or anyone else, can figure out for me how to get them to stay in at the same rate. There would be as many female generals as there are male generals if I could get them through to that 26-year point.

McLaughlin: I want to go back to the question about doctrine and the tradeoff. One of the tradeoffs you see from intelligence command and control people is that the presence of doctrine reduces the need for communications. If people understand what they are supposed to be doing, they have to communicate a lot less. On the other hand, that in turn means that you're more predictable, presumably less flexible, and if you're not making it up as you go along and you're doing it by the book, then anybody else who has the book knows what you're doing. It's one thing if you're in the Marine Corps and you say, "Take the high ground and hold it." Anybody fighting the Marine Corps knows that that's what the average first lieutenant in the Marine Corps has been taught to do. So that tradeoff of flexibility falls against the requirement for communications. But in an awful lot of cases the doctrine is like strategic planning for a commercial organization.

A good example for the moment is what I will describe as the charade of light infantry in the United States Army. There is no light infantry doctrine. There are concepts of what light infantry is about, but there's really no light infantry doctrine on what the real objective is, or whether it's simply disarmed heavy infantry or mechanized infantry without mechanization, or whether it's a bigger Ranger unit. Maybe the absence of doctrine isn't important, but unless people figure out what they want to use that tool for, you're working at a great disadvantage. The final issue there is, don't we happen to have light infantry in different-colored uniforms sitting on ships all around the world, called the U.S. Marine Corps?

Student: Just one overall comment that really impressed me. One of the threads that came out through your whole presentation is the pluralism of the bureaucracy. That is, everybody is out there fighting for their own constituency. As much as people who are not in the government believe that there is a hierarchic chain of command, that the President says so and everybody salutes smartly, it just doesn't happen that way, and it's a myth. It was beautifully brought out in many of the instances.

Wood: Somebody asked me how I liked my tour of duty in the White House and I said, "Well, for a military guy it was really unusual. I'm used to going out in a field on a military base and I say do something and something gets done. You give an order in the White House and it's an invitation to negotiate.

Oettinger: We've run out of time. Thank you so much, Norm.

Wood: I hope it was useful.